Cancellation of the DPRK-U.S. Summit: the Chinese Perspective
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No. 2018-31 (May 28, 2018)

Dr. Chung Jae Hung

Research Fellow, Department of Security Strategy Studies

jameschung@sejong.org

 

The June 12 summit scheduled to be held in Singapore between President Donald Trump and Chairman Kim Jong-un to end the animosity that continued for more than half-century and to usher in a new era of reconciliation, peace, and prosperity was canceled. In his letter to Chairman Kim Jong-un on May 24, President Trump wrote, “based on the tremendous anger and open hostility displayed in your most recent statement, I feel it is inappropriate, at this time, to have this long-planned meeting.” While most media outlets reported that President Trump’s fury and hostility against the two statements from First Vice-Minister Kim Kye-gwan and Vice Foreign Minister Choe Son-hui were attributable to Trump’s such behavior, the root cause lies in the clear-cut disagreement on the means to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue between North Korea and the U.S.

The U.S. and North Korea hassled over the method of denuclearization—the former emphasized a speedy grand bargain of denuclearization first, followed by compensating measures, whereas the latter (and China) propounded the progressive approach with synchronous measures. Specifically, the U.S. asserts that it will guarantee regime security and economic compensation only after it has thoroughly verified North Korea’s abolition of nuclear weapons. Contrary to this, North Korea (and China) consistently argues the ‘dual track’ approach of exchanging stages of denuclearization with compensation in a progressive and synchronous manner given the lack of mutual trust and hostility existing between the two countries. Particularly, because the negotiations collapsed in 2009 between North Korea and the U.S. over the issue of inspection and verification of North Korean nuclear facilities, North Korea (and China) demands corresponding compensation from the U.S.—in steps of disablement, freeze, verification, and dismantlement, it wants measures such as easing economic sanctions, providing economic aid, downsizing and suspending ROK-U.S. joint military exercises, normalizing relations with North Korea, and signing a peace accord. Consequently, if President Trump demands a speedy process of a grand bargain—denuclearization first, compensation measures after—, Pyongyang will hardly accept the offer.

Moreover, North Korea officially declared itself as a nuclear weapons state, acquiring nuclear weapons and intercontinental ballistic missile capabilities in spite of economic sanctions and pressure for more than past couple of decades. As such, North Korea, along with the implementation of progressive and synchronous measures, views that the U.S. approach of a package deal needs revision. Already on May 16, First Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs Kim Kye-gwan issued a personal statement, expressing a hard-nosed position, “if the U.S. is trying to drive us into a corner to force our unilateral nuclear abandonment, we will no longer be interested in such dialogue and cannot but reconsider our proceeding to the DPRK-U.S. summit.” Consecutively on May 24, Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs Choe Son-hui stated: “In case the U.S. offends against our goodwill and clings to unlawful and outrageous acts, I will put forward a suggestion to our supreme leadership for reconsidering the DPRK-U.S. summit”; “in order not to follow in Libya's footstep, we paid a heavy price to build up our powerful and reliable strength that can defend ourselves and safeguard peace and security in the Korean peninsula and the region”; and “We will neither beg the U.S. for dialogue nor take the trouble to persuade them if they do not want to sit together with us.”

In contrast, NSC Security Advisor John Bolton recently advocated that the U.S. could suspend the negotiations on the North Korean nuclear issue immediately and consider the military option as North Korea has no intention to follow the Libyan model of denuclearization—renunciation of nuclear weapons first, and compensation afterward. U.S. Vice President Mike Pence also warned that if North Korea does not accept the U.S. offer, North Korea might end up with the Libyan model. This indicates that the two countries should diminish mutually hostile perception. As for now, North Korea continually demanded the U.S. to guarantee regime security more specifically and assuredly, relieve security concerns, and withdraw its policy of hostility against North Korea, mentioning the previous cases of Iraq and Libya. In the end, if the U.S. grapples with the North Korean nuclear issue through a zero-sum game without taking into account North Korea’s assertion of security guarantee for the regime, the negotiations are bound to fail. Hence, the South Korean government is required to have a more delicate strategic thought as well as bold policy responses.

After the cancellation of the DPRK-U.S. summit, Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Lu Kang said, “we hope that the DPRK and the US will cherish the positive progress achieved recently, remain patient, send out goodwill to each other and meet each other halfway, continue to commit themselves to resolve each other's concerns through dialogue and negotiation and advance the denuclearization of the Peninsula” at the regular press conference. Hence, despite the cancellation, China appears to cling to the pre-stated approaches to the North Korean nuclear issue—‘dual track’ approach that is consistent with the existing progressive approach and the ‘action-by-action’ principle. Especially after the two summits with North Korea, China undoubtedly illuminated its position that it will resolve the issue with a progressive approach and synchronous measures—the same context of dual track approach—rather than what the U.S. asserts—unilateral ‘complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement (CVID).’ Furthermore, China’s major North Korea experts emphasize that the U.S. should gradually build confidence with North Korea, taking measures corresponding to North Korea’s actions (proclamation to commit to denuclearization, release of three American prisoners, and demolition of Punggye-ri nuclear test site) such as lifting some parts of sanctions against North Korea or suspending the ROK-U.S. joint military exercise. In addition, since North Korea highlighted the possibility of continuous dialogue and negotiations with the commitment to denuclearization, Beijing also maintains that it can no longer take part in the U.S.-led sanctions regime. As North Korea and China already discussed large-scale people-to-people exchanges, economic investment and cooperation, etc. through the two summits, the bilateral exchanges of goods and people will blossom rapidly once the denuclearization issue advances further.

Meanwhile, on the cancellation of the summit, China believes that President Trump passing the buck to China for North Korea’s change in attitude and attempting to exert maximum pressure is of no use to resolving the North Korean denuclearization issue and rather affects negatively on U.S. relations with China and North Korea. Specifically, China views the hostility between North Korea and the U.S. as the fundamental cause underlying the North Korean nuclear issue. Hence, for Beijing, it is impossible to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue unless the U.S. withdraws from its policy of hostility against North Korea, normalize relations with North Korea, and sign a peace accord on the Korean Peninsula with relevant parties.

Consequently, the South Korean government should have a realistic and square perception of the current reality it faces—the U.S. and Chinese views and its differences on North Korea and the transforming political environment surrounding the Korean Peninsula—rather than having wishful thoughts and seek more delicate logic and strategic response based on the national interest of peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula.