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Medvedev’s ‘Dead Hand’ Threat and North Korea’s Nuclear Retaliation System |
| September 1, 2025 |
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Seong Whun CheonVisiting Research Fellow, Sejong Institute | dr.cheon@sejong.org
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On July 31, Dmitry Medvedev, Deputy Chair of the Security Council of the Russian Federation, issued a warning to President Donald Trump to “remember how dangerous the fabled ‘Dead Hand’ can be,” raising concerns about the possibility of a U.S.-Russia nuclear confrontation. The exchange began on July 29 when Trump pressed for an earlier deadline to end the Russia-Ukraine war and demanded strengthened sanctions,1) prompting Medvedev’s backlash. It then escalated into Trump’s repeated warning, Medvedev’s “Dead Hand” threat, and Trump’s order to deploy nuclear submarines. 2)
It has not been confirmed whether the submarine in question was an SSN equipped with torpedoes, an SSGN armed with cruise missiles, or an SSBN carrying nuclear ballistic missiles. However, given that since 1985 the Soviet Union/Russia has never publicly mentioned its ultimate secret nuclear weapon, the Dead Hand, and that there has been no precedent of the United States publicly ordering the deployment of nuclear submarines following a dispute with the opposing leadership, this incident delivered considerable shock to the international community. The Kremlin spokesperson assessed that this did not amount to an escalation of the nuclear crisis, emphasizing that all sides should exercise caution when making references to nuclear use, while the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs declared its withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. 3)
The Dead Hand refers to Russia’s nuclear command and control system, a fully automated nuclear retaliation system designed as a last resort to automatically launch all remaining nuclear missiles at pre-designated targets in the event that the Russian leadership is decapacitated by an enemy attack. Its conceptual origin can be traced to the ‘Doomsday Machine,‘ an imaginary weapon introduced by the renowned nuclear physicist and founder of the Hudson Institute, Herman Kahn. Dead Hand was the designation during its research and development stage, whereas the system actually deployed and currently operated by Russia is called ‘Perimeter.’
The Soviet Union publicly referred to the automated nuclear retaliation system at the U.S.-Soviet arms control negotiations in Geneva in November 1985. At that time, when President Reagan refused to abandon his intention to pursue the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) despite the Soviet Union’s strong opposition, Gorbachev threatened that the Soviet Union would introduce an automated system that entrusted key decisions on nuclear use to computers, warning that such a move would result in an uncontrollable situation.4) At that time, the Soviet Union was already operating this system.
This article examines the Dead Hand as a weapon system, which Medvedev invoked to threaten Trump, by analyzing it in the context of related concepts, and assesses the possibility that North Korea might possess a similar system. An important policy implication is that intelligence collection on North Korea should be expanded from a focus on nuclear capabilities to the field of nuclear operations. Furthermore, this article evaluates whether the decapitation operation against North Korea’s leadership—one of the core elements of the triad system established by the South Korean military to counter the North Korean nuclear threat—constitutes a realistically viable measure, and emphasizes that public references to such a decapitation operation are undesirable. -
(1) ‘Doomsday Machine’
Doomsday Machine is a conceptual device of Herman Kahn in the late 1950s, which can be considered an imaginary weapon system capable of annihilating humanity.5) This device, deployed safely deep underground several thousand feet below the surface, is linked to a computer connected to hundreds of sensors and communication networks across the United States. For example, if five nuclear warheads were detected to have exploded on the U.S. mainland, the device, receiving this information through the computer, would activate a system that automatically launches U.S. nuclear warheads toward the Soviet leadership and densely populated areas. Doomsday Machine is still used in literature, film, and various other genres as a term referring to a apocalyptic weapon that could bring about the destruction of humanity.
(2) ‘Dead Hand’
In the early 1980s, concerned that a preemptive U.S. strike could eliminate them before they could properly retaliate, the Soviet leadership decided to develop a system that could guarantee a retaliatory strike. Accordingly, they conceived a fully automated retaliatory system—known as the Dead Hand—in which retaliation would be carried out entirely under computer command, without human intervention.6) However, the Soviet military opposed the idea, citing the risks of a fully automated system devoid of human control, and as a result, the Dead Hand remained at the conceptual level.
(3) ‘Perimeter’
If the Dead Hand is a fully automated system that relies solely on computers, the Perimeter is a semi-automated system in which human control elements are involved. It is a retaliatory system in which a small number of agents, sheltered in deep underground bunkers, assess the situation in the event of an enemy attack and guide missiles deployed on the surface to launch. The Soviets completed all tests of the Perimeter in November 1984 and deployed it operationally in early 1985.7)
The agents in the underground bunkers continuously monitor the following three conditions, and if all are satisfied, they press the launch button of the ‘Perimeter command rockets’ that control the nuclear missiles. These rockets then fly across the Soviet Union, communicating with nuclear missiles that have survived the enemy attack, guiding them to launch.8)
- · Confirm whether the Kremlin leadership/military command has authorized the activation of Perimeter
- · Confirm communication with the Kremlin leadership/military command; if communication fails, it is assumed that they have been eliminated by an enemy nuclear attack
- · Use sensors scattered across the ground to measure flashes, radiation, seismic activity, and other indicators to confirm whether a nuclear explosion has occurred
During the Cold War, Perimeter was a highly classified system, but its existence was revealed to the public in October 1993 through an op-ed in The New York Times by Bruce Blair, an American nuclear strategy expert and a leading advocate against the use of nuclear weapons.9) -
It cannot be confirmed whether North Korea currently possesses a (semi-)automated nuclear retaliation system such as Perimeter or the Dead Hand, as the procedures and plans for nuclear use constitute top national secrets. However, based on publicly released documents and official materials, it can be inferred that North Korea is sufficiently aware of the existence of systems like Perimeter, and although it may not involve advanced computer systems, it is presumed to have established its own “North Korean-style nuclear retaliation system.”
(1) North Korea’s Law on Nuclear Forces
The basis that makes such an inference possible is Article 3(3) of the Supreme People’s Assembly decree (“On the Policy of the Nuclear Forces of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea”) announced by North Korea on 8 September 2022:expanding the operational space for tactical nuclear strikes and achieving their diversification The command and control system of the state nuclear forces refers to key political and military figures who have access to North Korea’s “nuclear button,” akin to the leaders of the Kremlin and senior military commanders during the Soviet era, with Kim Jong Un situated at its very apex.-
3. Command and control over nuclear forces
3) If the command and control system over the state nuclear forces is placed in danger by an attack of hostile forces, then, in accordance with a pre-determined operational plan, a nuclear strike to annihilate the hostile forces, including the point of provocation and the command headquarters, shall be automatically and immediately executed.
Indicators for inferring North Korea’s nuclear-use doctrine can also be found in the nuclear counterattack tactical exercises conducted in 2023 and 2024, as well as in Kim Jong Un’s speech marking the DPRK’s founding anniversary in 2024.
The “final nuclear-attack-order authentication procedures and launch-authorization system” of the 2023 nuclear counterstrike exercise is understood as a system that implements Articles 4 and 7 of the 2022 nuclear possession law in a manner suited to reality. It appears to denote the routine procedures for conducting a nuclear war that maintain a constant mobilization posture so that, whenever Kim Jong Un decides, nuclear use is possible and, upon issuance of an order, can be executed immediately.-
The nuclear counterstrike virtual comprehensive tactical exercise was conducted divided into nuclear-strike command and control system management drills, live-practice training transitioning into a nuclear counterstrike posture, and tactical ballistic missile launch exercises carrying mock nuclear warheads. Prior to the launch exercises, the operational normality and safety of technical and institutional mechanisms—such as the final nuclear-attack-order authentication procedures and the launch-authorization system—were inspected, and the attendant courses of action were practiced repeatedly. (Korea Central News Agency, March 20, 2023) The hypothetical comprehensive tactical nuclear counterstrike exercise was carried out in sequence as a live drill to activate the nuclear counterstrike command and control system and to master the procedures and processes for transitioning units to a nuclear counterstrike posture upon issuance of the nation’s maximum nuclear crisis alert, the Volcano Alert System; it also trained units assigned nuclear counterstrike missions to become proficient in mission execution procedures and order, and included the firing of extra large rocket projectiles carrying mock nuclear warheads. With even extra large rocket artillery forces mobilized and the exercise proceeding successfully, it was assessed with satisfaction that the Party Central’s concept for building nuclear forces—aimed at expanding the operational space for tactical nuclear strikes and achieving their diversification—had been accurately realized. (Korea Central News Agency, April 23, 2024)
The clear conclusion is that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s nuclear force and the posture to be able to employ it properly at any arbitrary time to guarantee the state’s right to security must be more thoroughly completed. We are now unwaveringly implementing the nuclear-force construction policy to increase the number of nuclear weapons exponentially, and the Republic’s nuclear combat forces are being operated within an ironclad command and control system. (Kim Jong Un’s speech on the anniversary of the founding of the Republic, Korea Central News Agency, September 10, 2024)
By contrast, the “procedures and processes for transitioning to a nuclear counterstrike posture” in the 2024 nuclear counterstrike exercise are presumed to be procedures close to the Perimeter concept. This is because the “Volcano Alert System,” the nation’s maximum nuclear crisis alert, was activated. Ordinarily, a nation’s maximum nuclear crisis is more appropriately interpreted not as a localized nuclear clash of limited scale but as a large-scale nuclear war in which the Party and military leadership could be annihilated or a similar situation could be occasioned. In view of the importance of the above nuclear possession law and statements, the scope of intelligence collection on North Korea should henceforth be expanded to include information on nuclear operations as well as nuclear capabilities.-
4. Execution of the Decision to Use Nuclear Weapons
The nuclear forces of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea immediately execute orders to use nuclear weapons.
7. Routine (ordinary) Mobilization Posture of the Nuclear Forces The nuclear forces of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea maintain a routine mobilization posture so that, when an order to use nuclear weapons is issued, it can be executed immediately under any conditions and environments.
The United States also appears to assess that North Korea has a nuclear reprisal plan in the event of a decapitation strike. Elbridge Colby, the current Under Secretary of War for Policy, said in an interview with VOA on April 20, 2024, that just as the Soviet Union possessed a system that would automatically launch all nuclear weapons if its leadership were eliminated by a U.S. attack, we must assume that North Korea also has such an automated system, and that if the United States were to conduct a large-scale attack to decapitate the North Korean leadership, we should assume that North Korea would strike the United States without any restraint.10)
(2) Decapitation Operations Against North Korea Are Practically Impossible
Given the asymmetric relationship in nuclear capabilities between North Korea and the United States, the North Korean leadership is well aware that, as a small nuclear state, it must demonstrate a strong resolve not to simply submit to a nuclear power in order to survive. Accordingly, North Korea would seek to possess the capability to employ all of its nuclear weapons to carry out a retaliatory strike at a decisive moment—namely, when its leadership is on the verge of being annihilated and the regime could come to an end. In this context, Medvedev’s threat regarding the Dead Hand serves as a warning that North Korea may have, in its own way, actually established a semi-automated nuclear retaliation system. The view of Colby, U.S. Under Secretary of War for Policy, that North Korea possesses a retaliatory system prepared for the annihilation of its leadership is an issue that should be given significant attention in future U.S.-South Korea consultations.
In this context, it is necessary to reconsider the validity of decapitation operations against the leadership, which our military contemplates as part of the Korea Massive Punishment and Retaliation (KMPR) strategy. The 1968 attack on the Blue House by Kim Shin-jo and his group represents a case in which a decapitation operation by special forces failed. In contrast, the 2020 U.S. drone strike that assassinated Qasem Soleimani, commander of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, and the recent precision strikes by Israel against Hamas and Hezbollah leadership as well as Iranian military commanders and nuclear scientists, are examples of successful cases. However, there remains significant debate regarding the advantages and disadvantages of decapitation operations, their effectiveness, the achievement of ultimate objectives, and the potential for unintended consequences.11)
In particular, if the target of a decapitation operation possesses nuclear weapons, and moreover has its own semi-automated nuclear retaliation system similar to the Perimeter, the potential adverse consequences of the operation would be unimaginably severe. The proverb “you give an inch and they take a mile” would pale in comparison, as one might “give a spoonful and receive a mountain of sacks” in return. Since the actual use of nuclear weapons in August 1945, no decapitation operation anywhere in the world has targeted the leadership of a nuclear-armed state. Against a nuclear-armed country, not only is decapitation difficult, but any direct attack is extremely challenging. This is why many argue that, had Ukraine not relinquished its nuclear weapons in the early 1990s, Russia would not have been able to invade.
For the purpose of easing inter-Korean tensions and opening the door to dialogue, it is also inappropriate to publicly mention the decapitation operation card. It is fully understood that the intent of our military is not to immediately eliminate the North Korean leadership, but rather to emphasize deterrence by possessing such a capability. However, this logic is only applicable when the military balance between the two Koreas is maintained at a certain level. At present, with the strategic balance between the two Koreas tilted unilaterally in favor of the nuclear-armed side, it is unreasonable for the non-nuclear side to carry out a decapitation operation. Refraining from public references to the decapitation operation and maintaining maximum ambiguity regarding its existence would be far more conducive to deterrence against North Korea. -
3. Command and control over nuclear forces
1) On July 29, President Trump pressured that unless the war was ended within the next ten days (Trump’s previous deadline for ending the war had been fifty days), sanctions would be strengthened against third countries purchasing Russian oil. Andrew Osborn, "Medvedev reminds Trump of Russia's Doomsday nuclear strike capabilities as war of words escalates," Reuters, July 31, 2025.
2) Michael R. Gordon, Robbie Gramer, Alex Leary, "Trump Positions Nuclear Submarines Following Threats From Former Russian Leader," Wall Street Journal, Aug. 1, 2025.
3) Paul Sonne and John Ismay, “Russia says it will stop abiding by missile treaty,”New York Times, August 4, 2005. The United States first withdrew from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty on August 2, 2019, citing Russia’s violations as a pretext.
4) William Inboden, The Peacemaker: Ronald Reagan, The Cold War, and The World on The Blink (New York: Dutton, 2022), p. 375.
| Doomsday Machine, Dead Hand, Perimeter
5) Herman Kahn, On Thermonuclear Wzr (New York: The Free Press, 1960), p. 145.
6) David Hoffman, The Dead Hand (New York: Anchor Books, 2009), p. 23.
7) Ibid., p. 24.
8) Ibid., pp. 152-153.
9) Bruce Blair, “Russia’s Doomsday Machine,” New York Times, October 8, 1993.
| Policy Implications for the North Korean Nuclear Issue
10) 함지하, [워싱턴 톡] “전술핵 한국 재배치지지...‘자체 핵무장’ 가능성 열어둬야,” VOA, 2024년 4월 21일
11) 강창부, “참수작전의 효과성에 관한 논쟁과 그 시사점,” 국가전략, 2020년 가을호, pp. 5-32.
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