Current Issues and Policies No. 2018-15
December 11, 2018
Dr. Hong Hyun-ik
Director, Department of Diplomatic Strategy Studies, the
Sejong Institute
hyunik@sejong.org
The
Current State of Play
In 2018, the inter-Korean
relations have embraced an era of peace based on the confidence built between
the two leaders who met three times and the two Koreas are preparing a mutually
beneficial economic cooperation. North Korea and the U.S. also have agreed on
principles of resolving the North Korean nuclear issue, normalizing bilateral
relations, and establishing a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula at the June
12 summit. South Korea and the U.S. suspended large-scale joint military drills
and North Korea replied with several measures: repatriated American detainees,
returned remains of U.S. soldiers, and manifested its intention to cease future
nuclear development – demolished the nuclear test site, dismantled Sohae
missile launch site, and suspended nuclear and missile tests since last
December.
However, as Vice Chairman Kim
Yong-chol canceled his visit to the U.S. early November - which was to prepare
the second DPRK-U.S. summit - it enfeebled the momentum for denuclearization
and the summit. The November U.S. midterm election resulted in the Democrats’
control of the House and weakened President Trump’s power base. When the
Congress opens next January, it will likely to hold back the administration’s negotiations
with North Korea. In such context, President Trump showed his determination to
negotiate with North Korea, mentioning that he will have the second summit with
Kim Jong-un next January or February and narrowed down the list of potential
venues to three when he met with President Moon at the G20 summit late
November. Moreover, he asked President Moon to deliver his message that
Chairman Kim’s visit to South Korea will serve a positive momentum to settle
peace on the Korean Peninsula and that he will provide what he wants when he
implements the agreement between the two leaders. U.S. National Security
Advisor John Bolton, who maintains a hardline stance against North Korea, made
an extraordinary remark - Washington will review the option of lifting sanctions
when North Korea shows progress in the denuclearization process.
Against this backdrop, the
possibility of Kim’s visit to South Korea prior to the DPRK-U.S. summit has
grasped the attention from the media. While it seems that the second
Trump-Kim meeting will be held within the next two and a half months, the talks
between Pyongyang and Washington to prepare the summit have only taken place as
a working-level dialogue at Panmunjom early December and the high-level talks
are yet to be scheduled. The inter-Korean relations are likely to be a
breakthrough or a mediator for the DPRK-U.S. talks.
This paper examines the
positions of three countries on the North Korean nuclear issue at the current
situation, lays out the outlook on the issue for 2019, and elaborates South
Korea’s strategy for Kim Jong-un’s visit to South Korea and the resolution to
the North Korean nuclear issue.
How
South Korea, North Korea, and the U.S. View the North Korean Nuclear Issue
Moon
Jae-in Administration’s Position
The Moon administration chiefly
values the principle of ‘defending the peace on the Korean Peninsula.’ In this
context, it has achieved the inter-Korean rapprochement with Chairman Kim and
ushered in the era of peace on the Korean Peninsula, adopting measures for
lessening military tension, preventing accidental clashes, and building
confidence. Building military confidence between the two Koreas possibly sets a
favorable condition for North Korea’s denuclearization. It also entailed the
recommendation to the U.S. to participate in the declaration to end the Korean
War that de facto ended 65 years ago in a political and symbolic manner as a
gesture to encourage North Korea to adopt measures for denuclearization free
from security concerns as the two Koreas already agreed on terms resembling a
peace treaty - preventing accidental military clashes and building confidence
beyond an ‘end-of-war’ declaration.
The South Korean government’s
policy orientation on the North Korean nuclear program follows the idea of
‘being the driver of Korean Peninsula affairs.’ This is Seoul’s concept of
playing a facilitator and mediator role between Pyongyang and Washington to
reach an agreement on the nuclear issue, assuming responsibility as a key
stakeholder and preparing a creative proposition to resolve the issue - a more
active approach to the issue compared to the previous administrations. It
advises Pyongyang to build trust with Washington by adopting measures for
denuclearization and receive corresponding measures in return. On the other
side, Seoul persuades Washington to declare the end to the Korean War and ease
sanctions flexibly as Kim Jong-un’s commitment to denuclearization is more
trustworthy than his predecessors so as to induce North Korea’s swift
denuclearization process in an irreversible manner.
The Moon administration is
poised to welcome Kim Jong-un’s visit to Seoul and encourages Kim to pay a
visit this year - but it will accept the visit even if it takes place next
year. The administration attempts to seize the opportunity to be exempt from
sanctions by inducing North Korea’s additional measures of denuclearization and
seek South Korea’s economic development through mutually-beneficial
inter-Korean economic cooperation such as the resumption of the Kaesong Industrial
Complex.
Chairman
Kim’s position
Chairman Kim Jong-un thinks and
acts based on the principle of ‘safeguarding the regime at all costs.’ In this
context, North Korea bolstered its nuclear and missile development during the
Obama administration which was reluctant in negotiations with North Korea. When
the Trump administration posed a hardline posture against North Korea, it
strived to enhance nuclear and missile capabilities as a brinkmanship tactic and
declared the completion of state nuclear force late November 2017 when it
perceived that it had acquired minimal deterrence against the U.S. with the
successful test-launch of Hwasong-15 missile which made the U.S. east coast
within range.
Afterward, Kim Jong-un engaged
in proactive diplomacy with confidence. First, North Korea sought reciprocal
inter-Korean economic cooperation and participated in the Winter Olympics under
the concept of national cooperation between South and North Korea. Together with
South Korea, it opened in an era of peace on the Korean Peninsula through three
inter-Korean summits. Moreover, having set forth the proposition that North
Korea could abandon its nuclear arsenal once the U.S. military threat is
removed and the regime security is guaranteed, Chairman Kim received assurances
of normalization of diplomatic relations with the U.S. and the establishment of
a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula in exchange for the commitment to
complete denuclearization at the summit talks with President Trump. Thereafter,
Kim Jong-un pressured the U.S. to take corresponding measures while North Korea
divided up the denuclearization procedures into several stages, asserting that
he will accept denuclearization when the U.S. complies with the principle of
mutual respect and security. However, as the U.S. did not take additional steps
other than the suspension of large-scale war games with South Korea, North
Korea has urged the U.S. to adopt additional corresponding measures while it
halted additional denuclearization measures since last July.
In a long-term vision, Kim
Jong-un aims to establish the foundation for a long-term rule by having the
international sanctions lifted as it takes denuclearization measures at a
step-by-step and case-by-case basis depending on the U.S. corresponding
measures and achieving economic growth through inter-Korean economic
cooperation and reception of international investment.
President
Trump’s Position
With the slogan of ‘America
First,’ President Trump seems to have a policy goal of winning the presidential
elections in November 2020. It is rational to explicate that President Trump
pursues his North Korea policy in such a context. Unlike the negotiators in the
previous administrations who had the expertise and experience but took a
restrained attitude with the disbelief in North Korea, President Trump has
opted for a top-down resolution - believing his intuition and judgment - and
Chairman Kim also wants negotiations with President Trump and reach a deal with
him directly.
Nevertheless, faced with the
anti-Trump sentiment and distrust against North Korea deeply entrenched among
many media outlets, intellectuals, and the establishment, President Trump hopes
to receive public praise for diplomatic achievements by inducing North Korea’s
denuclearization with minimal cost. Hence, whereas the U.S. journalists and
scholars, armed with distrust against North Korea, criticize the top-down
approach to negotiations with North Korea, President Trump lauded himself for
diplomatic and security accomplishments - rapid reduction of North Korea’s
security threat against the U.S. and return of American detainees - and has fended
off North Korea’s discontent of U.S. unilateral policy toward North Korea by
expressing trust in Kim Jong-un.
Outlook
in 2019
Compared with the era of peace
and reconciliation during the previous Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun
administrations, the peace process unfolded on the Korean Peninsula this year
appears more likely to end with success.
First, currently, the peace
process based on trust among the leaders of the two Koreas and the U.S. seems
to proceed in a virtuous cycle. Although the two Koreas had moments of
reconciliation during the Bush administration in the past, the U.S. hardline
stance exposed clear limitations with the cacophony between Seoul and
Washington on the confrontation between North Korea and the U.S. and policy
coordination toward North Korea. Additionally, when the Obama administration
endeavored to engage in talks with the North Korean regime, the momentum was
weakened by the passive attitude of the previous Lee Myung-bak and Park
Geun-hye administrations. Now, the two Korean leaders have built rapport; Kim
Jong-un and Trump have maintained trust toward one another; South Korea and the
U.S. have minimized the differences on their North Korea policy and upheld
coordination. Even though cleavages exist lies between the officials of North
Korea and the U.S., these hindrances could vanish by the trust between the
leaders.
Second, the three leaders
commonly perceive that the peace process on the Korean Peninsula suits their
political interests. President Moon, having values of progressiveness and
peace, obviously leads the drive. Chairman Kim strives to lay the groundwork
for his long-term reign by having the regime’s safety guaranteed and achieving
economic growth with gradual denuclearization. President Trump endeavors to
have the resolution to the North Korean nuclear issue as his diplomatic
accomplishment, sustaining trust with Chairman Kim, even when he sparked
disputes with competitive powers and even allies by addressing solely U.S.
interests. If possible, he aims to win the Nobel Peace Prize based on this
diplomatic feat and retain his presidency onwards.
Third, the three leaders have
some time to pursue the process as they have more than a year and 10 months
until the end of their terms - different from the past. It contrasts with the
past where only five months remained at the decisive moments to pursue the
peace process - for either President Clinton or President Roh Moo-hyun.
Fourth, Chairman Kim Jong-un’s
peace diplomacy initiative with an active attitude full of confidence -
differing from his father Kim Jong-il who passively approached the peace
process through Presidents Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun’s persuasion - also
increases the possibility of success. Chairman Kim also manifests a leadership
with efforts to fulfill the promises - adding to the positive factors.
As such, while Chairman Kim’s
Seoul visit in December will raise the likelihood of success in
denuclearization and the peace process on the Korean Peninsula, his visit
postponed early 2019 will still ensure a high rate of success.
Yet, it is worrisome that there
still is room for the political environment to retreat to a confrontational
state, as the conservative factions within the three countries may excessively
oppose and resist the advancement of negotiations - bringing the peace process
to a standstill. For example, the anti-Trump bloc within the U.S. and North
Korea-skeptics could pressure President Trump to categorically refuse any
corresponding measures without North Korea’s preceding ‘complete’ denuclearization,
despite North Korea’s expression of intent to denuclearization. Then Kim
Jong-un may a return to hardline stance against the international community,
reneging the denuclearization process.
Nonetheless, from a bird-eye
view, the process of denuclearization and establishment of a peace regime on
the Korean Peninsula is likely to advance forward albeit twists and turns and a
slow pace.
South
Korea’s Policy Direction
Because the inter-Korean summit
in South Korea seems more likely to be held earlier than the DPRK-U.S. summit
whether it takes place in December or January, the paper presents the South
Korean government’s strategy when Kim visits Seoul.
In the context of time, the
South Korean government should encourage North Korea to take additional
denuclearization measures, explaining the realist logic in international
politics as a relatively weak power - which may stir sentiments of
undeservedness - and emphasizing that President Trump will have a leeway to
take corresponding measures when North Korea makes a step toward
denuclearization.
The problem is that the South
Korean government cannot provide any material concessions to Chairman Kim due
to the sanctions imposed by the UN and the U.S. Against this backdrop, it
should focus on the resolution based on the historic meaning that the North
Korean leader visits South Korea for the first time. President Moon could
review the idea of persuading Chairman Kim to pay a tribute to the National
Cemetery, express firm determination that ‘I deeply contemplated several
unfortunate incidents that occurred around the inter-Korean demarcation line
and will make efforts to prevent these events from recurring,’ and revoke the
freeze of South Korean assets in Mount Kumgang and Kaesong Industrial Complex -
in exchange South Korea could lift the May 24 measures and pave the way to
resume operation of Kaesong Industrial Complex and tourism of Mount Kumgang.
Regarding the North Korean
nuclear issue, Seoul should organize affairs for North Korea to swiftly accept
the international inspection team to observe the demolished Punggye-ri nuclear
test site and the dismantlement of the missile engine test site in Tongchang-ri.
Furthermore, as Chairman Kim pledged to permanently shut down the Yongbyon
nuclear facilities when the U.S. takes corresponding measures to President Moon
in Pyongyang in September, the South Korean government should persuade that it
is wise to take dramatic measures - deconstructing the Yongbyon facilities
under the supervision of the inspection team and receiving monitoring team
afterward - and induce U.S. corresponding measures in return - open a U.S.
liaison office in North Korea, declare end to the Korean War, ease sanctions,
and make inter-Korean economic cooperation exempt from sanctions such as the
resumption of Kaesong Industrial Complex and tourism of Mount Kumgang. Also, it
could convince that it will be easier to urge the U.S. to take corresponding
measures when North Korea could declare the nuclear facilities in Yongbyon, of
which Chairman Kim already pledged to dismantle. In sum, the South Korean
government could request North Korea to take a substantial step toward
denuclearization on one side, and persuade the U.S. to induce North Korea’s
denuclearization adopting an original corresponding measure and ease sanctions.
Even if Chairman Kim visits
Seoul after meeting with President Trump, the South Korean government should
have a draft resolution including the schedule that links North Korea’s
denuclearization with sanctions relief, establishment of DPRK-U.S. liaison
office, ‘end-of-war’ declaration, establishment of a peace regime on the Korean
Peninsula, etc. to offer both sides and strive to achieve the denuclearization
and establishment of a peace regime according to Seoul’s timeline, reflecting
and revising the draft by continuous consultation with both sides.
This article is based on the
author’s personal opinion and does not reflect the views of the Sejong
Institute.
*Translator’s
note: This is an unofficial translation of the original paper which was written
in Korean. All references should be made to the original paper.
File