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[Outlook on Global Affairs 2025-Special Issue No.5] The Inauguration of Trump 2.0 and Outlook on Russia in 2025 |
| December 23, 2024
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Beom-Shik ShinProfessor, Seoul National University | sbsrus@snu.ac.kr
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The U.S.-Russia relationship is being closely scrutinized with Trump’s re-election. During his first term, the U.S. under Trump raised concerns about NATO's relevance, even suggesting the conditional application of Article 5, the collective defense clause, and attempted to reduce U.S. military presence in Germany. Trump's expressed affinity for Russian President Vladimir Putin, particularly after Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014, was seen as shaking the very foundations of the transatlantic relationship. Ahead of his re-election campaign, Trump has reiterated his intent to quickly negotiate with Putin to end the war if he wins. It seems highly probable that the Trump administration’s second term will involve a significant reduction in military support to Ukraine. Trump's passive stance on the Russia-Ukraine war and his "Make America Great Again" slogan, which prioritizes domestic politics, could result in a reduction in U.S. involvement and influence in international issues.
Given this backdrop, various projections regarding the possibility of ending the Russia-Ukraine war have emerged with Trump’s potential re-election. During his campaign, Trump repeatedly emphasized that he would quickly end the war if elected. During his first term, Trump’s "America First" policy focused on reducing overseas military engagements and improving relations with Russia, setting a precedent for a similar approach in the future. As such, there is a high likelihood that he will attempt to reach a peace deal with Russia, positioning it as a major foreign policy achievement. This forecast is supported by the assumption that Trump, as a pragmatic dealmaker, will likely reduce military and economic aid to Ukraine, putting additional pressure on Ukraine to negotiate with Russia. This could serve as a catalyst for formal peace talks between the two countries. Trump's first administration’s preference for negotiations and deals rather than full-scale sanctions against Russia makes such an outlook plausible, with hopes that the process could mark the beginning of a peace resolution.
A major point of focus in this context is the appointment of Keith Kellogg, former National Security Advisor to Vice President Mike Pence, as a special envoy to manage the war's resolution. Kellogg's appointment has drawn significant attention, as he is reportedly working on a plan that could include freezing the frontlines at their current positions and excluding Ukraine's NATO membership from the negotiations. President Putin has signaled his readiness to engage in talks with the U.S. in response to this initiative. Thus, Trump’s potential appointment of Kellogg as a special envoy suggests that peace talks over the Russia-Ukraine war could commence early in Trump’s second term.
However, Trump’s team is reportedly open to the possibility of territorial concessions from Ukraine. Yet, there are considerable concerns that reducing support for Ukraine or seeking territorial concessions could strengthen Putin’s aggressive policies and undermine NATO’s cohesion and credibility. Furthermore, such concessions could leave room for Russia to rearm and potentially launch another attack. From Russia's perspective, a weak ceasefire would provide Ukraine with an opportunity to rearm, which could create a pretext for a future war. Overcoming the strong security dilemma that could arise in Russia-Ukraine or Russia-Europe relations presents a significant challenge. In addressing this, the Trump administration’s second term will likely need to prepare a policy for Ukraine’s reconstruction, presenting it as an incentive, while using the reduction of U.S. support for Ukraine as a strong deterrent, thereby shifting the burden mainly to Europe. At the same time, it will be crucial to secure leverage that can pressure Russia, such as a form of punishment, to complement the incentive of bringing the war to a close on terms favorable to Russia. In this context, sanctions will likely play a central role in Trump’s Russia strategy. As observed during the Russia-Ukraine war, sanctions have been the result of coordinated efforts among Western nations. Despite the mitigation of their effects by the policies of the Global South, the West, led by the U.S., has implemented powerful sanctions against Russia, targeting its vulnerabilities. The West has also taken steps to block Russia’s attempts to evade sanctions, particularly through restrictions on financial institutions and access to crucial technologies and materials needed for military operations. However, sanctions, while serving as a deterrent, could also act as a significant incentive if lifted. Due to legal constraints in the U.S., the president cannot unilaterally lift sanctions without broader legislative action. Specifically, the 2017 Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) requires the president to submit a report to Congress when reducing or removing sanctions. This legal mechanism complicates any immediate changes to sanctions policy. Nevertheless, with the Republican Party holding more influence in Congress, there may be a greater chance of Trump reaching an agreement on this issue.
Thus, the U.S.-Russia relationship under Trump’s second term will be closely watched, as various possibilities for change emerge. The central issue will likely be how the two countries can narrow the differences in their positions on resolving the Russia-Ukraine war. -
Can the Russia-Ukraine war, which the world has been eagerly watching, move towards a swift resolution? The focus of international developments related to Russia in 2025 will undoubtedly center on how much coordination can be achieved between the United States and Russia regarding the Russia-Ukraine conflict. To answer this, it is necessary to analyze the positions of the various stakeholders directly and indirectly involved in the war.
First, Russia essentially maintains the initial objectives it set when it began the war. Regarding the appointment of Keith Kellogg as a special envoy, Reuters reported, citing five current and former Russian officials familiar with the Kremlin’s internal affairs, that President Putin might broadly agree to a “freeze of the conflict” along the frontlines. However, it is also reported that Putin insists on two key conditions: Ukraine must abandon its NATO membership ambitions, and the concessions of vast territories currently occupied by Russia must not be part of any agreement. Therefore, the most important precondition for starting negotiations is Ukraine’s renouncement of NATO membership. This is because Russia's primary goal in its "special military operation" is to neutralize Ukraine. Thus, if Ukraine insists on joining NATO, any form of negotiation seems unlikely to begin.
In contrast, Ukrainian President Zelensky has stated in recent interviews that for the war to end, the territories controlled by Ukraine must fall under the protection of NATO. This suggests that Ukraine believes the war could end without territorial recovery as long as NATO membership is secured. In other words, Ukraine’s security guarantees become a crucial condition for peace. While this position by Ukraine can be seen as a step forward, the NATO issue remains a major obstacle, making it difficult to close the gap between the two sides.
Meanwhile, Keith Kellogg, in his book published last spring, expressed skepticism about the continued military support to Ukraine, suggesting that it is merely an expensive show of goodwill. He called for a ceasefire and doubted the feasibility of Ukraine recovering all the territories occupied by Russia. Kellogg also holds the view that, to bring Putin to the negotiation table, Ukraine's NATO membership must be postponed. This stance by Kellogg is likely to reflect the U.S. position in promoting peace negotiations.
The European Union's (EU) position is also a crucial factor that cannot be ignored. In his inaugural speech, the newly appointed President of the European Council, António Costa, made it clear that he could not accept Ukraine’s surrender. He emphasized that Ukraine’s peace must follow international law and underlined the necessity of territorial recovery. This European stance, which views Ukraine as a bulwark against security threats from Russia, reflects concerns about European security that differ from those of the United States. As such, even if the U.S. pushes for a ceasefire or peace agreement based on Ukrainian concessions, it is difficult to rule out the possibility that the EU will continue to support Ukraine's war efforts independently. However, there are significant arguments suggesting that, due to Europe's deteriorating economic situation and the divided opinions within Europe regarding the Russia-Ukraine war, it may not be easy to sustain increased support for Ukraine. -
Based on these fundamental positions, several potential scenarios for the future development of the war can be considered, as outlined in [Table 1].
During the Biden administration, the anti-Russian alliance of the U.S.-Ukraine-Europe (Position D) clashed with Russia's position, which continued the war by preventing further support to Ukraine. As a result, the Russia-Ukraine war has remained an active conflict over the past few years. However, with the inauguration of the Trump administration in 2025, U.S. policy, which had focused on supporting Ukraine through significant aid to exhaust Russia’s national power, is expected to change. The position of Ukraine, which seeks to continue receiving Western support while entering peace negotiations (Position B), may no longer be a viable option in the future.
Instead, under the second Trump administration, the U.S. and Russia may converge on Position A, which involves reducing aid to Ukraine and engaging in peace negotiations.
However, the strong security concerns of Europe may lead to a scenario in which even limited support for Ukraine continues, making it unlikely for Ukraine to move towards ceasefire or peace negotiations. In this case, Russia might revert to seeking a solution through military force, while Europe and Ukraine may continue to clash with Russia, moving toward Position C. Nonetheless, given the limited sustainability of European support for Ukraine, the war would likely evolve into a low-intensity conflict, and this situation would probably be short-lived.
In summary, the direction of the Russia-Ukraine war during the Trump administration seems to shift from the high-intensity conflict outlined in Position D — where the interests of the key stakeholders have clashed over the past three years — to a low-intensity conflict (Position C) or peace negotiations (Position A). The timing of the ceasefire or peace negotiations will depend on how quickly the Trump administration can identify areas of negotiation and conditions to narrow the differences between these two positions.
Based on this analysis, a predictable scenario could unfold under the condition that Ukraine abandons its NATO membership and receives a weaker form of security guarantees.
First, a partial territorial concession leading to a ceasefire agreement could occur. In this scenario, Ukraine would agree to relinquish some or all of the territories it currently holds, recognizing Russia’s effective control over these areas in exchange for a ceasefire or peace agreement. If Ukraine abandons NATO membership, this scenario appears to be the most feasible at the moment. Second, a long-term ceasefire or mediation by a third party could take place. Instead of direct peace talks between Ukraine and Russia, a third party — such as the European Union, a major power (e.g., the U.S., China, or India), or an international organization like the UN — might mediate a long-term ceasefire. However, Russia is strongly opposed to this scenario. Third, the prolonged war due to difficulty in finding negotiation conditions could be a possibility. If the disagreements between the U.S., Russia, and Ukraine remain unresolved, and Russia continues to maintain its advantage in the war, it is unlikely that any ceasefire or peace negotiations will take place. In this case, Russia would likely continue its war of attrition, keeping control over the occupied territories and exerting pressure on Ukraine until it eventually surrenders. -
Another crucial variable to consider in the context of negotiations for ending the Russia-Ukraine war is the domestic situation within Russia in 2025. Contrary to initial expectations, Russia has demonstrated continued political and economic resilience over the past three years, enabling it to sustain the war. However, the key question is whether Russia can maintain this resilience and continue the war into next year. This ability will be one of the most decisive factors when it comes to determining whether Russia will engage in ceasefire or peace negotiations.
As is well known, the results of the Russian presidential election in the spring of 2024 show that President Vladimir Putin, who started his fifth term with 87.3% of the vote and a voter turnout of 77.4%, has solidified his control over the Russian political system, exhibiting a clear "rally around the flag" effect. Furthermore, the ruling United Russia Party’s overwhelming victory in the September regional elections further demonstrated the lack of significant changes in Russia's domestic political stability. Several factors can explain this political stability.
Firstly, there is the conservatization of Russian society. The memories of the 1990s, when Russia essentially collapsed, are deeply embedded in the Russian population's psyche and strongly influence their support for Putin. The humiliation felt by Russians in the 1993 elections, exemplified by the Zhirinovsky phenomenon, played a major role in the rapid shift toward conservatism in Russian politics. Regarding the Ukraine war, while there is some anti-war sentiment, the majority of Russians strongly support the legitimacy of the "special military operation" aimed at Ukraine's "neutralization, demilitarization, and de-Nazification." There is also a sense of crisis that if Russia does not win this conflict, it could experience the same humiliation from the West as in the 1990s. This sentiment has translated into strong support for Putin. Although there are opposing views on Putin's undemocratic regime, media censorship, and anti-war sentiments, these voices have not gained significant traction due to Russia’s internal conservatism, and this tendency has only intensified in times of war. Thus, the political stability resulting from the domestic conservatism combined with the wartime conditions is unlikely to change significantly in 2025.
Next, the performance of Russia's wartime managed economy has contributed to this stability. Various indicators released by the World Bank clearly show that the Russian economy has remained resilient, and while inflation initially surged at the start of the war, the economy soon stabilized, and citizens’ incomes have increased as the wartime economy has flourished. In fact, despite the ongoing war, Russia's economy has exceeded expectations. According to World Bank data, in 2022, Russia’s GDP (in terms of purchasing power parity, PPP) reached $5.5 trillion, surpassing Germany’s GDP of $5.31 trillion, making Russia the 4th largest economy in the world, ahead of Japan. In 2023, Russia's GDP growth rate was 3.6%, and it is expected to reach 3.9% in 2024, outperforming the G7 countries. International financial and economic assessments have placed Russia as Europe’s largest economy and the 4th largest in the world, behind China, the U.S., and India. This strong economic performance can be attributed to Russia's effective mitigation of Western sanctions by strengthening cooperation with China and the Global South, as well as the activation of its defense industry, leading to rising wages and a positive cycle of increased consumption.
Of course, there are critiques pointing to the illusionary effects of wartime economics, highlighting issues such as high inflation and interest rates that fluctuate in the late teens. However, Russia’s central bank predicts inflation in 2024 to be between 9.2% and 9.3%, while real wages are expected to rise by around 9%, offsetting inflationary pressures. Moreover, concerns regarding fiscal deficits due to military spending are mitigated by the introduction of progressive income taxes and corporate tax increases, which are expected to generate an additional 2.6 trillion rubles in tax revenue. As a result, Russia is expected to have little trouble covering its wartime expenses in the near future. Amidst some premature assessments suggesting that Russia, with its complete self-sufficiency in resources and food, is gradually laying the groundwork for industrial independence as a result of the war, the overall stability of the Russian economy appears to be effectively dispelling the public's concerns about the conflict.
Given the political and economic situation in Russia, the analysis suggests that Russia will not face significant difficulties in sustaining the war for at least one to two more years. Even disregarding the post-war outlook for Russia’s economy, there is little reason to believe that Russia will encounter significant obstacles in continuing the war. A key indication of this is the recent replacement of Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, a security expert, with economic expert Andrei Belousov, which highlights how seriously Russia is taking preparations for a long-term war of attrition and the management of its wartime economy. Thus, the domestic political stability and successful management of the wartime economy provide a strong foundation for Russia as it prepares for potential ceasefire or peace negotiations. This confidence may also explain Russia’s increasingly aggressive stance on the battlefield in recent months. -
In line with its emphasis on the alliance with the United States, the South Korean government has actively participated in sanctions against Russia and has also been proactive in cooperating with NATO. South Korea’s active participation in sanctions against Russia has led to corresponding retaliatory actions from Russia, which has caused a downturn in the operations of South Korean companies in Russia, such as Samsung, Hyundai, and LG. Direct flights between the two countries have been suspended, negatively affecting both human and material exchanges.
In particular, the growing North Korea-Russia alignment, in contrast to the deterioration of South Korea-Russia relations, presents a significant challenge for the Korean Peninsula and South Korean diplomacy. Since the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine war in 2022, North Korea has actively supported Russia’s stance and eventually reached a point where it provided weapons and artillery shells to Russia. This development prompted changes in South Korea’s principles regarding support for Ukraine, leading to the decision in late 2022 to indirectly supply artillery shells to Ukraine via the U.S. and Poland. Furthermore, the Yoon Suk-yeol government defined the illegal arms trade between North Korea and Russia as a provocation against South Korea, even suggesting the possibility of directly supplying offensive weapons to Ukraine, further deteriorating South Korea-Russia relations.
A pivotal change occurred in June 2024, when President Putin visited North Korea and signed the "Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement" with Kim Jong-un, which resembled a military alliance. The geopolitical tensions exacerbated during the Russia-Ukraine war, the strengthening of the North Korea-Russia alignment, participation in sanctions and retaliatory measures, as well as military and security concerns, have all become significant challenges between South Korea and Russia. Particularly, recent speculations about the potential deployment of North Korean troops to Russia have attracted attention as a factor that could influence the direction of the war. Although various claims have been made, there has been no decisive evidence regarding the participation of North Korean troops in combat, and South Korea has been cautious in responding to these claims. In this situation, the issue of South Korea’s support for Ukraine has emerged as a multidimensional challenge for South Korean diplomacy.
However, with the onset of the second Trump administration, some analysts have predicted that Russia’s potential mediating role in the strategic competition between the U.S. and China could be revived. Given Russia’s persistent wariness and fear of China’s rise, it is not entirely out of the question that Russia could respond positively to a more conciliatory U.S. approach toward Russia in the second Trump administration. Moreover, political changes in South Korea, such as the potential impeachment of the president, could signal shifts in South Korea’s foreign policy direction, heightening instability and fluidity in the Northeast Asian geopolitical landscape. In particular, if the second Trump administration moves toward improving relations with North Korea, it could lead to significant changes in the security dynamics and balance of power in Northeast Asia.
Thus, South Korea must establish a nimble and pragmatic diplomatic strategy to respond to the rapidly changing security landscape. It is essential to strengthen relationships with the United States and Japan while proactively managing ties with China and Russia. SMoreover, it is crucial to actively develop mechanisms to mitigate the shocks from changes in the external environment by promoting the active activation of minilateral channels, such as the Korea-China-Japan channel in Northeast Asia. Concerns about South Korea being sidelined in the United States North Korea approach must also be alleviated. These tasks are possible through agile and flexible diplomatic responses, in which Russia could be leveraged as an asset for South Korean diplomacy. South Korea and Russia have maintained a "strategic partnership" since 2008, and there is accumulated experience through various cooperation channels. Furthermore, from a geopolitical realist perspective, it is difficult to separate South Korea's core external task — establishing peace on the Korean Peninsula and achieving reunification — from Russia. While Russia may have been a contributor to the division of the peninsula, it can also play a role in the journey toward reunification. Of course, Russia could also become a vetoing force rather than a contributor to peace and stability on the peninsula. Therefore, in the face of rapidly changing circumstances, South Korea needs to actively manage and improve its relations with Russia, minimizing negative impacts on its diplomacy while securing positive opportunities that may arise.
| Trump 2.0 and U.S.-Russia Relations
| Positions of Stakeholders and Prospects for Ceasefire/Peace in the Russia-Ukraine War
| Domestic Situation in Russia and Future Outlook
| Challenges and Responses in South Korea-Russia Relations
※ The opinions expressed in 'Sejong Focus' are those of the author and do not represent the official views of the Sejong Institute
