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Assessment of North Korea's Missile Development Trends: January through April 2026 |
| April 27, 2026 |
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Jang Won JOVisiting Research Fellow, Sejong Institute | jjo@sejong.org
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Since embarking in earnest on the development of “short-range solid-propellant missiles” in the first half of 2019, North Korea has steadily pursued the transition to operational use of range-tailored ballistic missile capabilities, including hypersonic glide vehicle(HGV), in order to achieve "diversification" of its tactical strike assets. Beginning in 2024, North Korea has also demonstrated a trend toward improving its 600mm super-large multiple rocket launcher systems as a low-cost, a means of mass delivery means, while actively seeking to expand ground-based missile launch platforms into sea-based and submarine-based launch platforms.
Entering 2026, North Korea has been conducting tests oriented toward verifying operational viability in actual combat conditions, going beyond simple performance evaluation of weapons systems. The development trend is assessed to be advancing in the direction of enhancing combat effectiveness, as evidenced by △ the launch of a HGV on January 4, △ the mass launch of super-large multiple rocket launchers (4 shells and 12 shells respectively) on January 27 and March 14, △ the launch of strategic cruise missiles from the destroyer ‘Choe Hyon’ on April 12, and △ cluster warhead tests on April 8 and April 19, all of which highlight the capability to "conduct concentrated strikes on specific areas while evading missile defense system." This is assessed to reflect the weapons operation trends observed in the recent U.S.-Iran military confrontation, and to embody North Korea's intent to demonstrate that it possesses the capability to "break through the ROK-U.S. missile defense syste and concentrate devastating firepower on specific areas.“
The technical developments North Korea has sought to highlight this year may be summarized as follows: △ the ability to conduct mixed launches combining HGV with existing irregularly maneuvering short-range tactical missiles → enhancing intercept evasion capability; △ the mass launch of cluster warheads mounted on short-range tactical missiles and super-large multiple rocket launcher rounds → enabling the concentrated projection of firepower onto specific areas; △ the diversification of warhead types including cluster warheads, carbon fiber warheads, and existing large 4.5-ton warheads → aimed at disabling of ROK military infrastructure, command systems, and air defense systems; and △ the expansion of strategic cruise missile launch platforms from ground-based to sea-based platforms → improving detection evasion capability through launch platform diversification. These developments give rise to an increasingly pressing need to strengthen South Korea's countermeasure strategy against the threat of North Korea's advancing missile capabilities.
Meanwhile, amid the foregoing trend of improvement in North Korea's missile development technology, certain technical limitations have also been observed in which North Korea continues to encounter difficulties, including △ the lack of a capability for successive firing of super-large multiple rocket launchers, △ sluggish progress in the development of submarine-based launch platforms, and △ delays in the completion of hypersonic missile development.
This report draws on materials released by North Korean state media to analyze the implications of missile-related weapons development activities observed between January and April 2026, with the aim of assessing the technical advancements achieved and the limitations identified over this period. -
Cluster Warhead Tests Conducted with the Hwasongpo-11A Missile
Following the disclosure of the cluster warhead test conducted on April 8, North Korea again publicized through Rodong Sinmun, the conduct of a cluster warhead effectiveness evaluation test carried out on April 19.
Rodong Sinmun reported that "in the cluster warhead test conducted on April 8, the Hwasongpo-11A struck an area of 6.5 to 7 hectares (equivalent to the area of ten soccer fields)," and that "in the cluster warhead test conducted on April 19, five rounds of the Hwasongpo-11Ra equipped with cluster munitions and mine-dispensing warheads struck an island 136km away, covering an area of 12.5 to 13 hectares."
The missiles North Korea designates as the "Hwasongpo-11" series encompass several variants, as follows:
⑴ Hwasongpo-11A(가) : North Korea's version of the Iskander, designated KN-23, a ballistic missile with a range of 600km. ⑵ Hwasongpo-11B(나) : North Korea's version of the ATACMS, designated KN-24, a ballistic missile with a range of 400km. ⑶ Hwasongpo-11C(다) : An improved variant of North Korea's Iskander, a ballistic missile with a range of 800km. ⑷ Hwasongpo-11D(라) : A close-range ballistic missile (CRBM) designed for strikes against short-range targets, with a range of 100 to 300 km, and a variant of the Hwasongpo-11A developed for the mass production of cost-effective tactical missiles at a low unit production cost.
Cluster munitions, when employed in actual combat, disperse hundreds of submunitions in the air, which upon descending to the ground simultaneously strike a wide area, resulting in an extensive damage radius. This renders them highly controversial weapons, as the probability of damage to civilian facilities as well as military infrastructure such as air base runways is considerable. Given that cluster munitions are regarded as inhumane weapons capable of causing harm to civilians and civilian facilities, most countries avoid disclosing their possession of such munitions to the extent possible. In this context, North Korea's ostentatious display and threatening disclosure of these weapons is assessed to reflect an underlying intent to prioritize the maximization of operational threat over international norms. However, cluster munitions themselves have been operated by numerous countries since the 1970s, and North Korea had already claimed in November 2022, in connection with its response to a ROK-U.S. aerial training exercise, to have "conducted a missile test equipped with a scatter-type warhead." Accordingly, the warhead disclosed on this occasion does not represent a newly developed munition. The reason North Korea chose to highlight the term "cluster munition" on this occasion appears to be an attempt to threaten that by "increasing the number of submunitions compared to previously, thereby expanding the capacity to devastate a wide area," and by combining such diversified warheads with various short-range solid-propellant missiles and super-large multiple rocket launchers, it possesses the capability to "penetrate South Korea's defense system and inflict significant damage."
In addition, a Graphite Bomb is a type of non-lethal weapon in which submunitions containing chemically treated ultrafine carbon fibers act upon transformers and transmission lines, causing short circuit-induced overloads that destroy the electrical power supply network. The United States employed such weapons during the 1991 Iraq War, and China and South Korea are reported to be currently developing them. It is noteworthy that North Korea has on this occasion publicly disclosed and demonstrated that it is also proceeding with development of this weapon, assessed to be at an early stage of development.
Launch of Strategic Cruise Missiles from the Destroyer ‘Choe Hyon’
On April 12, North Korea launched two strategic cruise missiles from the destroyer ‘Choe Hyon’ (a vessel of approximately 5,000 tons), with a flight duration of approximately 2 hours and 12 minutes. North Korea stated that the launch was conducted "as part of an operational evaluation test system, for the purpose of inspecting the weapons integration command system launch control mechanism, achieving proficiency in missile service operations, and confirming the accuracy and target strike precision of an improved active anti-jamming navigation system." Prior to this, on March 4 and March 10, North Korea had also launched several strategic cruise missiles from the same destroyer platform, stating that "weapons system training in an actual combat system involving low-altitude evasion maneuvers and defense network evasion maneuvers was conducted."
In 2025, North Korea launched strategic cruise missiles on two occasions, on January 25 and December 28, utilizing ground-based launch platforms, and appears to have advanced the reliability of the strategic cruise missile weapons system to the stage of completed development through reliability verification exercises and proficiency training on operational mission execution procedures. Entering 2026, North Korea is assessed to have succeeded in fully transitioning the strategic cruise missile launch system from ground-based to sea-based platforms.
However, as North Korea has not demonstrated on any occasion to date the stable launch of strategic cruise missiles from a submarine-based launch platform, the development of a vertically launched submarine to surface launch platform capable of carrying and operating the missile is assessed to remain incomplete.
600mm Super-Large Multiple Rocket Launcher: Sequential Launch of 12 Shells
Rodong Sinmun reported on March 14 that "a firepower strike training exercise of the western district long-range artillery unit was conducted, with 12 600mm multiple rocket launchers (KN-25) and two artillery batteries mobilized." The newspaper published photographs of 12 super-large multiple rocket launcher rounds being sequentially launched in succession, reporting that "the launched rocket artillery rounds struck island targets in the East Sea at a range of 364.4 km with a 100 percent hit rate, once again demonstrating concentrated devastating destructive power and military value."
North Korea had also previously conducted a test launch of four rounds of an improved 600mm super-large multiple rocket launcher on January 27. On that occasion, Rodong Sinmun reported that "all performance indicators of the weapons system have been improved in the direction of maximizing offensive power, and in particular the maneuverability, intelligence, and accuracy of the rocket artillery rounds have been incomparably upgraded, including the striking of a maritime target 358.5 km away."
Since conducting the first test launch of the 600mm super-large multiple rocket launcher on August 24, 2019, North Korea has continued development and repeatedly conducted test launches throughout 2020 and 2021 to verify performance, with the system making its official public appearance at the military parade on April 25, 2022. On December 31, 2022, a ceremony was held to present 30 mobile launchers (six-tube MRL) for the mass-produced super-large multiple rocket launcher, and on February 18, 2026, North Korea publicly staged a ceremony presenting 50 five-tube MRL launchers, demonstrating its large-scale production and operational capabilities.
Meanwhile, four types of mobile launchers for the super-large multiple rocket launcher have been identified through materials North Korea has released via state media since 2019: a four-tube tracked type, a six-round tracked type, a four-tube four-axle eight-wheeled vehicle type, and a five-tube four-axle eight-wheeled vehicle type, the last of which made a prominent appearance at the ceremony presenting 50 mobile launchers on February 18, 2026.
The mobile launcher that appeared at the ceremony presenting 30 units on December 31, 2022, was a tracked type equipped with two rows of six launch tubes in a six-round configuration, but has seldom appeared since that time. This appears to be attributable to a determination that tracked mobile launchers are unsuitable for actual combat use due to their heavy vehicle weight and reduced driving speed.
In the case of the four-tube four-axle wheeled vehicle type mobile launcher, while mobility is superior, its concentrated firepower strike capability is inferior to that of the six-tube type. North Korea appears to have made a final determination that the five-tube configuration (three launch tubes on the lower tier and two launch tubes on the upper tier) is the most suitable, and is assessed to have begun concentrated development of the five-tube four-axle wheeled vehicle type from the middle of 2024. The five-tube four-axle wheeled vehicle type was mobilized for the super-large multiple rocket launcher test launch conducted on September 12, 2024, and following that test, concentrated improvement work was undertaken. Given that a ceremony was held on February 18, 2026, to present 50 five-tube four-axle wheeled vehicle type mobile launchers, the five-tube launch system appears to have established itself as the primary configuration (North Korea has designated this five-tube super-large multiple rocket launcher as the "upgraded ultra-precision multiple rocket launcher," with a range of 400km).
A critical capability requirement for the five-tube super-large multiple rocket launcher is the capability to conduct five consecutive rapid-fire launches. The core capability of a multiple rocket launcher system is "concentrated firepower," consisting of the projection of a large volume of rounds against a specific area within a short period of time. The essential operational requirement is to unleash maximum firepower simultaneously in rapid succession within a short time interval, and then to vacate the launch position within a short period of time in order to evade detection of the launch position. Accordingly, if equipped with five launch tubes, the ability to fire five rounds in rapid succession at short intervals in order to increase "instantaneous firepower density" is an important capability element.
However, North Korea has not demonstrated the ability to conduct consecutive launches equaling the number of launch tubes mounted on a mobile launcher during mass launch exercises. The instances in which North Korea has conducted mass launches are as follows:
⑴ March 18, 2024: Six four-tube launchers mobilized; one round each fired simultaneously for a total of six shells. ⑵ May 30, 2024: Eighteen ‘four-tube and six-tube’ launchers mobilized; one round each fired simultaneously for a total of 18 shells. ⑶ January 27, 2026: Two five-tube mobile launchers mobilized; two rounds fired simultaneously on two separate occasions for a total of four shells. ⑷ March 14, 2026 Twelve five-tube mobile launchers mobilized; aligned in a single row, one round each fired sequentially for a total of 12 shells.
These facts constitute evidence that North Korea's "upgraded ultra-precision multiple rocket launcher" (five-tube configuration) does not possess the consecutive launch capability, namely the ability to fire five rounds in rapid succession, which is the core capability requirement of a multiple rocket launcher system. If North Korea had possessed the capability to conduct five consecutive rapid-fire launches, North Korea, which is inclined toward ostentatious demonstrations, would already have released video footage of five rounds being launched in rapid succession from a five-tube mobile launcher.
Hypersonic Glide Vehicle(HGV) Launch
On January 4 of this year, North Korea conducted a HGV launch training exercise, reporting without disclosing specific launch parameters that "the missile was launched from the Ryokpo District of Pyongyang City in a northeast direction and struck a target at a range of approximately 1,000 km over the East Sea."
Since conducting the first HGV test launch in January 2021, North Korea has continued development through seven test launches conducted through October 2025. However, following its claim at the time of the seventh launch on October 22, 2025, that it had "successfully conducted a test of an important weapons system," and its assertion at the time of the January 4 launch this year that "the missile struck its target," North Korea has been unable to specify the concrete details of the test successes. Kim Jong Un remarked that "through today's launch training exercise, it was confirmed that a very important national defense technology task was carried out, and we must continuously upgrade our offensive weapons systems," referencing the "need for continued improvement," and has been unable to declare that "development has been successfully completed."
The technology for hypersonic glide vehicle development is an extremely high-difficulty technical challenge requiring precision guidance and control to be achieved while the glide vehicle maneuvers at hypersonic speeds. The United States, China, and Russia are known to have been researching and developing this technology for approximately 30 years or more. In the case of China and Russia, which are known to have deployed the system, questions remain regarding the completeness of the technology even after deployment, and the United States, which seeks to apply the most advanced technology, is also known to remain in a state of incomplete development.
Based on the development trends observed to date, North Korea appears to have achieved some degree of technical progress through analysis of flight data accumulated over the eight test launches conducted since the first test launch in 2021, including △ improvements to the rocket engine performance of the launch vehicle and △ refinements to the glide vehicle design. However, the program appears to remain at the stage of analyzing flight patterns such as long-range glide maneuvers of the hypersonic glide vehicle and integrating the findings into precision guidance and control technologies. It is assessed that additional test launches will continue to be required in order to develop precision guidance and control algorithms for high-speed flight under hypersonic conditions and to secure sufficient flight data necessary for the development of hypersonic aerodynamic design and thermal shielding technologies. -
During the period from January through April of this year, North Korea achieved the following: △ the continued development of precision guidance and control technology for glide vehicles through hypersonic missile launches; △ a demonstration of sequential launch capability using five-tube mobile launch platforms that have entered mass production, in the case of super-large multiple rocket launchers, which offer a more cost-effective alternative to ballistic missiles; △ an emphasis on warhead diversification including cluster warheads and carbon fiber warheads; and △ the expansion of launch platforms from ground-based to sea-based through the launch of strategic cruise missiles from naval vessels. In particular, the mounting of diversified warheads such as cluster warheads on cost-effective super-large multiple rocket launchers, when employed simultaneously with short-range solid-propellant missiles in mixed launches, suggests that the threat level posed to South Korea will increase, and that North Korea's weapons systems are capable of continued improvement over time. This constitutes a development trend of considerable note, as it gives rise to the need to further enhance South Korea's state of preparedness.
At the same time, however, in light of △ the delayed operationalization of hypersonic missiles, △ the failure to secure a sustained rapid-fire capability for super-large multiple rocket launchers, △ the fact that cluster warheads do not represent a new warhead type and that carbon fiber warheads remain at an early stage of development, and △ the fact that strategic cruise missiles have yet to be equipped with a submarine-based launch platform, it will be necessary to continue verifying the degree of technical completion of North Korea's capabilities rather than accepting at face value the demonstrations and claims North Korea puts forward.
Our Response Measures
North Korea's missile development activities in the first half of 2026 differ from previous patterns in that they are focused on verifying operational viability in actual combat conditions, going beyond mere demonstrations of military force. In particular, the possibility of combining diversified warhead types such as cluster warheads with various delivery systems poses a burden on the ROK-U.S. defense architecture that cannot be underestimated.
As such, North Korea's advances in missile technology reflect a multifaceted pattern that goes beyond a simple quantitative increase, encompassing △ the reduction of weapons system operational costs, △ improvements in combat effectiveness and precision, and △ the diversification of weapons systems and launch platforms. South Korea's response strategy must be strengthened in alignment with these changes.
Accordingly, in order to effectively counter North Korea's threats and secure a position of advantage, South Korea must accelerate the diversification and advancement of its missile and launch systems, while in particular incrementally expanding the quantitative and qualitative capabilities of its offensive and intercept missile inventories and launch platforms, thereby enhancing the survivability and operational flexibility of its forces. In addition, in order to improve the efficiency of responses to North Korea's missile threats, the development of low-cost, high-efficiency intercept systems and, over the long term, the development of AI-based real-time response systems capable of securing a "mass simultaneous response capability" appear to be essential.
Furthermore, a sea-based integrated defense architecture should be established to enhance the multilayered response capabilities of naval vessels, while the information sharing framework among South Korea, the United States, and Japan regarding North Korean missiles must be further advanced in order to strengthen the capability to detect and respond to enemy mobile launchers. Over the long term, it will be necessary to further strengthen ROK-U.S. defense cooperation toward the establishment of a persistent surveillance and tracking architecture based on a low-orbit satellite constellation and the transformation of the battlespace toward space and network-centric operations.
| Assessment of Trends in Missile Program Activities
| Implications of Missile Program Activities
※ The contents published on 'Sejong Focus' are personal opinions of the author and do not represent the official views of Sejong Institue
