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[Outlook on Global Affairs 2025- Special Issue No.7] Review of 2024 North Korea’s Political Landscape and Outlook for Foreign and South Korea Policy in 2025 |
| December 23, 2024
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Seong-Chang CheongSenior Research Fellow, The Sejong Institute | softpower@sejong.org
- The key characteristics of North Korea’s political landscape in 2024 include △ Preparation for ‘suppressing South Korea in case of emergency’ and the entrenchment of hostile inter-Korean relations, △ Complete restoration of North Korea-Russia alliance and the deployment of North Korean troops to the Ukraine war, and △ Elevation of Kim Ju Ae’s status. Major events and policies that will determine the situation in North Korea in 2025 include △ Expansion of North Korea-Russia military cooperation and possibility of Kim Jong Un’s visit to Russia, △ Resumption of dialogue between North Korea and U.S., △ Continuation of policies to ‘erase unification and nation’ and the potential for military provocations against South Korea.
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1. Preparation for ‘Suppressing South Korea in Case of Emergency’ and the Entrenchment of Hostile Inter-Korean Relations
In December 2023, at the 9th Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea, Kim Jong Un, the Supreme Leader of North Korea, instructed preparations for a major crisis to "fully subdue the entire territory of South Korea by mobilizing all physical means and capabilities, including nuclear weapons." He also assessed that inter-Korean relations had "completely solidified into a hostile relationship between two states and belligerent countries at war, no longer a relationship between kin or ethnically similar nations."
In his address during the 10th session of the 14th Supreme People's Assembly on January 15, 2024, Kim Jong Un pointed out the need to delete the expression "three principles for reunification" as stated in the July 4, 1972 North-South Joint Communique (self-reliance, peace, and national unity) from the constitution. He also ordered the complete physical severing of the northern section of the Gyeongui Line, which had symbolized inter-Korean exchange and cooperation, to an "irreversible" extent, and the removal of the "eyesore" Monument to the Three Principles of Reunification, which stood at the southern gateway of Pyongyang.
With the exception of the constitutional amendment, most of Kim Jong Un’s directives were implemented by 2024. North Korea abolished inter-Korean dialogue and cooperation bodies such as the Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland, the National Economic Cooperation Bureau, and the Mt. Kumgang International Tourism Bureau, making it unlikely for inter-Korean dialogue to resume even if there is a change in government in South Korea. Kim Jong Un's push for a complete severing of inter-Korean relations is likely due to the negative impact of the "wealthy South Korea" and the Korean Wave (K-pop and Hallyu), which have been seen as factors that erode loyalty to the regime and contribute to instability. Therefore, while North Korea has abandoned the pursuit of "peaceful reunification" through dialogue and cooperation, it is important to note that Kim Jong Un has not renounced the use of military force, as evidenced by his directive to "prepare to subdue South Korea in the event of an emergency."
Starting in May 2024, North Korea responded to leaflets sent by South Korean defector groups with a new tactic—"trash balloons." These balloons carried waste such as old wires, manure, household trash (including paper and cigarette butts), excrement, and Chinese-made used batteries, as well as anti-South Korea leaflets (known as "fliers"). The trash balloons caused flight delays and diversions at Incheon Airport, as well as damage to vehicles and greenhouses.
On December 3, former Defense Minister Kim Yong Hyun, who had suggested declaring martial law, reportedly ordered Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Kim Myung Soo to carry out a preemptive strike on the source of the trash balloons, but this order was opposed by Kim, and the plan was allegedly aborted. Former Minister Kim declined to testify when questioned by the prosecution. Had the preemptive strike been carried out, it is feared that a serious military conflict between North and South Korea could have occurred.
On October 11, the North Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that South Korean drones had infiltrated Pyongyang on the nights of October 3, 9, and 10, dropping leaflets above the building of the Workers' Party of Korea's Central Committee, where Kim Jong Un’s office is located. North Korea regarded this as a serious military and political provocation, warning that they would take action if such an incident occurred again. In response, the South Korean Ministry of National Defense stated that it could not confirm the incident, but recently, there have been suspicions in the National Assembly that the Drone Operation Command, under the direction of former Minister Kim, had sent drones to Pyongyang. Thus, inter-Korean relations in 2024 were in a highly precarious and volatile situation.
2. Complete Restoration of North Korea-Russia Alliance and the Deployment of North Korean Troops to the Ukraine War
In June 2024, Russian President Putin visited Pyongyang and signed a "Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty" with Kim Jong Un. This treaty, which restored North Korea-Russia relations to the level of Cold War-era alliance ties, promises immediate military support in case of an external armed invasion under Article 4.
On October 14, Putin submitted the treaty ratification proposal to the Russian parliament, and the lower and upper houses of the Russian legislature unanimously approved it on October 24 and November 6, respectively. Kim Jong Un also ratified the treaty and signed it on November 11 by decree as Chairman of the State Affairs Commission. Then, on December 4, the North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Kim Jong Gyu and Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Andrey Rudenko exchanged ratification protocols, thus the treaty took effect on this day, according to Article 22 of the treaty.
However, even before the treaty took effect, in October, North Korea began sending troops to assist Russia, which was engaged in the war with Ukraine. According to a report from the National Intelligence Service on October 18, "North Korea transported its special forces to Russia via a Russian naval transport vessel between October 8 and 13, confirming the involvement of North Korean troops." It was also revealed that "North Korea has recently decided to deploy 12,000 troops, including four brigades of special forces, to the war in Ukraine." While North Korea had previously sent small numbers of engineers and air force personnel during the Vietnam War, this is the first time it has sent a large-scale ground force to fight in a foreign war.
This situation clearly demonstrates Kim Jong Un's aggressive and expansionist nature, which seeks to maximize North Korea's national interests not only through defense of its own territory but by involving itself in the wars of other nations. By participating in the war in Ukraine, North Korea aims to obtain advanced technologies and conventional weaponry from Russia in areas such as military reconnaissance satellites and nuclear-powered submarines. This involvement also allows North Korea to gain combat experience and test the performance of its domestically developed weapons. In the event of a future conflict on the Korean Peninsula, North Korea could secure military support from Russia. However, the price for this support will inevitably involve the large-scale sacrifice of young soldiers.
3. Elevation of Kim Ju Ae’s Status
In 2024, the status of Kim Jong Un's eldest daughter, Kim Ju Ae, within North Korea was significantly elevated. On January 5, the Rodong Sinmun newspaper separately introduced Kim Ju Ae's attendance, ahead of other senior officials, and used respectful language to refer to her, compared to how other high-ranking officials were addressed. While Kim Ju Ae’s public activities had largely been focused on the military field until 2023, it is noteworthy that in 2024, her public engagement in the economic sector increased significantly.
On August 4 of the same year, Kim Ju Ae attended the ceremony for the handover of a new tactical ballistic missile weapon system alongside Kim Jong Un. During this event, Korean Central TV showed her aunt, Kim Yo Jong, the Deputy Director of the Workers' Party of Korea Central Committee, respectfully guiding her niece, Ju Ae. As Kim Ju Ae ascended the stage following Kim Jong Un, Kim Yo Jong slightly bowed and extended her arm to guide her, while Ju Ae stood upright, looking as she passed by. It was a rare sight to see Kim Yo Jong, who had once been regarded as the de facto second-in-command in North Korea, offering such courtesy to someone. This scene can be interpreted as indicating that Kim Jong Un had "designated" Kim Ju Ae as his successor, and that Kim Yo Jong, respecting her brother's decision, was supporting her niece’s elevated position. -
1. Expansion of North Korea-Russia Military Cooperation and Possibility of Kim Jong Un’s Visit to Russia
Russia will have no choice but to focus more on recapturing Krusk and expanding its territories until Trump takes office and calls for a ceasefire between Russia and Ukraine. To achieve this, Russia is in urgent need of additional North Korean military forces and weapons support. Even if Russia were to reach a ceasefire with Ukraine, it would still require North Korean labor for tasks such as the reconstruction of the Donbas region. Therefore, cooperation between North Korea and Russia is expected to continue in some form even after the war in Ukraine.
Russia holds a Victory Day event every year on May 9th in Moscow’s Red Square to commemorate the Soviet Union’s victory over Nazi Germany in World War II. However, it is considered unlikely that Kim Jong Un would visit Russia on this occasion. If Kim Jong Un were to attend the Victory Day ceremony, it could provide an opportunity for him to break free from isolation and project an image of a "normal state" by meeting not only President Putin but also other leaders from the Global South gathered in Red Square. However, Kim Jong Un has never participated in a multilateral summit, and given the limited areas for cooperation with countries other than Russia, he is expected to prefer bilateral meetings rather than multilateral ones.
If Kim Jong Un were to attend the Victory Day ceremony and meet President Putin again, it is unlikely that Putin would be able to dedicate much time to him due to his need to engage with many other heads of state. However, since Kim Jong Un would require ample time to secure Russia’s cooperation in areas such as military reconnaissance satellites and nuclear-powered submarines, it is believed that he would prefer to visit separately either before or after the Victory Day ceremony. If Kim Jong Un were to visit Moscow, it would mark his first visit since 2001, 24 years after the visit by Kim Jong Il, the former Defense Chairman.
2. Outlook for Resumption of Dialogue Between North Korea and U.S.
Since the breakdown of the Hanoi North Korea-U.S. summit and the Stockholm North Korea-U.S. working-level talks in 2019, North Korea has consistently rejected dialogue with the United States. Even with the election of Donald Trump as the U.S. president in the 2024 election, there has been no significant change in this stance. In a commemorative speech at the opening of the "National Defense Development-2024" exhibition in Pyongyang on November 21, Kim Jong Un stated, "We have already gone as far as we can in negotiations with the United States, and the conclusion I have reached is that the will for coexistence of the great powers is not there, but rather a position of total power and an unchanging aggressive and hostile policy toward North Korea." Since Kim Jong Un holds such a negative view of negotiations with the U.S., it is unlikely that North Korea will resume dialogue with the U.S. after Trump's inauguration in January 2025.
Currently, North Korea can earn significant foreign currency from artillery exports, military deployments, and sending laborers to Russia, and it can also acquire advanced military technology. Therefore, the benefits of strengthening ties with Russia outweigh the potential gains from improving relations with the United States. However, if Russia and Ukraine agree to a ceasefire due to pressure from Trump's second administration, a certain relaxation in North Korea-Russia relations will be inevitable. If President Trump extends an offer to North Korea, Kim Jong Un will likely feel compelled to reconsider the resumption of North Korea-U.S. talks.
If Kim Jong Un decides to engage in talks with the U.S., the South Korean government, which is unable to actively engage with the second Trump administration due to the state of emergency events and the impeachment of President Yoon Suk Yeol in the National Assembly, may take advantage of the situation to persuade President Trump to halt joint U.S.-South Korea military drills. Trump has been critical of the U.S.-South Korea joint drills, and if he were to push for a reduction or suspension of these exercises, Kim Jong Un might actively respond to a North Korea-U.S. summit to support Trump’s decision and drive a wedge between the U.S. and South Korea. In this case, Kim Jong Un could pursue a "North Korea-U.S. reconciliation" policy, exchanging "love letters" with Trump while advancing a policy to strengthen ties with the U.S. and weaken relations with South Korea.
In his memoir "At War with Ourselves: My Tour of Duty in the Trump White House", former National Security Advisor Herbert McMaster recounts that in November 2017, during his first year in office, Trump visited China and told President Xi Jinping that "the U.S.-South Korea military exercises are provocative and a waste of money." McMaster added, "Trump seemed to agree with President Xi's suggestion of the 'dual suspension' (suspension of North Korean provocations and U.S.-South Korea military exercises)." In fact, after the June 2018 Singapore summit, Trump announced that he would suspend U.S.-South Korea joint military exercises, and the drills were canceled that August.
During his presidential campaign, president-elect Trump had stated, "I will get along well with Kim Jong Un," and "He will also want me to come back, and he will miss me." After being elected president, on November 22, he appointed former Deputy Special Representative for North Korea Alex Wong, who had handled North Korea-U.S. talks during Trump’s first term, as the next Deputy National Security Advisor. On December 14, he also appointed Richard Grenell, his "diplomatic strategist" and former U.S. Ambassador to Germany, as Ambassador for Special Missions, including North Korea-related tasks, reaffirming his intention to resume North Korea-U.S. diplomacy. Grenell has been a strong supporter of Trump's "America First" foreign policy and his belief in holding summits with adversarial nations to resolve issues.
For Kim Jong Un, the enhancement of his nuclear and missile capabilities is his greatest achievement, and the possibility of him negotiating to give up his nuclear weapons is close to zero. However, as some of Trump’s close aides have suggested, if the new administration seeks to limit ICBMs capable of striking the U.S. while allowing North Korea’s nuclear weapons to remain in exchange for easing international sanctions on North Korea, North Korea could consider such arms control negotiation positively. In this case, the U.S. would effectively recognize North Korea's nuclear weapons, which would put the South Korean government in a very difficult position, as it has continued to adhere to the unrealistic goal of denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula or North Korea.
3. Continuation of Policies to ‘Erase Unification and Nation’ and Outlook for the Potential for Military Provocations Against South Korea When the Supreme People's Assembly meeting is held in January 2025, it is expected that the passage in the preamble of the North Korean Constitution, which reads, "The great leaders Comrade Kim Il Sung and Comrade Kim Jong Il have made immortal contributions to the realization of the cause of national reunification, and they are the eternal benefactors of the nation. The great leaders Comrade Kim Il Sung and Comrade Kim Jong Il regarded the reunification of the country as the foremost task of the nation, dedicating all their efforts and energy to its realization. The great leaders Comrade Kim Il Sung and Comrade Kim Jong Il not only laid the foundation for the Republic as a stronghold of national reunification, but also presented the fundamental principles and methods for reunification, developing the national unification movement into a nationwide campaign, thus paving the way for the reunification of the country with the united strength of the entire nation" (emphasis by author) will be deleted. Article 9 of the North Korean Constitution, which states, "The Democratic People's Republic of Korea strengthens the people's power in the northern half of the country and vigorously promotes the three revolutions in ideology, technology, and culture, achieving the complete victory of socialism, and fights to realize national reunification according to the principles of independence, peaceful reunification, and national unity" (emphasis by author), is also expected to have its latter part removed.
In his January 2024 Supreme People's Assembly speech, Kim Jong Un emphasized that South Korea must be regarded as the "primary enemy" and the "unchanging main enemy" and that this should be reflected in the constitutional provisions. Therefore, this directive is expected to be incorporated into the revision of Chapter 3, "Culture," in the Constitution.
Kim Jong Un also made clear his stance on the Northern Limit Line (NLL) during the January 2024 speech, stating, "No boundary, including the illegal and unlawful 'Northern Limit Line,' will be tolerated, and if South Korea even violates our territory, airspace, or waters even 0.001mm, it will be considered an act of war." This revealed his intent to disregard the NLL and break the status quo. Following this, North Korea began conducting coastal artillery exercises in the waters north of Yeonpyeong Island and Baengnyeong Island in the West Sea from the beginning of the year.
On February 14, Kim Jong Un oversaw the testing of a new ground-to-ship missile, the "Badasuri-6," and reaffirmed the new military operational plans against South Korea and his commitment to neutralizing the Northern Limit Line in the West Sea. According to the Rodong Sinmun, Kim Jong Un stated, "It does not matter how many lines exist in the West Sea of Korea, and there is no need to debate them. What is clear is that if the maritime border we recognize is violated by the enemy, it will be regarded as an infringement on our sovereignty and an act of military provocation."
With North Korea's intention to neutralize the NLL in the West Sea and maintain its own "maritime border" while imposing it on South Korea, there is a high possibility of military clashes occurring in the future in the West Sea. Sydney Seiler, former U.S. National Intelligence Officer for North Korea and Senior Adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), also warned in an article published on October 21, 2024, that North Korea's nuclear and missile capabilities have significantly increased since the sinking of the Cheonan ship and the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island in 2010. He stated, "A scenario where North Korea launches island shelling, ship sinking, or other military attacks against South Korea in 2025 is highly plausible, and we need to prepare for it." He further commented, "Kim Jong Un may have once believed that more aggressive provocations were unnecessarily dangerous, but with his increasing nuclear arsenal and support from Russia, he may now feel more comfortable taking risks." He also predicted, "This overconfidence in nuclear deterrence could lead Kim Jong Un to engage in coercive actions that were not seen in the past.“ -
In his acceptance speech at the Republican National Convention last July, President-elect Trump stated, “It’s a good thing to get along with someone who has a lot of nuclear weapons,” and added, “If we are re-elected, I will get along with him (Kim Jong Un).” Under Trump’s pressure, if Russia and Ukraine reach a ceasefire, North Korea may once again become interested in dialogue with the United States. Therefore, a "Korea passing" scenario, where South Korea is sidelined, could occur as the Trump administration seeks to resume direct summits with Kim Jong Un.
If President Trump pushes for a summit with Kim Jong Un, it will be crucial for South Korea and the United States to closely coordinate regarding the potential concessions the U.S. might offer North Korea, particularly if North Korea agrees to limit its ICBM development. While the South Korean government cannot block a Trump-Kim summit, it must make every effort to ensure that such discussions do not negatively impact South Korea’s security situation.
Trump has previously expressed concerns over the high costs associated with maintaining U.S. troops in South Korea and conducting joint military exercises, so it is likely that, upon re-election, he will push for the reduction and partial withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea and a scaling back of joint military exercises. As a result, it is anticipated that the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence will further weaken under Trump’s second term. Therefore, the South Korean government needs to actively consider all military options, including developing its own nuclear capabilities, acquiring nuclear-powered submarines, and establishing nuclear deterrence capabilities comparable to Japan's.
If South Korea's foreign and security leadership fails to function effectively during the transition to a new U.S. administration, especially amid the declaration of emergency martial law and presidential impeachment proceedings, it will be difficult to respond effectively to North Korea's military provocations. Taking advantage of this situation, North Korea may test South Korea’s military response capabilities and escalate provocations to neutralize the NLL. Therefore, even if political parties in South Korea are in conflict over domestic political issues, it is absolutely necessary for them to cooperate on foreign and security matters. Expert groups also emphasize the need for South Korea to look beyond domestic political divisions and seek sustainable diplomatic, security, and North Korea policies to overcome the current security crisis, establish a stable order in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia, and bring North Korea back to the negotiating table. If South Korea’s North Korea policy changes drastically every time a new government comes into power, it will be difficult for North Korea to trust South Korea.
| Review of North Korea’s Political Landscape in 2024
| Outlook for North Korea’s Foreign Policy and Policy Towards South Korea in 2025
| Our Response Direction
※ The opinions expressed in 'Sejong Focus' are those of the author and do not represent the official views of the Sejong Institute.
