File China’s Role in the North Korea-U.S. Summit
No. 2018-33 (June 1, 2018)
Lee Tai-hwan
Senior Research Fellow, Department of Diplomacy Strategy Studies
The Sejong Institute
Is China a variable to consider
in the DPRK-U.S. summit? At the press conference ahead of his meeting with South Korean counterpart,
President Trump claimed North Korea changed its attitude because it had China at
the back—thus, China emerged as a
significant factor in the DPRK-U.S. summit. He indicated that China influenced
North Korea's change in attitude after the second DPRK-China summit in Dalian.
The U.S. viewed that Chairman Kim has made hawkish remarks against the U.S.,
exuding confidence after the summit with President Xi Jinping in Dalian on May
7 unlike the first meeting with President Xi last March.
As a matter of fact, it cannot
be a coincidence that the first meeting between Chairman Kim and President Xi
occurred before the-then State Secretary nominee Mike Pompeo visited Pyongyang
early April and that the second DPRK-China summit also took place before
Secretary Pompeo visited North Korea for the second time. As it portrayed the
idea that North Korea consulted China before contacting the U.S., the U.S. implied that the
meeting with President Xi affected the agenda and details for North Korea's
talks with the U.S. Could Beijing's moves and stance constitute as a key
variable in the DPRK-U.S. summit? Let's take a look at China's position first.
Through the editorial section
of the Global Times (Huanqiu Shibao),
Beijing refuted some western media’s report that China stands behind North
Korea. The statement denounced the western media, claiming that it made reports
of a ‘speculative nature’ such as ‘China compelled North Korea to take a
different stance.’ Highlighting that China has nothing to do with North Korea’s
change in attitude, the writer expressed dissatisfaction against the moves that
attempt to ostracize China in the Korean Peninsula affairs. Under the rapidly
transforming environment of the Peninsula, it asserted that South Korea and the
U.S. should not rely on China, but also not underestimate China’s role. According
to the article, since China, bordering the Korean Peninsula, is a staunch
supporter of denuclearization and lasting peace on the Peninsula and a major
power with significant influence, South Korea and the U.S. will commit a
critical mistake if it treats China inappropriately. This was a statement in
opposition to the possibility of a trilateral declaration ending the Korean War—excluding China—which could be held after the
DPRK-U.S. summit.
With the two summits with North
Korea, China covertly tried to insert the image that China exerts its clout
behind North Korea. Beijing intended to inscribe the point that
if its interests in the Korean Peninsula are not reflected in the
denuclearization process, it is bound to fail—to not
only Pyongyang, but also Washington and Seoul.
At the St. Petersburg
International Economic Forum on May 25, PRC Vice President Wang Qishan said
that the Korean Peninsula affairs are closely associated with China’s interests
and that war or chaos situation on the Korean Peninsula is China’s red line—revealing China’s intentions. This
implies that China is a key stakeholder in the DPRK-U.S. talks and has crucial
interests at stake regarding the future of the Korean Peninsula and Northeast
Asia which is to be unraveled in line with the result of the summit.
China strived to mend the
derailed relations with North Korea by having summit talks twice ahead of the
North Korea-U.S. summit. It is focusing on enlarging its role and share in the
future progression such as North Korea’s change and the establishment of a
peace mechanism on the Korean Peninsula. One such case includes allowing a delegation
consisting of North Korean party officials heading municipal and provincial
committees to tour economic facilities for 11 days from May 14.
In this line of thought, North
Korea’s relations with China will likely to thrive further in the future.
Nonetheless, there is no need to worry excessively. The bilateral relations,
aggravated since the Kim Jong-un regime began, needs some time to consolidate
through confidence-building steps.
Thus, in conclusion, the
bilateral relations fall short of being a negotiation leverage against the U.S.
With this point in mind, one should consider two factors when mentioning China
as a variable. First, it should be taken into account that China puts the
relations with the U.S. as its top priority. The U.S. and China have generally
stood on the same wavelength regarding the denuclearization of North Korea,
despite disputes in the South China Sea and trade disputes that have escalated
to a trade war. The U.S. concentrated on the North Korean nuclear issue, even
to the extent of using the trade dispute with China as a card for cooperation on
the issue. With this interest from the U.S., the two countries are known to
have discussed not only the cooperation to enhance the sanctions regime against
North Korea, but also the management measures in case of a contingency on the
Korean Peninsula. Perceiving the pressure, Chairman Kim opened the possibility
of DPRK-U.S. talks, ordering the bureaucrats to prepare talks with the U.S. at
the extended Politburo meeting held last October.
Considering that the U.S. and
China, as well as the inter-Korean summit, played a role in drawing North
Korean to the denuclearization talks, it is worthy to take note on how much should
China’s position be taken into account in the denuclearization process. Although
China and the U.S. share the same goal of denuclearization, the two countries
have different opinions.
Against the American idea of
‘all-in-one’ deal, China champions the North Korean narrative—a progressive solution. In his
telephone conversation with President Trump on May 8, President Xi supported
the progressive measure, elucidating that the two sides should take
corresponding measures in different steps.
Underlining the point that the
international community should not ease sanctions before the permanent
denuclearization, President Trump demanded China take part in the U.S.
solution. The success of denuclearization depends on how far China and the U.S.
can cooperate in the denuclearization process.
However, it requires more
complex calculations on China’s role in the formal declaration of ending the
Korean War and the establishment of the peace regime on the Korean Peninsula—matters beyond the
denuclearization issue. According to one Hong Kong media, DPRK-China-Russia
trilateral summit is scheduled to for June 9, inviting North Korea as an
observer for the Shanghai Cooperation Organization meeting which will be held
in Qingdao in June. If the three countries meet together following DPRK Foreign
Minister Ri Yong-ho’s visit to Russia last April and Russian Foreign Minister
Lavrov’s meeting with his North Korean counterpart in his visit to North Korea
on May 31 to discuss bilateral relations and the Korean Peninsula affairs, this
will be a move to bolster the position in establishing security order in the
Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia after the DPRK-U.S. summit. This hints at
the difficulties—even after a successful summit
between North Korea and the U.S.—towards the process of a peace accord in the
future. It reminds the evermore importance of South Korea’s role and diplomacy.