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[Outlook on Global Affairs 2026-Special Issue No. 6] Japan in 2026: Strategic and Political Outlook |
| December 11, 2025 |
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Kitae LeeSenior Research Fellow, Sejong Institute | ktleekorea@sejong.org
- In 2025, political leadership within the Liberal Democratic Party shifted from the Shigeru Ishiba administration to the Sanae Takaichi administration. This report examines the implications of this transition by analyzing domestic political adjustments under the Takaichi administration, which is positioned within the conservative right wing of the Liberal Democratic Party. It further assesses developments in the U.S.–Japan alliance and Japan’s ongoing defense buildup, the deterioration of China–Japan relations, and the evolving dynamics of ROK–Japan relations and DPRK–Japan relations. Building on these assessments, the report presents an outlook for Japan’s domestic politics and external strategic environment in 2026. Finally, it identifies policy considerations and cooperation pathways for the South Korean government in managing East Asian international politics and in navigating relations with both Japan and North Korea under the Takaichi administration.
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In 2025, Japanese politics entered a period of political crisis as the Ishiba administration suffered consecutive defeats in the Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly elections and the House of Councillors elections. Notably, the House of Councillors election revealed a significant shift as the conservative-oriented Sanseitō emerged as a disruptive force, signaling the acceleration of multiparty dynamics and raising questions about the durability of the Liberal Democratic Party’s long-standing single-party dominance. Against this backdrop, mounting pressure within the Liberal Democratic Party called for Prime Minister Ishiba’s resignation on the grounds of electoral responsibility, ultimately leading Ishiba to announce his decision to step down. During this process, the ruling Liberal Democratic Party elected Sanae Takaichi as its new leader through an internal presidential election, marking a symbolic return of the party’s hardline conservative faction to power. Takaichi subsequently secured confirmation as Japan’s first female prime minister through designation votes in both the House of Representatives and the House of Councillors, formally inaugurating her administration.
At the same time, the process through which Takaichi secured the premiership not only reflected a consolidation of conservative right wing forces within the Liberal Democratic Party, but also resulted in the departure of Komeito from the ruling coalition and the formation of a new coalition configuration with the conservative opposition Japan Innovation Party (Nippon Ishin). Komeito withdrew from the coalition due to policy divergences with Prime Minister Takaichi over visits to the Yasukuni Shrine and political finance reform. However, with the support of Nippon Ishin, Takaichi was able to secure her election as prime minister. As a result, Japan’s political landscape entered a more complex phase characterized by party system diversification and new patterns of coalition bargaining within the conservative camp.
In this context, the most salient feature of Japanese politics in 2025 was the simultaneous occurrence of leadership change within the Liberal Democratic Party and the progression toward a more diversified party system, both of which disrupted Japan’s traditional dominant party configuration. The Ishiba administration’s electoral defeats, combined with the momentum of multiparty dynamics, created conditions for a leadership shift toward the hardline conservative Takaichi camp within the Liberal Democratic Party, leading to both a rightward tilt in Japanese politics and heightened political uncertainty. While the Takaichi administration has sought to advance domestic political stability and external policy initiatives on the basis of a reconfigured conservative coalition landscape, asserting priorities in economic and security strengthening, the departure of former coalition partners and the broader drift toward a multiparty system are expected to impose constraints on future political governance. -
In 2025, the U.S.–Japan relationship continued to strengthen around security and economic cooperation despite political uncertainty within Japan. In February, Prime Minister Ishiba and President Donald Trump held a summit meeting in Washington and formally reaffirmed their commitment to reinforcing the U.S.–Japan alliance. The two leaders emphasized the importance of maintaining a free and open order in the Indo-Pacific region, reaffirming the applicability of the U.S.–Japan Security Treaty to the Senkaku Islands (referred to as Diaoyu Dao in China), enhancing Japan’s defense capabilities, and coordinating policy responses toward the DPRK. Japan, for its part, reconfirmed its commitment to increasing defense expenditures to the equivalent of 2 percent of GDP by 2027, in line with existing government policy, as part of a broader agenda of fundamental defense capability strengthening. While President Trump welcomed Japan’s efforts to raise defense spending, he simultaneously applied pressure regarding the concrete level and pace of increases, revealing a dynamic mixture of coercive bargaining and strategic coordination in U.S. policy toward Japan.
The emphasis on defense spending and alliance coordination continued during the October summit between Prime Minister Takaichi and President Trump, where strengthening U.S.–Japan security cooperation was elevated as a core agenda item. Prime Minister Takaichi underscored Japan’s defense buildup and economic self reliance as key national priorities and, reflecting her hardline conservative orientation, announced plans to modernize conventional and asymmetric weapons systems and introduce next generation submarines equipped with vertical launch systems (VLS). Regarding defense spending, the Takaichi administration advanced the pre-existing target of achieving defense expenditures equivalent to 2 percent of GDP from 2027 to 2025, while also keeping open the possibility of additional increases in response to demands from the Trump administration.
U.S.–Japan relations in 2025 were characterized by alliance reinforcement and concrete discussions on Japan’s defense buildup and strategic self-reliance. In dealings with President Trump, Tokyo signaled a clear commitment to increasing defense spending and expanding advanced security cooperation, while simultaneously emphasizing trade and investment cooperation on the economic front. This close linkage between security cooperation and economic policy coordination is expected to exert significant influence on the regional security environment and economic order in East Asia in the years ahead. -
China–Japan relations in 2025 showed signs of improvement under the Ishiba administration. Seeking to normalize diplomatic relations with Beijing after taking office, Prime Minister Ishiba pursued active dialogue and engagement initiatives, including holding summit talks with Chinese counterparts on the margins of ASEAN-related meetings. A notable achievement during this period was the agreement to resume imports of Japanese seafood, which had been suspended following the release of treated water from the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant. This development was widely interpreted as a positive signal for the resumption of economic and people-to-people exchanges between the two countries. Prime Minister Ishiba also maintained a cordial relationship with Chinese President Xi Jinping and emphasized a “mutually beneficial strategic partnership,” thereby laying the foundation for stable exchanges based on shared interests.
By contrast, China–Japan relations deteriorated rapidly after Prime Minister Takaichi came to power in October 2025, backed by the consolidation of conservative right wing forces within the Liberal Democratic Party. Prime Minister Takaichi identified a Taiwan contingency involving a potential Chinese attack on Taiwan as a major trigger for an “existential crisis” for Japan. Amid mounting tensions, Beijing raised issues such as Okinawa’s sovereignty and the United Nations Security Council’s “enemy state” clauses in international fora, fueling anti Japanese sentiment, to which Tokyo responded by adopting a more assertive diplomatic posture and reinforcing military readiness. Coupled with China’s diplomatic pressure, Japan began concentrating defense resources on the Southwestern Islands, including Okinawa, and moved to bolster the Self Defense Forces and deploy advanced weapons systems in preparation for potential Chinese military coercion.
Taken together, China–Japan relations in 2025 shifted sharply from a “relationship improvement” phase under the Ishiba administration, which prioritized pragmatic diplomacy and the restoration of economic exchanges, to a “relationship deterioration” phase following the inauguration of the Takaichi administration. This transformation reflected domestic political changes in Japan, most notably the rise of the conservative hardline camp, and manifested as an intensification of strategic competition with China and strengthened Japanese responses to perceived security threats. -
The year 2025 marked the 60th anniversary of the normalization of diplomatic relations between the Republic of Korea (ROK) and Japan, yet domestic political instability in South Korea delayed a bilateral summit until after President Lee Jae-myung took office. A turning point in the normalization of ROK–Japan relations came with the summit between President Lee and Prime Minister Ishiba held in Tokyo on August 23, which produced the first official joint press statement between the two governments in 17 years since 2008. The two leaders agreed to institutionalize shuttle diplomacy and regularize high-level communication, while announcing a range of forward-looking cooperation initiatives including expanded cooperation in future industries such as hydrogen and artificial intelligence (AI), enhanced people-to-people exchanges through an expanded working holiday program, and the creation of new consultative mechanisms to jointly address societal challenges such as low birth rates and population aging. The leaders also reaffirmed their shared commitment to the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and the establishment of lasting peace, and pledged to strengthen strategic coordination on security issues including North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs and cyber threats. Mutual understanding was further reached on reinforcing the virtuous cycle of U.S.–ROK–Japan trilateral security cooperation and on cooperation toward resolving the issue of Japanese nationals abducted by North Korea.
Later in October, Prime Minister Takaichi visited Gyeongju to attend the APEC Leaders’ Meeting and held a bilateral summit with President Lee Jae-myung. Taking place only nine days after Takaichi took office as Prime Minister, the summit emphasized the advancement of a future-oriented ROK–Japan relationship based on mutual trust and explored opportunities for practical cooperation across economic, security, and societal domains. The two leaders also reaffirmed their shared commitment to the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, the strengthening of U.S.–ROK–Japan coordination, and cooperation toward resolving the issue of Japanese nationals abducted by North Korea.
However, an incident in November in which the Japanese government rejected a request by the Republic of Korea Air Force’s Black Eagles aerobatic team to conduct mid air refueling in Okinawa due to concerns about training flights near Dokdo highlighted the limits of bilateral military and cultural exchanges. In response, Seoul postponed the dispatch of the ROK military band to the Japan Self Defense Forces (JSDF) Marching Festival, demonstrating that symbolic military diplomacy channels can be easily drawn into sensitive territorial and historical disputes. These developments underscored the fragility of trust building processes and reaffirmed the political and societal constraints on ROK-Japan military cooperation.
The year 2025 represented an important period for ROK–Japan relations in which future-oriented cooperation and deeper linkages in regional security and economic affairs advanced under the symbolic context of the 60th anniversary of diplomatic normalization. At the same time, persistent historical and territorial disputes continued to impose burdens on mutual trust, revealing a complex bilateral landscape. While efforts to reinforce U.S.–ROK–Japan coordination and establish new frameworks for cooperation were active in the economic and security domains, political risks remained evident in sensitive areas of military exchange. -
In 2025, the Ishiba administration adopted a moderate and pragmatic approach toward Japan–North Korea relations that emphasized “trust building” and “practical dialogue.” Departing from the previous pressure-only posture, Tokyo proactively sought to resume dialogue by proposing an unconditional summit with North Korea. While prioritizing the resolution of the Japanese abduction issue, the administration approached the broader relationship with a longer-term perspective oriented toward improving bilateral ties and contributing to stability in Northeast Asia. Issues related to peace on the Korean Peninsula, complete denuclearization, and responses to North Korea’s missile threats were pursued in parallel with strengthened U.S.–ROK–Japan coordination and broader cooperation with the international community.
By contrast, the Takaichi administration adopted a markedly hardline and pragmatic stance with a distinct conservative orientation. Immediately after taking office, Prime Minister Takaichi clearly identified the resolution of the Japanese abduction issue as the government’s highest priority and expressed her determination to achieve a breakthrough during her term. On November 3, she attended a large-scale national rally on the abduction issue, where she publicly stated that she was seeking a summit with North Korean Leader Kim Jong Un, signaling a strong commitment to resolving the matter. At the same time, she emphasized the need for North Korea’s complete denuclearization and for strengthened U.S.–ROK–Japan trilateral coordination. Taken together, the core of the Takaichi administration’s policy toward North Korea is characterized by pressure for progress on the abduction issue and a preference for Japan-led practical action.
Japan–North Korea relations exhibited a prolonged stalemate in 2025, as the Ishiba administration’s pragmatic approach centered on dialogue and trust building coexisted with the Takaichi administration’s conservative hardline stance that prioritized the abduction issue. Political and historical sensitivities surrounding the abduction issue continued to delay the resumption of dialogue, yet the Takaichi administration has persisted in seeking proactive solutions, including attempts to hold a summit, despite North Korea’s passive posture. -
Japan’s domestic and international outlook for 2026 is expected to be shaped by significant political and diplomatic challenges as the Takaichi administration’s conservative and hardline orientation becomes more fully articulated. The Takaichi government is likely to advance Japan’s “normal state” agenda by revising the three key security documents (the National Security Strategy, the National Defense Strategy, and the Defense Buildup Program), which are expected to be updated by the end of 2026, thereby expanding Japan’s role as a national security actor beyond the traditional constraints of the pacifist constitution and implicitly keeping open the possibility of future constitutional revision. In addition, Japan is expected to strengthen policies aimed at counterbalancing China as strategic competition between the two countries intensifies.
Amid persistent tensions between China and Japan in 2026, the Takaichi administration could maintain relatively high approval ratings, which would allow for the possibility of dissolving the House of Representatives and calling a snap general election. If Prime Minister Takaichi succeeds in leveraging her personal popularity to reclaim conservative voters who shifted to the Sanseitō and the Democratic Party for the People in the previous election, the administration could be positioned for a decisive victory. Such an outcome would provide a foundation for longer-term political continuity based on a stable conservative support base and could improve prospects for the House of Councillors election two years later.
However, if internal corruption concerns, particularly those related to political funding and intra-party financial practices that have drawn significant public attention and contributed to previous electoral losses, remain unresolved within the Liberal Democratic Party, the administration could face declining approval ratings or heightened political instability. In addition, under a deteriorating external environment marked by worsening China–Japan relations, the negative domestic effects of Chinese diplomatic or economic pressure could also become a liability for cabinet support levels.
Accordingly, 2026 is expected to mark a year of significant change in Japan’s security policy. As work to revise the three security documents accelerates, Japan is likely to explore shifts in its security posture that go beyond existing policy constraints, including issues such as cost-sharing for the stationing of U.S. forces in Japan, the acquisition of advanced weapon systems, and potential reconsideration of the Three Non-Nuclear Principles. The U.S.–Japan alliance is expected to serve as the primary platform for these developments by supporting the expansion of the Self-Defense Forces’ operational roles and Japan’s broader defense buildup.
The U.S.–Japan relationship is expected to continue developing around a division of roles within the alliance based on Japan’s enhanced security capabilities and Tokyo’s efforts to expand its regional leadership. Since the inauguration of the Takaichi administration, close communication and cooperation between the U.S. and Japanese leaders have persisted, with Japan focusing on strengthening its strategic partnership with the United States through military modernization and the acquisition of advanced weapon systems. As a result, the alliance is likely to move beyond a traditional cooperation framework and evolve in ways that support Japan’s pursuit of a more proactive diplomatic presence.
In China–Japan relations, the improvement efforts attempted under the Ishiba administration have effectively stalled since the inauguration of the Takaichi government. One structural factor behind this shift has been the weakening of moderate, policy-oriented factions within the Liberal Democratic Party that historically served as coordination channels even during periods of bilateral tension. The retirement of former LDP Secretary-General Toshihiro Nikai in 2024 and the marginalization of former Diet Affairs Committee Chairman Hiroshi Moriyama have reduced the scope of informal communication between the two countries, while Komeito’s departure from the ruling coalition has effectively eliminated what remained of a “China pipeline” within the governing bloc. The Japan Innovation Party, the LDP’s new coalition partner, maintains an explicitly competitive stance toward China, suggesting that the coalition arrangement may reinforce an institutionally anchored hardline posture toward Beijing for the foreseeable future. As a result, a significant improvement in China–Japan relations is unlikely in 2026.
China is likely to adhere firmly to its “One China” principle while adopting a medium- to long-term strategy of patience that could extend to waiting out the Takaichi administration. Beijing is therefore unlikely to offer meaningful concessions aimed at restoring relations until a leadership change occurs in Tokyo. On the Japanese side, strong political perceptions remain that Japan “caved” to China during the 2010 Senkaku fishing boat collision incident, making it difficult for Prime Minister Takaichi to retract her statements related to an existential crisis scenario or shift to a more moderate stance. Although the likelihood of direct military conflict between China and Japan remains low, mutual distrust combined with a structural dynamic of “outlasting” the other side suggests that the resumption of stalled bilateral exchanges will be delayed.
The Takaichi administration is likely to pursue a “two-track approach” that separates economic engagement from security issues, maintaining diplomatic efforts to manage tensions. However, as long as fundamental strategic disputes related to Taiwan, the Senkaku Islands, and advanced technology controls persist, substantive improvements in bilateral relations will remain difficult. These frictions are expected to remain a central variable in Japan’s foreign and security policy, increasing the domestic costs of supply chain stabilization and the burden on Japanese firms seeking to hedge against China-related risks. Moreover, as U.S.–China strategic competition intensifies, Japan’s role as a “forward base” for countering China could narrow Tokyo’s hedging space.
In ROK–Japan relations, although security cooperation remains constrained in certain political and operational areas, sustained collaboration is expected under the framework of U.S.–ROK–Japan trilateral coordination, particularly in response to North Korea’s nuclear and missile threats. The 2025 summit between the two leaders contributed to the regularization of shuttle diplomacy, laying a future-oriented foundation for cooperation across economic, social, and security domains. As demonstrated by Defense Minister Shinjiro Koizumi’s emphasis on security cooperation with the ROK during his recent meeting with Ambassador Lee Hyuk, bilateral military-to-military exchanges and joint exercises are likely to remain stable through the end of 2025 despite periodic security frictions. However, unresolved historical issues and the Dokdo territorial dispute continue to pose potential obstacles to defense exchanges, indicating that additional time will be required to build more complete mutual trust between the two countries.
Moreover, the divergent perceptions between the ROK and Japan regarding the issue of “forced labor victims” remain pronounced, as illustrated by the two sides holding separate memorial events related to the Sado mine, making historical reconciliation difficult to achieve. Nevertheless, the ROK government’s pragmatic diplomatic approach, combined with the Takaichi administration’s interest in maintaining a stable bilateral relationship, suggests that the management of ROK–Japan tensions is likely to continue along pragmatic lines in 2026.
North Korea–Japan relations are expected to remain structurally deadlocked in 2026, with any substantive progress largely contingent upon the resumption of U.S.–North Korea dialogue. The Takaichi administration is likely to maintain North Korea’s nuclear and missile threats, as well as the abduction issue, as core security and human rights priorities while simultaneously keeping open the possibility of a summit with Chairman Kim Jong-un under a dual approach of “pressure and dialogue.” North Korea, by contrast, is unlikely to initiate bilateral engagement with Japan, given its distrust and wariness toward a Japanese government with a pronounced conservative right-wing orientation, and will more likely treat Japan as a secondary bargaining card within broader negotiations with the United States.
The abduction issue remains the most intractable obstacle in North Korea–Japan relations, with little prospect for resolution. Pyongyang maintains that the matter was concluded following Chairman Kim Jong-il’s apology and the repatriation of several abductees, and has effectively refused further investigation. Tokyo, by contrast, demands the full return of all abductees, clarification of the facts, and accountability for those responsible, making it structurally difficult to bridge the gap between the two sides. Given that the Takaichi administration’s political support base is closely tied to abductee family associations and conservative constituencies, Japan has limited room to make major concessions on this issue in pursuit of a summit with North Korea.
Overall, North Korea–Japan relations in 2026 are likely to remain in a managed phase characterized by expressions of willingness to engage in dialogue but limited substantive progress. Japan is expected to strengthen security cooperation through U.S.–ROK–Japan missile and anti-submarine drills to reinforce deterrence, while simultaneously exploring opportunities for contact with North Korea without making concessions on the abduction issue, which carries significant domestic political symbolism. In sum, Japan’s domestic and external environment in 2026 is expected to be shaped by the continued influence of the Takaichi administration’s hardline conservative orientation, marked by strengthened security policy, efforts toward constitutional revision, and intensified balancing against China. Domestically, issues related to political funding (“money and politics”) and diplomatic challenges will remain variables affecting the durability of the administration and its approval ratings. Externally, the U.S.–Japan alliance is likely to deepen on the basis of expanded role-sharing and enhanced Japanese diplomatic engagement, while China–Japan relations are expected to remain strained. ROK–Japan relations will likely continue to exhibit a mix of cooperation and friction, and North Korea–Japan relations will remain unstable and sensitive to the trajectory of U.S.–North Korea dialogue. -
For the ROK government to identify areas of cooperation with the Takaichi administration in East Asian international politics and in ROK–Japan and Japan–North Korea relations in 2026, a principled yet pragmatic approach will be essential. Given that the Takaichi administration is expected to maintain a hardline conservative stance on constitutional revision, security policy, and historical issues, Seoul should uphold firm principles regarding historical and territorial disputes while expanding cooperation in practical domains such as the economy, security, and science and technology. To this end, the ROK government would benefit from diversifying communication channels by revitalizing shuttle diplomacy at the summit level, institutionalizing ministerial and working-level consultations, and strengthening formal cooperation mechanisms through measures such as establishing new vice-ministerial and ministerial “2+2” foreign and defense dialogues.
With respect to China–Japan tensions, the ROK should exercise caution in directly involving itself in Taiwan-related issues, particularly as public diplomacy and perception battles between Beijing and Tokyo intensify in the international arena. However, given the linkage between the Taiwan issue and Article VI of the U.S.–Japan Security Treaty (the “Far East clause”), it will be important for Seoul to conduct a detailed assessment of how the Taiwan issue may intersect with the U.S.–ROK Mutual Defense Treaty and to explore strategic response options accordingly. Because the Taiwan issue carries significant potential to destabilize the regional security environment, the ROK should leverage cooperation frameworks with the United States and Japan while also pursuing autonomous diplomacy in order to maintain a balanced role in East Asia.
The ROK government’s “END Initiative” (Exchange, Normalization, Denuclearization) seeks to pursue normalization of relations with North Korea prior to full denuclearization, whereas Japan maintains the position that normalization can only follow the completion of North Korea’s denuclearization. This divergence in sequencing underscores the need for continued dialogue and coordination between Seoul and Tokyo, including efforts to identify confidence-building mechanisms linked to phased implementation of the denuclearization process. Such coordination would strengthen the stability of ROK–Japan relations and contribute to progress in the Korean Peninsula peace process.
Ultimately, it will be important for the ROK government to pursue a cautious yet proactive foreign policy grounded in “principled pragmatic cooperation” in order to expand future-oriented and substantive cooperation with the Takaichi administration, despite its rightward shift and hardline policy orientation. By diversifying diplomatic channels and internalizing the principles of preventive diplomacy, Seoul can maintain consistent responses to foreseeable points of friction while adopting a balanced approach that remains firm on sensitive issues such as historical disputes. This will enable the ROK to consolidate its stable position and cooperative networks amid the complex security and economic environment in East Asia.
| The Inauguration of the Takaichi Administration and Japan’s Party System Diversification
| Maintaining the U.S.–Japan Alliance and Strengthening Japan’s Security Policy
| Improvement and Deterioration in China–Japan Relations
| Stability in ROK–Japan Relations and Constraints on Security Cooperation
| Continued Stagnation in Japan–North Korea Relations
| Japan’s Domestic and International Outlook for 2026
| Policy Directions for the ROK Government
※ The contents published on 'Sejong Focus' are personal opinions of the author and do not represent the official views of Sejong Institue
