Summer of 2018, Reading into Kim Jong-un’s Field Guidance​

 

 

No. 2018-37 (July 18, 2018)

Dr. Hwang Jae Jun

Visiting Research Fellow, Center for East Asian Cooperation

The Sejong Institute

trapeze@sejong.org

 

There are dividing observations of Kim Jong-un’s recent field guidance in Korea and the international community. It might be natural that an increasing number of people have been attentive to Kim Jong-un’s moves since Kim held two inter-Korean summits as well as the first DPRK-U.S. summit this year. U.S. State Secretary Mike Pompeo, who brought President Trump’s letter after the DPRK-U.S. summit, failed to meet Chairman Kim, for the reason that Kim Jong-un was on a field guidance. And for the same reason, Kim did not attend the inter-Korean sports exchange—basketball friendly between the two Koreas—held in Pyongyang. Some interpreted such behavior as an indirect expression of dissatisfaction to the U.S. over North Korea’s follow-up measures of denuclearization and the timing of the declaration to end the Korean War, and others viewed it as moves tightening domestic control in face of trembling external political structure.

Why didn’t Chairman Kim meet Secretary Pompeo? Why didn’t he attend the symbolic event like the friendly basketball match between the two Koreas in times seeking transformation in inter-Korean relations? Finding answers to these questions only from Kim Jong-un’s field guidance is like “looking for a scorched-water rice at a well” as the Korean proverb goes—similar to counting eggs before they are hatched. Instead, the question should be why Kim Jong-un focuses on field guidance at this moment before anything else.

First, one should comprehend the characteristics of Kim’s field guidance as a style of his rule. Chairman Kim Jong-un has used field guidance as an effective means to strengthen his authority just like his predecessors. Since his father Kim Jong-il’s death on December 17, 2011, Kim Jong-un’s top priority was to clearly manifest that he is the supreme leader of North Korea to the North Korean people and to consolidate his power as soon as possible. According to the South Korean Ministry of Unification data, Chairman Kim’s public activities were mainly focused on military and economy—while it varies from year to year. This relates to Chairman Kim’s slogan of ‘byungjin line’—parallel development of nuclear capabilities and the economy. Kim Jong-un’s field guidance is focused on imminent issues.

Then, let’s have a look from the current situation. Chairman Kim’s public activities have been frequent and open to the public since late June after his third visit to China on June 20. Beginning with a combined reed farm in Sindo County of North Phongyan Province bordering China, Kim Jong-un intensively inspected the northern region including the area that borders China reaching Sinuiju and Samjiyon County of Ryanggang Province, and North Hamgyong Province for nearly three weeks. In the process, Chairman Kim Jong-un’s words and instructions have been circulated as teachings through media outlets such as Rodong Sinmun and Korea Central News Agency. For instance, the July 17 issue of the Rodong Sinmun is unusual. The printing of 12-page per se is surprising as it normally consists of six pages and nine pages dedicated to pictures and articles related to field guidance. The details of the article are more noteworthy. Chairman Kim hurled acute criticisms and censure even to a level that is equal to a formal reprimand of officials administering the area. Not to mention the cabinet, he lashed out the ‘formalistic and bureaucratic style of work of leading officials’ of party’s central and provincial organs. Reproving the procrastination in the construction of the Orangchon Power Station in North Hamgyong Province for three decades, Kim Jong-un even ordered the WPK Central Committee, and not the cabinet, to take responsibility to finish the construction.

Chairman Kim’s three-week-long extensive field guidance in the northern region will probably have a huge impact. First, the shuffling of officials is likely to follow beginning with the demotion of major officials in the cabinet and the party. Second, the party will have the authority on economic affairs again, shifting back from the cabinet. Especially, Chairman Kim seems to retreat from the idea of managing the economy through the cabinet and directly administer the economic affairs with the party as the ‘vanguard.’

However, it is currently unclear whether this will be the opportunity for the party to assume the leadership role in economic affairs or for the cabinet to take a more active role to tackle the economic issues with a sense of crisis. One certain thing is that Chairman Kim has deliberately raised the tensions and crisis within the society. Third, Chairman Kim’s such moves clearly evidence that the revision of ‘byungjin line’ decided at the party’s Central Committee meeting last April pinned down Kim’s commitment to economic development and not a mere façade towards the U.S. and the international community.

Evidently, it may be reckless to adamantly predict that the trajectory of Kim Jong-un’s North Korea with only a few pieces of a puzzle. Nonetheless, Kim Jong-un’s recent series of field guidance, at least, implies that it clearly illustrates what Kim’s North Korea is inclined to and what message it cares to deliver. Also, another clear point is that for the rest of the pieces to fit together in this puzzle, the sequence of events leading up to the rapprochement between North Korea and the U.S. and removal of economic sanctions should smoothly proceed. The inter-Korean relations should also develop further in this context.

Chairman Kim’s such moves will probably carry on until September 9, the 70th anniversary of the North Korean government at the shortest. This, in return, will have the following meaningful effects: first, publicizing boldly the commitment to tackle the economic issues directly, Kim Jong-un will consolidate his support base among the North Korean public; second, he could use this golden opportunity to take bold personnel shift and generational shift within the party and the cabinet; third, he could foster a climate favorable to turn the table on the international sanctions campaign.

At the military parade on April 15, 2012, Chairman Kim Jong-un declared, “It is the firm resolution of the Workers’ Party of Korea to enable our people, the best people in the world who have remained loyal to the party, overcoming all difficulties, to live, without tightening their belts any longer, and fully enjoy wealth and prosperity under socialism.” Moreover, in his New Year’s address on January first last year, Kim Jong-un expressed contrition and aspirations, “I have spent the whole year with regrets and a guilty conscience, to see my ability failing to reach what I have planned for the people. This year, I have made up my mind to spur on to greater efforts and to devote all of myself to the people.”

Chairman Kim’s remarks and activities until now have generally revealed his interest and desires—of what he wants to achieve—specifically. At least for now, we could firmly confirm that Chairman Kim utilizes field guidance as a method to clearly elucidate his message to domestic as well as foreign audiences.