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One Year into the Israel-Hamas War: Analysis and Implications of the Middle East Political Landscape |
| September 30, 2024
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Soyeon AhnCo-researcher, Seoul National University Asia Center | soyeonahn727@gmail.com
- It has already been a year since the Israel-Hamas war broke out on October 7, 2023. The conflict, which began with Hamas' surprise attack on Israel, has since evolved into a prolonged war with no clear end in sight. Israel, aiming to completely drive Hamas out, has responded with indiscriminate attacks that have even targeted civilians residing in the Gaza Strip. Furthermore, the nature of the conflict has shifted from a direct clash between Israel and Hamas to a broader struggle involving Iran-backed militant groups, transforming into a confrontation between Iran and its proxies and Israel. Amid this shift, Ismail Haniyeh, the leader of Hamas, was killed in a bombing at a guesthouse where he was staying after attending the inauguration ceremony of Iran's new president in August. Additionally, on September 17 and 18, simultaneous explosions of pagers and walkie-talkies used by Hezbollah in Lebanon caused numerous casualties. With Israel suspected to be behind the explosions, the likelihood of an all-out war between Hezbollah and Israel has increased, once again casting a shadow of war over the Middle East. Meanwhile, as negotiations for a ceasefire in Gaza have stalled, the situation in the Middle East remains uncertain.
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When Hamas attacked Israel last year, the international community’s primary concern was whether other Arab countries would get involved, triggering a new Middle East war. However, this war has instead reaffirmed the new political landscape in the region. Just before the conflict broke out, an unusual political thaw was taking place in the Middle East. In 2020, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Bahrain became the first Arab oil-producing Gulf countries to sign the Abraham Accords, agreeing to normalize relations with Israel. Since then, the UAE and Israel have strengthened their cooperation through various channels, including an FTA and the I2U2 minilateral group composed of India, Israel, the UAE, and the U.S. This reconciliatory mood appeared to become reality in October last year, right before Hamas' attack on Israel, when reports surfaced that Saudi Arabia, the birthplace of Islam and the leader of the Arab countries, was pursuing normalization with Israel. This signified the emergence of a new political movement in stark contrast to the past, as up until this point, when dealing with Middle East issues, opposition to Israel and support for Palestinian independence had united Arab countries. If Saudi Arabia were to join the ranks of countries normalizing relations with Israel, it would symbolically show that the Palestinian issue is no longer particularly significant for the Arab states. As the war broke out in the midst of these changes, Arab countries in the region showed few signs of actively engaging in the conflict, unlike in the past.
Instead, it was non-state actors that took a more active role. The walkie-talkie explosions that occurred across Lebanon from September 17 to 18 took place amid recent escalating tensions between Israel and Hezbollah. In other words, not only Shiite Islamist groups known to be backed by Iran like Lebanon’s Hezbollah, Yemen’s Houthi rebels, and Iraq’s Islamic Resistance, but also non-state Sunni Islamist militant groups like Hamas in the Gaza Strip and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad are actively engaged in the war against Israel. The so-called Axis of Resistance, backed by Iran, is also becoming a major player in the war with Israel. Amid these developments, Israel has provoked Iran in an attempt to draw it into direct involvement. However, Iran has been avoiding direct engagement as much as possible, instead choosing to indirectly participate through its proxies. Moreover, Israel’s indiscriminate attacks on the Gaza Strip have intensified the humanitarian crisis, escalating the international community’s criticism of Israel. Even within Israel, the public has become increasingly discontent with Prime Minister Netanyahu, leading to the Netanyahu government increasingly being viewed as the aggressor rather than the victim. -
As the war has evolved into a confrontation between Iran and Iranian-backed forces and Israel, Iran’s domestic politics have undergone rapid changes. In May, Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi was killed in a helicopter crash. Raisi, a key figure among Iran’s hardliners, was considered the leading candidate to succeed Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran's aging Supreme Leader. His sudden death forced Iran to hold a snap election to choose a new president, only a few months after the general election in March. However, due to record-low voter turnout and a landslide victory for the hardline ruling party, the election was not expected to have a significant impact. However, something unexpected happened. Masoud Pezeshkian, the only reformist candidate, was elected after a runoff. President-elect Pezeshkian has expressed that he will focus on economic recovery, particularly easing economic sanctions from Western countries. While the president is directly elected by the people, Iran maintains an Islamic theocracy in which the Supreme Leader holds significant power as the highest religious and political authority. Therefore, it is unlikely that a change in the presidency alone will bring about a substantial political shift. Nonetheless, the victory of a reformist candidate indicates that Iranian citizens are yearning for political change. As a result of widespread hijab protests that broke out in 2022 and economic hardships caused by economic sanctions after the withdrawal of the nuclear deal, Iran is facing heightened public dissatisfaction and frustration. In other words, the results of the election can be seen as a symbol of the public’s growing discontent. This situation is likely to constrain the Iranian government’s ability to act indiscriminately, which is expected to affect its approach to the war in the future.
In fact, despite widespread speculation that Israel was behind the death of the Hamas leader when he was attending the Iranian president’s inauguration, Iran has refrained from direct retaliation. Iran is in the midst of a devastating economic crisis caused by prolonged economic sanctions, and to make matters worse, public discontent reached a peak during the 2022 hijab protest movement. Under these circumstances, an all-out war with Israel could lead to excessively high costs, both economically and politically. Aware of the unstable domestic situation, Iran’s new president is unlikely to sanction a full-scale war with Israel as he has expressed desire to ease sanctions through negotiations with the West. Moreover, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei recently stated that there is no barrier to negotiations with Iran’s enemies. This prompted some analysts to speculate whether these remarks implied the possible resumption of nuclear negotiations. Amid this shifting domestic mood, Iran has refrained from escalating tensions even after the assassination of the Hamas leader. Rather, Iranian-backed militant groups led by Hezbollah in southern Lebanon have taken the lead in the conflict with Israel. Moreover, recent incidents, such as the walkie-talkie explosions, have heightened the possibility of an all-out war between Israel and Hezbollah. -
This war has prompted renewed reflection on the U.S.'s role in the Middle East. The conflict broke out amid shifting international political dynamics surrounding the Middle East, including the U.S.‘s policy of disengagement and the growing influence of China and Russia in the region. In March 2023, China brokered the normalization of relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran in Beijing. This led to speculation that China might be emerging as a new power in the Middle East, potentially replacing the U.S. In fact, many analysts viewed China as the primary beneficiary of the U.S.‘s pivot away from the Middle East and toward Asia. China has focused on expanding practical interests like economic cooperation with Middle Eastern countries while refraining from significant involvement in their domestic politics. However, during the Israel-Hamas war, China has not been able to demonstrate substantial influence. By expressing concern over the escalation of the conflict and stressing its support for the two-state solution, China hopes to strengthen solidarity with non-Western countries by supporting the Palestinian cause. However, while China continues to express its position, it has not been able to play an active or practical role in mediation or intervention. Similar to China, Russia, which had positioned itself as another emerging player to fill the void left by the U.S., is also failing to make a significant impact on the war.
Meanwhile, opinions are divided on the U.S.‘s current role in the Middle East. The U.S. continues to position itself as a mediator, proposing ceasefire plans for the Gaza conflict. However, the U.S. is also doing everything in its power to prevent the escalation of the war. While it remains Israel’s most powerful supporter and has increased military assistance to Israel, the U.S. has also shown discomfort with Prime Minister Netanyahu’s radical actions and the stalled ceasefire negotiations, signaling a shift from its past stance. This lack of clarity can be attributed to the difficulty for the U.S. government to take decisive action on Middle East issues with the presidential election to take place later this year. In addition, there have been ongoing protests in the United States criticizing Israel's indiscriminate attacks on Gaza, and negative public sentiment towards Israel has been growing. Finally, the recent change in the Democratic candidate, at a time when Trump–who has been supportive of Israel–appeared likely to win the election, has made it difficult to predict the future direction of U.S. Middle East policy. - Amid the ongoing political instability caused by the Israel-Hamas war, Middle Eastern countries have no choice but to seek out survival strategies. In particular, key oil-producing Gulf states, including Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar, aim to expand their influence and position as middle powers in the new international order. Last year, the UAE joined BRICS, continuing its long-standing pursuit of diplomatic diversification. From normalizing relations with Israel through the Abraham Accords to joining BRICS, the UAE has been extensively diversifying its diplomatic network. Regardless of the Israel-Hamas conflict, the U.S. is expected to continue its policy of disengagement from the Middle East. As a result, Middle Eastern countries are likely to continue reducing their reliance on the U.S. and building diversified diplomatic networks. Although Saudi Arabia has also pursued BRICS membership alongside the UAE, these efforts have currently been put on hold. The BRICS membership of oil-producing Gulf states is expected to contribute to the growing influence of the Global South, which has emerged as a new force in the international order. For the Gulf states, the U.S. remains a crucial security guarantor. However, amid U.S.-China tensions and the rise of the Global South, the Gulf countries are seeking to increase their influence in the international community and enhance practical economic cooperation through diplomatic diversification. For the Gulf monarchies, in particular, the top priority is achieving economic diversification by de-escalating tensions. The 2011 anti-government protests, known as the Arab Spring, showed these countries that their monarchies could be unexpectedly threatened at any time. Additionally, the U.S. shale revolution and the push for energy transitions in response to the climate crisis have made it clear to these states that they can no longer rely on rent-seeking economies for survival. In the face of these seismic changes, the oil-producing Gulf monarchies have begun pursuing social and economic reforms to ensure regime survival. Saudi Arabia, for instance, is implementing sweeping social and economic reforms to strengthen the monarchy’s power. Similarly, the UAE and Qatar have made economic diversification a top priority. For Gulf states focused on economic reform, emerging economies such as China and India are vital partners for energy exports and broader economic cooperation. Therefore, these countries are expected to continue efforts to expand their partnerships beyond the United States with countries they can promote practical cooperation with by joining international organizations led by Global South actors, such as BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).
- This war has reaffirmed that without a fundamental resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, achieving lasting peace in the Middle East will remain a challenge. Currently, the Gaza Strip is facing an unprecedented humanitarian crisis. As such, practical interest and financial support from the international community will be required in the future for the reconstruction of Gaza. Therefore, from a humanitarian standpoint, South Korea should also take part in post-war Gaza reconstruction efforts through actions such as providing humanitarian aid. Additionally, Korea should also consider the possibility of participating in the deployment of a UN multinational force to Gaza, which is one of the proposed post-war reconstruction initiatives. At the same time, it is essential to continue strengthening cooperation with key oil-producing Gulf states, which are seeking to expand their influence within the Global South. Since these countries are focusing on pursuing practical national interests through minilateral cooperation, Korea should also enhance its friendly relations with Gulf states by aligning with those that share common interests. Moreover, Korea must be able to effectively respond to new changes in the Middle East by preparing for various scenarios of the potential shifts in U.S. Middle East policy following the U.S. presidential election later this year.
| The 11th Xiangshan Forum
| The New Nature of Warfare in the Middle East: Non-State Militant Groups vs. Israel
| Iran’s Domestic Political Landscape and the Future Course of the War
| Limitations to the Role of Major Powers
| Diplomatic Diversification and Instability in the Middle East
| Policy Recommendations
