North Korea’s Resistance to US-ROK Joint Military Exercise

and Direction for US and ROK’s Responses

[Sejong Commentary] No. 2019-28

Cheong Seong-Chang (Vice President of Research Planning)

softpower@sejong.org

In the statement on November 13, 2019, North Korea’s State Affairs Commission (SAC) Spokesperson strongly denounced the US-ROK Joint Air Force Exercise and warned that North Korea’s “patience is nearing its limit.” North Korea also called the Joint Military Exercise “an explicit abrogation of the June 12 US-DPRK Joint Statement” and “a complete denial of the agreement in Singapore.”

But in fact, the June 12 Joint Statement says “President Trump commits himself to provide security guarantees to the DPRK, and Chairman Kim Jong Un reaffirms his firm and unwavering commitment to complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.” It is not overtly stated that the United States and South Korea will cease the joint military drills, whereas Kims “unwavering commitment” for denuclearization is clearly articulated. Therefore, North Korea’s argument that the joint military exercise is “an explicit abrogation of the June 12 US-DPRK Joint Statement” is ungrounded.

Immediately following the Singapore Summit, President Trump announced his decision to cease the US-ROK Joint Military Exercise based on his trust in Kim’s will for denuclearization negotiation. So far, however, North Korea has rejected discussion with the U.S. on the concept and the methods of ‘complete denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.’ If North Korea seriously participated in the talks following the Singapore Summit—the US-North Korea High-Level and Working-Level Talks, the Hanoi Summit, and the Working-Level Talks in Stockholm—it is unlikely that Trump would decide to resume the joint drills. Therefore, it was North Korea who abrogated the June 12 Joint Statement, not the U.S.

In the statement on November 13, North Korea claimed that they “gave the American President something to boast about for no reward, but the U.S. did not take any responding measures but only gave us betrayal.” But in fact, after they ceased the nuclear tests and intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) test launches, dismantled nuclear test facilities, and returned the remains of the U.S. soldiers, North Korea gained many benefits: the communication channel with the U.S. is in place; their relationship with China has improved; the inter-Korean and the U.S.-DPRK military tensions are alleviated; Chairman Kim Jong Un’s public image has substantially enhanced. Therefore, North Korea’s argument that they have not received any reward for their measures in 2018 is also ungrounded.

This is the first time that North Korea issued a SAC Spokesperson Statement. When Pyongyang expresses its stance under the name of the SAC or the SAC Chairman, it may take the form of the SAC Chairman Announcement, the SAC Announcement, the SAC Spokesperson Announcement, the SAC Spokesperson Important Statement, or the SAC Spokesperson Statement. The SAC Spokesperson Statement of November 13 is a manifestation of stance with a relatively lesser weight, but North Korea may raise the level of seriousness in the future, up to the SAC Spokesperson Announcement, the SAC Announcement, and the SAC Chairman Announcement.

On September 21, 2017, Kim Jong Un made a SAC Chairman Announcement at the building of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK): “Trump denied and insulted me as well as our state, and made the most atrocious declaration of war in history to annihilate our Republic. Accordingly, we will seriously consider responding measures that are correspondingly adamant, the most firm in history.” On November 29 of the same year, North Korea shocked the U.S. and the international society with the successful third test launch of an ICBM that covered the entire mainland of the U.S.

If North Korea executes another test launch of ICBM, it is likely that the UN Security Council will expand the sanction to tourism and China’s crude oil supply for North Korea. Therefore, if North Korea were to launch another test missile, it is likely to be a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) rather than an ICBM.

On July 23, 2019, Rodong Sinmun revealed North Korea’s newly-built submarine; on October 2, they successfully test launched a new model of SLBM, Pukguksong-3, from an underwater platform (or a barge) near the Bay of Wonsan. It is expected that they will launch another SLBM from the new-model (or trial-manufactured) submarine disclosed in July.

It is estimated that the new submarine model can load up to three SLBMs. If North Korea succeeds in the test launch and obtains more threatening and advanced nuclear capability with which it can discharge missile from a submarine as well, our way of denuclearization will be farther off. The SAC Spokesperson Statement, preceded by announcements by other high-ranking officials, is aimed at building up justification for military actions in the future, involving the SLBM.

But it is a well-known fact that North Korea takes the joint military exercises of the U.S. and South Korea as a severe threat. Therefore, in order to prevent North Korea from taking the uncompromising “new way” and to bring them back to the negotiation table, the two allies must seriously consider to temporary halt the joint drills at least until the earlier half of the next year.

The decision to cease joint military drills during the 2018 PyeongChang Olympics period has extensively contributed to easing of tensions in the Korean peninsula and improving the U.S.-DPRK relations. North Korea participated in the Winter Olympics, and this led to negotiations for denuclearization at the inter-Korean summit. This again resulted in North Korea’s abrogation of the Byongin policy and nuclear test facilities, and eventually the Inter-Korean and the U.S.-DPRK summits. If the two allies can make a similar concession again, North Korea will not choose to take the isolationist “new way,” which China will not welcome either.

On November 13, Mark Esper, the U.S. Secretary of Defense, also announced that the U.S. would consider the possibility of further reduction in the joint military exercises. In response to this, the South Korean government must also closely consult with the U.S. counterpart on the temporary cessation, on the condition that North Korea be earnest about the denuclearization talks and stop test launches of nuclear, mid-range, long-range, or submarine-launched missiles.

On the other hand, the failed working-level talks in Stockholm revealed the limitation of the North Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs, being under the control of the military. Thus, continuing working-level talks with the Foreign Ministry, hardliners without the full authority to negotiate, will not help the U.S. in the future. In October 2000, Kim Jong Il sent Jo Myong Rok, First Vice Chairman of the National Defense Commission (NDC) as a special envoy to Washington, DC and achieved an agreement upon fulfilling the 1994 Geneva Agreement, stopping the missile test launches, cooperating in humanitarian issues, and promoting President Clinton’s visit to North Korea. This time, the U.S. may invite Choe Ryong Hae, First Vice Chairman of SAC to Washington, DC to derive the second “U.S.-DPRK Joint Communique” for denuclearization and enhancement of the relations between the two countries.

※ Translator’s note: This is a summarized unofficial translation of the original paper which was written in Korean. All references should be made to the original paper.

※ This article is written based on the author’s personal opinions and does not reflect the views of the Sejong Institute.