Trump’s Unreasonable Demand for an Increase in the Defense Cost-sharing of the US Armed Forces in Korea: Its Background and Solutions

[Sejong Commentary] No.2019-29

Park Jee-Kwang

(Former Director of the Center for American Studies, The Sejong Institute)

Meetings to conclude the 11th Special Measures Agreement (SMA) continue to meet obstacles. The third round of the ROK-US defense cost-sharing talks that took place on November 19, 2019 ended in just 90 minutes (much shorter than the expected 7 hours), due to stark differences of stance between the two parties. Reportedly, the Trump administration is demanding Seoul to pay $5 billion in defense cost-sharing. That is more than five times the amount Seoul paid last year. Trump’s excessive demand that goes beyond common sense has baffled even the conservative media, and right-wing politicians including Lee Hye Hoon have voiced strong opposition against it.

Yet one may question the validity of his claim. “Is the US truly targeting for $5 billion?” In particular, those who have read Trump’s “The Art of the Deal” would predict President Trump to compromise at the appropriate level after getting a head start at the negotiation table with his unreasonable claim.

However, it seems to me that the final negotiation price will be much higher than the expectations of the public. This is backed by Trump’s particular political situation next year, in which he is seeking for reelection. The US-Mexico border wall is a policy strongly supported by the conservatives and is likely to reappear as a key issue during the election season. For this reason, the US House of Representatives with Democrats being the majority had cut the bulk of the US-Mexico border budget early this year, even enduring federal shutdown. Consequently, the construction of the US-Mexico border wall (also known as the Trump Wall) is making slow progress. According to Mark Morgan, the acting commissioner of Customs and Border Protection, so far only about 70 miles has been constructed. Furthermore, the existing border is known to be a product of reconstruction of previous walls. It has been known that President Trump is both angry and anxious. After visiting the border construction site in Otay Mesa in September, he announced to the press that he would build a total of 500 miles-long wall by the end of next year, that is, just before the election.

Putting technical, legal, and administrative barriers aside, one crucial reason for such delay in building the wall is due to budget deficit. The Trump administration has allocated $8.3 billion in order to build the Trump Wall, but the possibility of passing the bill the House is close to zero. In fact, the Democrats have made clear that they will not approve a single dollar. In this context, procuring an adequate amount of budget seems essential. This September, the Pentagon announced that it would postpone 127 military infrastructure projects (including two installations for the USFK) scheduled to be constructed next year, and use that budget ($3.6 billion) to extend 175 miles of the Trump Wall. Half of the delayed projects from Pentagon cover the cost of building and renovating US military bases inside the country, and strong backlash is anticipated from politicians in those area. Therefore, it is questionable whether the domestic military projects can actually be postponed in line with Pentagon’s announcement. Even if they overcome strong opposition from politicians and somehow procure $3.6 billion, that budget is still insufficient to build a 500-miles-long wall by next year. In this context, it seems natural for President Trump to feel tempted to pass the budget of USFK to Korea and use that budget to build the Wall. The Pentagon has already announced that in the case of overseas military installation, the US will proceed to discuss about defense cost-sharing with its allies. The fact that Japan, just like Korea, has received a $6 billion levy clearly shows Trump’s intention to build a US-Mexico border wall using the US overseas military spending.

Such political situation implies that the current stance of the US to suddenly ask for $5 billion should not be understood as one of many negotiation strategies. The negotiators also claim that the US is very direct and serious upon this matter. Consequently, claims that a dramatic increase in defense cost-sharing seems to be inevitable are gaining strength. Chosun Ilbo even suggested to the South Korean government that it should unravel the so-called five defense shackles bound by the ROK-US Defense Treaty in return for accepting Trump’s demand.

However, it is important to note that the current attitude of the US may suddenly change depending on the outcome of next year’s presidential election. If Trump loses, the excessive demand for defense cost-sharing will eventually disappear. Even in the case where Trump gets reelected and the Republicans regain their leverage on the House of Representatives, such demand will significantly lose its strength. That is because the House will surely pass the budget bills needed to construct the Trump Wall. Thus, the optimal scenario for us is either Democrats or Republicans achieve a landslide victory in the next year’s election. This hope is grounded on the belief that the negotiation environment regarding the defense cost-sharing may significantly alter according to the result of the election, so we need to minimize the increase this time. If this is not the case, it may also be a good idea to provide a one-time extra payment for the year 2020. For instance we could take charge in the construction of the delayed USFK infrastructure, and instead limit the increase rate to 10%.

The ROK-US alliance is the solid basis of our national defense strategy. And because it provides security benefits to our country, stationing US Armed Forces in Korea is an indisputable matter. However, as the US House of Representatives passed the legislation bill that prohibits the number of USFK to be under 22,000, it is hard to accept Trump’s excessive demands stemmed from motives other than security.

※ Translator’s note: This is a summarized unofficial translation of the original paper which was written in Korean. All references should be made to the original paper.

※ This article is written based on the author’s personal opinions and does not reflect the views of the Sejong Institute.

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