(March 2022 No14) Strengthened Japan-U.S. Alliance and Japan's Security Capabilities: Focusing on the Discussion of Possessing "Enemy Base Attack Capabilities"

Date 2022-03-03 View 933

 

 

Strengthened Japan-U.S. Alliance and Japan's Security Capabilities: Focusing on the Discussion of Possessing "Enemy Base Attack Capabilities" 

Lee Myon Woo

(mwlee@sejong.org)
Vice  President  of  Outreach,
the  Sejong  Institute​

 

English Abstract

 

The change in Japan's foreign and security policy dates back to the collapse of the Cold War. The Gulf War, which broke out at the time of the Cold War's collapse, made Japan feel the need to strengthen its security capabilities, and since then, it has become possible to send Self-Defense Forces overseas along with discussions on nationalization. The increase in threats from China and North Korea in the mid-1990s also influenced Japan’s vicinity emergency law, military deployment, and development. If the key to this gradual change was the introduction of security legislation in 2015, the recent revision of the three new security-related documents and the ability to attack enemy bases will be the withdrawal or end of the existing policy of defense and the beginning of a new policy.

Prime Minister Kishida is actively strengthening Japan’s security capabilities, including the ability to attack enemy bases. For example, in his first speech since his inauguration, in October 2021, he said that “we will protect the lives and livelihoods of the Japanese people against such issues as economic security, new domains such as space and cyberspace, remarkable improvements in missile technology, and furthermore, defense of our remote islands. In order to do so, we will realistically examine all options, including possessing what is called “enemy base attack capability,” without excluding any possibilities, and, with a sense of speed, fundamentally reinforce our defense capabilities” and propose a new national security strategy, defense outline, and mid-term defense capability improvement plan, so-called three security-related documents, within a year. Since then, the security policy has been changing steadily. Prime Minister Kishida’s enthusiasm is attributable to his approval rating of 60 percent since his inauguration and his shared awareness of the need to strengthen the U.S.-Japan alliance and Japan’s security capabilities amid the growing threat from China and North Korea.

As much again, the U.S.-China conflict and the U.S.-North Korea conflict in Northeast Asia are creating a new situation. Japan's security policy alone has changed a lot, and the anti-Japanese sentiment is expected to intensify with more criticisms in South Korea. However, given the changing situation in Northeast Asia, Japan's strengthening of its security capabilities is in line with the trend. If South Korea unconditionally criticizes Japan's change due to its perception of threats, it will not benefit but raise doubts instead. If South Korea is to pay attention to changes in China and North Korea, it must pay closer attention to those of Japan and make more active efforts to negotiate with Japan. After all, it is still Japan that can possibly dialogize, negotiate, and share.