Current Issues and Policies No. 2018-14
December 11, 2018
Dr.
Cheong Seong-Chang
Vice
President for Research Planning, the Sejong Institute
softpower@sejong.org
Seven Phases of North Korea’s Foreign
Policy Shift in 2018
In 2018, North Korea’s foreign policy and
policy on its nuclear program have shifted in seven phases: 1. Sought inter-Korean
dialogue and refused negotiations on denuclearization; 2. Reviewed the option
of dialogue with the U.S. including negotiations on denuclearization; 3.
Suspended nuclear tests and proclaimed the intention to negotiate
denuclearization; 4. Improved inter-Korean relations and agreed on the
‘complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula; 5. Built trust between the
leaders of North Korea and the U.S.; 6. Explored the possibility of exchanging
progress in denuclearization and the ‘end-of-war’ declaration; and 7. Specified
the details and deadline for denuclearization and sought alleviation of
sanctions. North
Korea’s policy on denuclearization will probably continue to evolve in
accordance with South Korea and the U.S. response to it. This report analyzes
how Pyongyang modified its position on the denuclearization issue and prospects
on North Korea’s foreign policy orientation in 2019.
1. Sought inter-Korean dialogue and refused
negotiations on denuclearization
Until last year, Kim Jong-un turned down
President Moon’s offer of dialogue and was immersed in advancing his country’s
nuclear and missile capabilities. However, Chairman Kim elucidated the
intention to participate in the PyeongChang Winter Olympics and to improve
relations with South Korea through his New Year's’ address. On the other hand,
he stressed to enhance North Korea’s nuclear force, exuding confidence in
nuclear deterrence vis-à-vis the U.S. more than ever. In his
address, he stated, North Korea “should mass-produce nuclear warheads and
ballistic missiles, the power and reliability of which have already been proved
to the full, to give a spur to the efforts for deploying them for action.”
2. Reviewed the option of dialogue with
the U.S. including negotiations on denuclearization
It seems that Kim Jong-un’s pivotal
change in his position is decisively attributable to President Trump’s message
that he is willing to talk directly with Chairman Kim. When the high-level
inter-Korean talks began after Kim’s New Year’s address, it is reported that
President Moon Jae-in delivered President Trump’s intention to engage in direct
talks with Chairman Kim —confirmed during a telephone call — to Chairman Kim. Such
position of President Trump should have been welcoming news to the South Korean
government.
On February 10, Kim Yo-jong, Chairman
Kim’s sister and the first vice director of the Central Committee of the
Workers’ Party of Korea (WPKCC) along with North Korea’s high-level delegation,
visited Cheong Wa Dae and conveyed the verbal invitation to President Moon,
saying that Chairman Kim is “willing to meet President Moon Jae-in at the
earliest date possible.” In response, President Moon said, “Dialogue between
North Korea and the U.S. is required for further development in inter-Korean
relations,” and asked North Korea to act more willingly in talks with the U.S.
Cheong Wa Dae officials expressed that the delegation including First Vice
Director Kim Yo-jong listened heedfully to President Moon’s words.
Because Kim Jong-un was aware of
President Moon’s idea to mainly discuss North Korea’s denuclearization at the
inter-Korean summit, Chairman Kim is likely to have considered the suspension
of nuclear tests and medium-to-long range missile test-fires as a compromise
with South Korea before the invitation. Nonetheless, if President Moon conveyed
President Trump’s proposal to hold a DPRK-U.S. summit to Kim Yo-jong when she
visited Cheong Wa Dae, North Korea should have reviewed even the so-called ‘big
deal’ — exchanging North Korea’s denuclearization with the normalization of
DPRK-U.S. diplomatic relations, a peace treaty for Korean Peninsula, removal of
sanctions, etc.
When WPKCC Vice Chairman Kim Yong-chol
visited South Korea to attend the closing ceremony of the Winter Olympics on
February 25, President Moon indicated to Kim Yong-nam that the DPRK-U.S. talks
should proceed soon for the improvement in inter-Korean relations and the
fundamental solution to the Korean Peninsula issue. Cheong Wa Dae issued a
briefing statement stating that the North Korean delegation shared the view
that the inter-Korean relations and the DPRK-U.S. relations should develop in
tandem — with the intention to engage with the U.S. The brief implied that
North Korea began to consider the summit with the U.S. seriously.
3. Suspended nuclear tests and proclaimed
the intention to negotiate denuclearization
Led by Director of National Security
Chung Eui-yong, the special delegation took a two-day visit to Pyongyang from
March 5 to meet Kim Jong-un. The special delegation reached a significant
agreement with the North Korean side regarding the North Korean nuclear issue
and the development of inter-Korean relations. The key terms agreed include holding
the third inter-Korean summit at the Peace House late April, establishing a
telephone hotline between the leaders of the two Koreas, announcing North
Korea’s commitment to denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, expressing
North Korea’s intent to engage in talks with the U.S., and inviting South
Korean art troupe and taekwondo team to Pyongyang, etc.
Among these six terms agreed, the most
crucial point is that North Korea ascertained that it will not conduct
additional strategic provocations such as nuclear tests and ballistic missile
tests while the dialogue continues. The second crucial point is that North
Korea ‘undoubtedly’ stated its commitment to denuclearization and illuminated
that it has no reason to possess nuclear weapons once ‘military threats against
North Korea’ are removed and the regime security is guaranteed. North Korea and
the U.S. were able to sit on the table to negotiate denuclearization because
the former pronounced a flexible stance - that it can abandon its nuclear
stockpile when military threats against itself are alleviated. The third most
significant matter was that North Korea expressed the willingness to engage in
frank discussions with the U.S. to consult the denuclearization issue and the
normalization of bilateral ties.
On March 8, Director Chung met President
Trump at the White House and delivered Kim’s message that he intends to meet
President Trump soon. President Trump replied that he will meet Chairman Kim in
May to achieve the permanent denuclearization - commencing the preparatory
steps to hold the DPRK-U.S. summit.
At the third plenary meeting of the 7th
WPKCC held on April 20, Kim Jong-un proclaimed “the new strategic line on
channeling all efforts on the economic construction” and the cessation of
nuclear and medium-to-long range missile tests officially. This has been a step
further from what he promised to the South Korean delegation last March -
suspension of strategic provocations such as nuclear and ballistic missile
tests during the period of dialogue.
As the North Korean leader claimed that
the byungjin line (of simultaneous economic and nuclear development) “came to a
successful conclusion,” this new line will replace the pre-existing byungjin
line. Chairman Kim declared that “no nuclear test and intermediate-range and
inter-continental ballistic rocket test-fire are necessary for the DPRK now …
the mission of the northern nuclear test ground has thus come to an end.”
4. Improved inter-Korean relations and agreed
on the ‘complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula’
President Moon and Chairman Kim met at
the Peace House in Panmunjom on April 27. They agreed to “bring forth the
watershed moment for the improvement of inter-Korean relations,” “make joint
efforts to alleviate the acute military tension and practically eliminate the
danger of war on the Korean Peninsula,” “cooperate to establish a permanent and
solid peace regime on the Korean Peninsula,” pursue declaring the end to the
Korean War during this year, and realize “complete denuclearization of the
Korean Peninsula.” The two leaders “confirmed the common goal of realizing,
through complete denuclearization, a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula.” Chairman
Kim Jong-un took a step forward from his remarks at the plenary meeting on
April 20 as he officially agreed ‘the complete denuclearization of the Korean
Peninsula’ for the first time.
5. Built trust between North Korea and
the U.S.
On June 12, Chairman Kim Jong-un and
President Trump agreed on initiating new bilateral relations, establishing a
lasting and solid peace regime on the Korean Peninsula, reaffirming the
complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, and recovering and
repatriating POW/MIA remains. The two leaders have built deep mutual trust
through the summit. Upon signing the declaration, President Trump said, “I
also will be inviting Chairman Kim at the appropriate time to the White House”
–stating another summit with Chairman Kim. He added that he built a special
relationship with Chairman Kim and lauded him as a talented man who loves his
country. In response, Chairman Kim said, “today, we had a historic meeting and
decided to leave the past behind and we are about to sign a historic document.
The world will see a major change.”
During the press conference after the summit on June
12, President Trump announced that the ROK-U.S. joint war games will be
suspended while the negotiations with North Korea continues. In his telephone
conversation with President Moon in the evening of the same day, President Trump
regarded Kim as a ‘nice partner to talk with’ and evaluated that ‘they had
developed a very special bond through the summit this time.’
6. Explored the possibility of exchanging
progress in denuclearization and the ‘end-of-war’ declaration
From July 6 to 7, U.S. State Secretary Mike Pompeo
visited Pyongyang and discussed the North Korea’s denuclearization issue with
WPKCC Vice Chairman Kim Yong-chol. At this high-level talks, North Korea
suggested the U.S. have exchanges in various domains and declare the end of the
Korean War on the 65th anniversary of the truce to improve bilateral ties. In
exchange, Pyongyang would simultaneously shut down the engine test site to
certify physically the suspension of ICBM production and working-level
negotiations for recovery of POW/MIA remains. However, Secretary Pompeo had a
negative view on ‘end-of-war’ declaration and demanded North Korea to declare
the list of nuclear weapons. As a result, the two sides left the first
high-level talks emptyhanded. Until this time, North Korea seems to have injected
a significant meaning into the ‘end-of-war’ declaration.
7. Specified the details and deadline for
denuclearization and sought alleviation of sanctions
The special delegation led by Director of National
Security Chung headed to North Korea on September 5 and confirmed Chairman
Kim’s position on the denuclearization timetable. Director Chung debriefed that
Chairman Kim wants to end the seven decades of hostility between North Korea
and the U.S. and achieve denuclearization within President Trump’s first term.
Chairman Kim’s words indicated that he hopes to complete denuclearization
process, normalize DPRK-U.S. relations, and sign the peace treaty before the end
of the Trump administation’s current term in January 2021.
During the inter-Korean summit held between
September 18 and 20 in Pyongyang, President Moon Jae-in and Chairman Kim
Jong-un signed the Pyongyang Joint Declaration which covers removal of the
danger of war and end to the hostile relations, solution to develop the
nation’s economy in a balanced manner, efforts to make progress in the
denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, Kim Jong-un’s visit to Seoul, etc.
The Pyongyang Joint Declaration, agreed by the two
Korean leaders, stipulates, “The two sides shared the view that the Korean Peninsula
must be turned into a land of peace free
from nuclear weapons and nuclear threats, and that substantial progress
toward this end must be made in a prompt manner.” And “the North will permanently dismantle the Dongchang-ri missile engine test site and
launch platform under the observation of experts from relevant countries.”
Moreover, “The North expressed its willingness to
continue to take additional measures, such as the permanent dismantlement of the nuclear facilities in Yongbyon, as
the United States takes corresponding measures in accordance with the spirit of
the June 12 US-DPRK Joint Statement.” Finally, “The two sides agreed to
cooperate closely in the process of pursuing complete denuclearization of the
Korean Peninsula.”
President Trump commended the
denuclearization-related terms agreed at the Pyongyang inter-Korean summit in
September. On September 24, President Moon visited the U.S. and met President
Trump with Chairman Kim’s message that he has unwavering trust and expectations
on President Trump and he wants to realize denuclearization by meeting with
President Trump as President Trump could only solve the issue. And President
Trump replied that the time and venue for the second DPRK-U.S. summit will be
announced soon.
Thereafter, President Trump announced a specific range of date for the second
DPRK-U.S. summit - next January of February.
When Secretary Pompeo visited Pyongyang
on October 7, North Korea and the U.S. agreed to constitute a working-level
negotiation team to discuss North Korea’s denuclearization process and the
schedule for the second bilateral summit swiftly. These terms are yet to be
fulfilled and Vice Chairman Kim Yong-chol’s trip to the U.S. has been
postponed. This gridlock between Pyongyang and Washington appears to originate
from the fact that the two sides cannot find a common ground between the U.S.
demand of denuclearization measures and North Korea’s demand of sanctions relief.
It is evaluated that the North Korean regime currently concentrates more on
having sanctions mitigated rather than having the U.S. participate in the
‘end-of-war’ declaration.
Outlook for North Korea’s Policy on South
Korea and Foreign Affairs in 2019 and Seoul’s and Washington’s Strategies
The two events that will shape North
Korea’s foreign policy in 2019 are Kim Jong-un’s visit to Seoul and the second
DPRK-U.S. summit. Chairman Kim’s visit to the South Korean capital may even
take place in December 2018. The leaders of the two Korea will foremost discuss
the North Korean nuclear and missile issue which failed to make progress even
though the terms were agreed at the September inter-Korean summit in Pyongyang.
At the Pyongyang summit, Kim pledged to permanently close the Tongchang-ri
missile engine test site and launch pad with the observations from experts of
relevant countries, but this did not happen yet. Therefore, once Kim Jong-un
takes the trip southward, he should elaborate on the time for such events.
In addition, he expressed that should the U.S. takes ‘corresponding measures’
in accordance with the June 12 DPRK-U.S. Joint Statement, North Korea will
continue to take additional measures such as the permanent closure of the
Yongbyon nuclear facilities. He should clarify what ‘corresponding measure’
that North Korea desires to President Moon at the possibly-forthcoming Seoul
summit.
For the second DPRK-U.S. summit to be successful
and the denuclearization process and the development of inter-Korean relations
to pick up the pace in 2019, North Korea and the U.S. should agree on the
timetable for North Korea’s denuclearization and the removal of the list of
sanctions against North Korea. North Korea may possibly stick to the gradual
approach of ‘taking one solvable issue at a time in a step-by-step manner based
on the principle of ‘action-for-action’ building confidence’ even in 2019. In
such case, the North Korean regime may avoid discussions on abandonment or
displacement overseas of nuclear warheads and medium-to-long-range missiles and
attempt to negotiate primarily the permanent closure of Dongchang-ri engine
test site and launch pad and the nuclear facilities in Yongbyon. Conversely, as
Chairman Kim said that he wishes to finish the denuclearization process early
with President Trump at the Pyongyang summit, he could possibly speak of the
abandonment of nuclear warheads and long-range missiles at the second DPRK-U.S.
summit. At the Seoul summit, the South Korean government should persuade the
North Korean authorities for Kim Jong-un to engage in venturesome negotiations
at the second meeting with President Trump.
The international community, including
the U.S., needs to consider the five-stage denuclearization process within
Trump’s current term - prior to January 2021. First, North Korea closes the
nuclear facilities in Yongbyon. Second, North Korea transfers 50% of its ICBMs
outside. Third, North Korea ships the rest of ICBMs overseas. Fourth, North
Korea removes half of its nuclear warheads from its territory. Finally, fifth,
it displaces the other half of nuclear warheads outside of the country. It is
desirable for the international community to consider providing compensation to
North Korea for each stage.
If Pyongyang agrees to this timetable of
denuclearization, the U.S. should declare the end of the Korean War with North
Korea at the second bilateral summit and offer the timetable on easing/removing
sanctions and improving bilateral relations. Especially, when North Korea
permanently shut down nuclear facilities in Yongbyon, it is desirable for the
UN Security Council to agree on lifting sanctions against North Korea related
to people’s livelihoods such as exports of North Korean textile and fisheries
and economic cooperation first.
Nevertheless, viewing the course of
events between North Korea and the U.S. after the Singapore summit on June 12,
the high-level talks were never easily held and the two sides faltered in bridging
the gap at these talks. When President Trump and his affiliates have different
negotiation strategies and Chairman Kim and his affiliates also have different
negotiation strategies, these problems will recur in 2019. Accordingly, the
South Korean government should draft an agreement for the inter-Korean and
DPRK-U.S. summits and manage trilateral high-level talks and working group to
support the implementation of the clauses agreed at the summits. If it is
difficult to constitute a ROK-DPRK-U.S. trilateral working group, Seoul should
bolster its communication with Pyongyang by forming an inter-Korean working
group concerning denuclearization and ‘corresponding measures’ akin to the
currently-operating ROK-U.S. working group.
This article is based on the
author’s personal opinion and does not reflect the views of the Sejong
Institute.
*Translator’s
note: This is an unofficial translation of the original paper which was written
in Korean. All references should be made to the original paper.
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