Current Issues and Policies No.
2018-21
December 18, 2018
Dr. Yoon Ik Joong
Professor, Hallym
University of Graduate Studies,
youn@hallym.ac.kr
Summary
In Russian politics
in 2018, President Putin was sworn in for the fourth time and new policies such
as pension reforms were introduced but faced a public backlash. In foreign
policy, Russia continued to wrestle with the confrontation with the West such as
the crisis in Ukraine, Syrian civil war, and the spy incidents in the UK and
the West maintained economic sanctions against Russia. Nevertheless, it has
countered the U.S. unilateralism with China, developing bilateral relations to
a historic high in 2018. Meanwhile, although the ROK-Russia relations have made
considerable progress including the summit and vibrant exchanges across various
domains in 2018, the dramatic improvement of inter-Korean relations, DPRK-U.S.
summit, and the Northeast Asia defined by continuing U.S.-China standoff stole
the headlines. The two countries laid the foundations for ROK-DPRK-Russia
trilateral cooperation among others, but these details failed to come into
fruition. Should the Moon Jae-in administration’s New Northern Policy is unable
to make substantial and tangible progress in so-called ‘nine bridges’ issue of
the Russian Far East development in 2019, the policy drive will deteriorate.
The year 2019 will be the testing ground for the Moon administration’s New
Northern Policy and the development of ROK-Russia relations.
1.
Russian Domestic Politics in 2018
Presidential
Elections, Pension Reform, and Anti-Government Protests
On March 18, 2018,
Vladimir Putin won the presidential elections and inaugurated as the 7th president
of the Russian Federation on May 7 - commencing his fourth term in power
(2018-2024). He became the longest-serving leader of Russia since General
Secretary Josef Stalin during the Soviet Union era. The elections in March
grasped the attention from the domestic and international media as several
issues intermingled: allegations of Russia’s interference at the U.S. elections
(so-called Russia-gate); conflict in Ukraine; economic instability caused by
western sanctions and fall in oil prices; and the candidates from the
opposition like Pavel Grudinin who put up a good fight. Winning with the
largest proportion of votes (77 percent), President Putin re-appointed Dmitri
Medvedev as the prime minister and set education and public health among others
as the primary tasks for the new government. At the same time, Putin ordered
the administration to surge as the world’s fifth largest economy and to reduce the
level of poverty by half within the six years - during Putin’s fourth term.
However, before Putin’s inauguration, the Russian society was unstable due to
nationwide anti-government protests that condemned the Putin regime’s
authoritarian policies and suppression of democracy. Around 1,300 people
who attended the anti-government protests against Putin’s policies were
detained by the Russian government. Besides, the Putin government introduced
pension reforms which instigated public outrage and decline in approval
ratings. The essence of the pension reforms was to raise the pension age by 5
years - from 60 to 65 for men and 55 to 60 for women. It is assessed as the
most shocking pension reform in modern Russian history. The plan passed the
State Duma in September.
Continuance
of the Conflict with Ukraine
The Russo-Ukrainian
relations, which deteriorated since Russia’s annexation of Crimea in March
2014, have continued the confrontational state by the Ukrainian Orthodox
Church’s independence from the Russian Orthodox Church, the Russian seizure of
three Ukrainian vessels, and others. At the synod in
October, the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople approved the decree,
recognizing the independence of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church despite the
fierce opposition from the Russian Orthodox Church. The Constantinople
patriarchy’s decision enabled the Ukrainian Orthodox Church to enjoy autonomy
vis-a-vis the Russian Orthodox Church. Accordingly, the Ukrainian Orthodox
Church under the Moscow Patriarchate severed its relations with the
Constantinople patriarchy. Meanwhile, the Russian Orthodox Church declared the
schism with the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople for the reason that
the latter violated the former’s autocephaly. And the naval clash in November
heightened tensions between Moscow and Kyiv, worsening the already-strained
relations. The Russian coast guard violently captured three Ukrainian naval
vessels (two gunboats and a tugboat) which were passing through the Kerch
Strait toward Azov Sea late November. Although the bilateral treaty signed in
2003 stipulates the Kerch Strait and Azov Sea as a shared territory with free
access, Russia has claimed the dominance over the passage of Kerch Strait since
2015 after the annexation of Crimea.
Continuance
of War in Syria and U.S.-Russia Confrontation
As it is well known,
the U.S.-led international forces have named Syrian President Bashar al-Assad
as a dictator and confronted the Russians in Syria by supporting the rebel
forces. Syria is the sole Arab state that has maintained friendly relations
with Soviet Union/Russia since the late 1950s. When pro-Soviet Nasser of Egypt
died and his successor Anwar Sadat shifted to pro-American orientation in 1970,
Syria’s importance for the Soviet Union in the Middle East has elevated. The
cordial relations have continued after the collapse of the Soviet Union. In the
post-Cold War era, Syria is a geopolitical foothold for Russia to exert its
influence in the Middle East and the Mediterranean. Putin’s Russia obstructed
the opposition forces or Sunni forces winning the war in Syria to boast to the
West that cooperation with Russia is essential in issues such as the Syrian
civil war, the spread of armed factions in the Middle East, and the refugee
influx to Europe. Besides, Russia has aggressively involved in the resolution
to the civil war in Syria and piled up pressure against the West to acquiesce
its annexation of Crimea and lift economic sanctions against Russia. Russia’s
foreign policy and security strategy since 2000, when President Putin was sworn
in, highlights that the improvement of relationship and cooperation with the
countries that were under Soviet sphere of influence along with those
constituted the Soviet Union (referred as the Near Abroad) are key countries to
achieve Russia’s core interests. Consequently, because losing influence in
Syria will engender decline in Russia’s position in the Middle East, Russia
carried on its confrontation and struggle against the U.S. throughout 2018. For
example, the alleged chemical attack in the Syrian opposition area last
April staged acute tensions between Russia and the West again. Both sides
exchanged diatribes against each other and expanded the battlefront; thus, the
tendencies of a new Cold War incessantly deteriorated the U.S.-Russia
relations.
Continuance
of Enhanced Cooperation with China
In 2018, Russia and
China affirmed that they have been the best strategic partner in history,
voicing their stances in unison regarding major international issues such as
the sanctions against North Korea, the war in Syria, and the crisis in Ukraine.
The highlight of this developed partnership was when the two countries
started the largest joint military exercises during President Xi Jinping’s
visit last September to participate in the Eastern Economic Forum in
Vladivostok. With Chinese participation, Russia’s ‘Vostok-2018’ drills
conducted the joint operation plans beginning in Russia’s eastern region
including Siberia. This drill, the largest one in scale since 1981, involved
some 300,000 Russian soldiers, more than 1,000 aerial vehicles (drones,
helicopters included), 80 warships, and 36,000 military vehicles. The drill
took the form of strategic joint exercise with China’s participation - 3,200
soldiers, 1,000 armaments and equipment, and 30 fighter jets and helicopters.
The two countries manifested the stronger-than-ever bilateral relations in the
military domain such as arms purchases and joint exercises, not to mention the
economy.
2.
South Korea-Russia Relations in 2018
Even though the two
countries made meaningful progress in bilateral relations including the summit
and exchanges in various fields, these accomplishments failed to steal the show
under the U.S.-China confrontational structure in Northeast Asia, the dramatic
inter-Korean rapprochement, and the DPRK-U.S. summit. Furthermore, the two
countries failed to cement a tangible result in the “nine bridges” of
cooperation in Russian Far East development. Instead, the two countries
gathered international attention in terms of culture and sports as they
commonly hosted major sporting events -
the 23rd Winter Olympics in PyeongChang and the 21st World Cup in Russia.
Russian
View of the Korean Peninsula Affairs
The Putin
administration, beginning its fourth term, actively espoused Moon Jae-in
administration’s policies and principles which aims at denuclearization of the
Korean Peninsula and the establishment of a peace mechanism in Northeast Asia
for substantial and tangible achievements in New East Policy for the
development of the Russian Far East. For example, the Russian government and
the Duma welcomed the inter-Korean summit in April itself and the resultant Panmunjom
Declaration and expressed that Russia will jointly strive for denuclearization
of the Korean Peninsula and the settlement of a peace regime. Also, the Russian
political community embraced the Pyongyang Joint Declaration in September as a
significant achievement and urged the international community to support the
implementation of the declaration. In addition, the Kremlin continually
stressed the previous stance that the six-party talks’ should resume in the
future process of establishing a multilateral peace and security regime in
Northeast Asia based on the peace mechanism on the Korean Peninsula. In more
specific terms, the Russian government re-proclaimed that it has a phased
initiative to discuss the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and regional
security architecture in Northeast Asia through multilateral framework -
insisting the resumption of the six-party talks. In fact, Russia, along with
China, has proposed a ‘roadmap’ that specified the peaceful, phased resolution
to the Korean Peninsula issue and consistently urged the implementation of this
roadmap since July 2017. The Russo-Chinese roadmap lays out the resolution
in three phases: first, North Korea announces that it suspends additional
nuclear and ballistic missile tests and complies with non-proliferation
principles regarding nuclear weapons and missiles and South Korea and the U.S.
replies with downsizing its joint military exercises; second, the two Koreas
normalize bilateral relations by direct talks; third, the multilateral framework
resumes to discuss denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and the regional
security architecture in Northeast Asia. Additionally, Russia continued to
raise the necessity to ease and lift international sanctions against North
Korea.
President
Moon Jae-in’s State Visit to Russia and ROK-Russia Summit
From June 21 to 23,
President Moon Jae-in sought to develop cooperation with Russia through his
second visit to Russia and the summit. His state visit to Russia - first
official visit to Russia by a South Korean president since President Kim
Dae-jung visited in 1999 - overlapped with the World Cup period and proceeded
after the two inter-Korean summits and the DPRK-U.S. summit. Hence, this
visit connoted a special meaning as it was the first summit diplomacy after the
two inter-Korean summits and the June 12 DPRK-U.S. summit. While congratulating
Russia for hosting a global event and directly explaining the results of the
inter-Korean summits and North Korea-U.S. summit to President Putin, President Moon
attempted to draw Russian support for South Korea’s position on North Korea’s
denuclearization and the establishment of a Korean peace regime, directly
appealing to President Putin. Furthermore, President Moon addressed at the
Russian State Duma - for the first time as South Korean president. This is
viewed as his emphasis on the role of the legislative branches for bilateral
cooperation. At the ROK-Russia summit, Presidents Moon and Putin adopted
the joint declaration containing 32 clauses while agreeing to continue joint
efforts to achieve complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and secure
perennial peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia as a
whole. The joint declaration reflected the thawing ambiance surrounding the Korean
Peninsula following the successes of inter-Korean and DPRK-U.S. summits.
Ultimately, President Moon endeavored to entice Russia’s active will for
cooperation, necessary in the denuclearization process, as he affirmed the
common goal of peace and prosperity on the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia
with President Putin. In addition, President Moon highlighted the
ROK-DPRK-Russia trilateral cooperation projects to turn the summit as an
opportunity to kickstart the ‘New Northern Policy.’ Therefore, the summit laid
the foundation for trilateral cooperation. The two countries discussed
substantial measures in three key agendas, expanding future growth engine,
developing the Eurasian region and the Russian Far East, and enhancing public
welfare, to have synergic effects on bilateral relations at the expanded
meeting.
Invigoration
of South Korea-Russia Inter-Regional Cooperation
Last April, the
Gyeonggi province expanded economic exchanges with Primorsky Krai of Russia,
signing exchange and cooperation agreement with regional enterprises and
organization. Gyeonggi province officials also signed a memorandum of
understanding regarding investment and cooperation with organizations such as
the Vladivostok Free Zone
residents supporting the representative companies of the Russian Far East. And Gyeonggi province
also signed a memorandum on cooperation with Rostec State Corporation in
Khabarovsk. And in November, the regional government entities of Korea and
Russia held ‘South Korea-Russia Inter-Regional Forum’ in Pohang. With the
participation of representatives of 17 regional entities of Korea and 9 regions
of Russia, businesspeople, and experts, the forum discussed bilateral
cooperation in various domains including but not limited to the economy, trade,
science, logistics, and energy. At the Pohang City Hall, the regional
government meeting was held to discuss expanded cooperation between the
representatives of the regional governments from the two countries. The
co-chairs of the forum, governors of North Gyeongsang province and Primorsky
Krai, announced the ‘Pohang declaration’ after the meeting. Invigoration of
inter-regional cooperation is evaluated as a means to produce concrete outcomes
of bilateral cooperation.
3.
ROK-Russia Relations Outlook in 2019
Russian
President Vladimir Putin’s South Korea Visit
Last June, President
Moon, during his visit to Russia, invited President Putin to visit South Korea,
and President Putin accepted the invitation. President Putin’s visit will be
determined after considering various factors, the progress in inter-Korean
relations, the result of the second DPRK-U.S. summit, Chairman Kim Jong-un’s
visit to Russia, and President Putin’s visit to North Korea, among others. The
development of the Russian Far East including the ROK-DPRK-Russia trilateral
cooperation will also affect President Putin’s schedule to visit South Korea.
Thus, as President Putin will visit South Korea, Russia will play a larger role
in the Korean Peninsula and regional affairs in 2019. As a matter of fact,
noting the concerns of ‘Russia passing (Russia being neglected)’ in Korean
Peninsula affairs in 2018, President Putin is likely to take a more active step
when the larger picture on the Korean Peninsula (denuclearization and regime
guarantee for North Korea) is set and the specific plans are drawn out -
asserting the six-party framework in 2019. Meanwhile, Moscow is expected to
strongly hope President Moon to attend the fifth Eastern Economic Forum held in
Vladivostok in September. For the Moon administration’s New Northern Policy and
Putin government’s New East Policy, the South Korean President should seize the
opportunity of the forum in Vladivostok.
Need
for Tangible Results and Execution in Pending Issues between the Two Countries
To achieve the
blueprint of ROK-Russia cooperation, the two countries should bear fruits in
‘nine bridges’ issues as soon as possible, while it is also vital to find
strategic commonalities between South Korea’s New Northern Policy and Russia’s
New East Policy. Should the two countries are unable to make concrete outcomes,
the New Northern Policy will lose the impetus. For a forward-looking and
constructive development of ROK-Russia partnership, it is imperative for the
Moon administration to carry out detailed plans and achieve tangible
outcomes regarding the bilateral cooperation projects in the Russian Far East,
while the policy vision of New Northern Policy is also important. The two
countries should not satisfy by discussing ‘potential’ and ‘possibility’ of
cooperation. Both governments need concrete ‘achievements.’ The year 2019 will
be a decisive year in Moon administration’s New Northern Policy and the
development of bilateral relations.
ROK-Russia
Economic Cooperation
The success of
reaching the goal set at the ROK-Russia summit in June 2018 - bilateral trade
volume of $30 billion and people-to-people exchange 1 million by the 30th year
of bilateral relations (2020) - hinges on the interactions in 2019. Although
the bilateral trade volume recovered to $19 billion, a 40-percent increase from
2016, the two countries did not harness the relation’s potential sufficiently.
While the bilateral trade volume is expected to increase in 2019, the progress
in ROK-Russia FTA (in services and investment) negotiations will be a crucial
factor in the future development of bilateral economic relations. The two
countries began the FTA discussions in 2007, but the negotiations suspended
after two years in 2009 by Moscow’s request. Meanwhile, the role and
competitiveness of head of the Presidential Committee on Northern Economic
Cooperation and former Goldman Sachs economist Kwon Goo-hoon, newly appointed
last November, will heavily affect the bilateral economic cooperation.
Additionally, if the West eases economic sanctions against Russia and North
Korea, the bilateral and ROK-DPRK-Russia trilateral economic cooperation will
gain boost. If not, the bilateral and trilateral economic cooperation will not
yield substantial results.
This article is based on the
author’s personal opinion and does not reflect the views of the Sejong
Institute.
*Translator’s
note: This is an unofficial translation of the original paper which was written
in Korean. All references should be made to the original paper.
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