China’s policy toward North Korea after the Trump-Kim summit at Panmunjom

[Current Issues and Policies 2019-16]

Dr. Lee Seong-hyon

Director of the Center for Chinese Studies,

the Sejong Institute

sunnybbsfs@sejong.org

China’s stake in the North Korean Nuclear Issue rises

Some experts suggest that the third US-DPRK Summit at Panmunjom on June 30th, 2019, was made possible because President Xi Jinping of China nudged Kim Jong Un to do so. If this were true, it would imply Xi Jinping’s intention to act as a behind-the-scene mediator between Donald Trump and Kim Jong Un. This essay reflects on China’s strategic perspectives before and after the third US-DPRK Summit and predicts the direction of China’s future policy toward North Korea.

Geng Shuang, the spokesperson of the Foreign Ministry of China, commented (July 1st) on the Summit at Panmunjom that it was “a constructive meeting with positive outcomes” and, emphasizing the significance of North Korea and the US’s agreement to resume working-level talks, that “China supports this.” He added that “President Xi Jinping's recent successful visit to North Korea has injected new impetus into the political settlement process of the Peninsula issue,” hinting at China’s role behind the curtains.

From China’s strategic perspective, the US-DPRK Summit on June 30 and the Xi’s preceding visit to North Korea (June 20th-21st) are organically connected. The South Korean government showed a positive reaction as soon as Xi’s plan to visit the North was announced. On June 18, an authority in the Blue House commented on Xi’s visit that the visit will “help revive the impetus for dialogue and keep the ember alight,” echoing the explanations from the Chinese government’s commentary.

The authority also said “the US and China share a perfect unanimity of opinion regarding the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.” This remark means that there is a consensus between the US and China to bring North Korea to table for dialogue, backing the analysis that Xi Jinping will play a certain ‘mediating’ role in the Summit at Panmunjom, as stated above.

According to Chinese state media, Xi indeed stated in Pyongyang that he supported the US-DPRK dialogue. Xinhua News Agency (June 20th) reported that Xi started his speech by saying “During the past one year, the Korean peninsula rekindled the prospect for solution through dialogue and gained empathy and anticipation from the international society.” He continued, “positively evaluate North Korea’s effort for denuclearization,” and “the international society is hoping for US-DPRK talks to progress and bear fruit.” Although the subject of the sentence was ‘the international society,’ this is clearly a diplomatic rhetoric to express that China wishes the success of the US-DPRK talks.

Worthy of more attention are his next remarks, which can be summarized as follows: [China will] 1) acquire an accurate understanding of the state of affairs from a strategic altitude and a long-term perspective in order to defend the establishment of peace in the Korean peninsula; 2) support political solution for the Korea problem; 3) help North Korea to address its rational concerns on security and worries about economic development to the best of our ability; and 4) play an active role in accomplishing denuclearization in the peninsula.

These statements need to be read closely, because China too, like the US, wants denuclearized North Korea but via different means. As US-China rivalry intensifies, differing policy over North Korea can be a potential source of conflict in the future.

‘Political solution for the Korea problem’ means that military forces may not be used to solve North Korea's nuclear issue—a message toward the US. The expression ‘rational concerns on security’ is now rather familiar; it means China understands ‘security anxiety’ North Korea would feel had it given up the nuclear program. By this, China takes side with North Korea, and shows its political care and sympathy for North Korea as another socialist state.

It means China, sharing an identity of socialist state with North Korea, sympathizes North Korea’s ‘rational security concerns’ and is willing to help with its worries about economic development. To specify this, an extreme phrase, ‘to the best of our ability (力所能及)’ was used. The English translation literally clarifies the meaning. It is a phrase that can be found more frequently in conversations among friends than in realist diplomacy. Even in the ‘blood alliance’ of China and North Korea, the phrase was last used by Wen Jiabao, the former Premier of China, in his visit to Pyongyang in October 2009. Considering 2009 was the 60th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries and 2019 is the 70th, this can be called a ‘treasured’ expression that is used only once in ten years.

The key is in Xi’s description of his approach: ‘from a strategic altitude and a long-term perspective.’ This quite abstract expression reveals China’s intention to solve the North Korean nuclear problem fundamentally, which Trump’s current approach cannot achieve.

Trump has argued that previous US Presidents’ approaches to North Korea in the past 25 years were all wrong. Hence he made the extraordinary move to meet Kim Jong Un face to face in Singapore and fix the problem, but the North Korea problem was stagnated again in one year since the Singapore summit. During this period, China was only observing the situation. Some talked of the ‘China passing.’ Now, however, China has declared that it will play ‘an active role’ to draw a ‘fundamental’ solution to the North Korea problem, which Trump could not fix. A Chinese scholar explained, “This means Xi Jinping will take the lead in dribbling the ball of North Korean nuclear issue.”

In sum, Xi Jinping’s visit to Pyongyang in June was a significant event in which China proposed so-called the ‘Chinese solution (中國方案)’ for the North Korean nuclear issue. While China’s existing policies, ‘double-freeze’ (雙中斷; simultaneous cease of North Korea’s nuclear and missile tests and the US-ROK joint military exercises) and ‘double wheels’ (雙軌竝行; parallel developments in US-DPRK peace treaty and denuclearization), focused mainly on ‘management’ of the North Korea problem, this time it proposed a ‘solution’ to the problem. Employing the forceful diplomacy, characteristic of the Xi Jinping era, in its North Korea policy, China gives a direct answer to the question ‘if North Korea gives up nuclear weapons, who will guarantee its security?’—China will be the one to step up and relieve North Korea’s concerns.

Thus China denies the American solution, which is by means of economic sanctions, and proposes the Chinese solution, which is by means of security guarantee. This solution is based on the logic that North Korea will abandon the nuclear program only if its ‘rational’ security concerns are addressed. Therefore, this is fundamentally different in philosophy from the US’s policy.

Also significant is that Xi actually engaged in an action to alleviate North Korea’s security anxiety. First, Miao Hua, Director of the Political Work Department of the Central Military Commission, accompanied Xi to Pyongyang—a clear political signal that China and North Korea will begin exchanges in the military sector. Miao is a three-star admiral of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), responsible for personnels and propaganda of the armed forces. Although it is in fact ‘normal’ for such a high-rank military officer to accompany to a summit, this event particularly draws attention because there had been almost no military exchanges between the two countries in the last ten years. No military dignitary had visited North Korea during the period, which is an ‘abnormal’ state. Therefore, the Summit in June was a momentous event that ‘normalized the abnormal.’

This does not mean that Chinese and North Korean armies will start joint military drills any time soon, as US and South Korea do. The exchange is likely to begin with ‘soft’ exchanges, such as observing military exercises and North Korean military personnel’s visits to PLA. Miao Hua’s name was actually not included in the list of entourage made public by the Chinese state media. The military exchanges between the two countries might become “visible” to the purview of the outside world if China decides to send a delegation of military dignitaries to Pyongyang for their 70th anniversary, which falls on October 6. However, there is one important variable. If the US and North Korea are planning to resume long-overdue working-level negotiations, then North Korea may want to keep a low profile of its burgeoning military exchanges with China.