Failed Working-Level Nuclear Talks in Stockholm and Direction for Kim Jong Un’s U.S. Policy

[Sejong Commentary] No.2019-26

Cheong Seong-Chang 

Vice President of Research Planning,

The Sejong Institute

softpower@sejong.org

In seven months after the failure of the U.S.-North Korea Summit in Hanoi in February this year, the working-level talks held in Stockholm on October 5 also broke down. Because the Hanoi Summit revealed a stark difference in the two nations’ positions, this working-level talks should have narrowed the difference and kicked off the long journey toward a comprehensive agreement.

After the meeting, however, Kim Myong Gil, DPRK’s Ambassador and the chief negotiator, announced at a press conference that “We don’t believe that the United States is substantively ready for negotiation with us, and therefore we suggested that the negotiations be suspended until the end of the year so that the U.S. can think things over.” But it won’t be easy for the working-level officers on both sides to gather frequently, discuss denuclearization and corresponding measures, and create a set of specific agreements, within the remaining three months until the year-end. North Korea is virtually urging the U.S. to bring the exact kind of proposal that North Korea wants, and such one-sided demand only casts shadows on the North’s sincerity for the denuclearization talks.

Kim stated, “A complete denuclearization of the Korean peninsula is possible only when all obstacles that threaten our safety and hinder our development are undoubtedly eliminated.” Since the ‘first security guarantee and sanction lift, next denuclearization’ is an unacceptable stance for the U.S., the discrepancy will not be easily reduced even if the working-level talks resume.

Kim also said, “We can move on to a full-scale discussion for next steps of denuclearization when the United States responds sincerely to the measures we first took for denuclearization and trust-building, such as ceasing nuclear tests and intercontinental ballistic missiles launches, dismantling of nuclear test facilities, and returning the remains of American soldiers.” He also criticized the U.S. for imposing economic sanctions against North Korea for fifteen times, resuming joint military drills, which President Trump had publicly promised to stop, and threatening North Korea’s rights to survive and develop by deploying high-tech war equipments around them. That is, North Korea is arguing that, if the U.S. wants to continue the talks for denuclearization, it must alleviate the sanctions, cease joint military exercises with South Korea, and stop selling high-tech weapons to the South.

In the meeting in Stockholm, North Korea again rejected an in-depth discussion on the specific definition, methods, and time schedule of denuclearization. Under such circumstances, the U.S. can neither accommodate North Korea’s demands nor allow a ‘partial denuclearization’ instead of complete.

Of course, the best scenario for North Korea would be to discard only a portion of the nuclear program and induce the U.S. to lift the sanctions, so that it can remain a nuclear power while developing its economy. But since such strategy is inadmissible for the U.S. and South Korea, North Korea has no option but to shift its stance from partial to complete denuclearization, or otherwise the North will remain isolated in the international society under continued economic sanctions.

If there is no progress in denuclearization and therefore no alleviation of the UN sanctions by the end of the year, North Korean workers dispatched to China (estimated to be 30,000-50,000), Russia, and other countries, will be forced to return. This will cause a severe plunge in North Korea’s foreign earnings; it seems that the country is planning to handle the possible crisis by attracting more tourists from China.

It is a serious misjudgement if one expects, based on the current favorable relationship between the two, that China will take sides with North Korea even when the North forcefully conducts another nuclear test or launches another ICBM. Presidents Xi Jinping, Moon Jae-in, and Donald Trump agreed to hold summit meetings with Kim Jong Un only because Kim had openly promised to be earnest in the denuclearization talks. Advancing the nuclear and missile program will revert North Korea to the pre-2018 isolation.

To wit, another test launch of ICBM by DPRK will prompt the U.S. and the international society to urge China to stop providing crude oil to North Korea, a pressure to which China will have to relent eventually. Furthermore, another nuclear test will drop Kim’s credibility irrecoverably, when he has already destroyed the nuclear test tunnels in Punggye-ri after declaring in April 2018 that “We do not need any more nuclear tests or test launches of medium-, long-range, or intercontinental ballistic missiles.” at the 3rd Plenum of the 7th Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea (WPK).

Back in October 2000, Kim Jong Il sent Jo Myong Rok, First Vice Chairman of the National Defense Commission (NDC) and Director of the General Politburo of the Korean People’s Army (KPA), to the United States as a special envoy. During the five-day visit, Jo had consecutive meetings with President Bill Clinton, Madeleine Albright, Secretary of State, and William Cohen, Secretary of Defense. As a result, the two governments issued the US-DPRK Joint Communique in which they confirmed their commitment “to make every effort in the future to build a new relationship free from past enmity.”

Likewise, Kim Jong Un may send Choe Ryong Hae, First Vice Chairman of the State Affairs Commission (SAC) and President of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly (SPA), as a special envoy to the U.S. to meet with President Trump, Mike Pompeo, Secretary of State, and Mark Esper, Secretary of Defense, and strike a bargain on the North’s denuclearization and corresponding measures. If Kim Jong Un wants to go bold in the negotiation, normalize the relations with the U.S., lift the UN sanctions and develop the nation, he must put Choe in charge of the denuclearization talks instead of the bureaucrats in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who are not free from the pressure of the military. Choe has successfully carried out a robust military reform when he was the Director of the General Politburo of the KPA. Ri Yong Ho, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Kim Myong Gil, the chief negotiator for last week’s working-level talks, both accompanied Jo to the U.S. in 2000. Therefore, once Kim Jong Un makes the decision, Choe’s visit to the U.S. and high-level talks between the two countries will not be hard to realize.

The future of North Korea is only gloomy unless Kim Jong Un overcomes the selfish foreign ministry bureaucrats, who would not be bothered as long as they can maintain their status, even if the country is isolated again, the people’s lives become more difficult, international distrust on North Korea heightens, or the negative image of Kim proliferates. Kim Jong Un must decide: either to drive North Korea toward further isolation by leaving the negotiation with the U.S. to two incompetent hardliners, Choe Son-hui, First Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Kwon Jong Gun, former head of the North America Department of the Ministry; or to turn to another figure who can be bold, flexible, pragmatic, and effective, before it is too late.

※ Translator’s note: This is a summarized unofficial translation of the original paper which was written in Korean. All references should be made to the original paper.

※ This article is written based on the author’s personal opinions and does not reflect the views of the Sejong Institute.

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