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South Korea's Diplomatic and Security Strategies in Response to a Second Term of Trump |
| December 29, 2024
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Hyun-ik HongSenior Research Fellow, Sejong Institute | hyunik@sejong.org
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Former President Trump is expected to win a resounding victory in the upcoming U.S. presidential election, with his inauguration scheduled for January 20th this year. Having already served one term, Trump focused heavily on his reelection campaign and emerged successfully. Over the past four years, his appointments have been based more on loyalty to his "Make America Great Again"(MAGA) ideology rather than on professional expertise or experience. With the Republican Party now controlling both the House and Senate, Trump enters his second term with heightened confidence, ready to implement his policies forcefully from day one.
Trump’s approach to U.S. national interests has been defined by a narrow view of America’s global role, where foreign interventions are evaluated primarily on how they serve the nation’s economic and hegemonic interests. Building on his "America First" platform, he is likely to take a transactional approach aimed at minimizing costs and maximizing economic gains. As a result, he is expected to roll back many policies of the Biden administration. This shift is likely to have profound implications for the Korean Peninsula and U.S.-South Korea relations, with new challenges and diplomatic issues arising. South Korea must prepare for these shifts with flexibility, pragmatism, and a focus on rational, interests-based strategies.
Looking at Trump’s current policies, South Korea is likely to face several emerging diplomatic and security challenges. These include efforts to end the Ukraine war, South Korea’s role in supporting Ukraine, the resumption of North Korean-U.S. talks, potential setbacks in South Korea-U.S. relations, a possible reduction of U.S. troops stationed in Korea, and demands for significant increases in defense cost-sharing. In addition, questions may arise regarding South Korea's continued alignment with U.S. and Japanese foreign policy priorities. While issues such as renegotiating the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement or imposing broad tariffs may also be on the horizon, these topics will not be the focus of this paper.
This paper aims to examine the key diplomatic and security issues and challenges that South Korea must address in times of national leadership crisis, from the perspective of maximizing national interest, and to propose rational responses for each issue.
This paper examines diplomatic and security issues and challenges that South Korea faces during a national crisis, analyzing each issue based on the perspective of maximizing national interests and proposing rational responses. -
During the presidential election process, Trump repeatedly stated that if he had been president, the war in Ukraine would not have occurred, criticizing the U.S. for providing excessive support to Ukraine in a deadlocked situation. He also confidently claimed that if he were elected, could end the war within just one day. His vice presidential candidate, he suggested that the war should end in a manner similar to the Korean War, with a freeze in the combat situation to finalize territorial boundaries, setting up a demilitarized zone along the line of demarcation, and deploying peacekeeping forces from European countries. There also seems to be a possibility of easing sanctions on Russia if they partially accept Ukraine's demands.
Even after his election, Trump made it clear that ending the war in Ukraine would be his top foreign policy priority and appointed his close associate, Lieutenant General Keith Kellogg, as a special envoy to handle the issue. As the United States, which has provided more than half of Ukraine's war funding, clarified its stance on ending the war, both Russia and Ukraine have intensified their battles, each seeking to gain even the smallest piece of land. Ukraine, which had ceded about 20% of its territory to Russia and in August launched a sudden attack on Russia, seizing the Kursk region, roughly 1.5 times the size of Seoul, has since lost half of that territory back to Russia and continues to lose ground in the southeastern region.
In this situation, Ukrainian President Zelensky, citing North Korea’s troop deployment to Russia, sent Defense Minister Rustem Umerov as a special envoy on November 27 to seek support from the Yoon Suk-yeol administration, which had announced a policy of gradually increasing aid to Ukraine. He requested support or the purchase of defensive and offensive weapons. In response, Russia warned that if South Korea were to provide weapons to Ukraine, it would destroy the South Korea-Russia relationship and take measures that would seriously harm South Korea's security. Moreover, with President-elect Trump’s clear intention to end the war and National Security Advisor nominee Mike Waltz's warning that South Korea’s support would not lead to peace but to an escalation of the conflict, the South Korean government is reportedly refraining from providing support or selling weapons.
It is entirely understandable that our government joined international sanctions against Russia for its illegal invasion of another country and provided humanitarian assistance to Ukraine. However, Russia, with President Putin himself intervening, strongly warned South Korea for indirectly supplying 155mm artillery shells to Ukraine. This eventually led to the restoration of the North-Russia alliance and the deployment of North Korean troops to Russia.
Therefore, while the South Korean government’s stance on gradually expanding its support, from humanitarian aid to defensive weapons and eventually offensive weapons, may be intended to counter Russia’s excessive support, such as advanced military technology to North Korea, if implemented, it could have a very negative impact on South Korea’s security. Expanding South Korea’s support for Ukraine qualitatively should only be considered if concrete evidence emerges that Russia is either deploying troops to North Korea or transferring weapons or military technology that seriously jeopardizes South Korea’s security. Thus, it seems more prudent for the government to regulate the level of support by focusing on strengthening humanitarian aid to Ukraine. -
During the election campaign, President-elect Trump repeatedly asserted that during his first term, he had built a good relationship with Kim Jong-un, preventing the development of North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction and provocations, and reducing security threats to the U.S. He also stated that if re-elected, he would resume this positive relationship. Therefore, the resumption of North-U.S. dialogue seems to be a matter of time.
Given that the priorities of Trump’s second-term foreign policy will likely first address the Ukraine war, the Israel issue, countering China, Taiwan-related matters, and reducing trade deficits through tariffs—only then turning to the Korean Peninsula—expediting dialogue with North Korea may prove challenging. However, considerations such as winning the majority vote in the elections, controlling both chambers of Congress, and the appointment of loyalists to key positions provide Trump with an opportunity to assert that his personal preferences and agenda in foreign policy should be taken into account. Moreover, considering the potential for negotiations between North Korea and the U.S. regarding the deployment of North Korean troops to Russia amid the Ukraine war, there are reasons to believe that the resumption of North-U.S. dialogue is possible. In a December 12 interview with the Times, Trump indicated his intention to end the Ukraine war through negotiations, despite the complicating factor of North Korea's involvement. He also remarked, 'I get along very well with Kim Jong-un. I’m probably the only one he’s dealt with properly,' which hints at the possibility of a summit with Kim. Given President Putin’s use of his personal connections to facilitate a North-U.S. summit and Trump’s ambitions for a Nobel Prize, it’s difficult to dismiss the likelihood of renewed North-U.S. negotiations—and even a summit."
By appointing Alex Wong, who was involved in the summit with Kim Jong-un during his first term, as Deputy National Security Advisor, and Richard Grenell, a close ally who previously served as the U.S. Ambassador to Germany, acting Director of National Intelligence (DNI), and was also considered for Secretary of State, as 'Presidential Envoy for Special Missions' on December 14, Trump has demonstrated significant interest in North-U.S. relations. Grenell was tasked with handling some of the world's most pressing issues, including Venezuela and North Korea. This move underscores Trump’s strong focus on resuming a North-U.S. summit.
The biggest obstacle to North-U.S. dialogue is the fact that North Korea has changed. Kim Jong-un was disappointed with the results of the three North-U.S. summits in 2018-19, and since then, North Korea has significantly enhanced its nuclear and missile capabilities. Additionally, its foreign policy has shifted from survival through compromise with the U.S. to self-reliance and strengthening ties with China and Russia. North Korea has even entered into an alliance with Russia, sending troops, which has greatly diminished the need and value of any compromise with the U.S.
Therefore, whether Trump presents an offer that Kim Jong-un finds appealing will likely determine the success and timing of a summit. If the U.S. seeks a comprehensive agreement for the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, it is unlikely that a summit will take place. However, if smaller compromises—such as arms control or easing tensions—are pursued instead of full denuclearization, a meeting could occur relatively quickly. Additionally, Kim Jong-un may pursue talks with Trump as part of maintaining close North-Russia ties, bolstered by the deployment of troops, while simultaneously trying to isolate South Korea.
In particular, Trump may justify his diplomatic efforts by accepting a freeze on North Korea’s nuclear and long-range missile programs, allowing for a compromise with Kim Jong-un, such as agreeing to troop reductions in South Korea, and then claiming success in easing tensions on the Korean Peninsula. In this case, South Korea could face an even worse security situation than it did after the 1994 Geneva Agreement. Kim Jong-un would maintain threats to South Korea while reducing only the U.S. threat through a freeze on weapons of mass destruction. The U.S. would feel it has enhanced its security while promoting peace, thus maintaining influence over the Korean Peninsula, while South Korea is left to bear the continued nuclear threat from the North and is sidelined in the process, paying the cost but receiving no benefits. Therefore, the government must strengthen ROK-U.S. cooperation and persuade the U.S. administration that while the primary goal could be a freeze on North Korea’s nuclear programs, the ultimate objective is complete denuclearization. Moreover, issues such as the presence of U.S. troops in South Korea must be settled with prior consultation with South Korea, and it must be made clear that the extended deterrence posture should remain firm until North Korea’s denuclearization is achieved. If possible, ROK-U.S. coordination should jointly draft a roadmap for denuclearization and peace on the Korean Peninsula that can be discussed at the North-U.S. summit.
To prevent North-U.S. dialogue from leading to the isolation of South Korea, it is essential to solidify ROK-U.S. coordination, resolve inter-Korean animosities, and restore dialogue channels between North and South Korea. This requires a robust security posture and a firm response to provocations. At the same time, efforts should be made to halt the distribution of leaflets and broadcasting of loudspeakers to the North, while continuing to demonstrate a commitment to peace and humanitarian aid, as well as a willingness to restore reciprocal cooperation. Even before government-level dialogue is restored, efforts should be made to promote civilian-level dialogue and exchanges.
* ‘Tong-mi-bong-nam’ is a specific term that refers to North Korea’s diplomacy strategy of engaging directly with the U.S. while isolating South Korea.
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During the election campaign, President-elect Trump repeatedly emphasized the need for South Korea to increase its defense cost-sharing contributions. In a conversation hosted by the Chicago Economic Club on October 15, he referred to South Korea as a 'money machine' and demanded an annual defense contribution of $10 billion (approximately 14 trillion KRW). The next day, he added, 'They are a wealthy country. We have to start. We can no longer be taken advantage of.' In a December 8 interview with U.S. MBC, he criticized the U.S. defending European countries that don't buy American goods, calling it a 'double whammy,' and warned that if this wasn't addressed, the U.S. might withdraw from NATO.
Although the defense cost-sharing agreement between South Korea and the U.S. for the period 2026-2030 has been finalized and ratified by the South Korean National Assembly (with no need for U.S. ratification, meaning it is already in effect), the Trump administration is likely to demand renegotiation, threaten with tariff increases, or exert pressure through a reduction in U.S. troops stationed in South Korea. The fact that Richard Grenell, who publicly revealed Trump’s consideration of reducing U.S. troops in South Korea in June 2020, was appointed as North Korea Special Envoy suggests the possibility that these concerns may become a reality.
The South Korean government should not be surprised by these demands and should respond calmly. First, it should emphasize that the agreements were reached through legitimate procedures between the two countries and must be upheld, regardless of changes in government. Next, South Korea should highlight that, unlike Japan, it has not included land-use fees and KATUSA wages (Korean Augmentation to the U.S. Army) in its defense contributions. When comparing GDP-based contributions, South Korea has been paying more than Germany and more than double the amount of Japan. In terms of fairness with Japan, a reduction in South Korea's share would be more appropriate. It is also important to remind the U.S. that South Korea’s defense budget is significantly higher than the OECD average, and that South Korea has been purchasing considerable amounts of military equipment from the U.S. for decades.
When the U.S. pressures South Korea to increase its contributions by raising tariffs, South Korea should respond by separating trade and security issues. If the U.S. uses the threat of tariff increases, South Korea should argue that this is a separate matter from the defense contribution and suggest purchasing more U.S. exports, such as shale gas and military goods, or emphasize the substantial impact of South Korean investment in the U.S. on American employment.
If the U.S. uses the reduction of U.S. troops in South Korea as leverage to pressure for an increase in defense contributions, South Korea can offer a counterproposal in terms of maintaining the balance of military power on the Korean Peninsula. If the rationale for U.S. troops in South Korea is to deter North Korean provocations and invasions, South Korea already has a conventional military advantage over North Korea. Therefore, the main value of U.S. forces is their nuclear deterrence role. If the U.S. finds the cost-sharing agreement burdensome, South Korea could propose reducing the number of U.S. troops stationed in South Korea from the current 28,500 to about 22,000—thus reducing the overall cost—while enhancing nuclear deterrence capabilities. By offering this proposal in a spirit of goodwill and mutual understanding, it is likely that the U.S. would reassess its costs, recognize the role of U.S. troops in countering China, and ultimately abandon the demand for renegotiation or an increase.
However, if the U.S. remains stubborn, South Korea should accept an increase within reasonable limits but also demand countermeasures, such as allowing uranium enrichment and reprocessing at levels similar to Japan’s for peaceful nuclear purposes, permitting the development of nuclear submarines, or temporarily agreeing to the conditional and temporary redeployment of tactical nuclear weapons or nuclear submarines to the Korean Peninsula. -
The Yoon Suk-yeol government has made the mistake of blindly accepting the Biden administration's push for democratic solidarity to counter authoritarianism, which the U.S. has framed as a global strategic objective, and implemented a U.S.-Japan-biased foreign policy. This has resulted in turning North Korea, Russia, and even China into adversaries. The United States, as a superpower, has often paraded values like democracy and human rights, while practicing an "America First" pragmatic diplomacy. However, as a middle power, South Korea has pursued values and ideologies, only to lose sight of practical benefits.
While maintaining close relations with allied countries like the U.S. and neighboring Japan is positive, South Korea has neglected its own national interests, blindly following America and conceding unilaterally to Japan, which has not sufficiently reflected on its actions in depriving our people of their rights and freedoms. Moreover, South Korea’s hostile stance toward North Korea has created a tense situation where regional conflict, even a limited war, is possible at any time. Criticizing and dismissing issues deemed vital to China and Russia based on ideological grounds has only exacerbated the security situation on the Korean Peninsula. For meaningful dialogue, reconciliation, and cooperation between North and South Korea, surrounding powers must maintain peaceful and stable relations. However, South Korea's current policies have fostered a new Cold War-like divide between the South Korea-U.S.-Japan alliance and North Korea-China-Russia.
Trump’s foreign policy in his second term goes beyond Biden's pragmatism and Trump’s first-term "America First" to one of "America Only." While maintaining a friendly relationship with the U.S. is crucial, pursuing a one-sided foreign policy will risk neglecting South Korea's national interests. Rather than blindly following Trump, South Korea must balance its alliances, carefully calculating what it gives and receives. Trump aims to compete and confront North Korea, China, and Russia while maintaining good relations with their leaders, which suggests that South Korea should also confidently pursue friendly and mutually beneficial cooperation with these countries.
Additionally, as Trump will not base his approach on the framework of alliances, South Korea must reduce its dependency on the U.S. and strengthen its own efforts for self-reliance. This includes reinforcing national defense, advancing advanced technologies, diversifying supply chains, and expanding export markets, while simultaneously fostering a security environment on the Korean Peninsula that is favorable to South Korea. South Korea should express its commitment to peaceful coexistence with North Korea, reopening dialogue channels, and advancing humanitarian assistance and mutually beneficial cooperation to transform inter-Korean relations into a partnership. Relations with China should be restored as strategic partnerships, and Russia should be engaged to normalize relations as soon as the Ukraine war ends, with an emphasis on strategic partnership and mutual economic benefits to promote peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula.
Finally, South Korea should promote peace, coexistence, mutual respect, and cooperative diplomacy as the core of its foreign policy, while activating diverse cooperation with smaller nations. It should also work on building friendly relations with Global South countries, whose voices are increasingly prominent on the world stage, strengthening efforts for mutual cooperation and collaboration.
| Trump’s Push for Ending the Ukraine War and South Korea’s Support for Ukraine
| The Possibility of Resuming North-U.S. Dialogue and the Potential for ‘Tong-mi-bong-nam’ *
| Demands to reduce U.S. troops in South Korea, renegotiating the defense cost-sharing agreement, and a substantial increase in contributions
| From a U.S.-Japan biased ideological diplomacy to a comprehensive, pragmatic diplomacy based on friendship and cooperation
※ The opinions expressed in 'Sejong Focus' are personal opinions of the author and do not represent the official views of Sejong Institute
