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Foreign Policy Outlook for the New U.S. Administration |
| November 12, 2024
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Sang Hyun LeeSenior Research Fellow, The Sejong Institute | shlee@sejong.org
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The 2024 U.S. presidential election concluded with Donald Trump as the winner. Despite the presidential race being fierce enough to be described as “neck-and-neck” throughout much of the campaign period, Trump achieved a landslide victory over Kamala Harris. Due to Trump’s unquestionably decisive victory, the vote count was completed more quickly and quietly than expected. In the congressional elections held alongside the presidential race, the Republican Party secured a majority in both the Senate and the House of Representatives, forming a “united government” with both the presidency and Congress under Republican control. When Trump’s second term begins next January, his administration is expected to have much greater momentum in advancing its policy agenda compared to his first term. With his second term, Trump has gained the ability to aggressively push forward his agenda to cement his legacy. In fact, it could be said that his power will be virtually unchecked.
The Democratic and Republican parties hold fundamentally opposing views on the nature of international politics today and the role of the United States within it. Faced with the choice of either continuing as the leader of the familiar rules-based international order or shifting toward isolationism rooted in “America First” principles, the American public chose the America First policy championed by the Republican party.
In contrast to the Republican Party, the Democratic Party’s platform is characterized by its focus on international engagement and alliance networks. The Democratic platform prioritizes restoring America’s global leadership, grounded in the understanding that foreign policy and domestic challenges are inherently interconnected. Democrats criticize Trump’s America First policy for not only straining relations with allies and partners but also increasing U.S. isolation, causing economic stagnation, and undermining national security.
The core of Trump’s America First foreign policy begins with breaking away from the traditional globalist approach to foreign policy. The Republican Party criticizes U.S. foreign policy before Trump — under both Democratic and Republican administrations — for being globalist in nature, arguing that it was characterized by incessant intervention in international conflicts that did not directly serve America’s interests and by prioritizing global institutions over national interests. Trump has declared that he will not use American taxpayer dollars to fund overseas military operations that do not directly serve U.S. national interests. As is widely known, Trump views all issues through a transactional lens and instinctively rejects deals that he perceives as disadvantageous. Trump’s approach emphasizes correcting imbalances in foreign relations, where the United States incurs one-sided losses while other countries reap the benefits. The imbalances between the U.S. and the rest of the world that Trump refers to include, in the economic and trade sectors, the massive U.S. trade deficit, and in the military and security sectors, the insufficient security contributions from U.S. allies (i.e., inadequate defense cost-sharing and defense spending falling short of 2 percent of GDP). This is a principle that Trump applies not only to adversaries like China but also to close allies such as South Korea and Japan. When it comes to alliances, Trump perceives them not as security assets to be utilized but as burdens on the United States. This perspective is in stark contrast to the views of U.S. leaders from Harry Truman to Joe Biden, who regarded America’s alliances as force multipliers.
The launch of the second Trump administration is expected to bring with it a slew of changes in the areas of foreign affairs and national security. Trump's return effectively signals the end of the rules-based international order built under U.S. leadership after World War II. In July of this year, President Biden presided over NATO’s 75th anniversary celebration in Washington, D.C. For the past 75 years, NATO has symbolized America’s global leadership, functioning as a bulwark of democracy while helping maintain peace and stability among major powers. President-elect Trump has made it clear that he will no longer use American taxpayer dollars to sustain this order and has expressed his intent to replace the free trade system — which has contributed to today’s global economic prosperity — with trade barriers such as tariffs. Some of America’s democratic allies continue to rely on the U.S. nuclear umbrella, but this trusted nuclear umbrella has now become subject to the whims of the new U.S. president and could be withdrawn at any time. In his second inaugural address, President George W. Bush declared, “It is the policy of the United States to seek and support the growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture.” However, this policy of promoting democracy can be considered officially over with the launch of Trump’s second term.
As Trump takes office for a second time, South Korea is expected to face three major challenges. First is the ROK-U.S. alliance and North Korea policy. South Korea is almost certain to face demands for increased defense cost-sharing, and when it comes to North Korea policy, there are concerns about the possibility of a superficial nuclear agreement or deal resulting from direct talks between the U.S. and North Korea. Second are demands to adjust the economic relationship between South Korea and the United States. In particular, there are concerns of additional renegotiations of the free trade agreement (FTA) aimed at reducing South Korea’s significant trade surplus with the U.S., as well as potential setbacks to economic security cooperation following a repeal of the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA). Third is the growing demands for Korea to join the U.S. in its efforts to pressure China. The more that South Korean companies engage in such efforts against China, the more inevitable it becomes that they will suffer collateral damage.
It is also important to consider who will be part of Trump’s second administration. Currently, three groups of foreign policy and national security experts are considered to be positioned around Trump. The first group consists of Primacists, who are concerned with America’s overwhelming superiority and dominant status. This group includes figures such as former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and former National Security Advisor Robert O’Brien, who emphasize preserving the traditional influence of the United States. The second group consists of Prioritisers, who advocate for delineating U.S. foreign policy priorities and concentrating on Asia, particularly China. Key figures in this group include Fred Fleitz, Vice Chair of the America First Policy Institute, and Elbridge Colby, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense. The third group consists of Isolationists, who seek to avoid unnecessary intervention in international affairs. This group includes individuals like Richard Grenell, former Acting Director of National Intelligence, and Keith Kellogg, former National Security Advisor. Which of these groups will be favored, and how many experts on Asia and the Korean Peninsula will be included in that group, will be critical factors. At this point, it remains unclear whether they will adopt an inclusive perspective on the international order or pursue a more assertive America First policy. During Trump’s first term, many individuals with balanced perspectives left the administration. If his second term excludes career officials he distrusts while bringing in a large number of individuals aligned with his views, it is highly likely to become an amplified iteration of his first term. With the support of the Republican Party—which even controls Congress—Trump is likely to pursue his policy agenda even more recklessly in his second term. -
The launch of the second Trump administration is expected to bring about significant changes to U.S. foreign policy and the global order. First, current global hotspots are likely to face some kind of transformation. Regarding Ukraine, Trump has boasted he would end the Russia-Ukraine war within 24 hours of taking office. To increase the likelihood of a swift peace settlement, Trump is likely to suspend support for Ukraine and pressure it to cede its eastern territories occupied by Russia. This approach would help achieve a rapid diplomatic resolution to the war without U.S. military intervention. However, if Trump abruptly halts military support to Ukraine, forcing it to negotiate a peace agreement under unfavorable conditions, this could lead to a disagreement between the U.S. and NATO. In the Middle East, another hotspot, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is among those most likely to welcome Trump’s victory. Israel’s right-wing government expects the Trump administration to support policies for relocating Jewish settlers to Gaza and to endorse more aggressive military actions against Iran. Notably, on December 6, 2017, Trump formally recognized Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. On the Taiwan issue, Trump has repeatedly stated that, unlike President Joe Biden, he would not commit to defending Taiwan if he were to take office. He also maintains that any support provided to Taiwan must be financed by Taiwan itself. Consequently, Taiwan’s efforts to pursue independence are expected to weaken, and cross-strait tensions may ease somewhat under Trump.
Second, protectionist tendencies in the international trade environment are expected to intensify worldwide. Although Harris and Trump’s economic policies appear very different at first glance, in reality, both the Democratic and Republican parties share a commitment to prioritizing U.S. national interests through America First principles. America First reflects an irreversible shift in American society, a phenomenon that the U.S. media has referred to as the “Trumpification” of American policy. Since the pandemic, U.S. trade policy has increasingly leaned toward protectionism, regardless of which party is in power. However, there is one key difference—Trump primarily uses tariffs, while Biden relies on subsidies. Trump adheres to a viewpoint of “economic nationalism,” which emphasizes revitalizing and protecting domestic manufacturing industries. He focuses on modifying U.S. trade relations and agreements to ensure they provide direct and tangible benefits to the American economy while addressing inadequacies and unfairness in trade agreements and practices. Trump’s rhetoric reflects the concerns and resentment of American citizens over the reduction in manufacturing jobs and the decline of the manufacturing industry. Trump has also pledged to completely eliminate energy regulations championed by Democrats to boost production across all energy sectors, including oil, natural gas, and nuclear power. Additionally, Trump and the Republican Party are opposed to the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) and have repeatedly pledged to repeal it.
Third, U.S. policies toward China are expected to become even more hardline. Trump’s China policy is transactional, with a focus on short-term gains. To the Republican Party, China is seen as an adversary that must be defeated in competition and as a civilizational challenge to the entire Western world. Trump has proposed imposing a universal 10 percent tariff on all goods imported into the U.S., along with a 60–100 percent tariff specifically on Chinese goods. He has also vowed to strictly regulate China’s indirect exports through Mexico. His campaign pledges related to China include revoking China’s Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) status, phasing out imports of critical goods from China (such as electronics, steel, and pharmaceuticals), banning Chinese nationals from purchasing U.S. real estate and companies, and prohibiting the import of vehicles manufactured in China. Despite these thoroughly hardline pledges, Trump’s inner circle holds diverse views on how best to curb China’s rise. For example, Elbridge Colby, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, advocates for an aggressive approach that reallocates U.S. resources currently spread across Europe to the Indo-Pacific, focusing on China. Matt Pottinger, former senior advisor on the National Security Council (NSC), emphasizes a more long-term strategic projection, advocating for a cautious approach that reinforces readiness while avoiding immediate conflict. Compared to the Biden administration, which has opted for de-risking over decoupling, aiming to strike a balance between competition and cooperation, Trump’s China policy is much more hardline.
Fourth, changes in North Korea policy. Harris’s North Korea policy largely inherits the current Biden administration’s approach, which can be summed up as the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and strengthening deterrence through cooperation with allies and partners, including South Korea. This stance also emphasizes that if a summit with Kim Jong Un is necessary, it should be pursued using a bottom-up approach, following thorough preparations at the working level. In contrast, Trump’s North Korea policy remains centered around big deals achieved through personal diplomacy. Trump has repeatedly boasted about maintaining good relationships with leaders of authoritarian states, expressing his view that “getting along with Kim Jong Un is a good thing.” It remains unclear whether Trump, in his second term, will maintain his position that North Korea’s possession of nuclear weapons is unacceptable. Given the practical impossibility of denuclearizing North Korea, there have been calls within the United States to acknowledge North Korea’s status as a nuclear power and begin preparing for nuclear arms reduction talks. The concern is that any big deal between Trump and Kim could result in a performative summit lacking any substantive progress on denuclearization. If this happens, North Korea would effectively gain recognition as a nuclear state — an outcome that South Korea would find unacceptable. Another variable is whether Kim Jong Un will respond if Trump sends him another “love letter.” Despite holding three summits with the U.S.—Singapore, Hanoi, and the surprise meeting at Panmunjom — North Korea has essentially gained nothing. Unless Trump offers a very specific and enticing proposal, it remains unclear whether North Korea will accept his invitation.
Fifth, it is important to closely monitor the potential impact on South Korea-U.S. relations. There is broad consensus that the ROK-U.S. alliance has evolved into a robust comprehensive strategic partnership. However, with Trump‘s return to the White House, the possibility of working-level policy disagreements cannot be ruled out. Three challenges are expected for South Korea-U.S. relations in Trump’s second term. First is the demand for South Korea to increase its share of defense costs. During his campaign, Trump indicated that he intends to demand a ninefold increase in South Korea‘s defense cost-sharing contribution. While this is clearly unrealistic and likely just campaign rhetoric, some increase in Seoul’s share of defense costs seems inevitable. Seoul and Washington recently finalized the Special Measures Agreement (SMA) for 2026–2030. Under the agreement, South Korea‘s defense cost-sharing contribution for 2026 was set at 1.5192 trillion won, an 8.3 percent increase from the previous year, with future adjustments tied to inflation. However, there is a chance that President-elect Trump may disregard this agreement and call for a renegotiation. South Korea should also adopt a transactional perspective on the defense cost-sharing issue, maintaining the stance that while we will increase our contribution, we must also secure something in return. If President-elect Trump calls for a renegotiation, South Korea should engage in negotiations in good faith and propose a reasonable level of contribution. Viewing this as a transactional process, we should also prepare a list of counter-demands. These could include securing nuclear enrichment and reprocessing rights, requesting nuclear-powered submarines in line with the AUKUS precedent, and strengthening defense cooperation (particularly in areas such as maintenance, repair, and overhaul (MRO) for warships and aircraft).
An additional expected change is a shift in trade relations. In response to the Biden administration’s CHIPS and Science Act and the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA), Korean companies have either decided to or are in the process of making substantial investments in the U.S. in key sectors such as semiconductors, batteries, and electric vehicles. Enacted in August 2022, the CHIPS and Science Act has two main objectives. One is to increase semiconductor production in the United States, and the other is to attract significant investments in science and technology research. Although the Inflation Reduction Act was introduced to address the inflation that occurred in 2022 by reducing government spending, it also includes extensive provisions related to environmental regulations. If the second Trump administration repeals the IRA or intensifies friend-shoring of supply chains, South Korean companies are expected to face even greater challenges.
Lastly, South Korea is likely to experience frequent collateral damage from the United States’ hardline trade measures against China. The geopolitical tensions between the U.S. and China will inevitably result in setbacks for South Korean companies that have made significant investments in highly sensitive high-tech sectors in China. Due to bipartisan support for hardline policies against China, the U.S. Congress is advancing a comprehensive package of bills to counter China. The main measures under consideration include imposing high tariffs, revoking China's PNTR status, preventing transshipment through third countries such as Mexico, strengthening trade remedies, and revising the de minimis rule for duty-free thresholds. (The de minimis rule allows materials originating outside a free trade area to be considered as having the same origin as the finished product, provided they fall within a specified percentage of the product's total value or weight.) If the second Trump administration maintains its hardline stance against China, South Korean companies caught between the U.S. and China will inevitably find their position further constrained. -
South Korea is currently facing an era of unprecedented crisis. There are several alarming signs in both domestic politics and the international environment. Recent geopolitical developments have been highly tumultuous on a global scale. Under a fragmented world order, new blocs are forming, while diverse conflicts and clashes are erupting simultaneously across the globe, leading to heightened risk and uncertainty.
In the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, the intensification of systemic fragmentation — or the emergence of a fragmented world order — is ushering in an era of “every country for itself,” where all nations prioritize their own interests. Factors contributing to this environment include disruptions in global supply chains triggered by the pandemic, the resurgence of geopolitics, the reemergence of great power competition, the dysfunction of international institutions and regimes, and the breakdown of global governance. Against this backdrop, the ongoing U.S.-China strategic competition has been further exacerbated by Russia’s sudden invasion of Ukraine, which prompted a unified response from Western nations. This has rapidly transformed the global order into a confrontation between democratic and authoritarian systems. Moreover, the world is becoming increasingly divided into three blocs: the Global West, led by the U.S. and other Western nations; the Global East, centered around China and Russia; and the Global South, comprising India, Brazil, and other non-Western, developing countries. At the core of the current international order is the competition between the Global West and the Global East, particularly the U.S.-China relationship. This relationship, characterized by hostile competition across political, economic, ideological, and systemic dimensions, is expected to persist for the foreseeable future, with both nations actively engaging in competitive coalition-building efforts targeting the Global South. As fragmentation and bloc formation advance simultaneously, the likelihood of sudden crises surrounding various flashpoints around the global and in the Asia-Pacific region is increasing. The Ukraine war, the Israel-Hamas conflict, and Houthi rebel attacks on civilian vessels in the Red Sea have heightened military tensions in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea. On the Korean Peninsula, the rapid escalation of North Korea’s nuclear threat has resulted in the collapse of the peace process, further exacerbating security risks.
As such, the international landscape of 2024 is expected to continue to be characterized by a lack of clear global leadership, with all nations prioritizing securing their own security and economic interests. We have entered an era where the entire globe is interconnected as a single theater of conflict, leaving no country immune to the repercussions of wars in other regions. As a result, the familiar U.S.-led liberal international order, or the rules-based global order, which was established after World War II, appears to be transitioning into a new bipolar or multipolar order. Trump’s second term seems likely to steer the global order more decisively in that direction.
In addition to the current global situation, South Korea must also prepare for the uncertainties and risks that Trump’s second term could bring to the ROK-U.S. relationship. As mentioned earlier, key issues include the defense cost-sharing dispute, the risk of a direct nuclear agreement or deal between the U.S. and North Korea, adjustments to South Korea-U.S. economic and trade relations, and demands for South Korea to join U.S. efforts to pressure China. In such an environment dominated by uncertainty and risk, a balanced perspective and flexible response strategy are absolutely essential. Regardless of the outcome of the U.S. election, South Korea should aim to expand the value diplomacy it shares with the United States through the pursuit of a national security strategy centered on freedom, peace, and prosperity. At the same time, to build upon its alliance with the U.S., South Korea should expand networks with like-minded countries and effectively utilize its coalitional power as a middle power. The more uncertain the international environment becomes, the more South Korea must maintain a flexible strategic stance grounded in balance and resilience.
Specifically, the approximately two-and-a-half-month period from now until January 20, when Trump’s second term begins, will be the period during which his transition team operates. During this time, Trump will receive briefings on national security, intelligence, and other key issues. It is crucial to use this period to candidly and comprehensively convey alliance and security issues, as well as South Korea’s concerns, to Trump’s team. Rather than waiting for the start of Trump’s second term, South Korea should work to expand areas of mutual understanding with Washington even before the new administration takes office by broadening channels of engagement, including sending special envoys to the U.S. At the same time, at every possible opportunity, efforts should be made to ensure information from the South Korean government is reflected in the policies of the incoming U.S. administration.
Second, while the U.S. president wields overwhelming authority, Congress plays an equally significant role in American foreign policy. Although Congress is now under Republican control, depending on the specific constituency and issue, it will not always take the same position as the president. For instance, in the case of the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA), which Trump has vowed to repeal, the majority of investments under the act have been concentrated in Republican-dominated regions. As a result, even if Trump introduces legislation to repeal the IRA, Congress is likely to block it. Accordingly, the South Korean government should strengthen its diplomacy with Congress, independently from its engagement with the executive branch.
Third, at the executive branch level, it is essential to strengthen systems of cooperation with departments that directly handle alliances and diplomacy, such as the State Department and the Department of Defense. In practice, working-level agencies within the executive branch tend to still prioritize alliances and continue pursuing established initiatives, such as nonproliferation diplomacy. In the long term, the South Korean government should redouble its efforts to ensure the continuation of these working-level exchanges and collaborations.
| Foreign Policy Principles of the Second Trump Administration
| Key Issues and Outlook for Each Major Foreign Policy Area
| Implications for South Korea and Our Response Strategy
※ The contents published on 'Sejong Focus' are personal opinions of the author and do not represent the official views of Sejong Institue
