North Korea’s Nuclear Law from the Perspective of a Nuclear Doctrine

Kim Jungsup

(jungsupkim@sejong.org)

Vice President,

The Sejong Institute

English Abstract

Introduction

On September 8, North Korea’s Supreme People’s Assembly announced the legalization of its nuclear force. Its main contents include the mission, the command and control structure and the conditions for using its nuclear force.

This paper aims to seek future tasks by understanding Pyongyang’s nuclear doctrine in the theoretical context of nuclear deterrence rather than as a unique product of North Korea.

Deterrence Posture: Simultaneous Pursuit of Assured Retaliation and Asymmetric Escalation

Article 1 states that while the primary objective of its nuclear force is war deterrence, it will carry out an operational mission to achieve victory if it fails to deter war. This states that it aims for both missions of assured retaliation and asymmetric escalation in deterrence theory.

North Korea seems to be interested in ‘deterrence by denial’ strategy of which denying US reinforcements in Korea and Japan through a nuclear strike and displaying its nuclear warfighting capability at a tactical level.

Command and Control Structure: Conditional Delegation of Authority under Monolithic Command

Article 3 states that the president of the State Affairs of the DPRK has all decisive power over its nuclear weapons while prescribing an automatic nuclear strike as decided in advance if the command is placed in danger.

The automatic nuclear strike adheres closely to the deterrence logic and reflects North Korea’s fear of a decapitation operation or a disarming preemptive strike. Insisting on a highly centralized command structure causes a decapitation operation from South Korea and the US and weakens North Korea’s nuclear deterrence.

First Nuclear Strike: Conditions for the Use of Nuclear Weapons

Article 6 outlines five conditions for its use of nuclear weapons. It states that North Korea may use its nuclear weapons when ⓵ an attack by nuclear weapons, or other weapons of mass destruction (WMD), was launched or is imminent ⓶ a nuclear or non-nuclear attack by hostile forces against the state leadership and the command organization of the state’s nuclear forces was launched or is imminent ⓷ a fatal military attack against important strategic objects of the state was launched or is imminent ⓸ the need for an operation to prevent an expansion and protraction of war, and taking an upper hand in a war, is inevitably raised at the time of contingency ⓹ a catastrophic crisis has occurred that threatens the existence of the state and the safety of the people.

The Use of Nuclear Weapons when Facing an Imminent Attack

The Launch on Warning Posture was devised during the Cold War to minimize the dangers of a preemptive strike.

The regulation that allows the use of nuclear weapons upon judgment of an imminent attack reflects the dilemma inherent in nuclear strategy.

The Nature of North Korea’s Nuclear Doctrine and Tasks for South Korea and the US

The emphasis on the operational mission of nuclear force implies that North Korea‘s nuclear options can be diversified and its threshold for nuclear use lowered.

An offensive response by South Korea and the US against North Korea’s growing nuclear warfighting capability may weaken crisis stability.

Of the Three-Pillar System of the South Korean military, a focus on KMPR(Korea Massive Punishment and Retaliation) with an emphasis on the threat of retaliation is advisable as compared to the Kill Chain which may intensify crisis instability or the KAMD(Korea Air and Missile Defense) which has clear operational and economic limitations.

A nuclear war must be prevented from the perspective of intra-war deterrence and escalation control even in the case of a conventional armed clash.