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The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Summit and the Victory Day: Implications of the Emerging International Order and the North Korea–China–Russia Alignment |
| September 10, 2025 |
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Jae-Hung ChungSenior Fellow, Sejong Institute | jameschung@sejong.org
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Following the launch of the Trump administration’s second term, a large-scale tariff war and intensified strategic competition between the United States and China emerged, while the prolonged Russia-Ukraine war, escalating conflicts in the Middle East, and rising tensions in the Taiwan Strait further deepened global instability. In this context, the Xi Jinping leadership began to strengthen comprehensive political, economic, and security cooperation with Russia, the BRICS, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and Global South countries to accelerate the formation of a new multipolar international order. In particular, China has been promoting an “equal, democratic, and orderly” (平等有序) multipolar world order by aligning closely with Russia, the BRICS, the SCO, and Global South partners to advance an alternative vision to the U.S. and Western-led rules-based international order (RBIO).
Against this backdrop, the 25th SCO Summit, held in Tianjin, China, from August 31 to September 1, was the fifth meeting hosted by China and the largest in the organization’s history, attended by leaders or heads of government from about 20 countries and representatives from 10 international organizations. As chair, President Xi Jinping declared in his keynote address the goal of building a more equal and just multipolar international order and emphasized stronger security and economic cooperation among member states. In connection with this vision, China announced 20 billion yuan in free aid to member states, an additional 10 billion yuan in loans to major member banks, and proposed the establishment of an SCO Development Bank following the model of the BRICS New Development Bank (NDB). Xi also criticized certain Western countries for undermining the free trade order and for imposing discriminatory sanctions and bullying (覇淩) measures, pledging to respond actively through solidarity with Russia, the BRICS, and SCO members.
The summit, which was expanded into an “SCO Plus” format, brought together leaders from around 21 countries. In his keynote speech, Xi denounced the Cold War mentality, hegemonism, and protectionism, and called for joint responses to emerging threats and challenges while promoting the creation of a fair and rational international order. As the outcome of the summit, the Tianjin Declaration was officially adopted, criticizing hegemonic behavior by certain states, calling for cooperation against ethnic separatism, religious extremism, and international terrorism, and rejecting Cold War thinking, hegemonism, and protectionism. Unlike the Qingdao Declaration adopted at the 2018 SCO Summit, which expressed support for China’s and Russia’s peace initiatives promoting denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and regional stability, the Tianjin Declaration made no direct reference to North Korea’s nuclear issue.
The discussions also highlighted the limitations of the existing U.S. and Western-centered international order and the need to reform global governance, particularly in relation to the recent Israel–U.S. airstrikes against Iran, the call to end the massacre in the Palestinian Gaza Strip, and opposition to unilateral sanctions imposed by Western states. China further presented a mid to long-term vision to expand areas of cooperation among member states, pledging to open its vast domestic market and to promote joint projects in solar and wind power generation, the establishment of an artificial intelligence (AI) cooperation center, the sharing of China’s BeiDou (北斗) satellite navigation system, and collaborative programs in space and lunar exploration.
After the SCO Summit, China compiled the agendas of all member states and announced the Ten-Year Development Plan (2026–2035) for the future of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). The plan outlines a wide range of cooperative initiatives, including the establishment of an SCO Development Bank, 20 billion yuan in grants (2025–2028), an additional 10 billion yuan in loans (2025–2028), expanded scholarships and new master’s and doctoral programs for member states, the establishment of more than ten Luban Workshops for vocational and technical training, and the provision of over 10,000 vocational training programs. Foreign Minister Wang Yi highly praised the completion of the SCO’s medium- to long-term blueprint, noting that China would actively and constructively support its implementation. China declared its intention to accelerate the transition toward a multipolar world order by 2035 and reaffirmed its opposition to unilateral tariff measures, interference in sovereignty, and coercive or “bullying” (覇淩) actions that undermine World Trade Organization (WTO) norms. It emphasized once again the need to establish a fair and equitable multipolar international order. The Tianjin Joint Declaration strongly endorsed the WTO-centered multilateral trading system and indicated opposition to retaliatory actions that violate WTO rules, including the large-scale unilateral tariffs imposed by President Trump.
Meanwhile, Global South countries expressed a strong determination to move from being a “silent majority” to an “active majority,” stressing solidarity and practical cooperation among member states to defend their shared interests. In his keynote speech, Russian President Vladimir Putin argued that the root cause of the Russia-Ukraine war lies in Western interference and Ukraine’s pursuit of NATO membership. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi stated that the development aspirations of emerging economies should not remain confined within outdated frameworks, emphasizing that the diverse dreams and ambitions of developing nations cannot fit within a black-and-white screen and that the screen itself must be changed. Following the Russia-Ukraine war, the growing alignment among China, Russia, the Global South, BRICS, and SCO members has begun to reshape the global order. This dynamic, fueled in part by opposition to the Trump administration’s tariff policies and unilateralism, was symbolized by the rare gathering of the leaders of China, Russia, and India, signaling a renewed cohesion among major Eurasian powers and the potential emergence of a new international order.
At the summit, President Xi Jinping presented the Global Governance Initiative (GCI), an overarching framework that integrates China’s three major global initiatives: the Global Development Initiative (GDI), the Global Security Initiative (GSI), and the Global Civilization Initiative (GCI). This framework offers an alternative to the U.S. and Western-led international order. As of 2024, the total trade volume and economic scale of BRICS have already surpassed those of the G7, and the gap between the two groups continues to widen. Although the 2020 border conflict between China and India severely strained bilateral relations, the imposition of 50 percent tariffs on India by the Trump administration prompted a rapid rapprochement between the two countries. They have since agreed to resume border trade and direct flights after five years, and an official summit in China marked the first such visit in seven years. The strengthening trilateral relationship among China, Russia, and India, three major Eurasian powers, is expected to bring significant changes to the future international order. -
The Victory Day 80th Anniversary Ceremony, officially titled The Conference Commemorating the 80th Anniversary of the Victory of the Chinese People’s War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression and the World Anti-Fascist War (紀念中國人民抗日戰爭及世界反法西斯戰爭勝利80周年大會), was held at Tiananmen Square in Beijing on September 3, 2025. As the second large-scale military parade since the 70th anniversary in 2015, the event reaffirmed the historical narrative of the Chinese Communist Party’s leadership in the armed struggle against Japanese aggression. Prior to the ceremony, President Vladimir Putin stated in a media interview that China and Russia firmly condemn any distortion of World War II history and the glorification of Nazism and militarism, emphasizing that their joint struggle against these forces constitutes a core foundation of their current strategic partnership.1)
The United States, Japan, and other Western countries expressed strong opposition and dissatisfaction toward Russia, holding it responsible for the outbreak of the Russia–Ukraine war. As a result, they largely boycotted the Victory Day military parade in Beijing. The event thus reflected growing divisions within the international community, underscoring the urgent need for communication and dialogue rather than intensified bloc confrontation. With the Russia–Ukraine war extending beyond three and a half years, both Russia—locked in confrontation with Europe—and China—engaged in strategic competition with the United States—have emphasized the importance of their strategic partnership grounded in shared historical experience. Both countries highlighted this shared history by holding their respective Victory Day commemorations in Moscow and Beijing, in coordination with members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), BRICS, and Global South nations.
The Victory Day military parade lasted approximately 70 minutes and featured 45 formations with a total of about 22,000 troops. Forces from the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Rocket Force participated, along with four specialized branches: space, cyber, intelligence, and logistics support. The parade showcased a wide array of next-generation weapon systems reflecting the nature of modern warfare, including hypersonic missiles, laser weapons, stealth drones, ballistic missile interception systems, intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), and unmanned underwater vehicles. Among these, the unveiling of the XLUUV AJX002, an extra-large unmanned submarine similar to Russia’s nuclear torpedo Poseidon, along with the advanced stealth combat drone FH-97 and new ICBMs such as the DF-51 and DF-61, highlighted the remarkable progress of China’s military modernization.
Most notably, the joint presence of the North Korean, Chinese, and Russian leaders at the same event for the first time in 66 years symbolized the shifting contours of the global order. Chairman Kim Jong Un’s attendance marked his debut on a multilateral diplomatic stage and his first official visit to China in six years and eight months since January 2019. The seating arrangement on the rostrum, with President Xi Jinping at the center, President Vladimir Putin on his right, and Chairman Kim Jong Un on his left, visibly underscored China’s central role as the pivotal link in the trilateral alignment.
This emerging trilateral coordination can be interpreted as the convergence of distinct strategic interests. China seeks to counterbalance U.S. strategic competition by fostering an anti-U.S. bloc, Russia aims to secure external support to mitigate sanctions resulting from the prolonged Russia–Ukraine war, and North Korea pursues closer ties with Beijing and Moscow to break out of international isolation and solidify its de facto nuclear status. Some analysts argue that the three countries’ partnership remains limited due to divergent priorities, while others view North Korea’s diplomacy as shifting from isolationism toward bloc-based engagement.
In a recent meeting of the Foreign Ministry, Kim Yo Jong, Vice Department Director of the Workers’ Party, remarked that “South Korea will not even have a seat in our region’s diplomatic arena,” signaling a clear departure from Pyongyang’s past foreign policy approach. With China and Russia now openly embracing and supporting North Korea, the possibility of Pyongyang joining the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) or BRICS as an observer cannot be ruled out. Although many experts note that North Korea’s nuclear program and international sanctions pose immediate obstacles to such participation, the accelerating U.S.–China strategic rivalry, the protracted Russia–Ukraine war, and the strengthening of U.S.–ROK–Japan trilateral security cooperation could further polarize the global landscape. Under these conditions, and with Beijing and Moscow’s backing, North Korea may eventually deepen its engagement with Eurasia-centered Global South nations.
Accordingly, South Korea must pursue a more balanced foreign policy to prevent further escalation of bloc confrontation and explore new approaches to inter-Korean relations beyond the conventional framework of U.S.–North Korea dialogue. The participation of the North Korean, Chinese, and Russian leaders at the Victory Day ceremony underscores a shared effort to build a new multipolar, Eurasia-centered international order in which BRICS and SCO members are expected to advance economic and security cooperation in more concrete forms. -
The recent Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Summit and the joint attendance of the North Korean, Chinese, and Russian leaders at the Victory Day ceremony can be seen as symbolic events signaling the emergence of a new international order. China and Russia, emphasizing the structural inevitability of transformation in the U.S.–Western-centered order following the Russia–Ukraine war, have described the current period as “great changes unseen in a century” (百年大變局). In particular, China, under the frameworks of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the vision of a Community of Shared Future for Mankind, has advanced successive global initiatives including the Global Development Initiative (GDI), Global Security Initiative (GSI), Global Civilization Initiative (GCI), and most recently, the Global Governance Initiative (GGI), calling for a fair and balanced multipolar international order. While the United States and other Western countries have expressed concern and resistance toward the China- and Russia-led multipolar order, many Global South nations have shown strong willingness to participate in and support this emerging framework. This growing alignment underscores the need for the U.S. and its Western allies to devise more appealing and inclusive policy alternatives that reflect the evolving geopolitical landscape. As a result, the global divide between pro-Western and anti-Western blocs has become increasingly pronounced following the SCO Summit and the Victory Day meeting of the three leaders. The prolonged Russia–Ukraine war, intensified U.S.–China strategic competition, instability across the Taiwan Strait, and the parallel strengthening of U.S.–ROK and U.S.–Japan–ROK security cooperation alongside the consolidation of the North Korea–China–Russia bloc collectively mark the beginning of a new era of post–Cold War power realignment.
For the past seven decades, South Korea has achieved economic growth and democratization within the framework of the U.S.–ROK alliance and the Western-led order. However, in the current transitional period, pursuing foreign policy exclusively aligned with the United States and the West has become increasingly challenging. President Lee Jae-myung’s absence from the Victory Day ceremony, with National Assembly Speaker Woo Won-shik attending as his representative, highlights the complex and layered diplomatic dilemmas facing South Korea. Seoul must navigate a path that maintains the primacy of the U.S.–ROK alliance while avoiding the complete severance of ties with China, Russia, and North Korea, requiring the development of a sustainable, mid- to long-term external strategy capable of managing this rapidly evolving geopolitical environment.
If trilateral coordination among North Korea, China, and Russia deepens following the Victory Day events, it will inevitably reshape the dynamics of the Korean Peninsula peace process as well as inter-Korean and U.S.–North Korea relations. Whereas China and Russia once acted as mediators on the North Korean nuclear issue, they are now increasingly shifting toward the role of supporters, posing greater challenges to the denuclearization process. In this fluid and complex environment, South Korea must pursue diplomacy grounded in national interest and pragmatism, anchored in the U.S.–ROK alliance but coupled with efforts to improve relations with China and Russia. Even if political or diplomatic breakthroughs remain difficult in the short term, Seoul should prioritize restoring strategic communication and maintaining diplomatic space through flexible, multi-track engagement and sustained dialogue. Ultimately, South Korea must approach the current global transformations with objectivity and strategic clarity, recognizing that the world is entering a second major post–Cold War realignment. Going forward, Seoul should pursue a balanced and constructive relationship with its neighbors, China and Russia, while upholding the foundation of the U.S.–ROK alliance. Through such a balanced and pragmatic foreign policy, South Korea can contribute more actively to regional peace and stability and articulate new diplomatic strategies suited to the realities of the evolving international order.
| The 25th Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Summit and the Announcement of the Ten-Year (2026–2035) Development Plan
| The 80th Anniversary of the Victory Day and the Participation of the North Korean, Chinese, and Russian Leaders
1) During the anti-Japanese war of the 1930s, the Soviet Union provided significant support to China. Between October 1937 and June 1941, the Soviet Union supplied approximately 1,235 fighter aircraft, thousands of artillery pieces, tens of thousands of rifles, as well as ammunition, equipment, and other supplies to China. Following the Soviet advance into northeastern China in 1945, the strategic landscape of the Far East was fundamentally altered, creating a decisive turning point that led to the surrender of militarist Japan.
| South Korea’s Foreign Policy Choices and Responses
※ The contents published on 'Sejong Focus' are personal opinions of the author and do not represent the official views of Sejong Institue
