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[Sejong Focus] Analysis of North Korea's Super-Large Multiple Rocket Launcher and Reveal of Uranium Enrichment Facility

Date 2024-09-20 View 1,591

On September 13th, North Korea’s Rodong Sinmun reported that Kim Jong Un "inspected a weapons-grade nuclear material production base," revealing images of a production facility for highly enriched uranium. According to the article, Kim Jong Un "suggested that a key task of the long-term plan is to increase production
Analysis of North Korea's Super-Large Multiple Rocket Launcher and Reveal of Uranium Enrichment Facility
Sep 20, 2024

 

    Jo Jang-Won
    Visiting Research Fellow, Sejong Institute | jjo@sejong.org
    | North Korea's Reveal of Uranium Enrichment Facility
      On September 13th, North Korea’s Rodong Sinmun reported that Kim Jong Un "inspected a weapons-grade nuclear material production base," revealing images of a production facility for highly enriched uranium. According to the article, Kim Jong Un "suggested that a key task of the long-term plan is to increase production of weapons-grade nuclear materials" and stressed “the need to boost the number of centrifuges to exponentially increase the nuclear arsenal in accordance with the party's line of building up its nuclear forces."

      It is presumed that the uranium enrichment plant visited by Kim Jong Un is located at either the Yongbyon complex or the Kangson complex. According to media reports, North Korea allegedly doubled the size of its uranium enrichment plant at Yongbyon in 2013 (from 2,000 centrifuges to 4,000) and was discovered to have further expanded the facility in September 2021 (adding an additional 1,000 centrifuges). Moreover, a report published by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in June stated that "work commenced on the construction of an annex to the main building in the Kangson complex, significantly expanding the available floor space." The Kangson complex is a suspected "production facility for highly enriched uranium" similar to the uranium enrichment plant at Yongbyon. Therefore, it is questionable whether the Kangson complex, which is only a suspected uranium enrichment facility, and not the Yongbyon complex has been revealed, and it seems that further investigation is necessary to confirm if Kim Jong Un visited the Yongbyon or Kangson complex.
    | Intention Behind Revealing the Uranium Enrichment Facility
      North Korea’s report on Kim Jong Un's inspection of the uranium facility seems intended to demonstrate that his recent emphasis on "exponentially increasing the nuclear arsenal" is "more than just empty words" as "expanding the production of nuclear materials" is required to "exponentially increase the number of nuclear warheads.“

      During the 6th Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea held from December 26 to 31, 2022, Kim Jong Un called for "exponentially increasing the country's nuclear arsenal," and in a speech for party leaders on September 9th, he stated "we are steadily carrying out a policy of building up our nuclear forces to exponentially increase the number of nuclear weapons.“

      With the announcement of the Nuclear Force Policy Act in September 2022, the military exercises conducted by the tactical nuclear operation unit of the Korea People's Army from September 25 to October 9, 2022, the Supreme People's Assembly meeting in September 2023 where the Nuclear Force Policy was enshrined in the constitution, including the “exponential increase in the production of nuclear weapons," and now Kim Jong Un's inspection of the uranium enrichment plant, North Korea is actively showing off the "advancement of its nuclear capabilities.”

      Considering that a new U.S. president is to be elected later this year and that Kim Jong Un has intentions for "arms control talks" with the new U.S. administration, Kim’s emphasis on an "exponential increase in nuclear warheads" and "reveal of a nuclear materials production facility (uranium enrichment)" can be seen as moves to publicize and show off a "large number of nuclear warheads" to strengthen North Korea's leverage in the event of negotiations with the United States. In anticipation of possible "arms control talks," North Korea is likely to further strengthen its negotiating position by increasing its nuclear material production and continually claiming to possess a significant number of low-yield nuclear warheads.
    | North Korea Conducts Test-Fire to Verify Performance of Super-Large Multiple Rocket Launcher
      South Korea's Joint Chiefs of Staff announced on September 12th that "North Korea launched multiple short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) from the area around Pyeongyang into the East Sea at around 07:10 a.m., and the missiles flew around 360 km, landing in the East Sea." Regarding the missile launches, North Korean announced through the Rodong Sinmun on September 13th that it had conducted a test-firing of a super-large multiple rocket launcher (KN-25) with an article titled "Test-fire for Verifying Performance of New-type 600mm Multiple Rocket Launcher."

      The article reported that the defense industry enterprises under the Second Economic Committee developed and produced a new-type 600mm mulitple rocket launcher (MRL) with improved capabilities in response to the operational demands of the military. It also noted that the test aimed to verify the combat effectiveness of the launcher, which features an upgraded driving system and fully automated firing process. The article went on to claim that the excellent combat performance of the launcher was clearly proven through driving tests and a series of firing tests.
    | Purpose of Performance Verification and Test-Firing of North Korea’s Super-Large Multiple Rocket Launcher
      Based on North Korea's recent report, it appears that there were three main purposes behind the test-firing of the super-large MRL on September 12th. First, the driving performance of the super-large MRL transporter-erector-launcher (TEL) has been improved. According to the report, previous TELs had poor driving performance, which caused issues in terms of mobility and effectiveness. Therefore, it appears that North Korea has tested the driving and mobility performance of the TEL, which has been improved through efforts such as enhancing the axial power transmission system, improving the driving and braking systems, and upgrading the hydraulic system used for erecting rocket launchers. It can also be speculated that North Korea was able to make these improvements with Russian assistance, possibly as part of an exchange for North Korean shell supplies, with Russia providing the necessary parts and materials to produce munitions and upgrade military production lines.

      Second, North Korea likely attempted to enhance the overall firing control system for launching super-large MRLs from TELs from firing command to launch, including improving target input, trajectory control of the rocket, and the firing stabilizer system.

      Third, images from previous super-large MRL tests by North Korea show launchers capable of firing both four and six rockets in succession. However, images released with this report suggest that North Korea only tested a TEL capable of launching six rockets. According to previous reports, North Korea has never succeeded in launching six rockets in succession due to issues with the continuous firing system. However, it appears that North Korea has conducted the test to improve this system. The South Korean military has assessed that North Korea fired three to four rockets on September 12th, and it will be crucial to monitor the success of North Korea's future attempts to launch six rockets in succession.
    | South Korea's Response Measures
      North Korea has claimed success in developing miniaturized and lightweight tactical nuclear weapons and claimed to be in possession of a large stockpile of nuclear warheads. However, since Kim Jong Un called for "the development of miniaturized and lightweight tactical nuclear weapons" at the 8th Party Congress in January 2021, North Korea has not conducted any nuclear tests. Instead, it has only stressed the "advancement of nuclear capability" through rhetoric, casting doubts on its claims to have "completed the development of miniaturized and lightweight tactical nuclear weapons." North Korea is expected to continue to employ various methods of cognitive warfare to convince South Korea and the U.S. that it possesses both a large nuclear arsenal and the capability for tactical nuclear strikes. At the same time, the timing of North Korea's test launch of a super-large MRL on September 12th is noteworthy. The launch may have been a response to the Korea-U.S. joint Ulchi Freedom Shield (UFS) exercise, during and immediately before and after which North Korea refrained from any missile provocations. It may also be an expression of dissatisfaction with President Yoon Suk Yeol's announcement of the "August 15 Unification Doctrine." Additionally, there is a possibility that it was a test in preparation for providing super-large MRLs to Russia in the future.

      North Korea's actions aim to put pressure on the Korean government and the new U.S. administration by demonstrating its ongoing efforts to advance its nuclear and missile capabilities. Therefore, Korea needs to substantially strengthen U.S.-ROK "integrated extended deterrence measures" while actively explaining to U.S. opinion leaders North Korea's true intentions for "arms control talks." Additionally, it is crucial to exert pressure on North Korea by revitalizing discussions on "strengthening the U.S. nuclear umbrella," including the potential "redeployment of tactical nuclear weapons.“

      Furthermore, while closely monitoring the trajectory of Russia-North Korea military cooperation, particularly whether Russia provides North Korea with advanced military technology, it is critical that South Korea continues to raise concerns with the international community about North Korea potentially supplying military weapons to Russia, and to prepare for the possibility of North Korea providing super-large MRLs to Russia.
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