Analyzing the Results of the 20th National Congress of the CCP: Changes in the Power Structure and Implications for Foreign Policy

Lee Jung Nam

(ljnam21@korea.ac.kr)

Professor,

Asiatic Research Institute, Korea University

English Abstract

Analysis of the 20th Party Congress, on Power Structure Changes and Foreign Policy Implications

Xi Jinping formalized that China would pursue ‘Chinese-style Modernization’ instead of a Western-style modernization based on liberal democracy and market economy.

The 20th Party Congress declared that the CCP would achieve rejuvenation of the Chinese nation by leading its modernization based on Xi Jinping‘s ‘Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era.’ The nationalist goal is to be fulfilled by ‘Chinese’ socialist means.

Formation of a Power Base through the Reconstruction of a Leninist Party

After becoming the General Secretary of the CCP in November 2012, Xi Jinping made the ‘reconstruction’ of a Leninist ‘vanguard’ party as a top priority. Ideological commitment to communism and organization regulations were strengthened, followed by a power structural reform.

The 19th Party Congress in 2017 stipulated the principle that the “Party exercises overall leadership over all areas of endeavor in every part of the country” in the Constitution of the CCP. Furthermore, ideological indoctrination was strengthened through large-scale propaganda and education campaigns of party history which were supported by reinforced party control over key state organizations, state and private enterprises, and social groups.

Rearrangement of Party Leadership around the Xi Faction and Consolidation of a ‘One-Man Rule’ System

Xi Jinping consolidated his position as the single dominant leader in the party by placing ‘loyalists’ at the center of the party’s highest branch of power structure.

Moreover, following the opportunity to appoint 13 new members, Xi Jinping filled almost all 24 seats of the Politburo with members of the Xi Faction.

The consolidation of the ‘one-man rule’ system will assure a united drive of Xi Jinping’s policy initiatives. However, it may treat different opinions or criticisms within the party or the society as discord and make the revision of top leadership’s policy choices difficult.

From ‘Economic Growth Oriented’ to ‘Ideology and Regime Stability Oriented’

Xi Jinping mentioned the gradual promotion of economic reform in his Party Congress Report, but his economic reform policy is different from that of Deng Xiaoping. If China pursues socialist modernization apart from the western society, the process would naturally be different from its past economic reform.

Deng Xiaoping’s economic reform meant entering the market economy system and opening up to the West. This is fundamentally different from the socialist type of modernization argued by Xi Jinping.

Therefore, Xi Jinping’s declaration of a ‘Chinese Modernization’ formalizes China’s pursuit of a diverging path from the West, refuses foreign intervention, and reflects its strong will to face ideological competition with the US.

Foreign Policy Implications

If China pursues socialist modernization apart from the western society, the process would naturally be different from its past economic reform. Deng Xiaoping’s economic reform means entering the market economy system and opening up to the West.

Xi Jinping’s third term will exacerbate China’s competition with the US at the expense of cooperation. The range of the competition will expand broadly in diplomacy, security, values and institutions, economy, and technology.

The construction of a new civilization based on ‘socialist’ modernization is expected to create a strengthened regime and ideological competition.