Redirecting South Korea’s Japan Policy:

From Demand for Reparation to Demand for Acknowledgement of Colonial Illegality

[Sejong Commentary] No.2019-25

Cheong Seong-Chang

Vice President of Research Planning,

the Sejong Institute

softpower@sejong.org

In July 2017, in the first summit meeting with Prime Minister Shinzo Abe of Japan held at Hamburg, Germany, President Moon Jae-in of South Korea said that “Korea and Japan are the closest friends both geographically and culturally, sharing basic values and strategic interests,” and that he “hope[s] that countries would work together to establish a forward-looking, mature, and cooperative partnership while bringing the past wounds of history under proper management.” Prime Minister Abe positively responded, “Japan and Korea, invaluable neighbors that share strategic interests, should continue to cooperate based on close communication between the two leaders.” Nevertheless, the two leaders could not bridge the stark difference in their views on the ‘comfort women (sexual slaves to the imperial Japanese army)’ agreement concluded in December 2015 during the Park Geun-hye administration.

The relationship between South Korea and Japan strained drastically when the Supreme Court of the former delivered the verdict in October 2018 that Japanese companies have the responsibility to provide reparations for the victims of forced labor during the Japanese colonial era. The relationship further exacerbated in the following month, when the South Korean government officially announced the dissolution of the Reconciliation and Healing Foundation that had been establish upon the military sexual slaves agreement of 2015, facing strong resistance by the Japanese cabinet. On July 4 this year, Japan imposed export restriction on three key materials needed for production of semiconductors; on August 2, Abe convened a cabinet meeting and decided to amend its legislation on import, export, and trade to exclude South Korea from the ‘whitelist,’ the list of trusted trading partners that receive preferential treatment in customs clearance. In response, the Moon administration of South Korea announced its decision to end General Security of Military Intelligence Agreement (GSOMIA) on August 22, and is expected to announce a revised notice on the import and export of strategic materials to exclude Japan from Korea’s ‘whitelist’ within this week.

The greatest responsibility for the current collapse in the Korea-Japan relationship falls on the Abe cabinet, which does not recognize the illegality of the colonial rule and responded to the force labor reparation issue with economic retaliation. Nonetheless, a tough-to-tough, head-on confrontation would not be the wisest way for Korea. Although it is possible that Japan will suffer more damage due to Koreans’ boycott of Japanese products and tourism to Japan, economic loss on our part is also unavoidable since the two economies are closely integrated. It will not be easy either to narrow the fundamental technological gap between Japan and Korea in a short period of time.

The recent economic retaliation by Japan is to a great extent an emotional reaction against the Supreme Court ruling on forced labor reparation. Therefore, the most important key to restore the bilateral relationship is to find the solution for this issue. The following six options may be considered as the solution.

As the first option, the victims themselves may opt to sell the properties that are seized from the companies held responsible. In this case, the victims, who already went through the solitary struggle in the judiciary, must now fight against the Japanese corporations, as well as their government and citizens (Nam Ki Jeong). Should the execution be enforced upon the companies, the Korea-Japan relationship will only be worsened.

The second option is to install an arbitration committee according to the dispute resolution procedure in Article 3 of the Claims Settlement Agreement of 1965. This process will take at least 1-2 years to arrive at the conclusion, delaying the relief for the victims as much.

The third option is for both countries to take the issue to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) together, and receive the credible third-party adjudication from the international organization. But it is doubtful that a lawsuit will help improve the relationship. Also, considering the international society’s low sense of responsibility for colonialism, the likely result will be either a partial victory/partial loss (Lee Won-deog), or even a complete loss (Nam). It must be noted that there are very few cases in which former imperialist countries compensated for colonial rules. It will take at least 3-4 years for the ICJ to reach a verdict; therefore, this option will delay reparation for the victims as well.

The fourth option is called the 1+1+1 (Nam)—in which the Korean government leads the process, and Korean companies that received the settlement money from 1965 and Japanese companies that conscripted the forced laborers provide compensation together—or 2+1 (Lee)—in which Korean and Japanese companies donate, and the Korean government joins to negotiate with the Japanese government, as suggested by Korea’s foreign ministry on June 19—strategy. As this process entails a trilateral agreement among the victims, the Korean and the Japanese companies, if succeeded it will promptly relieve the victims and restore the Korea-Japan relationship. However, it will be practically difficult to get consent from all three parties, especially the Japanese corporations. Given that the Abe cabinet does not recognize the illegality of the colonial rule, it is highly unlikely that they will accept the 1+1+1 or 2+1 strategy.

The fifth option is ‘pay first, claim for indemnity later’ strategy, in which the Korean government first offer remunerations for the victims according to the 2018 Supreme Court ruling and then negotiate with the Japanese government (Jin Chang Soo). Alternatively, the sixteen Korean corporations that received the settlement money may raise funds to pay reparations and then claim for indemnity to the Japanese government (Yang Ki-ho). If the Korean government or companies deal with the reparation first, the Abe cabinet will show a positive reaction. But it is also highly unlikely that they will accept the indemnity negotiation or allow their companies to participate in the negotiation.

As the sixth option, the South Korean government, with its advanced economy and enlarged financial budget, may maintain a moral high ground by completing the reparation internally and demanding apology and atonement for the colonial rule from Japan (Jin, Lee). If the Korean government declares that the former will not ask for monetary remuneration for the forced labor victims but the Japanese government must acknowledge the illegality of the colonial rule, the Abe cabinet will lose justification to uphold the economic retaliation and be placed in a diplomatic conundrum. As a related case, in 2007 the Roh Moo-hyun administration has provided compensation of 630 billion won to victims of colonialism according to the disclosure of documents between Korea and Japan.

If we reciprocate in kind to unrepentant Japan’s foul economic retaliation, the damage will be not only on them but also on us. If the remuneration to be delivered to the forced labor victims is not larger than the economic loss on our part as a result of this trade war, it is more desirable for the South Korean government to put an end to the strife by offering remuneration to the victims on behalf of the Japanese corporations, for the sake of South Korea’s national interest and future international cooperation for denuclearization of North Korea. South Korea may be reminded of Sun Tzu’s teaching: “To win the enemy in a fight is the lowest art of war; the supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting.”

※ Translator’s note: This is a summarized unofficial translation of the original paper which was written in Korean. All references should be made to the original paper.

※ This article is written based on the author’s personal opinions and does not reflect the views of the Sejong Institute.

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