Current Issues and Policies No. 2018-18
December 13, 2018
Dr. Chung Jae Hung
Research Fellow, the Sejong Institute
jameschung@sejong.org
1.
Chinese Politics in 2018
The most notable characteristic in Chinese politics in 2018
is the constitutional amendment and the establishment of President Xi Jinping’s
one-man rule. Along with the
emphasis on 'the Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics
for a New Era' proclaimed at the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party
of China (CPC) October last year, the lianghui
(National People's Congress, NPC and the National Committee of the Chinese
People's Political Consultative Conference, CPPCC) held last March proceeded
with constitutional amendment. Moreover, the amended constitution and ensuing
restructuring of state apparatus confirmed the establishment of Xi’s one-man
rule. After the constitutional amendment, most of the Chinese state media
especially highlighted the significance of this constitutional amendment - that
a strong leader is essential to achieve the ‘Chinese dream,’ ensure continuity
in key national policies, and expand China’s influence in the international
stage. President Xi himself illustrated the necessity and legitimacy of the
constitutional amendment, “We should not be concerned about personal gains or
fames. What we want is a good reputation not only among the people today, but
also a good reputation that will go down in history.”
The core of the amendment was Article 45 Paragraph
3 of Article 79 of the Constitution, "The terms of office for the
President and Vice-President of the People's Republic of China are the same as
those of deputies to the National People's Congress; presidents and
vice-presidents shall serve no more than two consecutive terms." This was
amended to read as “The terms of office for the President and Vice-President of
the People's Republic of China are the same as those of deputies to the
National People's Congress." Therefore, this enables President Xi
to rule for another term and even for life in legal terms. It has elevated
President Xi to the strongest leader in China since Chairman Mao. Furthermore,
the preamble of the constitution listed “Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese
Characteristics for a New Era” along with “Mao Zedong Thought, Deng Xiaoping Theory, the important
thought of Three Represents, the Scientific Outlook on Development” -
inscribing President Xi’s name for the first time in the constitution since Deng
Xiaoping. It de facto completed Xi Jinping’s one-man rule.1)
The establishment of President Xi’s one-man rule does not
end at the expansion of CPC General Secretary Xi’s power base and
consolidation, but also encompasses the historic shift from the existing 1978
constitution system.2) This does not only simply denote the transformation from
Deng Xiaoping-led orientation that held on for more than 40 years to Xi
Jinping-led orientation but includes the ‘Comprehensively Deepening Reforms’ -
fight against corruption - in all domains such as politics, economy, and
society. President Xi especially reckons corruption as the largest
threat against the CPC and appointed Deputy Secretary Yang Xiaodu of the
Central Commission for Discipline Inspection as the first director of the
National Supervisory Commission. Establishing the National Supervisory
Commission, the Chinese government has launched a wide range of anti-corruption
campaign against high-level officials within the CPC, government, PLA, and
state-owned enterprises as well as investigations into illegal economic
activities and tax evasion of major leaders of corporations and celebrities.
While the anti-corruption campaign during Xi’s first term mainly focused on
senior officials within the party, government, and the military, Beijing has
ratcheted up its social control and surveillance in Xi’s second term. The
social rigidity in China has increased as the government imposes tighter
control on the public’s expression of views on the internet and social media.
Meanwhile, the Xi Jinping leadership set forth several key policies to prepare
for the hegemonic competition with the U.S.: reinforcing the officials in
foreign affairs and security, fostering a powerful military, and expanding the
Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). As he reiterated several times earlier,
“In front of the great national interests and the tide of history, any actions
and tricks to split China are doomed to fail. ... The Chinese people and the
Chinese nation share a common belief that it is never allowed and it is
absolutely impossible to separate any inch of territory of our great country
from China!” President Xi clarified ‘the determination to safeguard China’s
core interests.’ Xi’s second term foreign policy will take the same orientation.
Specifically, President Xi Jinping - Vice President Wang Qishan - Director Yang
Jiechi of CPC Office of the Central Leading Group for Foreign Affairs - State
Councillor for Foreign Affairs Wang Yi hierarchy appears to spearhead China’s
foreign policy during Xi’s second term. It has begun to adopt a more aggressive
foreign policy with the slogans such as ‘modern socialist country,’ ‘belt and
road initiative (BRI),’ and ‘a new type of international relations.’ That is,
the foreign policy in Xi’s second term transcends the narrow goal of fostering
an international climate favorable to domestic regime stability and development
and pursues an alteration in regional order that contains China’s vision,
emphasizing Chinese values.
Obviously, for the time being, Beijing is unlikely to challenge the U.S.
hegemonic status in the region; but it will broaden its foreign influence
through stronger diplomatic ties with its neighbors and BRI. President
Xi urged the stronger ‘implementation of the military-civilian integration,
strengthened role of rule of law, deeper reform of system, and further
coordinated innovation in science and technology’ and increased China’s defense
budget to 1.11 trillion yuan ($175 billion) - an 8.1-percent increase. In 2017,
China’s defense expenditure passed the 1 trillion yuan threshold, placing China
as the second in terms of military spending globally - 1.04 trillion yuan in
total. The Chinese military already has a mid-to-long term plan to become the
world-class army that stands victorious in any war beyond a defensive army by
2050, realizing military reform and modernize the equipment by 2035 and develop
capabilities for the all branches and services in the military and
civilian-military integration. China has specified its plan to advance as an
economically prosperous and militarily powerful global power by 2050.
As such, the Chinese leadership
under Xi’s second term explicitly illustrated its will to achieve the interests
proactively and boldly - unlike the Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao era - and to
pursue shift in regional order based on China’s vision and objectives to
fulfill the ‘Chinese dream.’ Beijing has already emphasized China’s widened
position and role as a big power - replacing the old phrase ‘a new type of
major power relations' to ‘a new type of international relations’ and claiming
to build a ‘community with a shared future for humanity.’ China’s great power politics driven by President Xi’s one-man rule
have been well visible in domestic and foreign policy in 2018.
2. ROK-China
Relations in 2018
The Moon Jae-in administration, inaugurated in
May 2017, have made efforts to restore the ROK-China relations for the last
year. In October last year, the foreign ministers of the two countries issued a
joint statement on normalization of bilateral relations and advancement of
strategic cooperative partnership. In December last year, at the ROK-China
summit, the two leaders shared the view to open a better future for the
bilateral ties. The two leaders agreed on four principles regarding the Korean
Peninsula issue: war on the Korean Peninsula can never be tolerated; the
principle of denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula will be firmly
maintained; all issues, including the denuclearization of North Korea, will be
peacefully resolved through dialogue and negotiations; and improvement in
inter-Korean relations will be ultimately helpful in resolving issues involving
the Korean Peninsula. This implied that the Moon administration garnered
Chinese support on the principles of peace, stability, and non-tolerance of war
– the tenets that the administration emphasized. This was a significant
achievement to reduce anti-Korean sentiments within China and obtain national
consensus through the ‘ice-breaking steps’ despite the confrontation
surrounding the THAAD deployment. Hence, should South Korea breach the
‘three-no consultation’ regarding the THAAD agreed with China, the bilateral
relations will likely to aggravate again. Furthermore, amid its intensifying hegemonic competition with the U.S.
recently, China strongly perceives the ROK-U.S. alliance and the deployment of
U.S. strategic assets on South Korean soil as factors directly threatening
China’s core interests. Therefore, the South Korean government should take a
judicious approach and contemplation regarding the deployment of U.S. strategic
assets such as THAAD.
Despite the dilemma and
fluctuations in ROK-China relations, the Korean Peninsula in 2018 has undergone
a great transformation. President Moon Jae-in and Chairman Kim Jong-un had a
successful inter-Korean summit on April 27, a summit that opened a new chapter
in Korean history. The two leaders agreed on invigoration of inter-Korean
cooperation and exchanges in various domains including the complete
denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula to end the hostile relations and usher
in an era of national reconciliation, peace, and prosperity at Panmunjom, the
symbolic venue of division and confrontation for more than the last
half-century. Based on the improved relations affirmed at the inter-Korean
summit, the historic DPRK-U.S. summit was held in Singapore on June 12. It left
a very meaningful outcome of laying the groundwork to build trust and normalize
relations between the two countries which have lingered on mutual animosity for
70 years. Chairman Kim and President Trump had three key interests in mind - complete
denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, the guarantee of regime security for
North Korea, and normalization of bilateral relations - and reached a
comprehensive agreement on these matters. The phrase, “Convinced that the
establishment of new U.S.–DPRK relations will contribute to the peace and
prosperity of the Korean Peninsula and of the world, and recognizing that
mutual confidence building can promote the denuclearization of the Korean
Peninsula” implied such outcome. While the comprehensive agreement on
establishing a permanent peace regime on the Korean Peninsula and achieving
complete denuclearization matters, the most crucial achievement in the summit
was the two leaders found a common ground on confidence to resolve the complex
and difficult resolution to the denuclearization issue through the mutual
understanding on the need to build trust and improve relations between the two
countries.
On
the DPRK-U.S. joint statement, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi officially
hailed the summit, “the two countries’ highest leaders can sit together and
have equal talks has an important and positive meaning and is creating a new
history.” After the inter-Korean and DPRK-U.S. summits, the Chinese government
argued that the only solution to the North Korean nuclear and missile issue is
to relieve North Korea’s security concerns through continuous dialogue and
communication. With this as the basis, Beijing stressed the importance of the
denuclearization of the peninsula and the establishment of a peace regime. After
the series of summits, it has proposed Chinese-style common security approach,
as a counter to a zero-sum approach overlooking others’ security concerns, to
alleviate North Korea’s security fear as the resolution to the North Korean
nuclear issue.
Currently, China has not spared
diplomatic efforts to pursue its version of the resolution to the Korean
Peninsula issue, the ‘suspension-for-suspension’ and ‘dual track’ approach
since the inter-Korean and DPRK-U.S. summit. Urging the relevant parties to improve
bilateral relations to speed up the solution to the North Korean nuclear issue,
Beijing has begun to prepare coordinated measures with its neighbors. Chinese experts
on Korea already assert that South Koreans should extricate from the old
Cold-War mindset and North Koreans should prioritize economic development and
improvement of people’s living conditions above all else. To this end, it
demands closer coordination and cooperation with South Korea, stressing the
need to ease sanctions against and engage in economic cooperation with North
Korea. Therefore, when the Panmunjom declaration turns into implementation
phase earnestly along with the progress in the North Korean nuclear issue, the
inter-Korean economic cooperation and exchanges set in motion will drive
ROK-DPRK-China-Russia quadrilateral economic cooperation forward. The
inter-Korean railroad connection project will have synergic effects on economic
cooperation and co-prosperity not only on the Korean Peninsula but also
Northeast Asia when it extends to the trans-China railroad (TCR) and
trans-Siberian railroad (TSR) and is associated with the BRI.
Meanwhile, China, through close
consultation with South Korea, hopes to resume the suspended six-party talks to
foster favorable and smooth conditions for follow-up negotiations depending on
the denuclearization process after the inter-Korean and DPRK-U.S. summits. For
a smooth resolution to the North Korean nuclear issue, China believes that the
six-party talks should resume with the help of ROK-China close coordination
because of the intricate issues such as relieving North Korea’s security
concerns, removing sanctions against North Korea, assisting North Korean
economy, and establishing a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula. Hence, South Korea needs to take an audacious
policy shift of pursuing multilateral dialogue channels such as
ROK-DPRK-U.S.-China quadrilateral talks or the conventional six-party talks for
substantial cooperation with China on North Korea including the North Korean
nuclear issue. Particularly, Seoul should approach China’s
‘suspension-for-suspension’ and ‘dual track’ solution seriously and endeavor
bold policy attempts to prepare an inflective point in inter-Korean and
DPRK-U.S. relations and to promote inter-Korean, DPRK-U.S., and DPRK-China
relations all for the peace and stability of the Korean Peninsula.
Until now, South Korea has
engaged in dichotomous diplomacy, inclined toward China in the economic affairs
and inclined toward the U.S. in the security affairs. However, the THAAD
deployment issue brought Seoul to understand the Chinese influence and that
this diplomacy mechanism of shuttling between the U.S. and China is no longer
viable. The 25 years of bilateral economic cooperation since the establishment
of diplomatic ties between South Korea and China have deepened in an
unprecedented pace and China’s international influence has rapidly grown;
still, it is worthy to contemplate that South Korea’s strategy regarding China
has largely remained unaltered. Particularly, the previous government’s China
policy overlooked the national interest-based realities underpinning
international politics and exposed diplomatic incompetence, only focused on
others’ goodwill and understanding. This should be the lesson learned for the
current government. Moreover, the
intensifying and emerging U.S.-China hegemonic rivalry will coerce South Korea
to face strategic dilemmas - requiring Seoul to renew its China policy
completely.
For instance, Seoul could have
potential scenarios on U.S.-China and ROK-China confrontation drawn out and
thoroughly prepare response plans (even plans B and C) and measures for each
scenario. To this end, South Korea should have a principled understanding on
what South Korea can cooperate with China and what it cannot concede to China
for the sustainable development of bilateral relations so as to prepare for the
strategy regarding China. As such, despite the expansive development of
bilateral relations, the ROK-China relations relied heavily on the rapport
built between the leaders and have now encountered a predicament due to the
perception gap in vision and Korean Peninsula affairs. Thus, Seoul and Beijing
should build confidence in diplomacy and security to find common ground on the
denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, ‘end-of-war’ declaration, and the
peace treaty; and strive to expand cooperation in economy, society, and culture
based on mutual interests.
3.
Outlook on the Korean Peninsula and China in 2019
The Xi Jinping’s second-term leadership actively endeavors
to transmute China from a ‘big power (daiguo)’
to a ‘strong power (qiangguo)’. It is Beijing’s expression of confidence in astonishing
economic growth through the four decades of successful Chinese-style opening
and reforms and in its influence and voice that rivals with the U.S. at the
international stage. Particularly, President Xi proclaimed the ‘Chinese dream’
and ‘great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation’ at the 19th National Party
Congress with firm confidence and mid-to-long term goal to become a regional
hegemon dominant in all realms, not only economy, by 2050 - inevitably
signaling a shift in regional order.
Furthermore, China, with
President Xi taking office for the second term, vowed that it will extricate from adapting to the existing U.S-created
liberal international order and establish a Sinocentric regional order,
establishing new norms and institutions. Therefore, China maps out an
initiative to change the global governance and neutralize the U.S. Indo-Pacific
strategy and U.S.-Japan (South Korea) alliance by mobilizing all its means
(political, economic, military) and pursuing the BRI and great power strategy
to achieve the goal of building a modern socialist power with Chinese
characteristics by 2050. Foreign policy and security experts in China already
opine that if the U.S. does not take Chinese concepts - a new type of major
power relations, a new type of international relations, community with a shared
future for humanity - sincerely and attempts to hasten the Indo-Pacific strategy
and formulate the NATO-type alliance in the Asia-Pacific as a containment
against China, the U.S.-China strategic confrontation and collision will be
more likely to be intensified.
Meanwhile, domestically, the Xi
leadership proposes a vision of strong power of Chinese nationalism based on
the Chinese socialist ideology and actively pursues a state-led and
market-oriented economic reform (state capitalism) through strong control of
the society (neo-authoritarianism). That is, it presented a blueprint on ‘neo-authoritarian
socialist model with Chinese characteristics’ that responds to the U.S.
neoliberalist model. The Xi leadership’s blueprint is epitomized as a ‘Thought
on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era.' According to Xi’s
remarks, China endeavors to: enhance material foundation through the BRI, an
impetus for capital accumulation; beef up its military strength to pursue the
‘dream of a powerful military’ that guarantees national territorial integrity
and sovereignty; and to disseminate Chinese values and institutions globally
through the community with a shared future for humanity, all based on the Xi
Jinping Thought. Also, based on Xi Jinping Thought, the Chinese government
strives to achieve the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, rectifying the
social contradictions such as corruption, the wealth-poor gap, and
environmental degradation that unraveled after the reform and openings and
strengthen its global standing in accordance with its growing national power.3)
As it already illustrated the
firm determination to establish a new Sinocentric international order, the
second Xi leadership will maintain the Chinese solution to the North Korean
nuclear issue - ‘suspension-for-suspension’ and ‘dual track’ approach. Mindful
of this fact, the U.S. pressure on North Korea and China’s
‘dual track’ approach may cast a dilemma for South Korea despite the great
transformation of the Korean Peninsula. The Chinese leadership in Xi’s
second term has growing concerns of U.S. forces in Korea, ROK-U.S. alliance,
and U.S. deployment of strategic assets surrounding the Korean Peninsula.
Therefore, the U.S. forces in Korea and the ROK-U.S. alliance transition to a
regional alliance as strategic flexibility after the ‘end-of-war’ declaration
and the peace treaty regarding the Korean Peninsula will incite challenges and
confrontation between South Korea and China.
Already, Beijing has proclaimed
the strategic initiative and firm resolve to establish a new Sinocentric
regional order by 2050. The recalibration of ROK-U.S. alliance and U.S. forces
in Korea will likely serve as seeds of confrontation between South Korea and
China. China will actively involve in the Korean Peninsula affairs and exert
its influence, linking the ‘end-of-war’ declaration and the peace treaty to its
mid-to-long term foreign strategy and U.S.-China dynamics. The Xi leadership in
the second term’s perception on the Korean Peninsula, intermingled among past,
present, and future, has maintained that it cannot abandon the strategic and
geopolitical value of the peninsula in this unstable transitional phase in the
region caused by the deepening U.S.-China hegemonic rivalry. In other words, China will readjust its alliance with
North Korea, its geopolitical asset, and calibrate its relations with South
Korea with the consideration of its policy orientation and strategy to maximize
its interests.
Meanwhile, China, to avoid the
possibility of itself being marginalized in the resolution process for the
denuclearization, will resolutely accentuate the resumption of six-party talks
and the institutionalization of a multilateral security architecture in
Northeast Asia so that it could exert its influence in Korean Peninsula
affairs. This directly links with the issue of whether China could maintain or
even expand its influence the establishment of a peace regime on the Korean
Peninsula - Beijing already reiterated that it is a direct stakeholder in the
‘end-of-war’ declaration and the peace treaty after the inter-Korean, DPRK-U.S.,
and DPRK-China summits. Beijing insistently understands that the discourse on
‘end-of-war’ declaration and peace treaty will lead to a structural shift in
the regional geopolitics. Hence, it argues that the four parties, the two
Koreas, the U.S., and China, or six parties, four plus Japan and Russia, should
discuss and reach a compromise together the security issues surrounding the
Korean Peninsula such as the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, the
sanctions against North Korea, the status of United Nations Command, and U.S.
forces in Korea, etc. Obviously, the South Korean government asserts that the
status of U.S. forces in Korea is of South Korea’s sovereign matter, China
considers U.S. forces in Korea and its strategic assets as its security threat.
It requires frank bilateral communication and discussion to attenuate the
concerns.
Due to intensifying U.S.-China hegemonic competition, the Xi
Jinping leadership will react more sensitively to the core interests, and
accordingly, South Korea will probably face a security dilemma. Hence, it is
necessary to formulate an autonomous foreign strategy based on objective
analysis of the political environment. For instance, if the
inter-Korean relations and DPRK-U.S. relations drastically improve by the sustenance
of momentum created by the third inter-Korean summit and the ensuing Pyongyang
Joint Declaration and the ROK-DPRK-China trilateral economic cooperation begins
in earnest as the Moon administration’s New Northern Policy collaborates with
China’s BRI, this will possibly lead to the emergence of new economic
prosperity and an amicable climate for the Korean Peninsula. Consequently, the focus of South Korea-China
cooperation should lie on denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and the
establishment of a peace regime; and it is quintessential for South Korea to
lead the efforts to build a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula, encouraging
the relations with China to have a positive effect on inter-Korean, DPRK-U.S.,
ROK-U.S., and U.S.-China relations. Subsequently, it is vital to seek
sustainable peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, and ultimately
establish a multilateral peace and security regime in Northeast Asia, thus
opening a new prosperous age on the Korean Peninsula driven by geoeconomics, not
geopolitics.
--------------------------------------------
1) On March 17 after the
constitutional amendment, the lianghui reelected Xi Jinping unanimously as the
president and the chairman of Central Military Commission, and his affiliates
Wang Qishan and Li Zhanshu were elected as vice president and chairman of the
National People’s Congress respectively. This will strengthen Xi Jinping’s
one-man rule in the Chinese government.
2) The Chinese leadership gave
birth to the ‘78’ system’ linking with the capitalist world, once its archenemy
to destroy and seeking a bold transition to a revival of China based on
‘keeping a low profile. The previous ‘56’ system’ aimed at completion of total
orientation toward socialism to construct a new China. In turn, the 78’ system
initiated a neomercantilist national development pursuing a prosperous state
combining socialism with the market economy. This gave birth to the socialist
market economy with Chinese characteristics.
3) The previous Deng Xiaoping’s
thought on early stages of capitalism recognized ‘contradiction between
material demand and underdeveloped production’ as a major social contradiction;
the ‘Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New
Era’ views ‘the contradiction between people’s demand and imbalance for a
better life and insufficient development’ as the main social ill to resolve to
achieve the Chinese dream.
This article is based on the
author’s personal opinion and does not reflect the views of the Sejong
Institute.
*Translator’s
note: This is an unofficial translation of the original paper which was written
in Korean. All references should be made to the original paper.
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