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Delving into March 5 Inter-Korean Agreement: A New Dawn on DPRK-U.S. Dialogue?

 

No. 2018-13 (March 8, 2018)

Woo Jung-Yeop (Director, Security Strategy Studies Department)

woo@sejong.org

 

 

The South Korean delegation announced the terms of an agreement with North Korea after their meeting with Kim Jong-un in Pyongyang on March 5. The six-point statement contains North Korea’s shift of stance above the expectations that the delegation had. The hopes that have been garnered by North Korea’s surprise participation in the PyeongChang Winter Olympics, North Korean delegation’s visit to South Korea including Kim Yo-jong, and the South Korean delegation’s meeting with Kim Jong-un extend to the possibility of smooth resolution to the North Korean nuclear issue. At this juncture, it is necessary to prudently probe whether March 5 inter-Korean agreement will translate into DPRK-U.S. dialogue and what the DPRK-U.S. dialogue means.

First of all, we should note that the two Koreas agreed to hold the inter-Korean summit in late April. In the New Year’s press conference, President Moon Jae-in pronounced that he could meet with Kim Jong-un when the conditions are right and the two could reach a meaningful agreement. And after meeting with the North Korean special envoy including Kim Yo-jong, he posed a judicious attitude, citing the Korean aphorism, “looking for scorched-rice water at a well” (close to the English proverb, “don't count your chickens before they're hatched”). He mentioned the aphorism to remind that focusing on the summit is not helpful in solving the North Korean nuclear issue and rather worthless for domestic and international politics without understanding North Korea’s intentions under the international sanctions regime. Moreover, with the local elections coming up in June, the administration is likely to bear a heavy burden in pursuing the inter-Korean summit in the circumstance where it cannot ensure a substantial result and the U.S. may view the summit in a rather negative light.

Therefore, the decision to hold the inter-Korean summit in late April denotes that the delegation has positive prospects for the prerequisite of the inter-Korean summit – a progress in DPRK-U.S. relations. As the South Korean delegation is scheduled to visit the U.S. to expound the agreement with North Korea to the U.S. administration on March 8 and national security advisor Chung Eui-yong stated that he has North Korea’s undisclosed message to convey to the U.S., the South Korean government hinted that there is something that raises the possibility of a dialogue between North Korea and the U.S. While Pyongyang expressed its intention to hold ‘candid’ talks with the U.S. regarding the North Korean nuclear issue and the normalization of bilateral relations, Washington underlined several times that the North Korean side should directly manifest a sincere attitude on denuclearization. Moreover, it pointed out that North Korea knows the means to contact with the U.S. Taking these points into account, the South Korean delegation is likely to have heard the North Korean regime’s position related to its dialogue with the U.S. from North Korea. In other words, one could hypothesize that the delegation, in consultation with the North, confirmed that North Korea will directly deliver the message on denuclearization talks to the U.S. In such circumstances, the South Korean delegation is likely to tell the U.S. to accept North Korea’s intention to engage in the dialogue on denuclearization as it is difficult to hold talks with the complete denuclearization as a precondition. The South Korean delegation could explain to the U.S. the following points as preconditions for the U.S. to accept the request for a dialogue: North Korea expressed the intention to hold denuclearization talks with the U.S. in the inter-Korean agreement; it mentioned that the ROK-U.S. joint military exercises are understandable; and it stated that it will not carry out strategically provocative acts such as additional nuclear tests and test-fire of ballistic missiles, matching to a declaration of moratorium, stated in the terms of agreement. However, since the nuclear program could proceed without tests, Washington is likely to have different views on initiating dialogue with North Korea. It will demand North Korea to take a concrete measure, more than a declaratory moratorium related to denuclearization because the U.S. lacks trust on North Korea.

As it remains unclear by which means will North Korea voice its intention to hold talks with the U.S., I would like to suggest a possible scenario. As the indirect message by the South Korean government could be deemed insincere, a direct contact should take place between the U.S. and North Korea. Possibly, North Korea could use the ‘New York channel’ to consult with the U.S. regarding the repatriation of the U.S. nationals detained in North Korea, and the U.S. senior official could meet with Kim Jong-un in his/her visit to North Korea. This contact is not just to deal with the issue of repatriating U.S. detainees. North Korea is well aware of the fact that the U.S. perceives that the repatriation of U.S. nationals is irrelevant to what the U.S. hopes North Korea to show concerning the sincere resolve for denuclearization. Despite such facts, considering the North Korean political system, the two countries will probably discuss the issue of denuclearization in the process of U.S. senior official’s visit to bring back Americans detained in North Korea instead of North Korea approaching the U.S. in the hope of talks. The North Korean state media still addresses nuclear armament even after the agreement with the South Korean delegation. This illustrates that even the North Korean regime has to consider the opinions within the country. Consequently, North Korea cannot portray itself engaging in a dialogue with the U.S. succumbing to the sanctions and pressure.

Even for not such scenario based on this hypothesis, the inter-Korean agreement raised the likelihood of DRPK-U.S. talks. Nevertheless, the talks between the two parties do not allude to the negotiations on denuclearization. Washington has always argued that North Korea should return to the September 19 Joint Statement of 2005. The joint statement, with the objective of achieving verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula by peaceful means, indicates that North Korea is “committed to abandoning all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs, and returning, at an early date, to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to IAEA safeguards.” And the U.S. confirmed that it stationed no nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula and has no intention to attack or invade North Korea. Also, the two countries vowed to respect each other’s sovereignty and take measures to normalize bilateral relations. While the passage in the agreement that North Korea has no reason to possess nuclear weapons only if the military threat against North Korea is removed and the regime’s security is guaranteed is controversial, this was already included in the joint statement, accepting North Korea’s words. The six-party framework is likely to deal with the implementation of this point.

All points considered, North Korea’s understanding of the ‘verification’ of denuclearization will be the U.S. benchmark determining North Korea’s sincerity to denuclearization. North Korea’s moratorium in the form of declaration will not entice the U.S. to the negotiations table. Only after North Korea and the U.S. agree on the methods to verify North Korean nuclear program can the U.S. discuss the issue of lifting sanctions. Since Washington attributes Pyongyang’s change of attitude to sanctions and pressure, it is unlikely for the former to give ‘carrots’—lifting sanctions—to the latter before steps for denuclearization actually take place. This is why a prudent approach is needed.