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[Sejong Focus] Assessment and Implications of North Korea's Response to Natural Disasters in 2024 |
| December 30, 2024
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Eun-ju ChoiResearch Fellow, Sejong Institute | ej0717@sejong.org
- On December 22, 2024, North Korea announced the completion of housing construction projects in areas affected by floods that occurred in late July, specifically in the regions of North Pyongan Province, Ryanggang Province, and Jagang Province. Although the completion of these housing reconstruction projects marks the conclusion of recovery efforts in these areas, such natural disasters are not exceptional occurrences. Since Kim Jong Un came to power, North Korea has experienced annual natural disasters of varying scales. Due to the country's low resilience, these disasters have caused significant harm to public health, economic activities, and the daily lives of its citizens. Severe flooding along the Yalu River, which occurred this year, caused extensive damage in the neighboring regions of North Pyongan, Ryanggang, and Jagang Provinces. In response, North Korea mobilized its national resources to focus on recovery efforts. From July, when the disaster occurred, to December, when the reconstruction efforts were finalized, North Korea demonstrated specific patterns in its disaster response. This paper seeks to examine the characteristics and implications of North Korea's response during this period and to derive meaningful insights from its actions.
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In late July 2024, severe flooding along the Yalu River caused significant damage in the regions of North Pyongan, Jagang, and Ryanggang Provinces in North Korea. According to reports from North Korean media, over 5,000 residents in several island areas of Sinuiju and Uiju County in North Pyongan Province were isolated. Additionally, more than 4,100 homes and 3,000 jeongbo (approximately 3,000 hectares) of farmland were lost. The flooding also resulted in extensive damage to public buildings, infrastructure, railways, and roads. Considering the unreported damage in Jagang and Ryanggang Provinces, the actual scale of the disaster is likely much greater.
A field survey conducted by the author in late August along the North Korea-China border confirmed extensive flood damage in the Yalu River basin. As shown in, in Ojeok-ri, located on Wihwa Island, significant damage to housing was evident. In , the severity of the damage becomes even clearer. In a rural village in Junggang County, Jagang Province, when compared to 2023, parts of the road connected to a bridge near the Yalu River were submerged, and land along the riverbank appeared to have been washed away.
When severe flooding struck, North Korea quickly mobilized resources to rescue isolated residents. The air force deployed helicopters, and border patrols used rescue boats to evacuate more than 4,200 stranded individuals. Kim Jong Un personally visited affected areas, including Sinuiju and Uiju, and declared North Pyongan, Ryanggang, and Jagang Provinces as "Special Disaster Emergency Zones." During his visit, an emergency expanded meeting of the Political Bureau was held to assess the damage, ensure support for displaced residents, address health concerns, and discuss significant recovery measures. A directive titled “On Urgently Restoring Flood Damage in North Pyongan and Jagang Provinces” was issued.
North Korea prioritized recovery efforts by adjusting major policy plans for the year, indicating the severity of the damage. They conducted a detailed assessment of the flood’s impact, including the scale of recovery construction, required labor, and estimated budget. Resources initially allocated to nationwide construction projects were redirected to the disaster zones. Additionally, measures were taken to minimize further damage and loss of life, including strengthening weather forecasting, conducting preemptive maintenance, and securing essential equipment to ensure rapid deployment during future emergencies.
Before the floods, North Korea had convened several meetings to prepare for natural disasters. In June, the 10th plenary meeting of the 8th Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea identified disaster recovery as a key agenda item. On July 22, the State Emergency Crisis Response Committee reviewed the progress of disaster management efforts during the first half of the year. This meeting highlighted the need to reinforce disaster alert systems, establish standardized communication and reporting frameworks, and unify water management practices.
Despite these preparations, the flood response exposed significant shortcomings. A critical issue was the failure of state and local officials to recognize the seriousness of the disaster, which hampered effective emergency planning. Although the State Emergency Crisis Response Committee had an established structure at the provincial level, its operations remained largely superficial. Disaster prevention agencies lacked sufficient rescue resources, resulting in delayed action until the military intervened. Moreover, emergency disaster response teams and the Ministry of Social Security failed to accurately assess the situation, causing confusion during rescue operations and hindering efforts to minimize damage. -
When examining North Korea's response to the recent flood disaster, several characteristics become apparent. First, the country's systematic response at the national level appears more organized than in the past. This is likely attributable to the prioritization of the disaster as a critical national issue, as evidenced by Kim Jong Un personally visiting affected areas six times to assess damage and oversee recovery efforts. While local administrative capacities to manage crises remain inadequate, the immediate mobilization of military forces for rescue operations and the swift establishment of response policies, coupled with the rapid allocation of human and material resources, reflect notable improvements. Additionally, personnel changes were made, such as appointing Ri Hi-yong, First Deputy Director of the Organization and Guidance Department, as Secretary of the North Pyongan Provincial Party Committee, and Bang Du-seop, First Deputy Director of the Military Affairs Guidance Department, as Minister of Social Security. These central officials were assigned to oversee recovery operations. Furthermore, in September, the Standing Committee of the Supreme People's Assembly convened to amend the "Disaster Prevention, Rescue, and Recovery Law," supplementing provisions on establishing disaster management systems, disaster prevention, crisis response, and the preparation and supply of emergency materials to address issues exposed by the recent disaster.
Second, North Korea has recently been leveraging disaster recovery projects as part of its broader development initiatives. This approach was also evident during the reconstruction efforts following the massive floods in North and South Hwanghae, Kangwon, and South Hamgyong Provinces in 2020. At that time, the country rebuilt homes in the affected areas during the "80-Day Campaign" and set goals to develop new mining cities, such as Geomdeok County, Dancheon City, South Hamgyong Province. This reconstruction effort was integrated into the economic development five-year plan starting in 2021, with a target of constructing 20,000 houses by 2025. Similarly, North Korea announced plans to promote regional development focused on North Pyongan Province, one of the areas hit hardest by the recent floods. The recovery projects in the affected regions have been incorporated into the broader rural development strategy, including rural housing construction projects. Furthermore, during a speech at the housing completion ceremony for the affected areas on December 21, Kim Jong Un announced plans to build comprehensive greenhouse farms on Wihwa Island and Dajido and to commence full-scale development projects in Sinuiju starting in 2025.
Third, North Korea has utilized its response policies and recovery efforts for the recent flood disaster as a platform for political indoctrination. At the party level, the regime provided various relief supplies to disaster victims and demonstrated a keen interest in relief efforts. Over 13,000 displaced individuals were accommodated in Pyongyang during the recovery period, where infants and students were provided with education. Kim Jong Un personally greeted the displaced upon their arrival in Pyongyang, delivered a speech outlining future plans, and visited educational facilities to observe classes. These actions were publicized to emphasize the regime’s "people-first" policy and its commitment to the education of future generations. By highlighting these efforts, North Korea sought to strengthen party propaganda. In his speech, Kim also criticized South Korean media for allegedly exaggerating and spreading false reports about the flood damage in North Korea, calling them fabricated fake news. Additionally, he tied these criticisms to the North’s official 2023 policy on inter-Korean relations, which defined the South as an adversarial entity, thus seeking to legitimize this stance. Furthermore, following the disaster, North Korea rejected offers of aid from neighboring countries and the international community, choosing instead to carry out recovery efforts independently. This decision reinforced the regime’s long-standing narrative of self-reliance and independence.
Lastly, North Korea has disclosed more detailed information about disaster responses compared to the past. Through state media, the regime has provided specific updates on the damage, recovery plans, and measures to enhance future disaster preparedness. Under Kim Jong Un’s leadership, North Korea has increasingly revealed detailed accounts of disaster impacts and responses, compared to previous periods. In the case of this flood, Kim Jong Un delivered several speeches elaborating on the scale of the damage, specific recovery measures, issues encountered during response efforts, and plans for improvement. Additionally, the regime reported on the progress of recovery efforts through on-site inspections, even disclosing that the recovery timeline was extended twice. These actions suggest that North Korea aimed to focus public attention on relief and recovery efforts rather than the disaster itself, thereby preventing public unrest and showcasing the government’s capacity to respond effectively. -
As the recovery efforts for the large-scale natural disaster that occurred in North Korea in 2024 have come to an end, it appears that conditions have been created for affected residents to return to their daily lives. Reviewing the sequence of events reveals that the government swiftly responded at the national level to minimize damage, which is commendable; however, several issues also emerged during the process.
One notable aspect is that the recovery efforts, conducted through large-scale mass mobilization, have once again caused disruptions to the nation’s operations. In the course of recovering from the flood damage, the People's Army was deployed as a priority, and approximately 130,000 volunteers, primarily from the youth population, were dispatched nationwide to assist with reconstruction in the affected regions. While the scale of the disaster necessitated such extensive labor mobilization, the deployment of necessary equipment would have ensured faster and more effective recovery operations.
For example, as observed during an on-site visit to the affected areas in August 2024, <Photo 3> and <Figure 4> show the deployment of heavy equipment such as excavators and trucks in recovery efforts. Nevertheless, it appears that reconstruction and recovery work largely relied on extensive human labor. If disaster recovery continues to rely heavily on mass labor mobilization, it could disrupt ongoing nationwide construction projects and local industrial plant development initiatives that North Korea has recently been promoting.
Furthermore, there is a phenomenon in which the Party effectively assumes the administrative responsibilities of the Cabinet, referred to as "administrative delegation." This term describes a situation where tasks that should be overseen and executed by the administrative and economic institutions are instead carried out by the Party or the military. Traditionally, North Korea has sought to delineate the roles of the Party and the Cabinet, warning against the Party substituting the Cabinet's functions. Even under Kim Jong Un's leadership, emphasis has been placed on the Cabinet's responsibility and its role in crisis management. However, during the response to the recent flood disaster, the Central Committee of the Party took the lead, with little visible involvement from the Cabinet or the Premier.
According to the "Disaster Prevention, Rescue, and Recovery Law," in the event of a disaster-induced crisis, the Cabinet is responsible for convening the State Emergency Crisis Response Committee and leading recovery operations as the command center. Yet, based on North Korean media reports, the recovery efforts were directly led by the Party, with the Premier visiting recovery sites only twice. The law-mandated leadership role of the State Emergency Crisis Response Committee was not evident.
Lastly, even in the face of a national disaster crisis, North Korea adhered to the principle of self-reliance, rejecting offers of aid from neighboring countries and international organizations under the guise of political justification. This approach resulted in missed opportunities for more effective disaster response. Instead of prioritizing political principles and relying on the nationwide mobilization of relief supplies, the focus should have been on minimizing the suffering of disaster victims and resolving their hardships swiftly.
North Korea did take measures such as dispatching field medical teams, conducting disinfection campaigns, and distributing nationwide reserves of food and supplies, including aid obtained under the "principle of self-reliance." Social solidarity, such as collaboration and unity among citizens during the recovery process, is indeed important. However, such solidarity should not translate into an undue burden on society. Kim Jong Un emphasized in his speech that relief efforts should not involve overburdening institutions or individuals with excessive demands for supplies or performance metrics. This underscores that the burden of recovery and relief operations has likely been shifted onto the North Korean people. To address this issue, utilizing external aid to supplement the shortage of supplies would be a more effective solution. -
To address the recurring damage caused by natural disasters, North Korea must strengthen its "disaster resilience." This means that while it may not be possible to completely prevent natural disasters, the country should develop capabilities to minimize damage and enable affected residents to swiftly return to their daily lives. Achieving this requires a comprehensive integration of technological, social, and policy efforts. Specifically, measures such as strengthening infrastructure, establishing early warning systems, providing disaster education and training, implementing nature-based solutions for sustainable management, and building financial safety nets are essential. North Korea has recognized the need to enhance disaster response capabilities and has consistently emphasized such efforts, including presenting similar policy tasks during the recent recovery operations.
In its Voluntary National Review (VNR) report submitted to the United Nations, North Korea pledged to significantly increase the number of cities adopting and implementing integrated policies and plans for inclusivity, resource efficiency, climate change mitigation and adaptation, and disaster resilience by 2020. It also committed to developing and implementing comprehensive disaster risk management at all levels. However, these commitments have not been visibly realized. Given the increasing frequency of natural disasters, it is imperative for North Korea to effectively advance its disaster response capabilities. In this regard, international cooperation for North Korea’s disaster risk management remains critical. Yet, despite the gradual reopening of borders that were closed during the COVID-19 pandemic, staff from international organizations and aid agencies have yet to return to North Korea. As a result, opportunities to accurately assess the scale of disaster damage, develop appropriate response measures, and procure necessary relief materials with the cooperation of the North Korean government have not been fully utilized.
Nevertheless, it is worth noting that North Korea does not entirely reject the need for international cooperation on disaster-related matters. In June 2024, North Korea sent a delegation from its State Emergency Disaster Committee to the "Comprehensive Security 2024" international exhibition held in Moscow, Russia. Furthermore, in the "Agreement on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership" signed with Russia, it explicitly outlined mutual cooperation in disaster prevention and mitigation (Article 12). However, addressing issues related to natural disasters and emergencies requires international collaboration beyond specific countries or political blocs. In this context, North Korea must adopt a more open approach and actively pursue diverse cooperative initiatives.
The South Korean government should also explore ways to play a constructive role in North Korea’s disaster response and recovery efforts. North Korea’s natural disasters are directly tied to the survival of its residents, making South Korea’s proposal to provide relief supplies a commendable humanitarian initiative. However, further steps are needed to propose more proactive measures, such as establishing a disaster management cooperation mechanism that takes into account the shared impacts of climate change and natural disasters on the Korean Peninsula. In this regard, creating a cooperative framework for sharing data on disaster prediction and early warning systems would be highly effective. Flooding in the Han River and Yalu River basins, which significantly affects both sides, underscores the need for collaboration on water resource management. Considering that North Korea still relies on labor-intensive recovery methods with slow and inefficient outcomes, sharing advanced disaster management technologies could be a viable way to enhance North Korea’s disaster response capabilities.
In the short term, while North Korea tends to emphasize self-reliance and reject external aid, it is noteworthy that indirect assistance through international organizations tends to be more acceptable. South Korea could collaborate with organizations such as the United Nations and the International Red Cross to propose programs aimed at strengthening North Korea’s disaster management capacity and act as a mediator to facilitate necessary support during disasters. These efforts could go beyond simple humanitarian assistance to enhance interdependence as a Korean Peninsula community and serve as a critical step toward ensuring the sustainability of the peninsula as a whole.
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| Flood Damage and North Korea's Response in the Yalu River Region
| North Korea's Flood Response and Recovery: Evolving Disaster Management and Political Utilization
| Achievements and Limitations of North Korea’s Disaster Recovery Efforts
| Possibilities and Implications of North Korea’s Disaster Response Cooperation
※ The opinions expressed in 'Sejong Focus' are personal opinions of the author and do not represent the official views of the Sejong Institute
