U.S. expectations and concerns about the new South Korean government
Woo Jung Yeop
Research Fellow,
The Sejong Institute
(woo@sejong.org)
A month has passed since the inauguration of the Yoon Seok-yeol administration. Compared to the past, discussions between the governments of the United States and Republic of Korea seem to be proceeding at a rapid pace. On the 11th day of President Yoon Seok-yeol's inauguration, President Joe Biden visited the Republic of Korea for the ROK-US summit. On June 11th, the defense ministers of South Korea, the U.S., and Japan held a summit in Singapore. On June 13th, Foreign Minister Park Jin visited Washington and met with U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken. Furthermore, Cho Hyun-dong, the first vice foreign minister, and Wendy Sherman, the U.S. Deputy Secretary of State, also met.
With North Korea’s missile launches raising tensions on the peninsula and a potential seventh test in the mix, security cooperation between South Korea and the U.S. is more important than ever. This importance may be the result of diplomatic and security lines between the two countries moving swiftly. More fundamentally, it may be due to both the Biden administration’s willingness to further strengthen the ROK-US alliance upon the launch of South Korea’s new administration in South Korea and the Yoon administration’s firmer determination to emphasize the alliance’s importance.
Against this background, public and private meetings were held between the Sejong Institute, the Council on Foreign Relations, and the Wilson Center in the U.S. It has been confirmed that expectations for changes in the direction of South Korea's policy due to the change of the Korean administration are very high in the U.S. However, despite Washington’s positive outlook on Korea’s new policy direction, questions regarding the implementation of concrete policies remain. This commentary will discuss the concerns and the expectations of the U.S. As exemplified in the results of the last summit, the two key interests for the U.S. are (1) ensuring cooperation with the new South Korean government’s North Korea policy and U.S. regional policy, and (2) expanding cooperation in the realm of economic security. Each area will be explored below.
Foremost, leading experts in Washington seem to be supporting the South Korean government’s approach towards North Korea in principle. In particular, they agreed that it would not be easy to change inter-Korean relations without North Korea's progress in denuclearization, as North Korea's denuclearization and the promotion of inter-Korean relations go hand in hand. As it will be virtually impossible for the Biden administration to pursue a so-called ‘small deal’ with North Korea through a disarmament-oriented approach, there will not be a significant difference in its North Korea policy between South Korea and the U.S. As stated in the joint statement, measures such as strengthening the joint defense posture and normalizing discussions on extended deterrence appear to align with ways to improve preparations for emergencies on the Korean Peninsula.
However, there was little confidence in whether such a ROK-U.S. policy could deter North Korea's provocations. Many believed that North Korea will eventually launch more missiles and conduct its seventh nuclear test. There were opinions on what measures should be discussed between Korea and the U.S. if such a situation occurs, given that additional sanctions at the U.N. level would not be possible given China and Russia's non-cooperation.
Additionally, it was recognized on a positive level that the Yoon Seok-yeol administration would offer unconditional dialogue and economic support to North Korea in exchange for meaningful denuclearization actions and humanitarian aid regardless of political developments. There were, however, skeptical responses about the possibility that such policies would actually lead North Korea to engage in denuclearization negotiations or deter North Korea's provocations. Nonetheless, the skepticism is attributed to the fact that there is little possibility that the current North will enter negotiations, rather than doubting the direction of the policy pursued by the Yoon Seok-yeol administration. Given that North Korea is unlikely to enter negotiations soon, it was widely believed that South Korea and the U.S. had no choice but to prepare and maintain sanctions in the long term. In the short term, it is unlikely that there will be major disagreements between South Korea and the U.S. over North Korea. It is similarly unlikely that North Korea will pursue the so-called tongmibongnam strategy, which ignores South Korea and pushes for negotiations with the U.S., thanks to better coordination between the two allies.
Washington seemed to be more interested in the new Korean administration’s perception on U.S. regional strategies and policies, such as the Indo-Pacific strategy. It perceives in a positive light both President Yoon Seok-yeol’s policy directions (as discussed in his Foreign Affairs contributions and interviews during election period) and his decision to enhance policy cooperation with the U.S. (as shown in the last summit’s joint statement). Amid such positive perception, concerns were raised by U.S. experts regarding excessive expectation within the U.S. In particular, Korean and Indo-Pacific experts in the US noted a difference in the actual and expected speed of Korea’s policy transition, which may become a cause of friction. Among them, high expectations for strengthening security cooperation among South Korea, the U.S. and Japan were mentioned as the main part.
According to a group mainly interested in the Indo-Pacific strategy, security cooperation among South Korea, the U.S., and Japan is more important than ever in an environment where security threats such as China are emerging. Therefore, there was an understanding that the historical problems between South Korea and Japan should be resolved rather quickly. While the expectation for the new Korean administration to do so is high in the U.S., experts in South Korea and Japan stressed that such high expectations could be a burden and that the issues between South Korea and Japan cannot be resolved by simple replacing the administration.
Regarding economic security, Washington welcomed President Yoon Seok-yeol's decision to take the lead in the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework at the last summit but pointed out that domestic politics and weakened leadership in the U.S. could hinder economic security cooperation. There are questions within the U.S. about whether the U.S. has the leadership to coordinate or resolve the problems of collective action that may arise among its allies regarding economic security. There is also the question of how to adjust conflicting interests among governments and corporates in South Korea, the U.S., and Japan. In addition, many suggested that the political factors in the U.S. that threaten the continuity of Biden’s policies may be an obstacle to cooperation between South Korea and the U.S. depending on the outcome of the U.S. midterm elections in November and the U.S. presidential election in 2024.
As a result of these discussions, experts from South Korea and the U.S. concluded that more communication between South Korea and the U.S. is needed in the future and that they should share their strategic goals and policy implementation methods. Although South Korea and the U.S. may identify the threats to their security and perceive North Korean issues similarly, diplomatic efforts on the part of the two governments are urgently needed. This is an unofficial translation of the original paper by Jisoo Kim jkim@sejong.org which was written in Korean. All references should be made to the original paper.
※ This article is written based on the author’s personal opinions and does not reflect the views of the Sejong Institute.
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