Inter-Korean and ROK-U.S. Summits and

Prospects for North Korea’s Denuclearization Talks

October 1, 2018

Dr. Hong Hyun-ik

Director, Department of Diplomatic Strategy Studies, the Sejong Institute

hyunik@sejong.org

President Moon Jae-in, through proactive consecutive summit diplomacy, enlivened the peace process on the Korean Peninsula which once lost drive. There were high hopes that the Singapore summit on June 12 will add momentum to the peace process on the Korean Peninsula. However, the peace process between North Korea and the U.S. — exchanging North Korea’s denuclearization with U.S. guarantee of regime security — stalled as the two sides ran in parallel — North Korea claiming that it already made several concessions and the U.S. arguing that North Korea is yet to make a substantial measure for denuclearization. With State Secretary Pompeo returning from his visit to Pyongyang early July empty-handed and President Trump suspending Pompeo’s re-visit to North Korea late August to seek a breakthrough in denuclearization talks, the DPRK-U.S. relations came to a standstill once again. Faced with this difficult juncture, President Moon rejuvenated the thrust of trust among the two Koreas and the U.S. — sending the special envoy to North Korea again — and made a breakthrough in North Korea-U.S. talks through the third summit with Chairman Kim in his visit to Pyongyang on September 18. Afterward, he translated the participation at the UN General Assembly in New York into summit diplomacy toward the U.S. and the international community, laying the stepping stone for the resumption of DPRK-U.S. negotiations and the possibility of a second DPRK-U.S. summit.

This writing will examine President Moon’s visit to Pyongyang and the U.S. — the inter-Korean and ROK-U.S. summits and the UN diplomacy — and assess its meanings. Then, it will prospect on the denuclearization talks and suggest the South Korean government’s policy measures.

2018 Inter-Korean Summit in Pyongyang

The Singapore summit on June 12 between North Korea and the U.S. concluded with four articles, three principles and the repatriation of U.S. POW/MIA remains. This drew many criticisms regarding the specifics of the agreement. Hence, some speculated that it will be inconceivable for North Korea to abolish its nuclear weapons — what it referred as ‘the treasured sword of justice for safeguarding the regime’ — in an untroubled and complete manner and entail considerable exertion along the way. At least, North Korea made several unilateral measures: suspended nuclear tests and missile test-fires since last December; returned three American detainees; demolished the underground nuclear test in Punggye-ri, Hamgyong Province in front of foreign journalists; began to dismantle the Sohae Satellite Launch Station in Tongchang-ri; and repatriated 55 bodies of U.S. soldiers. In return, President Trump replied with an announcement that the U.S. will suspend large-scale joint military exercises with South Korea on the grounds that deploying strategic assets to the Korean Peninsula is too expensive.

However, unfortunately, the amicable exchanges for the peace process between the two countries ended there. While the U.S. recognized that North Korea took several measures of sincerity, it exerted pressure on North Korea, pointing to the fact that it lacked any substantial measure on denuclearization such as freezing the nuclear program, declaring the list of nuclear and missile assets, and accepting inspection or letting international monitoring team inspect the region — and stressed that it will maintain sanctions against North Korea. Pyongyang disdained to take further moves of denuclearization unilaterally unless the U.S. makes the first worthwhile step on guaranteeing regime security to North Korea such as declaring the end to the Korean War and easing sanctions against North Korea.

Amid the burgeoning mistrust within the U.S. against North Korea, North Korea’s Kim Yong-chol warned in a letter to U.S. State Secretary Mike Pompeo in late August that if he is coming to Pyongyang to demand North Korea of denuclearization measures while the U.S. does not take action-for-action measures, he does not need to come to Pyongyang. When Secretary Pompeo demanded North Korea’s unilateral denuclearization during his Pyongyang visit early July, the North Korean authorities snubbed the U.S. standpoint as ‘gangster-like attitude’ and Pompeo was unable to meet Kim Jong-un. Whether President Trump recalled this experience is questionable, he canceled Pompeo’s another visit to Pyongyang. The public opinion favoring resumption of ROK-U.S. war games began to gain strength. This entailed the risk of bringing down the whole peace process on the Korean Peninsula among the two Koreas and the U.S., not merely the DPRK-U.S. relations.

In such a situation, President Moon sent a special delegation to North Korea on September 5. The delegation met with Chairman Kim and briefed the South Korean public on the outcome of their one-day visit to Pyongyang the next day. First, it announced that the third inter-Korean summit will be held in Pyongyang on September 18-20. Moreover, it delivered Chairman Kim’s message: he has strong trust in President Trump; North Korea is willing to achieve denuclearization before the end of President Trump’s first term (January 2021) — setting the deadline for denuclearization — ; he stressed that the declaration to end the Korean War has nothing to do with the issue of withdrawing U.S. forces in Korea; and he said that North Korea has intentions to take more active measures for denuclearization when the U.S. takes measures corresponding to North Korea’s friendly gestures such as preemptive measures on denuclearization such as the closure of the Punggye-ri nuclear test site—advancing denuclearization in pursuant to the ‘action-for-action’ principle.  

President Moon received a warm welcome and sincere hospitality when he arrived in Pyongyang on September 18. For example, when President Moon arrived at the Pyongyang Sunan Airport, 21 shots were fired for the cannon salute and the head of the honor guard uttered the phrase ‘His Excellency President Moon Jae-in.’ Moreover, North Korea displayed solicitude to the delegation from the South during the car parade passing through the welcoming crowd in Pyongyang—the chief of the Presidential Security Service sat in front of this car. It was touching to see the Kim Jong-un couple welcome their South Korean counterpart from the Pyongyang airport to the visit to Mount Baekdu. The South Korean President’s three-day visit to North Korea was sufficient enough to sense North Korea’s wholehearted sincerity.

President Moon and Chairman Kim adopted the ‘Pyongyang Joint Declaration of September 2018’ that encompasses the terms they agreed at the two summit talks. Along with alleviating military tensions, preparing economic cooperation, resolving the issue of separated families, the agreement included other agendas relevant to the nuclear issue — North Korea will demolish the Tongchang-ri missile engine test site under the watch of experts from relevant countries and expressed that it will take a step further such as the permanent closure of Yongbyon nuclear facilities once the U.S. takes corresponding measures. Welcomed by the 150,000 Pyongyang citizens packed at the Rungra Islet May Day Stadium with Chairman Kim’s introduction, President Moon delivered a seven-minute speech, declaring the two Koreas have agreed to remove all nuclear weapons and threats on the Korean Peninsula. This bears the significance that the Pyongyang citizens will be the witness that certifies the two Koreas’ joint commitment to denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Moreover, because Chairman Kim agreed to visit Seoul by the end of this year, the two sides have created a crucial opportunity to advance rapidly the bilateral ties to a normal relationship.

Furthermore, the ‘Agreement on the Implementation of the Historic Panmunjom Declaration in the Military Domain’ which was adopted as part of the Pyongyang Declaration resembles more of a peace treaty—beyond the end-of-war declaration. It covered measures to diminish military tensions and prevent armed conflicts between the two Koreas. The two sides agreed on rules of engagement to prevent accidental military clash, substantial disarmament measures across the demilitarized zone, designation of a No Fly Zone, joint operation to recover remains within the DMZ, establishment of a maritime peace zone and a pilot joint fishing zone in the West Sea, and operation of an ‘Inter-Korean Joint Military Committee.’ As the two Koreas achieved a ‘de facto peace’ while the U.S. remained hesitant to the end-of-war declaration, it is expected to assist President Trump in overcoming the conservative domestic opinions that oppose the declaration.

President Moon Jae-in’s Visit to the U.S.

Sustaining the momentum, President Moon engaged in the diplomacy of peace on the Korean Peninsula in front of global leaders at the UN General Assembly in New York. First, he met with President Trump on September 24, conveying Chairman Kim’s message during the 17-hour talk between President Moon and Chairman Kim. The ROK-U.S. summit that spanned 85 minutes involved in-depth discussions on the DPRK-U.S. summit and the schedule for the declaration to end the Korean War. President Moon stated that he affirmed Chairman Kim’s commitment to denuclearization and concrete implementation measures and the points that the ‘war-ending’ declaration will not affect the status of U.S. forces in Korea, ROK-U.S. alliance, and even the UN Command and that the armistice agreement will lose effect only after it is replaced by the peace treaty. This will have removed some of the burdens that President Trump might have had regarding the participation in the declaration to end the Korean War. As a result, President Trump, who ordered the administration to immediately resume negotiations with North Korea after the inter-Korean summit, officially announced the second DPRK-U.S. summit to be held—the venue and time to be announced soon. Although nothing specific was reported on what U.S. measure corresponds to the conditions to shut down the Yongbyon nuclear facilities, Cheong Wa Dae Spokesperson Kim Eui-kyeom said, “they [Presidents Moon and Trump] agreed to maintain close communication and coordination with regard to methods of cooperation, including the corresponding measures of the United States, in order to encourage Chairman Kim to remain committed to complete denuclearization.”

Afterward, President Trump thanked Chairman Kim for ‘his courage and the steps he has taken’ and declared the great paradigm shift in the administration’s North Korea policy—“we have engaged with North Korea to replace the specter of conflict with a bold and new push for peace.” At an interview with the Fox News, President Moon said that ‘[i]f the United States could take corresponding measures, then I believe we will be able to expedite North Korea by further denuclearization measures.’ And he enumerated the examples of ‘corresponding measures,’ which is not limited to sanctions relief and declaration to end the Korean War, but also include less political measures such as humanitarian assistance, cultural and artistic exchanges, establishment of U.S. liaison office in North Korea, and exchanges of economic delegation to North Korea, among others. He also underlined the fact that the measures South Korea and the U.S take could be reversible unlike North Korea—suspended joint military exercises could resume any time; the ‘end-of-war’ declaration can be revoked any time as it is a ‘political statement’; and if North Korea breaks promises, sanctions could be re-imposed and strengthened. Commenting on this interview from President Moon, President Trump publicly recognized Chairman Kim’s determination for denuclearization as he chaired the UN Security Council meeting—he said “I believe that Chairman Kim … wants peace and prosperity for North Korea” at the very venue where the international community adopted the sanctions on North Korea.

Finally, President Moon stated “Chairman Kim expressed his hope of completing denuclearization as soon as possible to focus on economic development” and highlighted, “We[international community] must assure Chairman Kim that he has made the right decision in committing to denuclearization” in his address at the UN General Assembly—where he earnestly appealed for the impartiality of peace on the Korean Peninsula to the whole world.

Eventually, the negotiations between North Korea and the U.S. are back on track in several steps. DPRK Foreign Minister Ri Yong-ho delivered Chairman Kim’s letter and extended his invitation to President Trump who lauded the letter as ‘historic’ and ‘a beautiful piece of art.’ In reply, Secretary Pompeo decided to visit Pyongyang in October. Hence, it seems that the second DPRK-U.S. summit will be held in the near future.

Prospect for Denuclearization Talks and South Korea’s Response

Currently, the leaders among the two Koreas and the U.S. have built bonds with each other to a considerable degree and share a common ground on the peace process on the Korean Peninsula. They all share the perception that the ‘end-of-war’ declaration has political and symbolic connotations—having no effect on the USFK, ROK-U.S. alliance, and the UNC. Concerning the inter-Korean agreement in the military domain to alleviate military tensions that likens to a peace treaty, some in South Korea and the U.S. expressed concerns that it might negatively affect the alliance. However, this angst soon faded when President Trump welcomed the Pyongyang Declaration.

Therefore, the outlook on the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula does not appear shady. In the not too distant future, the venue and time for the second meeting between Chairman Kim and President Trump are expected to be fixed—after the two sides agree on the timeline for denuclearization in the short and medium term with the meeting between U.S. Special Representative to North Korea Stephen Biegun and DPRK Vice Foreign Minister Choe Sun-hui in the Austrian capital and Secretary Pompeo’s visit to Pyongyang to reaffirm North Korea’s goal to denuclearize within President Trump’s first term. If the second DPRK-U.S. summit is held, the two sides will have achieved a further step to North Korea’s denuclearization and the ‘end-of-war’ declaration will have been coordinated and scheduled. It seems plausible to have Kim Jong-un’s visit to Seoul and the declaration to end the Korean War taken place within this year.

Understandably, those who distrust North Korea could criticize that North Korea’s denuclearization measures are insufficient. Nevertheless, as President Trump seems to clearly fathom, they should face the fact that North Korea’s denuclearization takes a considerable amount of time. Thus, it is wise to have the conviction that the denuclearization will ultimately be achieved when the two sides progressively take corresponding steps with an unwavering resolve and patience and consideration of North Korea’s security dilemma.

Despite the course of events, many skeptics with deep-rooted distrust against North Korea exist in both South Korea and the U.S. Mindful of this fact, the two countries should pursue more sagacious policies in a meticulous manner. In this context, the author presents several policy recommendations.

First, since Chairman Kim made active steps for denuclearization until now, South Korea and the U.S. should undoubtedly certify that the North Korean regime and leadership will remain intact and even develop the country’s economy — that ‘byungjin line of parallel economic and nonnuclear development’ is plausible and not the ‘byungjin line of parallel economic and nuclear development.’ It is practical to encourage Kim Jong-un to continue this type of behavior in good faith. At this juncture, the South Korean government should continue to persuade the U.S. that it is appropriate to induce additional denuclearization measures by seriously taking part in the discussions on the declaration to end the Korean War — instead of regressing to the near-war crisis state last autumn after refusing the declaration.

Second, because the North Korean nuclear issue is a life-and-death matter for South Korea’s security, not only for the U.S., the South Korean government should engage in intermediary diplomacy between North Korea and the U.S. with a proactive attitude to the issue. It could volitionally carve out a specific negotiation plan that combines North Korea’s denuclearization and the security guarantee for the North Korean regime based on ‘action-for-action’ principle and revise it according to the two sides’ views — having South Korea’s proposition and schedule agreed and adopted in the DPRK-U.S. negotiations.

Third, the South Korean government should endeavor to make the peace process on the Korean Peninsula — which returned to the normal path—irreversible. Because the DPRK-U.S. relations can aggravate to a confrontational state any time, the South Korean government should consistently build confidence to avoid the inter-Korean relations falling into hostility—by defusing military tension, providing humanitarian assistance, and conducting cultural and sports exchanges. In addition, it should espouse Chairman Kim’s commitment to denuclearization and President Trump’s efforts for denuclearization and peace through mutual trust to impel them to uphold the momentum alive.

Fourth, South Korea should prepare inter-Korean economic cooperation with confidence—reminding of the fact that the South Korean economy is 40 times larger than that of North Korea. It is practical to pursue economic cooperation projects that benefit both sides — that support North Korea’s economic recovery and rejuvenate the South Korean economy. In this context, the inter-Korean economic cooperation project most helpful to the South Korean economy is the operation of the Kaesong Industrial Complex; thus, it should pour in efforts to resume the operation first. In light of this, Seoul could persuade Washington of the utility of ‘snap-back system.’ Since the sanctions will be reinstated and enhanced if necessary should North Korea deceive the international community, the South Korean government may emphasize that the international community is able to wisely induce additional progress in denuclearization continuously by flexibly easing sanctions depending on North Korea’s denuclearization process. Moreover, the Mount Kumgang tourism will be an easier project to resume despite the international sanctions regime; hence, the South Korean government could approach this project first in parallel with humanitarian elements such as the regularization of the reunion of separated families.

Fifth, the South Korean government should relieve the extreme distrust against North Korea within the domestic society to convert the inter-Korean reconciliatory mood to advancement in North Korea’s denuclearization and the establishment of a peace regime. If the government exhibits more sincerity of sharing information related to inter-Korean affairs with the leadership of the opposition, it will assuage the concerns of Seoul’s North Korea policy being politicized, promote national dialogue and integration, and raise trans-partisan support and consensus on the government’s North Korea policy.

Sixth, it should be noted that except for a select few including President Trump and Secretary Pompeo, the advisors in the White House, senior officials in the administration, and the U.S. Congress members still have a high level of skepticism toward North Korea. Seoul should enhance diplomatic activities in the public and private sector and the legislative branch actively promoting and convincing that South Korea and the U.S. should take a reciprocal approach in their North Korea policy considering North Korea’s security dilemma—and that this propels North Korea’s denuclearization, settles peace on the peninsula, and serves the U.S. strategic interest in the end.

*Translator’s note: This is an unofficial translation of the original paper which was written in Korean. All references should be made to the original paper.