Japan's House of Councilors Election Results:

Difficult to Revise the Constitution, But Abe's Influence Remains

No.2019-23 (2019.07.23)

Dr. Jin Chang Soo

Director of the Center for Japanese Studies

jincs@sejong.org

Although the ruling party won the majority as expected at this year’s House of Councilors Election, it failed to take 2/3 of seats, which is the number qualifying for the amendment to the constitution. It seems like the Japanese citizens considered this election as a vote of confidence for the Abe administration. They threw a vote for Abe because the general atmosphere was not supportive of opposition parties. Not many among citizens expected the Abe administration would change through this election, and thus people were less interested in the election than ever as the result of 48% turnout of voters represents.

Though there were many voices in Korea that ROK-Japan relations are being used at the election, Korea-Japan relationship has not become a critical issue. It is true that Abe attempted to politically utilize Korea-Japan relations, but other domestic issues such as pension and consumption tax have dominated debate scenes. Denunciation of Korea by Abe effectively strengthened cohesion within the conservatives, but it is hard to link such action to the winning votes of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP).

In 2019 Election, support for the the LDP remained intact with no clear issues raised. Opposition parties sought to collect dissenting votes against Abe by opposing his proposal to raise consumption tax and pension, but it was not successful. Nevertheless, the fact that the Abe administration remains the same does not mean that the results of election have insignificant impact on Japanese politics. For Prime Minister Abe, this election was a critical juncture to determine whether he could push for a constitutional revision and maintain his influence.

At the beginning, Abe raised the issue of constitution revision and attempted to make it an issue for the election. For him, this year’s election was the last opportunity to thrust constitutional amendment. However, unlike his intention, other issues such as annual pension overpowered the issue of constitutional reform, and it failed to become a critical agenda. Moreover, the majority party failed to take 2/3 of seats at this election. As a result, only 81 seats were secured, four short of number qualifying for constitutional amendment.

A few Korean media forecasted that Abe would push for constitutional amendment even by drawing in opposition parties since he has been aggressive toward the constitutional amendment. But numerous obstacles await for Abe in making such amendment. First, Komeito (New Komeito, NKP), a Japanese political party, must approve the amendment. If the LDP succeeded in securing more than 2/3 seats, The NKP might have soften its stance of opposing the constitutional amendment to remain as the ruling party. However, since fraction that thrusts for the constitutional reform is no larger than 2/3, there is no reason for the NKP to be active in this issue. The opposition from the NKP is painful for Abe because the LDP cannot maintain its status as the ruling party without the coalition with the NKP. Second, it is never easy to attract politicians from opposition parties. At least four proponents of constitutional revision must be secured in the upper house to push for the amendment, but it is not much hopeful. There are rumors saying that Abe is in contact with conservative figures within the Democratic Party for the People (DPFP) to persuade for the constitutional revision. However, most politicians in DPFP have their support base at the working class, so they find it hard to transfer their position in favor of the LDP. Third, even if the National Assembly agrees to the constitutional amendment, it will not be easy to pass the hurdle of referendum. Public opinion poll indicates that the Japanese citizens in general expressed adverse opinions toward the constitutional revision. Provided the referendum rejects the amendment of constitution, PM Abe will have to resign and the constitutional revision won’t be discussed for at least a decade. It is hard to think that Abe will shoulder such political risks and make all-out efforts to revise the constitution. As seen from his previous attitude, Abe has more focused on the maintenance of power than the amendment of constitution.

If Abe pushes for the constitutional amendment, he may succeed doing so by giving up article 9. But in other words, it would also mean that he failed in revising article 9, which he insisted on. Now Abe will have to face the reality that constitutional revision is impossible. Considering that he could not revise the constitution even when 2/3 of the ruling party supported the amendment, Abe needs to accept that he has lost his momentum for amendment as a result of this election.

Abe's influence after the election is another issue which needs close attention. If the LDP took the sole majority or put up a good fight, Abe could have sought for the fourth term. However, it is no longer a possible option. Nonetheless, since the ruling party (LDP+NKP) acquired a stable majority for this election, the Abe administration will maintain its rule and its influence in Japanese politics, and Abe will also sustain his power within the LDP. Abe’s strength comes from him standing as a visage of election. Abe has shown a strong image in every election, and in fact he has won all five elections. Competition for post-Abe position within the LDP may begin, but Abe will continue to exert his influence as he holds the right to dissolve the House of Representatives. Furthermore, currently Abe faction doubles that of other factions. In other words, it is difficult to become a next prime minister without Abe's support. Depending on Abe's political affairs, his influence as a kingmaker will last for a long time.

The result of election does not indicate any reason for Abe to improve ROK-Japan relations. Japanese conservatives are relieved that Abe gave Korea a blow. For this circumstance, Abe is not much considering a possible exit from the current Korea-Japan relationship. Therefore, there is a high possibility of Abe being tough on Korea. First, it is very likely to delete Korea from Japan’s “white list,” which is scheduled for August. Based on this move, Abe will attempt to put more pressure on Korea. He has also forewarned the execution of countermeasures in case of official liquidation of the assets of Japanese companies, which were ordered by the South Korean Supreme Court to compensate former Korean workers who were forced into labor during the colonial period.

There are voices inside Japan criticizing Abe, but many reasonable opinions are buried in the anti-Korean atmosphere. The citizens of both countries may become major victims of the current situation. However, not many people think that the damage of Japan will be larger than that of Korea. Thus, there is low incentive for Japan to negotiate since people predict that Korea would receive larger damage.

It is important to create a window of opportunity to find an exit from the current situation. If South Korea continues to act in passive manner without any will to manage ROK-Japan relations, it will be harder to find an exit strategy. Provided the South Korean government waits for the time to negotiate due to actual harm, such as prevalence of negative perception toward Korea in Japan or happening of real damage in Korea or to Korean people, the South Korean government will “lock the stable door after the horse is stolen.”

※ Translator’s note: This is a summarized unofficial translation of the original paper which was written in Korean. All references should be made to the original paper. 

※ This article is written based on the author’s personal opinions and does not reflect the views of the Sejong Institute.