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Outlook for Trump 2.0: Nuclear Policy Toward North Korea and US-North Korea Nuclear Arms Control Talks |
| November 7, 2024
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Seongwhun CheonVisiting Research Fellow, The Sejong Institute | dr.cheon@sejong.org
- Former President Donald Trump has been elected as the 47th President of the United States. His election, characterized by an “America First” approach, which was unconventional and unpredictable disregarded established laws, challenged vested interests, and has raised significant concerns within the international community accustomed to the liberal international order and its norms. This anxiety is particularly pronounced in South Korea, which is facing several challenges, including the irreversible escalation of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program and the evolving dynamics due to North Korea’s close ties with Russia. In addition, there are concerns regarding Trump’s potential demand to reduce US forces stationed in South Korea and to increase defense spending. This article examines the foreign policy frameworks of both the first and second Trump administrations and analyzes the possibilities and strategic implications of US-North Korea nuclear disarmament negotiations while considering what Trump’s nuclear policy toward North Korea may look like in his second term.
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The foreign policy approach of Andrew Jackson, the first US president to survive an assassination attempt, is expected to persist throughout both terms of the Trump administration. The events that spurred the Jacksonian tradition in America include the 1917 Zimmermann Telegram (a German telegram proposing a military alliance against the United States if Mexico supported Germany), which helped draw the United States into World War I, the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1939, and the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. Adherents of the Jacksonian tradition tend to reject vested interests, view the political class as corrupt, and have a strong aversion to elites. In international relations, they are instinctively realist, often disdain international organizations and international law, show indifference to the spread of liberal democracy, and are hesitant to intervene in events that have nothing to do with the US. However, they are quick to respond to direct threats against the US. These individuals tend to prefer strong leaders, like Washington and Roosevelt, and place great trust and loyalty in their leaders, granting them more policy flexibility and maneuverability.
Trump’s second term is anticipated to continue the Jacksonian tradition while also embracing the concepts of “post-liberalism” or “national conservatism” advocated by Vice President J.D. Vance. In America, post-liberals are usually devout Catholics, anti-woke 1), skeptical of big businesses, and tend to be nationalistic about trade and borders. They want to maintain good relations with authoritarian leaders around the world and support protectionist trade policies to revive communities that have been affected by the decline of American manufacturing. They are also sympathetic to the idea of a “Deep State,” which represents the corrupt vested interests that was publicized during Trump’s first term and have called for mass layoffs of mid-level federal employees.
1) “Woke” is a term used by African Americans in the late 1990s to refer to people who believe that there are deep-rooted inequalities in American society based on race and gender. In the wake of the Black Lives Matter movement in 2014, conservatives began using the term “anti-woke” to combat these progressive values.
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(1) Maintaining the “Anything But Biden”(ABB) Approach
President George W. Bush, who took office in 2001, campaigned on an “Anything But Clinton” (ABC) platform. He promised to overhaul the foreign policy of the previous Clinton Democratic administration, particularly concerning North Korea. This approach was a backlash against the Clinton administration’s last-ditch efforts to establish diplomatic relations with North Korea, which were seen as political achievements, while ignoring the fact that Pyongyang had secretly developed a uranium enrichment program in violation of the 1994 Geneva Agreed Framework. Given the increasing polarization of US politics, the second Trump administration is expected to be just as aggressive in its cleanup efforts as the Bush administration was.
Under the ABB banner, Trump is likely to ignore or reverse the policies of the Biden administration during this second term, and there is a strong possibility that the fallout will affect the North Korean nuclear issue. At a campaign rally in Pennsylvania on October 19, Trump criticized Biden’s diplomacy, claiming, “If you do the exact opposite of what Biden did, you’ll go down as the president with the greatest foreign policy in history.” He is expected to label Biden’s denuclearization efforts as a failure and pursue a new strategy to differentiate himself.
(2) “Constructive Destruction”
In his second term, Trump will seek to disrupt norms and conventions and innovate to create a better America, leveraging the experience and stronger leadership gained since his first term. He is anticipated to adopt a pragmatic approach toward North Korea, prioritizing America’s national interests based on a realistic perspective. This will involve moving away from outdated views such as denuclearization, liberal democratic values, and traditional international institutions and norms. Contrary to expectations that the North Korean nuclear crisis will be relegated to a lower priority, it may be treated as an urgent concern due to shifts in the security landscape in Northeast Asia, particularly the growing geopolitical rivalry between the US and China and the close ties between North Korea and Russia.
Relevant officials also indicate that Trump’s second term will be one of constructive destruction. For instance, Alexander Gray, who served as the NSC chief of staff during Trump’s first term, testified that Trump had instructed his staff to find innovative solutions to long-standing problems faced by previous administrations and that he believes it is misguided to repeat the same policies and expect different outcomes. Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Elbridge Colby also stated in an interview with Yonhap News on May 6: “I think President Trump’s unconventional and fresh perspective is good,” “I don’t understand why we cling to a conventional approach to the North Korean nuclear issue when it has completely failed,” "An unconventional approach should become the new norm,“ ”We need to consider all options, including increasing contact with the North Korean leadership.“
(3) Former National Security Advisor O’Brien’s Insights on Foreign Affairs
Former National Security Advisor Robert O’Brien outlined Trump’s foreign and security policy for his second term. The key points concerning North Korea’s nuclear program include: - Emphasized the accomplishments of Trump’s first term, particularly the approach of ‘peace through strength,’ and noted North Korea's suspension of nuclear and long-range missile tests.
- Suggestions for Trump’s second-term foreign policy: ① Avoid hostility towards alliances; ② Overcome the shortcomings of post-Cold War globalization; ③ Pursue diplomacy rooted in traditional American principles and instincts; ④ Criticize the rules-based international order as an abstract concept and globalization elitism disguised as support for democracy; ⑤ Maintain friendly relations with authoritarian regimes; ⑥ Follow a realist approach that acknowledges opposing regimes.
- Hinted at the possibility of resuming direct diplomacy with North Korea by recalling Trump’s offer to Kim Jong-un during his first term, which presented an opportunity for North Korea to join the international community, without directly mentioning North Korea’s dictatorship or nuclear program.
(4) Abandoning Denuclearization and Seeking New Alternatives
The argument that denuclearization is unrealistic has been raised in American politics for quite some time. Even at the beginning of Trump's first term in 2017, there were bipartisan calls for containment and management focused on a nuclear freeze or preventing the North from advancing its nuclear capabilities, along with self-criticism regarding the failure of Obama’s “strategic patience” strategy.
Most notably, Robert Gates, who served as the Secretary of Defense and Director of the CIA and is highly respected by both Republicans and Democrats, proposed a system in which North Korea would be allowed to retain its nuclear weapons in limited capacity. Gates argued that Kim Jong-un is unlikely to give up his nuclear arsenal, as he views it as essential to his survival. Therefore, he suggested that the US should allow North Korea to maintain 20 to 30 warheads while implementing thorough inspections to prevent further nuclear development. CNN host Fareed Zakaria has also contended that the world is already coexisting with a nuclear-armed North Korea, and what is now needed is a strong deterrence, similar to the one that maintained peace during the Cold War against leaders like Stalin and Mao. James Acton, a nuclear expert at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, emphasized that denuclearization is no longer realistic and that the US needs to establish clear ground rules for engaging with a newly nuclear-armed North Korea.
Even in the 2024 presidential election, there has been a growing consensus that the strategy of denuclearization has failed and that a new policy should be developed based on the reality of North Korea’s nuclear capabilities. For instance, an editorial in The Washington Post highlighted that the US is facing a worst-case scenario. Past administrations have attempted isolation, sanctions, appeasement, and incentives, each of which has proven ineffective, leading to the conclusion that North Korea is undeniably a nuclear power. Former Deputy Under Secretary of Defense Richard Lawless stated that it is neither necessary nor wise to reject the prospect of a nuclear North Korea. Commander of the US Forces Korea, Paul J. LaCamera, noted that while past efforts concentrated on preventing North Korea from acquiring nuclear weapons, the focus has now shifted to preventing the regime from using them. Brad Sherman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee expressed skepticism about Kim’s willingness to relinquish nuclear weapons. He argued for a realistic approach, suggesting that the world would be safer with North Korea having ten nuclear weapons under surveillance than if it had an unlimited stockpile unsupervised. -
(1) Realistic Perceptions in the US
The spectrum of policies among experts advising Trump during his second term on the North Korean nuclear issue is quite broad, ranging from advocating for denuclearization to pursuing nuclear disarmament negotiations. However, there are considerable expectations that Trump will acknowledge the reality of North Korea’s nuclear capabilities and pursue disarmament talks based on his friendship with Kim Jong-un to mitigate threats to the mainland. For instance, Ian Bremmer, president of the Eurasia Group, said that Trump might agree to a nuclear freeze in exchange for relief from sanctions and that North Korea’s nuclearization would put pressure on South Korea’s nuclear development. Christopher Miller, who served as acting secretary of defense during Trump’s first term, argued that North Korea’s nuclear program is irreversible and that negotiations should be based on reality, not expectations. He also added that disarmament talks could be an effective means of communication with Pyongyang and that a freeze on nuclear activity could be a viable option in exchange for sanctions relief.
Fred Fleitz, Former NSC Chief of Staff, argued that Trump would quickly resume personal diplomacy with Kim Jong-un during his second term. He anticipated significant changes in North Korea policy and noted that Trump is eager to find opportunities to normalize relations with the country and reduce tensions. In his acceptance speech at the Republican National Convention, Trump remarked that it’s good to get along with someone who has a lot of nuclear weapons, acknowledging North Korea’s provocations while expressing his commitment to improving relations upon returning to office. The fact that both the Republican and Democratic parties have dropped the term ‘denuclearization’ from their platforms in this presidential election reflects the prevailing sentiments in American society regarding the North Korean nuclear issue. In addition, the joint statement from the 56th ROK-US Security Consultative Meeting (SCM), held recently in Washington, gained media attention for omitting any mention of denuclearization.
(2) Disarmament: A Traditional Means of Ensuring Security
The United States has historically viewed disarmament negotiations as one of the two main pillars for achieving national security, alongside military buildup, and has pursued both strategies simultaneously. While an escalation of military force is a response to perceived threats from adversaries, disarmament negotiations represent a proactive, non-military way to reduce those threats. Typically, disarmament negotiations have three main goals: to lower the risk of war, to minimize the scale of damage in the event of war, and to reduce the costs associated with preparing for war.
Therefore, it is natural that past administrations, from the 41st Bush administration to the current Biden administration, have consistently engaged in various dialogues with North Korea as its nuclear capabilities advanced. However, as North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs have become more sophisticated, each administration has adopted different policies and strategies regarding negotiations. With a widespread belief that the denuclearization policy has failed, the second Trump administration is expected to embrace a realist foreign policy rooted in the Jacksonian tradition, pushing for US-North Korea nuclear disarmament negotiations to mitigate the threat North Korea poses to the mainland as much as possible. American people will accept nuclear disarmament negotiations as a means of reducing the risk of war with North Korea, mitigating damage in the event of war, and alleviating the burden of preparing for war.
(3) Destroying Denuclearization, Creating Nuclear Disarmament
Considering the foreign and security policy stance of the Trump administration and the views of key officials, Trump is expected to end the era of denuclearization and initiate a new era of nuclear disarmament based on the perspective of constructive destruction in his second term. Therefore, the second Trump administration is likely to seek a summit with North Korea and engage in negotiations for nuclear disarmament. A US-North Korea nuclear disarmament agreement could represent a significant shift in the security landscape of the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia, which has been shaped since the end of World War II.
Trump may perceive denuclearization as a strategy promoted by the same mainstream forces that drove America in the post-Cold War era, namely the elites and established foreign and security policy bureaucracies he distrusts. As a result, the Trump 2.0 administration might view denuclearization as an outdated concept that can be discarded without hesitation in order to underscore its political clarity. For them, denuclearization is a prime example of the rules-based international order that former National Security Advisor O’Brien criticized as an abstract concept, and a legacy of neo-liberal internationalism and globalization that the US needs to overcome. However, abandoning denuclearization, a policy established since the presidency of George H.W. Bush, will not be easy. Challenges such as bureaucratic entrenchment, the potential for blaminh those who are responsible for policy failures, and societal perceptions that have been ingrained over three decades may stand in the way. Nevertheless, Trump may overcome these obstacles in his second term by breaking stereotypes and pursuing change.
(4) The First Step: Freezing North Korea’s Nuclear Capabilities
In December 2023, Politico caused a stir by reporting that if re-elected, Trump would consider overhauling his previous CVID approach to instead pursue a freeze on North Korea’s nuclear program. Instead of wasting time on denuclearization negotiations, the idea is that the US would ease economic sanctions and provide support in exchange for North Korea freezing its nuclear capabilities, halting further nuclear development, and accepting verification measures, to focus on the greater threat posed by China. Political circles in America and key figures within Trump’s camp view this report as credible, especially given the current circumstances on the Korean Peninsula.
Previous US administrations, both Republican and Democratic, have acknowledged the necessity of interim steps in negotiations with the ultimate goal of denuclearization. Even within the Biden administration, this viewpoint has been consistently expressed by Mira Rapp-Hooper, Senior Director for East Asia and Oceania at the NSC, and Jung Pak, a senior State Department official on the DPRK. 2) The broad consensus within the US on the failure of denuclearization, the irreversible advancement of North Korea’s nuclear capabilities, and the changing geopolitical landscape in Northeast Asia due to US-China and US-Russia strategic competition have created conditions in which the second Trump administration could negotiate with North Korea primarily aimed at freezing its nuclear program. Given the prospect that denuclearization is out of the question, there is no reason for the Democratic Party, which has historically advocated for negotiations with North Korea, to oppose a nuclear freeze if Trump pursues it in his second term.
(5) Strategic Significance of US-North Korea Nuclear Disarmament Negotiations
Nuclear disarmament negotiations with the primary goal of freezing North Korea’s nuclear program are also likely to gain support from the American public. If Trump succeeds in eliminating North Korea’s long-range missile capabilities that threaten the mainland, the public may view him as a president who abandoned denuclearization efforts, since those initiatives failed to prevent North Korea's advance, and effectively ensured the security of the United States. It’s also important to consider past experiences, as talks between North Korea and the US have previously led to improved public opinion regarding North Korea. According to Gallup, overall perceptions of North Korea shifted significantly in a favorable direction before and after the Singapore agreement. For instance, the percentage of people who viewed North Korea as the biggest enemy dropped from 51% in early 2018 to 14% in 2019.
North Korea is also expected to come to the negotiating table viewing Trump’s proposal to negotiate nuclear disarmament as a de facto recognition of its nuclear arsenal. The North Korean leadership will likely focus their bargaining position on extracting maximum military and strategic benefits from the US while minimizing any concessions related to the scale of nuclear reductions and the operation of their nuclear forces. Former National Security Advisor McMaster predicted that Kim Jong-un might say to Trump: “In exchange for US forces leaving the Korean Peninsula, let me retain a few nuclear weapons. Then I will stop my long-range ballistic missile program and limit my nuclear program.”
North Korea is likely to develop long-term strategies for nuclear disarmament negotiations, with the current and following administrations in mind. Pyongyang will focus on making small concessions over time, making it unlikely that Trump will get everything he wants during his term. In reality, reaching a disarmament agreement typically takes more than a decade. North Korea will seek to achieve several goals in these negotiations, including recognition as a de facto nuclear power, enhanced political, diplomatic, and strategic status and voice, and economic development. Throughout this process, the international community will increasingly recognize the significance of a small country's nuclear capabilities.
If US-North Korea nuclear disarmament negotiations exclude South Korea, North Korea will have a dominant position in the security dynamics on the Korean Peninsula. North Korea’s nuclear monopoly and the nuclear imbalance between North and South Korea will increase security vulnerabilities for South Korea. Moreover, skepticism about the feasibility of a South Korea-led unification is likely to grow both domestically and internationally. To prevent this from happening, the South Korean government must prepare thoroughly to ensure that they are not excluded from these nuclear disarmament negotiations. Fundamentally, the nuclear and unification policies that have been pursued by the past governments since President Roh Tae-woo, based on the premise of denuclearization, need a complete redesign. The first step should be to declare the Joint Declaration on Denuclearization, agreed upon by North and South Korea in December 1991, null and void. Only by removing this obstacle can we effectively address the North Korean nuclear threat.
2) Kim Hwan-yong, “NSC official may consider interim steps toward denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula’,” VOA, March 5, 2024; Kang Byung-chul, “Jung Pak, ‘North Korea denuclearization won’t happen overnight...interim steps needed,” 『Yonhap News』 March 6, 2024.
| Trump Administration’s Foreign Policy: The “Jacksonian” Tradition
| Outlook for North Korean Nuclear Policy under a Trump 2.0 Administration
| The Possibility and Strategic Significance of Nuclear Disarmament Negotiations Between the US and North Korea
※ The contents published on 'Sejong Focus' are personal opinions of the author and do not represent the official views of Sejong Institue
