Kim Jong Un's Order to Tear Down South Korean Facilities in Mt. Kumgang 

and Directions for South Korea’s Counter-strategy

[Sejong Commentary] No. 2019-27

Cheong Seong-Chang

Vice President for Research Planning

softpower@sejong.org

On October 23, 2019, Rodong Sinmun reported that Kim Jong Un visited the Mount Kumgang Tourist Resort and ordered to demolish facilities, which had been built by South Korea. Kim inspected the facilities including the Kosong Port, Hotel Haegumgang, the Cultural Center, Kumgangsan Hotel, and Okryugwan Restaurant Mt. Kumgang, and lambasted that “the buildings are just a hotchpotch with no national character at all,” that “they were built like makeshift tents in a disaster-stricken area or isolation wards,” and that they “look so shabby as they are not taken proper care of.”

Since the assault on Park Wang-ja, a South Korean tourist shot and killed in Mt. Kumgang area in 2008, South Korea ceased the Mt. Kumgang tourism, leaving the buildings neither repaired nor remodeled for 11 years. Compared to new modern facilities North Korea has recently built in Samjiyon County, Wonsan-Kalma Coastal Tourist Area, or Yangdok County Hot Spring Resort, they can certainly be seen as “outdated.”

Kim Jong Un “instructed to remove all the unpleasant-looking facilities of the South side with an agreement with the relevant unit of the South side [Ministry of Unification]” and “scolded the relevant unit [United Front Department] of the Workers’ Party of Korea Central Committee for chopping off the land of Mt. Kumgang Tourist Region, neglecting proper supervision of the cultural tourist site, and thereby damaging the scenery.”

Further, Kim pointed out that while “the general view is that Mt. Kumgang is a common property of the North and the South and is the symbol and epitome of the North-South relations, and that the tour of Mt. Kumgang would not be possible without the development of the North-South ties, this is certainly a mistaken idea and a misguided understanding.” Thus, Kim Jong Un is anticipating a prolonged tension between the two Koreas and trying to wipe out all traces of the South from the tourist region; the Mt. Kumgang tourism will no longer remain as “the symbol of inter-Korean reconciliation and cooperation.” Even if the dialogue resumes in the future, it will not easily lead to an improvement or a detente in the inter-Korean relationship.

After dismantling all South Korean facilities in the Mt. Kumgang Tourist Resort, North Korea will likely construct their own modern and sophisticated tourist facilities, like those in Wonsan-Kalma Coastal Tourist Area. Kim’s order to install an airfield for tourism in a nearby county reflects his intention to increase the accessibility for the Chinese tourists. It is possible that Kim will make similar instructions about the Kaesong Industrial Complex, tearing down the South Korean buildings and setting out for a self-reliant development.

In the morning of October 25, North Korea sent a notice to the South’s Ministry of Unification suggesting they discuss the issue of demolishing the facilities “via exchange of papers.” This demonstrates that they do not intend to discuss any additional matters with the South. The South Korean government is partially responsible for this exacerbation, with their stiff attitude toward resuming the Mt. Kumgang tourism. Although tourism does not fall under the range of U.N. sanction targets, the United States and the international society have been negative toward the idea of resuming the Mt. Kumgang tourism, afraid of allowing a “bulk cash” to flow into the North. The South Korean government should have permitted a “small-scale tourism” first, under the condition of safety guarantee for South Korean citizens, so that the South can show the North its will for renewing the tourism enterprise and simultaneously ease the international society’s concerns for a “bulk cash” inflow.

Having missed the opportunity, the South Korean government cannot push for resuming the Mt. Kumgang tourism at this point unless they want to give an impression that the South is surrendering to the North’s pressure. Therefore, it is now more desirable to review the current measures that limit inter-Korean interactions—for example, lift of the May 24 measures—and to search for solutions to restore the interactions, than to tackle the Mt. Kumgang tourism again.

Kim Jong Un also said that they “will always welcome our compatriots from the South if they want to come to Mt. Kumgang after it is wonderfully built as the world-level tourist destination,” meaning that they will accept South Korean tourists only after South Korean facilities are removed and new ones are in place. The South Korean government should of course consider the property rights of South Korean citizens, but they cannot demand the North to keep the facilities forever while they are not allowing the tourism.

Today North Korea possesses a capacity to construct more advanced facilities than those built by Hyundai Asan in the past, and the South Korean facilities, deteriorated and unused for 11 years, are no longer appealing to the North. Therefore, the South Korean government must be cooperative to dismantling the facilities, except for the separated family reunion center, and discuss an opening of limited tourism in the areas other than Mt. Kumgang, such as Kaesong or Mt. Baekdu, under the condition of safety guarantee for our citizen. Hyundai Asan’s previous investments should be taken into account in the process.

The arguments of previous administrations that the revenue from our tourist visits would be appropriated for the North’s nuclear and missile developments lacked objective grounds. North Korea earned much more income from weaponry exports and economic cooperations with China, and the revenue from such activities was mainly spent on the nuclear and missile development.

Permission of a full-scale tourism on top of the North’s ongoing advancement in nuclear and missile capabilities will be condemned by the U.S. and the international society. Therefore, the South Korean government should restore the inter-Korean exchanges by allowing a “small-scale tourism”—that is, smaller in size than the Chinese tourism to North Korea—and civilian interactions, while relieving the international society’s concerns for a “bulk cash” inflow.

Nonetheless, after the ruptures in Hanoi and Stockholm talks, the possibility that the US-DPRK relations will worsen remains high. Therefore, the South Korean government must manifest that even the small-scale tourism to North Korea will be stopped anytime if the North executes another nuclear test or launches an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). North Korea has recently hinted on their plan to test launch an ICBM, and many experts view it is highly likely that the North will soon test launch a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) from their new submarines.

Under these circumstances, South Korea will only meet with a predicament if they disregard the US-ROK cooperation and hastily seek to restore the relationship with the North. Therefore, they must in advance make preparations for the case in which the peninsular situation exacerbates. The author hopes that the South Korean government will renovate its line-ups for diplomatic, security, and unification policies toward more flexible and strategic North Korea policy, and restore its role as “the driver” of the Korean peninsula problem.