North Korea’s 2nd Session of the 14th Supreme People’s Assembly and 

Evaluation of Changes in the Status of Chairman of the State Affairs Commission

No.2019-24 (2019.08.30)

Dr. Cheong Seong-Chang 

Vice President of Research Planning,

The Sejong Institute

softpower@sejong.org

North Korea amended its constitution again at the second session of the 14th Supreme People’s Assembly (SPA) August 29, 2019, after the previous amendment at the first session on April 11.

North Korea’s Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) reported that at the second session of the 14th SPA on August 29, the article regarding the status and authority of Chairman of the State Affairs Commission (SAC), “Chairman of the SAC is elected at the SPA in accordance with the unanimous will of all the Korean people, and is not elected as a deputy of the SPA,” was added to the Constitution.

In the election for deputies of the SPA held on March 10 of this year, Kim Jong Un was not elected as a deputy, unlike his father, Kim Jong Il, or his grandfather, Kim Il Sung. This was the first case in which the Supreme Leader of North Korea did not also assume the position of deputy of the SPA since the founding of the regime.

It has been interpreted that Kim Jong-un did not assume another position for the practical reason that, as he already possesses all the key positions in the party, the state, and the military—Chairman of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK), Chairman of the SAC, and Supreme Commander of the Korean People’s Army (KPA)—it was not crucial to hold another position that is largely honorary. The new constitutional revision serves to provide the justification for this after the fact.

KCNA also reported that it was added to the constitution that “SAC Chairman is authorized to promulgate SPA ordinances and major SAC decrees and decisions and to appoint or recall diplomatic envoys to foreign countries.” The former part, ‘promulgate SPA decrees and major SAC ordinances and decisions,’ is almost identical with the 1972 Constitution’s authorization of the President of DPRK to ‘promulgate decrees of the SPA, ordinances of the Central People’s Committee, and decisions of the Presidium of SPA.’ Therefore, the new constitutional revision makes the duties and authorities of SAC Chairman closer to those of the President of DPRK in Kim Il Sung’s era.

However, in the 1972 Constitution, the power to ‘appoint or recall ambassadors and ministers’ did not belong to the President but to the Central People’s Committee. The amendment in April also invested the Presidium of the SPA with the authority to ‘decide and promulgate appointment and recall of diplomatic envoys.’ The fact that the new amendment gave this authority, which even the President did not possess, to SAC Chairman demonstrates Kim Jong Un’s intention that he will directly manage appointments of North Korean representatives residing abroad. With this exhibition of his interest in diplomatic affairs, it is expected that diplomacy will carry a greater importance in Kim’s public activities.

Between the amendments in 1998 and April 2019, the official position that externally ‘represented’ DPRK was President of the Presidium of the SPA. But in April, North Korea revamped the Constitution to define Chairman of the SAC ‘the Supreme Leader of DPRK who represents the state.’ As a result, in North Korea, both SAC Chairman and SPA Presidium President—the latter also ‘represents the state and receives foreign envoys’ credentials and summons’—come to ‘represent the state’ together.

Practically, there will be little collision of authorities between the two positions, because the SAC Chairman will ‘represent that state’ at summits with most important nations such as the United States, China, South Korea, and Russia, and the SPA Presidium President will attend meetings with leaders of relatively less important countries. The fact that President of the Presidium of the SPA ‘represents the state’ has to do with the position’s emulation of ‘Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet’ of Soviet Union in its origin.

The 1972 Constitution conferred the power to ‘receive foreign envoys’ credentials and summons‘ to the President of DPRK. But since the new amendment in August did not mention that this authority will be given to SAC Chairman, it seems that the authority will remain in the hands of SPA Presidium President.

KCNA also reported that the SPA second session on August 29th modified the duties and authorities of the SAC to ‘supervise and develop measures on orders of the SAC Chairman, ordinances and decisions of the SAC, and executive ordinances.’ The amendment in April had stated that the SAC ‘supervises and develop measures on orders of SAC Chairman, decisions of the SAC, and executive ordinances.’ That is, ‘ordinances of the SAC’ is now added on.

The amendments in June 2016 and April 2019 granted the right to announce ordinances, which carry the same effect as laws, only to the SPA Presidium. The revision in August enabled the SAC to announce ordinances as the Central People’s Committee in Kim Il Sung’s era did. Consequently, the amendment on August 29 strengthens ‘the legal authority of the SAC as the pivotal institution to realize the monolithic guidance of the Supreme Leader’ and further guarantees Kim’s ‘monolithic guidance’ in national enterprises in general.

DPRK’s additional constitutional amendment to enhance the status and authorities of the SAC and its Chairman can be interpreted as a reflection of Kim Jong Un’s intention to manage the nation’s economy, defense, education as well as diplomacy more actively. Nevertheless, the fact that Kim has never held an SAC meeting so far, unlike the Politburo meetings and Plenary meetings of the WPK Central Committee that he held many times, sheds doubts on SAC’s actual role in policy decisions. It is also difficult to forecast how actively Kim will participate in the future denuclearization negotiations.

In order to nudge North Korea’s new decisions at the second session of the 14th SPA toward our goals of peace on the Korean peninsula, dissolution of the Cold War system, and improvement of the inter-Korean relationship, South Korea’s bilateral cooperations with the United States, China, Japan, and Russia are very important. North Korea-U.S. bilateral talks must also be expanded to four-party (North and South Koreas, the U.S., and China) and six-party (adding Japan and Russia) talks, so that North Korea’s denuclearization, establishment of the peace regime on the peninsula, normalization of the North Korea-U.S. and North Korea-Japan relations, and lift of sanctions on North Korea can be all advanced simultaneously.

※ Translator’s note: This is a summarized unofficial translation of the original paper which was written in Korean. All references should be made to the original paper.

※ This article is written based on the author’s personal opinions and does not reflect the views of the Sejong Institute.