File Prospects for North Korea's forward deployment of tactical nuclear weapons and implications for revising its operational plan - Evaluation of the 3rd Enlarged Plenary Meeting of the 8th WPK Central Committee
Cheong Seong-Chang
Director of the Center for North Korean Studies,
The Sejong Institute
(softpower@sejong.org)
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un held the 3rd enlarged plenary meeting of the 8th WPK Central Committee, the highest military policymaking and military command, from June 21 to 23 to discuss ways to strengthen and develop national defense capabilities in 2022. After Kim Jong-un's inauguration, North Korea has convened 16 meetings (including preliminary meetings) until the 2nd enlarged plenary meeting of the 8th WPK Central Committee in June 2021. Kim Jong-un's three-day meeting of the 3rd enlarged plenary meeting of the 8th WPK Central Committee suggests that there is an important decision on a major shift in North Korea's military strategy and reorganization of the military. Kim Jong-un smiled brightly and showed confidence throughout the three-day enlarged meeting, judging that his plan to "suppress" and "subdue" South Korea as the "biggest enemy" was progressing as planned.
North Korea elected Ri Pyong-chol, secretary of the party's Central Committee, as vice chairman of the party's Central Military Commission at the 3rd enlarged plenary meeting of the 8th WPK Central Committee, increasing the number of vice chairman of the organization to two, Park Jeong-cheon and Ri Pyong-chol. Through this personnel reshuffle, Vice Chairman Park Jeong-cheon is in charge of the command of operation and operations of nuclear weapons and missiles, and Vice Chairman Ri Pyong-chol is in charge of the division of roles and cooperation to support the development and deployment of strategic weapons. If the number of vice-chairman of the party's Central Military Commission increases to two and Kim Jong-un is unable to press the nuclear button in case of an emergency, then Park Jeong-cheon or Ri Pyong-chol is expected to press the nuclear button.
The most notable part of the decision by the party's Central Military Commission is the additional operational mission of the North Korean military front unit, the revision of the operational plan, and the reorganization of the military organization. On April 16, shortly after the 110th birthday celebration of Kim Il Sung, North Korea test-fired two "new tactical guided weapons" from Hamheung to East Sea. On April 17, North Korea explained in Rodong newspaper that "the new tactical guided weapons system has great significance in improving the firepower of the frontline long-range artillery units” and “strengthening the effectiveness of North Korea's tactical nuclear operations and diversification of its firepower mission.” It is analyzed that North Korea revealed its plan to deploy tactical nuclear weapons to long-range artillery units on the front line and made such plan concrete at the enlarged plenary meeting of the party's Central Military Commission.
On June 23, during the 3rd enlarged plenary meeting of the party's Central Military Commission, North Korea disclosed a map of its operational plans for the eastern region, including South Korea's Pohang region, through Rodong Newspaper. Based on this fact, North Korea should prepare for the worst-case scenario of accidental military clashes between the two Koreas and expand the scope of the attack on the eastern part of South Korea with tactical nuclear weapons or small nuclear weapons for the following reasons.
First, if North Korea uses nuclear weapons in South Korea's metropolitan area and western regions of South Korea from the beginning, China could suffer some damage and could protest. Second, if North Korea uses nuclear weapons in the eastern part of South Korea, even if South Korea and the U.S. hit the origin of North Korea's provocation in the eastern part of the country, Pyongyang's leadership will not be directly damaged, causing considerable public unrest in South Korea. In this regard, North Korea may be considering the way the U.S. surrendered Japan in World War II. The U.S. did not attack Tokyo with a nuclear bomb from the beginning to capitulate Japan, but dropped atomic bombs only on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, but Japan, surprised by the power of nuclear weapons, declared its surrender. In this way, North Korea could try to secure the surrender of the South Korean government by first attacking local cities and military bases far from Seoul with nuclear weapons.
Kim Yo-jong, the younger sister of Kim Jong-un, warned in a statement released on April 5, that if the South Korean military takes the lead in the early stages of the war, nuclear combat forces will be mobilized to prevent long-term war and preserve its military capabilities. If a local war breaks out between the two Koreas, it is highly likely that North Korea, which is inferior to conventional weapons, will respond with tactical nuclear weapons, so the threat of Kim Yo-jong should not be regarded as a mere "word bomb."
Since late 2008, when Kim Jong-un was officially appointed as North Korean leader and Kim Jong Il's successor, there have been military clashes between the two Koreas such as the Battle of Daecheong, the sinking of the Cheonan and the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island. During the Park Geun Hye administration in August 2015, when two South Korean soldiers were seriously injured by a wooden box mine buried by North Korea and the South Korean government responded by resuming loudspeaker broadcasting to the North, Kim Jong-un held an emergency extended meeting and declared a quasi-war state on the front line. At that time, however, North Korea was not well prepared for war and sought a compromise through negotiations, but after three nuclear tests and ICBM tests, it quickly advanced its nuclear and missile capabilities. Therefore, if there is another military conflict between the two Koreas, North Korea is likely to be more aggressive than in the past.
If North Korea attacks South Korea's front-line troops or provincial cities with tactical nuclear weapons and the U.S. threatens to respond with nuclear weapons, the South Korea-U.S. response could be in serious confusion. If the U.S. attacks Pyongyang, North Korea will retaliate against Seoul, Washington, D.C., and New York with nuclear weapons, and the U.S. will not be able to attack Pyongyang. And if the U.S. tries to restrain the Korean military to prevent its expansion, the Korean military, which has no wartime operational control, can be left helpless and has no choice but to follow the U.S. decision.
Until the beginning of this year, most experts underestimated the possibility of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, but the invasion became a reality. Kim Jong-un's remark at the military parade on April 25 that "our nuclear weapons cannot be confined to a single mission of preventing war" suggests that North Korea's military might not be used only for deterrence and defense purposes, but also for the "war of reunification of the Fatherland." Therefore, the Yoon Seok-yeol administration needs to make efforts to prevent accidental conflict and escalation between the two Koreas while promoting establishing a strategic headquarters to effectively integrate and operate missile power, cyber-electronic warfare, and space operations capabilities, which is one of the top 110 national tasks. It is also necessary to completely change the military strategy of the South Korean military, which is focused on preparing for conventional war, to a military strategy based on the premise of North Korea's use of nuclear weapons. This is because the South Korean military cannot effectively respond to North Korea's nuclear and conventional provocations through conventional operational plans and war drills. In addition, as the South Korean military has already reached the world's sixth-largest level in conventional weapons, it should actively promote the early return of wartime operational control. This is an unofficial translation of the original paper by Jisoo Kim jkim@sejong.org which was written in Korean. All references should be made to the original paper.
※ This article is written based on the author’s personal opinions and does not reflect the views of the Sejong Institute.