North Korea’s Hidden Card and DPRK-U.S. Talks

 

No. 2018-15 (March 9, 2018)

Park Jee Kwang (Research Fellow, the Sejong Institute)

jkpark@sejong.org

 

 

The ROK special delegation led by national security advisor Chung Eui-yong brought an outstanding outcome from the two-day visit to Pyongyang from March 5 to 6. It is comprised of six points: both Koreas to hold a summit at Panmunjom in late April; both Koreas to opening a hotline between the leaders; both Korea to proclaim the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula; North Korea to express its intention to hold talks with the U.S; North Korea to suspend additional nuclear tests and ballistic missile launches; and the two Koreas to carry out sports and cultural exchanges. Despite being a declaratory statement, the agreement may be highly-valued for inducing North Korea’s phase-shifting attitude.

             The most noteworthy point in the agreement is North Korea’s proposal not to test its nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles while the talks continue. It indicated that Pyongyang will accede to U.S. demands to suspend provocative acts for some time – the precondition to initiating talks. Accordingly, North Korea and the U.S. are likely to engage in “exploratory” talks. However, it seems rather short to bring out a positive response from the U.S. side if North Korea ultimately aims to negotiate the removal of economic sanctions beyond mere ‘exploratory’ dialogue.

Unexpected was the U.S. positive reaction to the March 5 agreement. Moreover, on March 9, it was confirmed that President Trump is willing to meet Kim Jong-un through national security advisor Chung Eui-yong’s press conference at the White House. By the U.S. reaction, it seems that the North Korea’s hidden card that national security advisor Chung relayed to the U.S. includes the suggestion that exceeds the terms of the inter-Korean agreement.

The media currently speculate about what this hidden card is in two directions.[1] First, the March 8 issue of Chosun Ilbo reported that the North Korea’s hidden card is suspending the development of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) that puts the U.S. mainland within the range. However, I understand that this suggestion seems too mediocre to open a dialogue between North Korea and the U.S. in earnest.

             If North Korea proposed the cessation of ICBM development as its hidden card as Chosun Ilbo reports, Pyongyang seems to conclude that the ICBM reaching the U.S. mainland as the red line set by the U.S. Hence, it believes it could begin talks with Washington once it abandons the development or ICBM that could reach the continental U.S. Should the report be true, North Korea deems that it could abandon the ICBM program, while keeping hold of its nuclear stockpile.

             It is unlikely that the U.S. will lift economic sanctions against North Korea, accepting the hidden card of “relinquishing ICBM program and retaining nuclear weapons.” Washington has proclaimed several times that the ‘complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization (CVID)’ is the precondition to engage in negotiations on lifting the sanctions. Though the U.S. administration had a conflicting and confusing stance on the North Korean nuclear issue, it has been consistent in asserting that sanctions could be lifted only after North Korea’s steps for denuclearization are objectively verified.

             In the U.S. perspective, the issue of ICBM development is of a secondary importance. President Trump hints at the possibility of scrapping the Iran nuclear deal, not because of Iran’s moves to develop ICBMs that could strike the U.S. The U.S. strongly opposes nuclear proliferation and has concerns especially regarding the likelihood of North Korean nuclear weapons falling into the hands of other dictatorial states or terrorist groups.

             Provided that North Korea ‘pledged’ to halt nuclear tests and firing of ICBMs, this does not attract the Trump administration’s interests much. This is because North Korea could covertly produce nuclear weapons and ICBMs in massive amounts without further tests. Kim Jong-un’s New Year’s address which mentions mass-production and deployment of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles also makes the U.S. suspicious.

             Hence, Pyongyang’s secret message to Washington should contain details concerning the verification of denuclearization measures’ for the DPRK-U.S. talks to set sail. In this regard, the JTBC news had an interesting story reported on March 7. According to this South Korean media, the essence of the hidden card is the issue of denuclearization, including a specific message regarding denuclearization and North Korea’s determination and attitude to DPRK-U.S. talks. Should the hidden card relate to the monitoring of steps for denuclearization, the U.S. will probably take it.

             To date, the North Korean nuclear issue has remained at a standstill because Pyongyang and Washington had different steps in mind - North Koreans argued that they could renounce their nuclear possessions only if the military threat against itself is eradicated and the safety of the regime is guaranteed, whereas Americans claimed that North Korea’s denuclearization should come first.

             Given that North Korea conveyed a transformative message regarding the verification of denuclearization to the U.S., the impasse between the two countries will vanish. In fact, North Korea accepted the inspection from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in the North Korean nuclear crisis in 1994. Thus, the inspection for denuclearization from an authoritative international organization, and not the U.S., is a condition that the North Korean can accept.

             Viewing the Trump administration’s response, it seems that North Korea posed a groundbreaking offer concerning the verification of denuclearization. If so, the process for DPRK-U.S. dialogue including the bilateral summit will expedite. And more importantly, the South Korean government will have the opportunity to assume a crucial role as a mediator in the process of DPRK-U.S. talks and the verification of denuclearization.