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Analysis and Assessment of the Results of the House of Councillors Election in Japan (7.20) |
| July 29, 2025 |
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Myon Woo LeeFormer Principal Research Fellow, Sejong Institute | mwlee@sejong.org
Kitae LeeSenior Research Fellow, Sejong Institute | ktleekorea@sejong.org -
The 27th Japanese House of Councillors election, held on July 20, 2025, was an election to decide 125 seats, consisting of 124 contested seats plus one additional seat to fill a vacancy (the total number of seats in the House of Councillors is 248, including 123 uncontested seats). The ruling coalition, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and Komeito, won 39 and 8 seats respectively, totaling 47 seats, which fell short of the 125-seat majority even when combined with the 75 uncontested seats by 3 seats. In contrast, the opposition Constitutional Democratic Party (CDP) won 22 seats, similar to its results in the previous 2022 House of Councillors election, while Democratic Party for the People (DPFP) won 17 seats, and Sanseitō advanced with 14 seats.
Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba had set the goal of securing a majority of 125 seats, including both contested and uncontested seats, prior to the House of Councillors election, and thus was effectively held responsible for the election defeat. Nevertheless, at a press conference the day after the vote count, he declared his intention to continue maintaining the government. Given that the future trajectory of Japanese politics may involve various scenarios—such as the continuation of the Ishiba administration, a change of prime minister within LDP, the formation of a new coalition government centered on LDP, or a change of government between the ruling and opposition parties—the results of this House of Councillors election can be analyzed as follows.
First, it was LDP’s defeat and the first opposition party, CDP’s underperformance. In particular, the LDP performed poorly in the 32 single-member districts, winning 14 seats and losing 18. Compared to the landslide victory in the 2022 House of Councillors election, where it won 28 out of 32 single-member districts, this represents only half of that performance. In this election, opposition candidates were numerous in the single-member districts. Sanseito fielded candidates in all 32 districts, resulting in a three-way competition with CDP candidates in 16 districts, while in the remaining 16 districts, four or more candidates competed. Previously, when opposition parties were in competition, LDP tended to have an advantage, but in this election, part of LDP’s traditional support base shifted to Sanseito, leading to vote splitting among conservative voters in many districts. As a result, coupled with Sanseito’s surge, LDP struggled in the single-member districts. CDP likewise saw votes critical of the government split among other opposition parties, namely Sanseito and DPFP. As a result, although it remained the largest opposition party, it secured only 22 seats. In particular, in the proportional representation segment, CDP shared seven seats each with DPFP and Sanseito, and in terms of proportional vote share, it ranked fourth, albeit by a narrow margin, behind DPFP and Sanseito. The absence of a clearly dominant opposition party indicates the collapse of the two party system between LDP and CDP that had been established since the 2000s.
Second, the rise of conservative opposition parties and the resulting emergence of a full-fledged multiparty system. Sanseito, which has a conservative-right character, secured 14 seats, while DPFP, representing conservative reform, won 17 seats, achieving significant gains. The emergence of a conservative party (Sanseito) replacing the conservative support base of LDP can be regarded as a historic event, and the gains made by DPFP may make it more difficult for opposition consolidation, as the position of CDP, which has historically functioned as the largest opposition party, could be undermined. The opposition spectrum, ranging from the conservative Sanseito to the progressive Reiwa Shinsengumi, complicates integration on policies concerning the constitution, security, and energy—issues fundamental to the nation. The resulting emergence of a genuine multiparty system indicates that the ‘two-party system capable of government change,’ which was established through electoral reform in the 1990s (transition to single-member districts), has effectively disappeared. The continued proliferation of parties unable to secure government alone portends potential disorder in Japanese politics. -
In the previous section, the results of the 27th House of Councillors election held on July 20 were briefly reviewed, and its characteristics were also reviewed. In this section, the background that led to these results is briefly summarized. For this purpose, the election outcomes and their characteristics mentioned above are condensed into two contrasting aspects: the “defeat of established parties,” led by LDP, and the “advances of emerging parties,” while also noting LDP’s retention of its position as the largest party. Such a brief summary and condensation is expected to clarify the background that produced these results.
(See table: established parties indicated in red, newly emerging parties in blue)
What accounts for the outcome characterized as the defeat of established parties and the advance of emerging parties? The answer may vary depending on how one defines established parties, but if they are briefly defined as those with a long history of parliamentary activity, then with the exception of CDP, LDP, Komeito, JCP, and SDP all experienced a decrease in seats, as shown in above. In contrast, emerging parties, with the exception of the Japan Innovation Party (JIP) and the NHK Party, generally increased their number of seats.
Various factors may be proposed in relation to the defeat of these established parties and the advance of emerging parties. As issues concerning competition within each electoral district have already been briefly mentioned above, the present discussion will focus on the following three factors. The first is economic factors. As is well known, Japan is still experiencing the so-called “lost thirty years.” While various economic indicators could be cited, the most representative example is the trend in per capita national income. Although Japan continues to maintain its position as the world’s fourth largest economy in overall scale, its per capita national income has remained at around 40,000 U.S. dollars over the past thirty years. In particular, this stagnation in economic life has become more pronounced in recent years as the Japanese economy has shifted from deflation to inflation and as Japan’s lagging position in comparison with countries such as South Korea has been increasingly noted.
The second factor is political. Within such an economic situation, what reemerged was LDP’s political funds scandal, which exerted a major influence. It was revealed that the revenues generated from LDP’s political fundraising parties had not been recorded or used in a transparent manner. This became a principal factor leading to the resignation of former Prime Minister Fumio Kishida and to LDP’s defeat in the 50th House of Representatives general election of 2024, held under the new Prime Minister Ishiba. What exacerbated the problem further was LDP’s response to the issue. For example, in a public opinion survey conducted by Nippon Television (NTV) in April, prior to the House of Councillors regular election of July, the question was asked, “Has Prime Minister Ishiba properly resolved LDP’s political funds problem?” To this, as many as 90 percent of respondents answered “No.”
In terms of political issues, one may also point to the insufficiency of policy responses. The aforementioned Nippon Television public opinion survey included an evaluation of the effectiveness of the cash payments (benefits) implemented by the LDP government as a countermeasure against inflation and related matters, and a large proportion of respondents gave negative assessments. For example, in the April survey, 76 percent of respondents evaluated the effectiveness negatively, and in the May survey, 66 percent of respondents did so. Although the negative evaluations somewhat decreased, they nevertheless fundamentally reveal a negative perception regarding the cash payments. This is also indicated by the fact that 63 percent of respondents reported feeling the burden of rising prices, and although the consumption tax functions as a source of revenue for social security, 50 percent of respondents answered that it “should be reduced,” which exceeded the 43 percent who answered that it “should be maintained.” This implies that countermeasures against rising prices are prioritized.
Leadership constitutes the third factor. The existence of a leader who can draw out such discontent, raise issues, and present countermeasures can bring about change, and in this respect Yuichiro Tamaki, leader of DPFP, and Sohei Kamiya, leader of Sanseito, may be cited as representative examples. Tamaki of DPFP achieved an unprecedented surge in the October 2024 House of Representatives general election with the slogan “Increase take-home pay” (tedori fuyasu), under the spirit of “solutions rather than confrontation.” He subsequently led the debate on the income tax base, specifically the “1.03 million yen barrier,” which became a major policy issue in the political arena, and in this House of Councillors regular election also brought about an increase of 11 seats. Kamiya of the Sanseito, who led the increase of 14 seats, may be regarded as the central figure of this electoral surge. As is evident from the slogan “Japan First” that he presented, he drew support through right-wing populism by channeling dissatisfaction with unstable domestic and international circumstances into nationalist and exclusionary tendencies.
An interesting point concerning leadership is the failure of Shinji Ishimaru. Although he was defeated in the 2024 Tokyo gubernatorial election, Ishimaru, who had created a stir, entered this election together with the ‘Path to Rebirth (PTR)’, founded in January, but he failed to attract significant attention and was defeated without securing a single seat. This result stands in sharp contrast to the previous Tokyo gubernatorial election, where although he did not initially receive much attention, he surpassed Renhō, a popular female politician of CDP, and secured second place. This demonstrates that while the character of a leader (leadership) is important, the vision to be presented and the means by which it is communicated are of great importance. Moreover, such a vision necessarily includes how an opponent is clearly identified and defined in order to respond to the discontent of the electorate.
In this respect, while Kamiya, the leader of JIP, and Tamaki, the leader of DPFP, were successful, Ishimaru can be said to have failed. Of course, it may be argued that PTR led by Ishimaru simply required more time. The important point here is that Japan has minor parties capable of responding to and representing discontent toward LDP and Prime Minister Ishiba. Although in this election right-wing parties such as JIP, which regard the increase of foreigners as a risk, were ascendant, the fact that the centrist-leaning DPFP also gained momentum demonstrates a strength of contemporary Japanese politics.
This, conversely, also explains why LDP continues to maintain its position as the first party. Ahead of this House of Councillors election, an NHK survey showed that the opinion “it is better for the opposition’s seats to increase” (36%) exceeded the opinion “it is better for the ruling party’s seats to increase” (18%). At the same time, the same survey showed that the party support for LDP was 24%, more than twice that of any other party. As a result, in the proportional representation vote, LDP obtained the largest number of seats, 12, with the highest share of 12.5%. This outcome demonstrates that despite considerable dissatisfaction with LDP, trust in it remains higher than for any other party. Accordingly, post-election demonstrations supporting Prime Minister Ishiba’s continued governance can be interpreted as another expression of Japanese voters’ expectation for governance centered on LDP, or for change within stability, and they reflect the overall character of this election.| Political Outlook -
How will Japanese politics unfold in the future? In this regard, three aspects are expected to play an important role: the factional dynamics within the LDP, the possibility of coalition formation with other parties, and external factors such as tariff negotiations with U.S. President Donald J. Trump. Among these, the Trump factor received the greatest attention as of July 22, two days after the election, when it was revealed that the tariff agreement had been smoothly settled at 15%, marking the overcoming of a critical point. Of course, the question of who will properly handle this Trump factor remains an important variable; however, this is an element that could influence whoever holds the leadership position, including the current Prime Minister Ishiba. Therefore, in this section, the focus will be on the first two aspects: factional dynamics within LDP and the negotiation of coalition formation among parties.
First is how the factional dynamics within LDP will move. Even after the defeat in the election had become clear, Prime Minister Ishiba expressed his intention not to step down and to maintain the administration. However, given that his electoral performance was by no means good, in addition to relations with other parties, the foremost hurdle is whether he can endure and overcome the factional dynamics within LDP. As mentioned above, under Prime Minister Ishiba, as shown in, LDP failed to secure a majority of seats in both the 2024 House of Representatives general election and the present 2025 House of Councillors regular election. Prime Minister Ishiba stated that maintaining the administration is his responsibility since important issues such as tariff negotiations with the United States lie ahead, but doubts are raised as to whether other LDP lawmakers, who would feel uneasy about the continuation of the administration following electoral defeats, will simply look on without taking action.
Although there will not be an election for the time being following this election, since the LDP–Komeito coalition did not secure a majority, if policy consultations with other parties do not proceed smoothly, there is a possibility that the House of Representatives may be dissolved through a vote of no confidence against the Ishiba Cabinet or that, as seen in 1994, a non-LDP coalition government may be formed through a vote in the National Diet. For this reason, LDP lawmakers will weigh whether Prime Minister Ishiba can indeed smoothly advance coalition arrangements with other parties, or, if not, who else would be preferable. As seen in the 2024 LDP presidential election, there are many candidates within the party besides Prime Minister Ishiba—such as Sanae Takaichi, Yoshimasa Hayashi, Shinjiro Koizumi, and Takayuki Kobayashi—which makes this all the more the case.
Second is the negotiations among parties surrounding the formation of a coalition government. In this regard, three main possibilities can be considered. The first possibility is an LDP-centered coalition government. Since the LDP still holds the strength of being the leading party, it is highly likely to take the central role in promoting a coalition. Of course, whether it will be Prime Minister Ishiba who does so or not remains uncertain at present. As shown inbelow, in terms of policy orientation, the range of possible partners is quite broad, including not only Komeito, which had been a coalition partner, but also Sanseito and Conservative Party of Japan, which made gains in this election. However, as seen over the past year in the negotiations with DPFP concerning adjustments to income tax brackets, concrete policy consultations are expected to be far from easy. Tamaki of DPFP has already expressed the position that he cannot cooperate with a party that does not keep its promises.
The second possibility is the formation of a non-LDP coalition government, as mentioned above, similar to that of 1994. At present, the most suitable person to undertake this would be Noda Yoshihiko of CDP, which holds the position of the largest opposition party in terms of seats. However, the performance of the party in this election can by no means be described as good, and the existing image of an established party still remains strong, making it difficult to predict how feasible such an initiative would be. In particular, compared with 1994, the most striking difference lies in the fact that the sentiment of “non-LDP” is not so strong. Attention is focused on whether within CDP or the opposition parties there will emerge someone capable of leading such a large-scale majority coalition, for example, like Ichirō Ozawa in 1994. Of course, it may be expected that Ozawa could step forward again this time, but given the decline of his image over the years, it also appears to be difficult in reality.
The third possibility is a grand compromise, or a grand coalition, between LDP and CDP. This can be presented as one possibility above all because the current leader of CDP, Noda, is a moderate conservative, and from that perspective, he is a figure who could reach a compromise with the current Prime Minister Ishiba of LDP. After the non-LDP coalition government of the 1990s, there was precedent in which LDP formed a coalition with the Socialist Party. Of course, at that time it was said to have been possible because there was a figure like Masayoshi Takemura, a former LDP member who was leading New Party Sakigake. Attention is likewise drawn to whether, in the present, there exists within LDP or CDP a figure who could similarly negotiate and bring about agreement. -
Going forward, Japanese politics may unfold under various scenarios, including the continuation of the Ishiba government, a change of prime minister within LDP, or a transfer of power between the ruling and opposition parties. Nevertheless, regardless of whether it is the ruling or opposition camp, the policy orientation of cooperating with South Korea is expected to be maintained. At present, Korea and Japan share tasks related to security cooperation with the United States, including responses to the tariff policy of the Trump administration and the issue of defense cost-sharing, with the need for joint responses gradually increasing. However, given the political situation in Japan, where confusion is anticipated as it enters a full-fledged multiparty system, the concrete implementation of Korea–Japan cooperation is expected to be difficult for the time being.
It is necessary to examine in detail the impact that the strengthening of the conservative rightward shift in Japanese society, as manifested in this House of Councillors election, will have on future Korea–Japan relations. First, the presence of Sanseitō, which made gains while putting forward the slogan of “Japan First,” will raise the issue of coexistence with foreigners within Japanese society. The fact that the younger generation in Japan, which expressed support for Sanseitō advocating stronger restrictions on foreigners in the House of Councillors election, is also the generation that has recently shown high interest in Korean culture such as music and cuisine, appears at first sight contradictory. It is necessary to analyze the possible influence of these two currents on Korea–Japan relations, including on Koreans residing in Japan. In particular, careful attention on the part of both the Korean and Japanese governments is required to ensure that the conservative rightward shift centered on Sanseitō does not extend to historical issues and thereby exert a negative impact on bilateral relations.
In this election, the “constitutional amendment forces,” consisting of LDP–Komeito ruling coalition, JIP, and DPFP, secured a total of 87 seats (excluding independents). Including non-reelection seats, the number reaches at least 184, thereby surpassing the 166 seats, equivalent to two-thirds of all members of the House of Councillors, required to initiate a constitutional amendment. Although in the House of Representatives the constitutional amendment forces have not yet secured two-thirds, and although there will be debates over constitutional revision with Sanseitō, which advocates not constitutional amendment but “constitutional creation (sōken),” it is expected that constitutional debate within Japan will further accelerate, given that Prime Minister Ishiba and LDP are pursuing constitutional revision. As the issue of Article 9 of the Constitution, including the designation of the Self-Defense Forces, is closely related to security issues in the East Asian region, it will be necessary for Korea to continuously monitor the process of constitutional revision debate within Japanese society going forward.
| Results and Characteristics
| Factor Analysis
| Implications for Korea-Japan Relations
※ The contents published on 'Sejong Focus' are personal opinions of the author and do not represent the official views of Sejong Institue
