Japan’s Pursuit of Political Stability and the ROK-Japan Relations:

Implications and Impacts of the Japanese House of Councillors Election

[Current Issues and Policiees 2019-17]

Dr. Lee Myon Woo

Vice President,

the Sejong Institute

mwlee@sejong.org

Exectuvie Summary

In Japan’s 25th House of Councillors election held on July 21, 2019, as mainstream media predicted, the coalition of Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and Komeito won a majority of the contested seats, taking 71 (the lowest number to win a majority being 63). However, it is hard to tell from this result who was the true winner of the election; the coalition did win far exceeding the “bar” of majority, but it failed to achieve the two-thirds majority (85 of the seats), one of the prerequisites for the constitutional amendment that Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and LDP have pursued.

Still, the success of the LDP-Komeito coalition, unhindered by the issues such as the retirement insecurity and the constitutional revision, is attributable to the following three reasons. First, a low voter turnout. According to the Asahi Shimbun, the voter turnout rate of this election was 48.80%, the second lowest since the end of the war after 44.52% of 1995. A poor voter turnout typically results from a low participation of independent voters, who may favor opposition parties, and is thus advantageous to LDP and Komeito through block voting.

Second, the lack of or inadequate attention to issues. The mass media, such as the Asahi Shimbun, had suggested three core issues for this election: the social security reform to relieve retirement insecurity; the consumption tax increase to 10%; and the constitutional revision. Though important, these issues did not stand out as the subjects of debate during the election campaign. Third, the voters chose political stability over other things. Although the voters are interested in retirement insecurity or related social security reforms, when it came to “which party to trust and cast vote for,” political stability became the priority.

Since July’s election was not a sole victory of LDP but an ambiguous victory of its coalition with Komeito, it is hard to determine the exact impact and the result will have on Japanese domestic politics and Abe’s policy lines. However, Mr. Abe and LDP seem to have a clear priority in their policy agenda. For example, according to the Yomiuri Shimbun, he stated at the press conference on the following day of the election that the coalition gained the trust of the people of Japan with a majority of seats, that this is an order of the people to open the discussion in the Diet for constitutional amendment, and that LDP will show its leadership in order to produce an amendment bill that can be agreed on by all parties.

This statement shows Abe’s interest in and enthusiasm for the amendment. As for the reason why he demonstrated his will even more clearly when the requisite proportion had not been secured at the election, there could be three possibilities.

First, it could have been his attempt to counter the declining possibility for the amendment, to rekindle the flames, and to maintain the political momentum when the consumption tax hike is due. Second, considering he has mentioned that some members of the Democratic Party for the People (DPP)—more conservative than the Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan (CDP)—are sympathetic to the constitutional revision, he might have wanted to persuade them in order to overcome the bar of two-thirds majority, because winning over the Japan Innovation Party and the independents would not be sufficient to achieve it. Third, since the amendment does not have to be enforced right away nor is this possible, he might have only proposed a gradual discussion for the amendment for the time being.

Whichever of these possibilities are true, the key point is that the constitutional amendment remains as a crucial project for Prime Minister Abe. Besides the constitutional revision, the core issue of interest in Japanese domestic politics is who will be the next Prime Minister—specifically, whether Abe will be reelected as the President of LDP for his fourth term by changing the party regulation, or if not him, whom he will support. Although it is true that Abe has won every election since 2012 and that is what is an essential factor for the Diet members, the revision of the party regulation to enable Abe to serve the fourth term will face a strong opposition. Therefore, another candidate supported by Abe is more likely to win. The increasing mention of Yoshihide Suga, the Chief Cabinet Secretary, has to do with this.

Apart from the election results, the fact that Abe’s position has become even more solid through this election suggests that the confrontation and antagonism between Japan and the Republic of Korea are unlikely to improve. South Korean media tend to view Japan’s export restriction as a political action aimed at the House of Councillors election, but it is in fact the Japanese government’s retaliation for the South Korean Supreme Court ruling regarding the forced labor issue, and more fundamentally, stems from Japan’s distrust of South Korea. Therefore, unless any convincing explanation or compromise measure is proposed from our side—although the United States or other third party might weigh in—Japan’s export restriction will be executed stage by stage and the ROK-Japan conflict will persist for a while. It is a crucial moment to reconsider our Japan policy in order to pursue our national interest and to avoid further damages on our citizens.