CVID? PVID?
No. 2018-27 (May 11, 2018)
Park Jee-Kwang
Research Fellow, Diplomacy Strategy
Studies Department
The Sejong Institute
Recently,
the unfamiliar term PVID has appeared frequently in the media. In the literal
sense, CVID is an abbreviation of ‘complete, verifiable, and irreversible
dismantlement’ and PVID stands for ‘permanent, verifiable, and irreversible
dismantlement.’ Just as the South Korean Foreign Minister Kang Kyung-wha said,
“PVID is no different from CVID, while the former underlines the resolve to
fundamentally solve the issue,” the South Korean society seems to regard the
two terms as interchangeable.
However,
if the two terms are basically identical, why did the U.S. officials begin to
use the term PVID instead of CVID all of a sudden when they talk about North
Korea’s denuclearization? The goal of CVID is to abolish North Korea’s current nuclear
stockpile only while the PVID even addresses the nuclear weapons North Korea
could potentially possess in the future. That is, PVID covers measures to
prevent North Korea from manufacturing nuclear weapons in the future as well.
The
U.S. strived to comprehend North Korea’s moves for denuclearization rationally.
Whereas most Americans still consider these moves as a subterfuge to buy time,
the Trump administration has different views. As it concluded that North Korea
has genuine intentions of denuclearization after several exchanges with the
North Korean regime, the administration set its policy objective of having a
substantial outcome through the upcoming summit talks with North Korea.
Nonetheless,
the Trump administration still does not have a clue why North Korea suddenly
wants to abandon its nuclear weapons, the possessions that the regime holds so dear.
Especially, the U.S. cannot understand why North Korea attempts to renounce its
nuclear weapons at this moment, when it successfully developed nuclear weapons,
withstanding a series of economic sanctions. Obviously, the North Korean
authorities state that it is pursuing economic prosperity beyond the survival
of the regime regarding its renunciation of nuclear weapons. The U.S. does not
accept this account from North Korea. Also, Pyongyang insists that it will negotiate
with Washington on an equal footing, based on the confidence as a nuclear
power. In turn, Americans view this as contradictory—abandoning its source of
confidence, their nuclear weapons.
If
North Korea is sincerely committed to abandoning its nuclear arsenal, the only
rational explanation—acceptable to the Trump administration—will be that North
Korea abandons nuclear weapons ‘now,’ but will produce them in the future. The
DPRK has already acquired the technology to develop nuclear weapons. In other
words, it has nuclear scientists and a detailed blueprint of a nuclear warhead.
Hence, even if North Korea discards nuclear weapons now, it has no difficulty
in developing nuclear weapons again in the future whenever it desires. If the
regime conceals plutonium, it is much easier to re-produce nuclear weapons. If Pyongyang
surrenders its nuclear weapons, Washington will lift economic sanctions and
normalize its relations with Pyongyang. And North Korea’s economic cooperation
with South Korea and China will set sail earnestly. If so, North Korea is
likely to achieve high economic growth over the next two decades, similar to
what South Korea and China had undertaken earlier. Then, North Korea will have
the capacity to mass-produce nuclear weapons much easier if it wishes to do so
when the North Korean economy has developed rapidly after a decade or two.
Such
scenarios appear to concern the U.S. Due to such trepidation, the U.S wishes to
add the term ‘permanent’ on top of CVID. Thus, U.S. State Secretary Pompeo
demanded North Korea to remove all data related to its nuclear tests and
facilities and emigrate thousands of North Korean nuclear scientists abroad. This
is because the only way to stop North Korea from producing nuclear weapons
again in the future is to remove the human resources related to nuclear
development.
Understandably,
it remains doubtful whether North Korea will concede to this unprecedented
demand from the U.S. Moreover, many obstacles stand in the way of actual
implementation of such demand. Even if North Korea accepts this demand, how to
distinguish and identify nuclear-related scientists in North Korea and where to
relocate them and their families, which will be around 9,000 to 15,000 people, appear
practically impossible. Nonetheless, the U.S. insists on such conditions as the
administration believes that this is the only means to thwart North Korea from
manufacturing nuclear bombs in the future using ‘current human resources and
know-how.’
How
should the U.S. react when North Korea refuses to emigrate its personnel
related to nuclear development? Specifically, should the U.S. walk out of the
denuclearization talks once North Korea claims that it could only accept CVID
and not PVID?
I
personally think otherwise. We have no idea how North Korea will be after ten
or twenty years and it is uncertain whether North Korea, more economically
developed and open, will be obsessed with nuclear development once again.
Therefore, it seems unclear whether raising the bar of denuclearization higher
from CVID to PVID suits the U.S. interests. It could utilize the PVID as a
negotiation option, but the U.S. appears to raise the threshold higher
excessively in the denuclearization talks with new conditions—exterminating
biochemical weapons. I hope the U.S. does not ruin the negotiations by asking
beyond necessary while North Korea seems willing to sit at the table to discuss
denuclearization.
File