Two Letters Giving Headaches:

What Does the Cancellation of the DPRK-U.S. Summit Mean to South Korea?

 

No. 2018-30 (May 25, 2018)

Dr. Woo Jung-Yeop

Research Fellow, Department of Security Strategy Studies

The Sejong Institute

woo@sejong.org

 

The two letters exchanged between Washington and Pyongyang in the term of 10 hours have given Seoul headaches. Having high expectations on this DPRK-U.S. summit more than anybody else in the international community, Seoul was shocked by the news. The timing and decision to suspend the summit are likely to be a huge burden in ROK-U.S. diplomacy, especially considering that Trump announced the decision right after President Moon returned from his meeting with Trump which was intended to successfully sustain the hopes of the DPRK-U.S. summit. While it may not be easy to overcome this upset, it should evaluate the circumstances coldheartedly and prepare for the next steps in foreign policy.

Primarily, two problems are visible related to this ROK-U.S. summit. First, Seoul had the wrong idea in mind regarding the summit itself. Prior to the ROK-U.S. summit, Nam Gwan-pyo, the second deputy secretary of the National Security Office, expounded, "[w]e expect the upcoming summit to play a role as a bridge (between the U.S. and North Korea) that will lead to the success of the North Korea-U.S. summit as it comes three weeks before the North Korea-U.S. summit. … While the leaders of South Korea and the U.S. have had close talks through frequent telephone conversations, they will be holding in-depth discussions on specific measures to realize North Korea’s complete denuclearization as well as lasting peace on the Korean Peninsula. The two leaders are expected to talk about measures to guarantee a bright future for North Korea in the case it truly goes through complete denuclearization.” The problem was that the U.S. had much more interest in whether North Korea has ‘genuine commitment’ to denuclearization rather than North Korea’s ‘measures’ to achieve denuclearization, or ‘measures to realize peace on the Korean Peninsula’ afterward. This is because Washington did not believe that Pyongyang explicitly clarified its determination to denuclearize yet. There seems to be a perception gap between the U.S. and South Korea with regards to North Korea’s resolve for denuclearization. At this juncture, discussing the ‘measures’ on denuclearization was off the track of how the U.S. understands the current situation. Hence, even though the public had high expectations, it was undesirable to have overreaching hopes prior to the summit. Second, as the South Korean government announced the summit details as if the U.S. and South Korea were on the same page in their discussion, President Trump’s cancellation letter came as a bigger shock to South Korea.

The South Korean government stated that it shared views with the U.S. government on the following matters: ‘measures to alleviate North Korea’s sense of regime insecurity’; and plans to declare the end of the Korean War among the two Koreas and the U.S. after the DPRK-U.S. summit. According to one foreign press, the South Korean government suggested the idea of declaring the formal end of the Korean War among the three leaders after the DPRK-U.S. summit in Singapore with President Moon Jae-in flying over to Singapore. And the U.S. government did not give an affirmative response. It is appropriate to indicate that the South Korean government shared this idea with the U.S. rather than discussed together with the U.S. And the summit did not proceed as what the South Korean government explained. On the regime security issue, President Trump said, ‘I will guarantee his safety. Yes, we will guarantee his safety....He will be safe,“—something different from regime security. The Korean media outlets over-interpreted his words as regime security guarantee. This needs some caution.

The second sentence of President Trump’s letter also calls for some attention. This is what troubles South Korea. President Trump wrote, “We were informed that the meeting was requested by North Korea, but that to us is totally irrelevant.” And he added, “If you change your mind having to do with this most important summit, please do not hesitate to call me or write.” This means that Pyongyang should express its intent to engage in talks with the U.S. directly to Washington—not via the South Korean government—if Pyongyang has the will to do so. In her statement, Vice Foreign Minister Choe Son-hui wrote, “It is the US who has asked for dialogue, but now it is misleading the public opinion as if we have invited them to sit with us”—as if the South Korean government had told different accounts to North Korea and the U.S. for the summit. In that sense, President Trump, having unrelieved doubts, urged North Korea to directly contact with the U.S. from now on. This has engendered a huge obstacle for the South Korean government in playing the broker role. Viewing Kim Kye-gwan’s statement, one could find what hurdles stand in order to bring the summit back on again. In the final part, it reads, “The first meeting would not solve all, but solving even one at a time in a phased way would make the relations get better rather than making them get worse. The US should ponder over it.” It seems that North Korea, for the first time, explicitly mentioned ‘phased’ since it expressed the intent to have denuclearization talks via the South Korean government channel. The North Korean regime has yet to mention the measures to realize denuclearization.

It is opaque whether Kim’s remark signifies that North Korea will implement a ‘phased’ approach to denuclearization. Still, if the current situation stems from the denuclearization talks between North Korea and the U.S., it could be said that North Korea stated for the first time regarding its approach to denuclearization talks. The phrase, “The first meeting would not solve all” indicates that North Korea opposes a comprehensive agreement on denuclearization. The expression, “but solving even one at a time in a phased way” implies that North Korea prefers a long-term discussion, a step-by-step agreement rather than the agreement on the end-state of complete denuclearization—exchanging between what North Korea could offer and the U.S. presenting rewards for each stage. This is not what Seoul nor Washington had in mind regarding the solution to denuclearization. What the South Korean government had in mind was a ‘comprehensive agreement with phased implementation’ rather than ‘phased agreements’ dividing the details and level of implementation. This is because an agreement at one stage does not translate into another agreement in the next stage and such agreements failed previously. Phased agreements cannot assure the parties to achieve complete denuclearization.

For North Korea and the U.S. to hold the summit in the future, the two countries should close in on the perception gap concerning denuclearization. As President Trump raised the expectations on the agreement, the U.S. is unlikely to lower the bar on any agreement with North Korea. Hence, the summit remains open depending on how fast the two countries can coordinate the differences.