Inter-Korean Relations, Denuclearization, and DPRK-U.S. Talks
No.
2019-01 (January 2, 2019)
Dr. Cheong
Seong-Chang
Vice
President for Research Planning, the Sejong Institute
softpower@sejong.org
North
Korea’s Chairman Kim Jong-un of Workers’ Party of Korea announced the ritual New
Year’s address with an unprecedented tone and format – speaking in a stable and
restrained tone at a Western-style ornamented office with photos of Kim Il-sung
and Kim Jong-il hanging on the wall. This breaks from the precedent cases where
he uttered the remarks behind a podium with a fairly scathing and rough tone.
Chairman
Kim seems to have renewed his style of announcing the New Year’s address this
year to boast symbolically that he is poised to take a novel path through the
three inter-Korean summits and the first-ever DPRK-U.S. summit.
In his
address, the North Korean leader allocated a considerable amount of the speech on
economy and relations with South Korea and the U.S. It reflects his biggest
interest last year and this year and implies his resolve to engage actively in
economic development and relations with South Korea and the U.S.
Particularly
concerning the inter-Korean relations, Kim Jong-un emphasized “the firm resolve
and will to usher in an era of peace in which war exists no longer on the
Korean peninsula” and clearly pronounced his opposition to the ROK-U.S. joint
military exercise and the deployment of U.S. strategic assets on the peninsula.
Nonetheless, this statement will not act against the development of
inter-Korean relations since Seoul and Washington will refrain from taking
military action against North Korea.
On the
establishment of a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula, Kim pointed out, “It
is also needed to actively promote multi-party negotiations for replacing the
current ceasefire on the Korean peninsula with a peace mechanism in close
contact with the signatories to the armistice agreement so as to lay a lasting
and substantial peace-keeping foundation.” As “multi-party negotiations”
obviously involves the participation of China, a signatory to the armistice
agreement, Beijing will welcome the statement. Therefore, when North Korea’s
denuclearization makes significant progress, the ROK-DPRK-U.S.-China
quadrilateral talks will be held to discuss the transition from the architecture
defined by the armistice agreement to a peace regime.
Regarding
the inter-Korean economic cooperation, the young leader is likely to urge the
resumption of Mount Kumgang tourism and reoperation of Kaesong Industrial
Complex, as he elucidated, “we are willing to resume the Kaesong Industrial
Park and Mt Kumgang tourism without any precondition and in return for
nothing.” Hence, the South Korean government needs to ask the U.S. and UN
Security Council to ease sanctions on North Korea to reoperate the Kaesong
Industrial Complex and resume Mt Kumgang tourism should North Korea permanently
decommission nuclear-related sites in Yongbyon or take a substantial measure
for denuclearization.
In
relation to the Korean unification issue, Chairman Kim Jong-un said the two
Koreas should “actively try to find a peaceful reunification plan based on
nationwide agreement and direct sincere efforts to this end.” Consequently, the
North Korean authorities will probably take up measures that lead to
unification as a key issue in inter-Korean dialogue - in line with the
recognition of the term articulated in the June 15 Inter-Korean Joint Declaration
in 2000, “there is a common element in the South's concept of a confederation
and the North's formula for a loose form of federation.” However, since some in
South Korea have a deep misunderstanding of North Korea’s ‘loose form of
confederation,’ it may instigate strife within the South Korean society. Thus,
the South Korean government should strive to ensure that the public has an accurate
understanding of the outline and details of the June 15 Inter-Korean Joint
Declaration.
The North
Korean supreme leader claimed, “we declared at home and abroad that we would
neither make [emphasized added by
the author] and test nuclear weapons any longer nor use and proliferate them,
and we have taken various practical measures” regarding North Korea’s denuclearization.
The assertion that North Korea halted production of nuclear weapons, beyond
suspending nuclear tests is a fully telling statement. If this assertion proves
to be true, South Korea and the international community will be able to fend
off the arguments made by some American pundits – that North Korea continues to
produce nuclear weapons and will possess around 100 nuclear warheads by 2020. This
will also have a positive effect on North Korea-U.S. negotiations.
While reaffirming
his firm determination for the establishment of a peace regime on the Korean
Peninsula and the ‘complete denuclearization,’ Chairman Kim expressed his will
to improve the relations with the U.S. – “I want to believe that our relations
with the United States will bear good fruit this year, as inter-Korean
relations have greeted a great turn, by the efforts of the two sides.” And he
added, “I am ready to meet the US president again anytime, and will make
efforts to obtain without fail results which can be welcomed by the
international community,” having a welcoming attitude on the second DPRK-U.S.
summit.
In the
meantime, he also alluded, “we may be compelled to find a new way” when the
U.S. miscalculates the North Koreans’ patience, enforces North Korea to
concede, and adheres to sanctions and pressure. In the worst case scenario,
North Korea may return to the byungjin line of simultaneous economic and
nuclear development. This could be construed as North Korea’s internal
discontent on the U.S. long silence, despite the term “The North expressed its
willingness to continue to take additional measures, such as the permanent
dismantlement of the nuclear facilities in Yongbyon, as the United States takes
corresponding measures in accordance with the spirit of the June 12 US-DPRK Joint
Statement” included at the Pyongyang Joint Declaration last September.
Because
Kim’s New Year’s address stresses the dialogue and fair negotiations with the
U.S., the possibility of North Korea redirecting to the old byungjin line is
very low. Nevertheless, if the U.S. fails to propose an adequate response to
North Korea’s offer of its first crucial step toward denuclearization, the
‘permanent closure of Yongbyon nuclear facilities,’ the tedious and bridled
gridlock between North Korea and the U.S. will be prolonged. Pyongyang will
also echo warning messages that hint at the possibility of North Korea
reversing its course to the byungjin line.
Consequently,
the South Korean government should reach an agreement early with the U.S.
administration on what to present vis-à-vis North Korea’s suggestion of
‘permanent closure of Yongbyon nuclear facilities,’ through bilateral strategic
dialogue and coordination. And on the international community’s ‘corresponding
measure’ to the shutdown of Yongbyon nuclear sites, South Korea should make
sure that its interests are maximally included – the reoperation of Kaesong
Industrial Complex, resumption of Mt. Kumgang tourism, and the construction to
connect railroads and roads between the two Koreas as both Koreas hope for. It
is desirable to discuss also the initiation of ‘quadrilateral talks’ for the
transition from the state of a ceasefire to a peace regime.
It may be
irrational to demand North Korea of making more crucial concessions when North
Korea already put forth the card of ‘permanent shut down of the nuclear
facilities in Yongbyon’ at the inter-Korean summit last September. At this
juncture, it is rather more significant for South Korea and the U.S. to prepare
and present the option of ‘corresponding measure’ than pursuing Kim Jong-un’s
visit to Seoul or the second DPRK-U.S. summit. Once South Korea and the U.S.
markedly respond to North Korea’s measure to ‘permanently close the nuclear
facilities in Yongbyon’ Kim Jong-un’s visit to Seoul and the second DPRK-U.S.
summit will be more swift and smooth. This may also create a positive momentum
to demand more from North Korea – possibly a second and even third phase in the
denuclearization process.
※ Translator’s
note: This is a summarized unofficial translation of the original paper which
was written in Korean. All references should be made to the original paper.
※ This article is written
based on the author’s personal opinions and does not reflect the views of the
Sejong Institute.
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