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[Outlook on Global Affairs 2025 - Special Issue No. 4] Outlook for Japan’s Political Landscape in 2025 |
| December 20, 2024
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Ki-Tae LeeSenior Research Fellow, The Sejong Institute | ktleekorea@sejong.org
- In 2024, Japan underwent a shift in leadership within the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) from the government of Fumio Kishida (岸田文雄) to that of Shigeru Ishiba (石破茂), who emerged as the new leader from the LDP's non-mainstream faction. This transition to a government led by a figure from the non-mainstream faction of the LDP brought about notable changes in Japan's domestic politics, its relations with South Korea, and its relations with North Korea. In this context, the following analysis will explore the characteristics of Japan's domestic politics, its relations with South Korea, and its relations with North Korea. Additionally, it will provide a forecast for Japan’s political landscape in 2025 in these three areas. Finally, the paper will offer suggestions for how the South Korean government can seek cooperation with the Ishiba government in terms of both South Korea-Japan relations and North Korea-Japan relations.
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In early January 2024, key figures within the "Seiwa Policy Study Group" (清和政策研究会, Abe Faction), a faction within the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), were arrested due to violations of the Political Funds Control Law related to political fundraising parties that had been ongoing since 2023. On April 4, 2024, the LDP decided to impose sanctions on 39 members of the Abe Faction and the Nikai Faction (二階派). Former Minister of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, Ryu Shionoya (塩谷立), former Chairman of the House of Councillors, Hiroshige Seko (世耕弘成), were recommended to leave the party; former Minister of Education Hakubun Shimomura (下村博文), former Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry Yatsushi Nishimura (西村康稔), former Chairman of the LDP Diet Affairs Committee Tsuyoshi Takaki (高木毅), and 17 other individuals had their membership suspended; 17 others received warnings. Most of these individuals had held key positions in the Abe government, and the Abe Faction, once the largest faction within the LDP, saw its power weakened due to the political funding scandal.
In response to the issue of illegal political funds, the Kishida government passed an amended Political Funds Control Law in June. However, public dissatisfaction with the LDP’s political practices continued to grow. Ultimately, on August 14, 2024, Prime Minister Fumio Kishida expressed his intention not to run in the upcoming LDP presidential election in September, signaling his desire to step down. The LDP leadership election became a crucial issue regarding who would be the “face” of the party for a potential victory in the next House of Representatives election, which would be triggered by a dissolution of the lower house. As it became apparent within the LDP that Kishida was unlikely to win, the party decided not to back him, and he withdrew from the race. The LDP presidential election was held on September 27, 2024. Former Secretary-General Shigeru Ishiba (石破茂) defeated former Minister of Economy, Trade, and Industry Sanae Takaichi (高市早苗) and former Minister of the Environment Shinjiro Koizumi (小泉進次郎) to be elected as the 28th President of the LDP. On October 1, 2024, Ishiba was appointed Prime Minister during the extraordinary Diet session, and he formed the Ishiba Cabinet.
Immediately after the formation of his Cabinet, Prime Minister Ishiba dissolved the House of Representatives, and the 50th House of Representatives election was held on October 27, 2024. The coalition government, which included the LDP and the Komeito Party, secured only 215 seats, falling short of the 233 seats required for a majority. In contrast, opposition parties such as the Constitutional Democratic Party and the Democratic Party for the People made significant gains. The LDP’s defeat was largely due to its inability to adequately address the political funding issue, which was the central topic of the election, leading to a loss of trust in the coalition government. Furthermore, the public’s distrust of Ishiba, who had been elected as Prime Minister amid high expectations, also played a significant role. During the LDP presidential election, Ishiba had stated that he would delay the dissolution of the House of Representatives, but immediately after taking office, he reversed his stance and called for the dissolution. Additionally, Ishiba expressed different positions on various policy issues, such as the selective surname issue (which allows couples to choose whether to adopt a common surname or keep their separate surnames), further eroding public trust in his leadership as the election’s chosen “face” of the LDP.
Although Ishiba gained popularity as a challenger to the mainstream faction within the LDP, particularly the Abe Faction, he faced significant challenges as a non-mainstream Prime Minister with limited control over the party. His minority government found it necessary to make partial compromises with the opposition parties, highlighting the limitations of a minority cabinet. The prolonged dominance of the LDP-Komeito coalition government had previously made a change in government appear unrealistic, but with the formation of Ishiba’s minority cabinet, the possibility of a political shift between the ruling and opposition parties emerged as a key characteristic of Japan's domestic politics in 2024. -
During the LDP leadership race in September, Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba presented foreign and security policy proposals that differentiated him from other candidates, including the concepts of an "Asian NATO," the revision of the Japan-U.S. Status of Forces Agreement, and the establishment of Japan-North Korea liaison offices in Tokyo and Pyongyang. However, in his inaugural speech to the National Diet after taking office, Prime Minister Ishiba did not provide any specific mention of these issues or other matters related to Japan's security and foreign policy. In the absence of thorough discussions or a national consensus on foreign and security policy, Ishiba's security vision ultimately failed to gain support.
Ishiba's security policies included the establishment of a collective security system through an "Asian NATO," the relaxation of Japan's collective self-defense rights, nuclear sharing with the U.S., and a review of the Japan-U.S. Status of Forces Agreement. However, there are many constraints both domestically and internationally for realizing the "Asian NATO" concept. Most importantly, a revision of Japan's pacifist constitution would be required to allow for a collective security system, and the Komeito Party, a partner in the coalition government, remains cautious about such a move. The U.S. has also officially rejected the idea of an "Asian NATO" and has not shown active support for it. In the future, the participation of South Korea in an "Asian NATO" led by Japan will be a key issue. However, given that the collective security system would consider China and Russia as threats, South Korea's participation would need to be approached cautiously, and there is no clear consensus within South Korea about how the country would position itself in such a system. This presents a major challenge for Japan’s efforts to lead a collective security framework in Asia.
Nuclear sharing with the U.S. also faces significant domestic constraints. Prime Minister Ishiba has long advocated for a revision of Japan's Three Non-Nuclear Principles (which prohibit the production, possession, and introduction of nuclear weapons), specifically focusing on the third principle, which prohibits the introduction of nuclear weapons into Japan. While nuclear sharing is supported by Japan's conservative hard-liners, including former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, it is difficult to strongly promote such a policy in the current environment, where Ishiba enjoys support from more moderate conservative factions, such as the Kishida faction. Particularly, given that a significant portion of the Japanese public strongly supports the Three Non-Nuclear Principles due to the country’s "nuclear allergy," any discussions on nuclear sharing with the U.S. are unlikely to gain traction. With discussions on nuclear armament and nuclear potential in South Korea gaining momentum, Japan’s consideration of nuclear sharing could have considerable implications on nuclear discussions in South Korea. Therefore, it is important to closely monitor Ishiba government’s nuclear policy in the coming years.
The issue of reviewing the Japan-U.S. Status of Forces Agreement is linked to Ishiba’s broader foreign and security policy agenda, which seeks to “equalize” the U.S.-Japan alliance and expand Japan’s role on the global stage. However, the precedent set by the Democratic Party government under Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama, which sought to “equalize” the U.S.-Japan alliance and demanded the relocation of U.S. forces from Okinawa, led to a deterioration in Japan-U.S. relations and resulted in the Hatoyama government’s collapse after just one year in office. It remains to be seen whether Ishiba’s approach to "equalizing" the U.S.-Japan alliance will be interpreted by the U.S. as an effort to increase Japan’s global role, or whether it will lead to a deterioration in Japan-U.S. relations due to perceived infringement on U.S. national interests. If the Ishiba government causes a deterioration in Japan-U.S. relations, it could trigger a concerted effort by the Abe faction or the Takaichi faction to undermine Ishiba’s government. -
In March 2023, following the announcement of the "third-party compensation plan" regarding forced labor victims and the subsequent Japan-South Korea summit between President Yoon Suk-yeol and Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, Japan-South Korea relations improved, and shuttle diplomacy between the two countries’ leaders was restored. Prime Minister Kishida visited South Korea on September 6, 2024, before his term ended, for the 12th summit with President Yoon, further emphasizing the Kishida administration's efforts to advance Japan-South Korea relations. Over the period, both countries revived their stalled intergovernmental consultation mechanisms and launched new ones, resulting in active communication and expanding cooperation in various fields, including economic security and advanced technologies.
Moreover, the two countries agreed to closely communicate and take firm action regarding North Korea’s continued provocations and its growing ties with Russia. Notably, during the Camp David summit in August 2023, the three leaders of the U.S., South Korea, and Japan jointly expressed support for the "free and peaceful unification of the Korean Peninsula," and during the September 2024 summit, Japan reiterated its support for the "August 15 Unification Doctrine," reflecting Japan's interest in and support for South Korea's unification efforts.
The improvement in Japan-South Korea relations also led to the revitalization of the trilateral cooperation system among South Korea, Japan, and the United States, creating a positive cycle that facilitated the resumption of the trilateral dialogues involving China, Japan, and South Korea. After a nearly four-and-a-half-year hiatus due to the deterioration in Japan-South Korea relations, the Japan-South Korea-China summit was held in Seoul on May 27, 2024. The summit resulted in a joint declaration on the regularization of the summit and cooperation in six areas, including climate change and disaster relief.
Following the inauguration of Prime Minister Ishiba in October 2024, many had high expectations that his progressive stance on historical issues would positively influence Japan-South Korea policy. Ishiba had expressed opposition to visits to Yasukuni Shrine and had emphasized the need for Japan to acknowledge its history of colonizing Korea (as stated in his November 2018 lecture at Waseda University). Notably, regarding South Korea’s decision to terminate the GSOMIA agreement in August 2019, Ishiba was one of the few Japanese politicians to explicitly acknowledge Japan's war responsibilities, making his position on historical issues clearer than most.
However, despite these progressive statements, Ishiba’s government has not deviated significantly from Japan's established positions regarding the "illegality" of the 1910 Japanese annexation of Korea and the forced labor and comfort women issues stemming from the 1965 normalization of diplomatic relations (the so-called "1965 System"). A prominent example is the controversy surrounding the UNESCO World Heritage listing of the Sado Mine. The Sado Mine in Niigata Prefecture, where forced labor of Koreans occurred during the Japanese occupation, was designated a UNESCO World Heritage site on July 27, 2024. While the Japanese government promised to acknowledge the forced labor in the museum and conduct memorial ceremonies for the workers who died there, it did not recognize the "coercive nature" of the labor in the museum’s documentation or the memorial services.
In November 2024, during the memorial service, Japanese Foreign Ministry official Akiko Ikuina's visit to Yasukuni Shrine sparked controversy (later acknowledged by Kyodo News as a misreport), and a lack of agreement on the format and content of the ceremony between Japanese and South Korean officials led to the event being held without the participation of the South Korean delegation, reducing it to a half-hearted affair. This event highlighted the failure of Japan-South Korea relations under the "incomplete 65-year system" to provide a fundamental resolution to historical issues. -
Since the Abe administration, Japan has called for an "unconditional summit" with Kim Jong-un, but the differing views between Japan and North Korea regarding the "unconditional" meeting—specifically the resolution of the abduction issue—have been a major obstacle. North Korea holds that the abduction issue was already resolved during the 2002 North Korea-Japan summit, where Kim Jong-il expressed his apologies and provided information about the status of the kidnapped individuals. In contrast, Japan insists on the full return of all abductees and has continued negotiations with North Korea with this goal in mind, but a resolution to the issue remains elusive.
On May 27, 2023, Prime Minister Fumio Kishida expressed his desire to facilitate an early summit with Kim Jong-un, stating, "I would like to have discussions at a high-level to advance this." Reports of secret meetings between Japan and North Korea in major Southeast Asian cities in March and May 2023 (Asahi Shimbun, September 29, 2023) suggested that Kishida's statement was likely a result of positive developments stemming from these unofficial contacts.
In January 2024, a major earthquake struck Ishikawa Prefecture in Japan, causing significant damage. On January 6, Kim Jong-un sent a condolence letter to Prime Minister Kishida, addressing him as "Your Excellency" and expressing sympathy for the victims of the earthquake. Then, on February 15, Kim Yo-jong, the deputy director of North Korea's Workers' Party, hinted at the possibility of Prime Minister Kishida visiting Pyongyang, suggesting a conditional visit to North Korea.
However, on March 25, Yoshimasa Hayashi, Japan's Chief Cabinet Secretary, stated that Japan could not accept North Korea's claim that the abduction issue had been resolved and emphasized that the "abductee issue" must not be excluded from any discussions. In response, Kim Yo-jong publicly rejected any further contact with Japan, and North Korea's Foreign Minister, Choe Son-hui, declared on March 29 that contact with Japan was "impossible."
Despite North Korea's public rejection of any contact with Japan, reports surfaced in mid-May 2024 that representatives from North Korea’s Reconnaissance General Bureau and foreign currency earning officials, along with a Japanese delegation consisting of prominent political figures from influential families, met in Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia, near the capital. The Japanese government refused to comment on these reports, merely stating that it would "refrain from responding." This suggested that informal contacts between Japan and North Korea were still ongoing in third countries.
Prime Minister Ishiba, who took office in October 2024, had expressed in interviews prior to his inauguration that he believed Japan and North Korea should establish liaison offices in Tokyo and Pyongyang to verify the information regarding the abductees in an official manner. He also opposed a sudden summit with North Korea, similar to Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's visit to Pyongyang in 2002, emphasizing a more gradual approach through the establishment of liaison offices. However, conservative factions in Japan, along with the families of the abducted individuals, opposed this proposal, arguing that such offices could be used by North Korea to buy time and wage a propaganda campaign by sending only favorable information.
Despite the change in government from the Kishida administration to the Ishiba administration in 2024, the situation in Japan-North Korea relations remains largely unchanged, with both sides still seeking an "unconditional summit" while continuing to attempt informal contacts in third countries. The major obstacle continues to be the difference in mutual recognition regarding the abduction issue—North Korea's stance that the issue has been resolved, versus Japan's insistence that it remains unresolved and must be addressed. This disparity in perceptions makes the continuation of Japan-North Korea relations particularly difficult, with no clear resolution in sight. -
As 2025 begins, the Ishiba government, based on the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)-Komeito coalition, plans to manage domestic politics through a "partial alliance" with opposition parties, particularly the National Democratic Party, on specific policies. However, as past examples have shown, the Ishiba cabinet, as a minority government, is expected to face many challenges in governance. The Constitutional Democratic Party (CDP), emboldened by its performance in the House of Representatives election, is set to intensify efforts for a regime change, strengthening its role in scrutinizing budget and bill passage in the National Diet. Therefore, while cooperation with opposition parties will be important for Ishiba in matters such as the optional family name issue, political reform (including political funding), and constitutional amendment, the ability to take the initiative and show active leadership on reforms will determine whether Ishiba’s government can evolve into a long-term administration.
Regarding Japan-U.S. relations, Japan expects that the continued increase in defense spending since the 2022 revision of the National Security Strategy (from 1% to 2% of GDP) will be positively evaluated by the second Trump administration, which is scheduled to begin on January 20, 2025. Although Prime Minister Ishiba, whose political foundation is weak, was refused a meeting with Trump—unlike Prime Minister Abe, who was the first foreign leader to meet with Trump before his inauguration—the Japanese government plans to rebuild its relationship with the incoming administration through Abe’s wife, Akie, who has close ties with the Trump family, and will try to organize a dinner.
Considering the weak political foundation of the Ishiba government as a minority cabinet, excessive expectations for the resolution of the historical issues between Japan and South Korea in 2025 are likely misplaced. Given Ishiba's weak domestic support, the defeat in the House of Representatives election, and the Japanese public's focus on issues like political and economic reforms, it is difficult to expect Ishiba to prioritize the historical issues in the short term. Furthermore, on issues such as the legality of the 1910 Japanese annexation of Korea, the maintenance of the 1965 normalization of relations framework, and Japan's territorial claims over Dokdo (Takeshima), Ishiba will likely continue the official positions of previous Japanese governments, as these issues are entrenched within Japan’s political stance.
Moreover, after the declaration of martial law by South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol in December 2024, which led to political chaos in South Korea, the future of Japan-South Korea relations has become even more uncertain. For instance, Yoshihide Suga, chairman of the Japan-Korea Parliamentary Friendship Association, had planned a visit to South Korea in December, but the political instability surrounding the martial law led to the cancellation of his trip. Prime Minister Ishiba also canceled his planned visit to South Korea, which had been scheduled for January 2025, prior to the ordinary National Diet session.
With the 60th anniversary of the normalization of diplomatic ties between Japan and South Korea in 2025, there were expectations of continued progress in bilateral relations following the improvement of ties in 2023. For example, there were discussions about presenting a second Kim Dae-jung-Obuchi Joint Declaration, which would continue the spirit of the historic 1998 "New Japan-Korea Partnership for the 21st Century" declaration. Various cooperation frameworks were being explored. However, for the time being, Japan-South Korea cooperation and trilateral security cooperation with the United States are expected to remain uncertain, largely dependent on the political situation in South Korea.
In addition, it is anticipated that there will be no major change in Japan-North Korea relations in 2025. The Ishiba government will continue the policy of "unconditional meetings with Kim Jong-un" that was advocated by previous Japanese prime ministers, taking into account the stance of the families of the Japanese abductees. Politically, with the LDP-Komeito coalition failing to secure a majority in the House of Representatives election, the Ishiba government finds itself lacking the political flexibility to engage actively in dialogue with North Korea. Externally, Japan will prioritize strengthening the Japan-U.S. alliance and trilateral cooperation with the United States and South Korea, as well as bolstering its own military capabilities to respond to regional security changes, such as North Korea's involvement in the Russia-Ukraine war and the potential for greater North Korean-Russian cooperation. -
While considering the fact that Prime Minister Ishiba’s political foundation is weak, the South Korean government needs to encourage Ishiba to frequently express his progressive stance on historical issues. Furthermore, it is essential to remind Japan of the development of its historical recognition, which evolved from the Hosokawa (1990s) and Kan (2010) statements, reflecting on Japan's historical responsibility and apology. This should be contrasted with the regressive views seen in the 2015 Abe statement ("We will not ask the next generation to apologize," and "Japan simply took a wrong path after the 1930s"), which have led to a regression in Japan’s historical recognition on the issue of South Korea. Therefore, continuous efforts are needed to encourage Ishiba to reach a level of historical recognition comparable to the 2010 Kan statement or even to develop an official statement, similar to previous Japanese apologies.
Regarding Japan-North Korea relations, South Korea should recognize the potential for its active role in expanding the space for North Korea-Japan engagement. Opportunities for North Korea-Japan dialogue could emerge when the trilateral cooperation between South Korea, the United States, and Japan is solidified and strengthened. In this scenario, North Korea, feeling diplomatically isolated through the trilateral alliance, might approach Japan. Through this engagement, North Korea could consider receiving support from Japan and possibly use it as an indirect channel for dialogue with the United States. On the other hand, as South Korea takes on an active mediator role in improving inter-Korean relations, it could also facilitate a rapprochement between Japan and North Korea. Therefore, South Korea must devise a foreign policy that actively recognizes its role in promoting a breakthrough in North Korea-Japan relations by leveraging its influence in shaping the broader Korean Peninsula issues.
| Launch of Ishiba Minority Government and Weakening of the LDP
| Limitations of Ishiba’s Foreign and Security Policies
| “Incomplete 65-Year System” and South Korea-Japan Relations
| Continued Stalemate in Japan-North Korea Relations
| Japan’s Political Landscape in 2025: Limitations of Ishiba’s Minority Government
| Response Direction of the South Korean Government
※ The contents published on 'Sejong Focus' are personal opinions of the author and do not represent the official views of Sejong Institue
