The Launch of Japan’s New Ishiba Cabinet: Background and Implications

Myon Woo Lee

Senior Research Fellow

1. Introduction

Japan’s new Ishiba Cabinet was launched on October 1, 2024, following the election of Shiberu Ishiba as the new Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) president. Ishiba, a 12-term Diet member and former secretary-general of the LDP, secured the LDP presidency on Friday, September 27, after a closely contested race that ended in a runoff.

Under Japan's parliamentary cabinet system, the president of the majority party—in this case, the LDP—is elected prime minister through a vote in the National Diet. Although finally achieving success on his fifth attempt, the election process was not an easy one for the former LDP secretary-general. In his previous two bids, he received substantial support from party members (including members of the Liberal National Congress and National Political Association) but was ultimately unsuccessful due to insufficient backing from fellow Diet members.

As a result, in the 2021 LDP presidential election, Ishiba declined to run due to uncertainties around securing the required 20 endorsements, instead deciding to endorse former Minister for Digital Transformation, Taro Kono. In the recent election, around 11 candidates were initially expected to run, once again raising doubts about whether Ishiba could secure the required 20 endorsements to enter the race, let alone secure victory.

This brief examines how Ishiba, despite a history of repeated defeats, was able to win this election, and explores his potential next steps following his long-sought victory as LDP president.

2. Background and Implications of the Ishiba Cabinet’s Launch

2.1) Results of the LDP Presidential Election

In the LDP presidential election, the first round of voting combines the votes of LDP Diet members and an equal number of votes from rank-and-file party members. In the second-round runoff, the total comprises votes from LDP Diet members and a fixed number of votes representing Japan’s 47 prefectures.

As shown in Table 1, a total of 736 votes were cast in the first round of this year’s LDP presidential election—368 from LDP Diet members and an equal 368 from party members. Ishiba secured 154 votes in this round, including 46 from Diet members and 108 from party members.​ 

Table 1. Results of the 2024 LDP Presidential Election

(*: In the first-round results column, the number on the left indicates Diet member votes, and the number on the right indicates party member votes.

(**: In the runoff results column, the number on the left indicates Diet member votes, and the number on the right indicates prefectural votes.

(***: The faction membership count reflects November 2023 figures, before the dissolution of factions due to the political funding scandal.)

(****: The total Diet member vote count does not equal 368 due to abstentions and invalid votes.)

(Source: Yomiuri Shimbun, “Shigeru Ishiba Wins LDP Presidency in Fifth Attempt, Becomes Prime Minister after Defeating Sanae Takaichi in Runoff (自民黨總裁に石破茂氏, 5度目の挑戰で首相へ... 高市早苗氏との決選投票制す),” September 27, 2024.)

Ishiba secured the presidency in the runoff election with a total of 215 votes—189 from Diet members and 26 from the prefectural chapters—narrowly defeating Takaichi, who was leading in the first round, by a margin of 21 votes. Takaichi received 173 Diet member votes and 21 prefectural votes, for a total of 194. Since no candidate was expected to secure a majority in the first round, collaboration strategies for the runoff had reportedly been in discussion well in advance. Ishiba’s significant gain in the runoff, securing more than four times his initial tally of 46 Diet member votes, can be attributed to these pre-election consultations and the struggle for power between factions.

2.2) Factors Contributing to Ishiba’s Election

Three main factors contributed to Ishiba’s election as LDP president. First, support for Shinjiro Koizumi, a popular candidate among the general public, gradually waned throughout the campaign period, particularly as a result of his performance in debates. Koizumi, a 43-year-old, five-term Diet member and son of former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, decided to run despite his father’s advice to “wait until you turn 50 before seeking party leadership.” His decision to run was strongly influenced by the unexpected enthusiasm surrounding Shinji Ishimaru in the Tokyo gubernatorial election in July.

In the Tokyo gubernatorial election in July, Yuriko Koike, the incumbent candidate unofficially endorsed by the LDP, was re-elected. However, the LDP suffered a poor showing in the Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly elections taking place at the same time, winning only two seats while losing six. This defeat, coupled with the enthusiasm surrounding Ishimaru’s campaign, reflected strong voter dissatisfaction with established political parties, including the LDP. This led to growing expectations within the party for the rise of a younger generation of leaders like Koizumi. It could be argued that these expectations also enabled 49-year-old, four-term Diet member Takayuki Kobayashi to launch his bid for the presidency. However, as support for Koizumi waned over the course of the debates, Ishiba was able to seize the opportunity created by Koizumu’s declining popularity.

Second, as briefly mentioned earlier, Ishiba has consistently enjoyed strong support from both regular voters and LDP party members, and this support persisted in the recent election. For instance, in the 2012 LDP presidential race, in which former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe returned to seek reelection, Ishiba won the first round with 165 votes from party members and 34 from LDP Diet members, totaling 199 votes. Similarly, in the first round of this election, Ishiba garnered 108 votes from party members, allowing him to advance to the runoff against Takaichi, even though Koizumi was ahead of Ishiba in terms of Diet member votes.

Third, a behind-the-scenes power struggle among three former prime ministers—Aso, Suga, and Kishida—played a key role in reducing fellow Diet members’ resistance to Ishiba’s candidacy. As noted earlier, Ishiba has historically struggled to secure votes from his peers in the Diet, despite strong support from rank-and-file party members. In this election as well, he received only 46 votes from LDP Diet members in the first round. However, the competitive dynamics pitting Aso against Suga and Kishida resulted in Suga and Kishida backing Ishiba, enabling him to secure enough Diet member votes in the runoff to claim victory.

A comparison of the votes cast in the first and second rounds suggests that Ishiba attracted support from Diet members who had initially backed Koizumi, Hayashi, and Kato, largely due to endorsements from former Prime Ministers Suga and Kishida. Takaichi, on the other hand, appears to have received support from Diet members aligned with former Prime Minister Aso, who rallied those who had initially backed Kobayashi, Motegi, Kamikawa, and Kono. This dynamic was reflected in Ishiba’s post-election appointments, with Suga replacing Aso as LDP vice president, a key party position, and Hayashi, a member of the Kishida faction, retaining his post as Chief Cabinet Secretary in Ishiba’s Cabinet.

3. Ishiba’s Leadership Environment

3.1) Ishiba’s Policy Orientation

Prime Minister Ishiba’s policy orientation can be broadly divided into two main aspects. The first is “self-reliant modern nationalism,” which emphasizes national security and is evident in his proactive stance on constitutional reform and the introduction of collective self-defense. Ishiba advocates for amending the Constitution to remove the so-called peace clause in Article 9, paragraph 2, that states, “war potential will never be maintained,” with the goal of transforming the Self-Defense Forces into a full-fledged military.

Ishiba’s dedication to constitutional reform is evident from the choices he has made in his political career. Ishiba was first elected as an LDP Diet member in the 38th House of Representatives General Election in 1986. However, he left the party in 1993 due to then-President Yohei Kono's decision to "suspend discussions on constitutional reform," a policy aimed at softening the party’s image after suffering an election defeat and losing its majority.

While witnessing the ongoing war in Ukraine, this stance has evolved into advocacy for the creation of a collective security framework in Asia—a so-called “Asian NATO.” Ishiba argues that Russia was able to invade Ukraine due to it not being part of NATO, and that because today’s Ukraine could be tomorrow’s Asia, Asia also needs a binding collective security arrangement similar to NATO.

Ishiba’s proposals to revise the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty—the basis for the U.S.-Japan Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA)—and to introduce nuclear sharing can also be viewed from this “self-reliant modern nationalist” perspective. In particular, his assertion that fostering a more equal U.S.-Japan relationship will strengthen bilateral relations offers a glimpse into the elements of ethnic nationalism embedded in his modern state nationalist posture.

The second aspect is his emphasis on communication, which incorporates elements of proceduralism, pluralism, rationalism, and realism. Since these principles are fundamentally rooted in consideration for others, they contrast with the previously discussed “self-reliant modern nationalism” and can be termed “pluralistic nationalism.” This orientation is expected to contribute to improving and strengthening South Korea-Japan relations.

3.2) Ishiba’s Political Environment

To evaluate whether Ishiba can effectively lead the Cabinet and implement policies, this section will examine the composition of the Cabinet, the approval ratings of the prime minister and the Cabinet, and the LDP’s expected vote share in the upcoming House of Representatives election. First, three key features define the composition of the Ishiba Cabinet: the exclusion of the dominant Abe faction from Cabinet member appointments, the appointment of members with no faction affiliation, and a balanced allocation of posts among factions. Notably, the inclusion of individuals that are close to Ishiba suggests that this Cabinet structure could contribute to stabilizing his leadership and ability to implement policies. Of course, this assessment assumes that the Ishiba Cabinet is not defeated (i.e., fails to secure a majority) in the upcoming House of Representatives election.

Second, Prime Minister Ishibia’s standing ahead of the House of Representatives election on October 27 appears less than favorable. As shown in Table 2, approval ratings for the newly launched Ishiba Cabinet are far from good, hovering around 50% according to surveys conducted by various newspapers.

Table 2. Comparison of Ishiba Cabinet Approval Ratings by Newspaper

(Source: Nikkei, October 2, 2024)

The newly launched Cabinet’s approval rating, hovering around 50%, is likely a reflection of low support and significant dissatisfaction from the public and voters toward the current administration. This low approval rating, barely exceeding the 50% approval rating of the Aso Cabinet, which had the lowest rating since 2006, suggests that the LDP’s strategy to repair the low approval rating of the Kishida-led Cabinet through a leadership change and minimize potential losses in the upcoming general election is unlikely to go as planned. Additionally, the low level of proportional representation votes projected for the LDP in the next general election further exacerbates this setback.

As examined above, the current approval rating for Ishiba and his Cabinet, standing at only 40%, is very unstable. Nonetheless, the general expectation is that the LDP will maintain control without losing its majority (233 seats). Of course, the outcome may vary depending on voter turnout, but this expectation is largely due to the strength of the LDP’s organizational support, its ongoing coalition with the Komeito party, and the fact that the opposition parties have yet to fully coordinate their coalitions and candidate selections.

In addition, despite the ongoing public distrust toward established parties and a Jiji Press poll in October showing a record-low 28% approval rating for the Ishiba Cabinet, a similar wave of enthusiasm like what was witnessed during Ishimaru’s campaign in the Tokyo gubernatorial election in July, seems unlikely. This is partly because there is no prominent figure driving this kind of enthusiasm in the upcoming general election. In addition, as shown by a Kyodo News poll related to the House of Representatives election, while some want the opposition to gain more seats, many still prefer that the LDP remain in power.

4. Policy Recommendations: Korea’s Response Strategy

As mentioned above, from Korea’s perspective, Ishiba embodies two somewhat contrasting aspects. Therefore, Korea should adopt a strategy of “selective active engagement” focusing on minimizing conflicts and fostering cooperation in line with its own national interests.

First, while Ishiba’s push for constitutional reform may raise concerns in Korea, it is also a formidable challenge domestically in Japan. Accordingly, rather than an overly active response, Korea could continue to engage in discussions and debates, while carefully monitoring the progress on the issue. Aware of the challenges surrounding this issue domestically, Ishiba is avoiding commenting on constitutional reform ahead of the House of Representatives election set for October 27.

Accordingly, it would be sufficient for South Korea to closely observe the situation rather than rush to respond. As this is primarily a Japanese domestic issue, any discussions about its potential impact on South Korea could take place after clearer developments emerge. A similar approach could be applied to other issues raised by Ishiba, such as the “Asian NATO” proposal or SOFA amendments.

On the other hand, the launch of the Ishiba Cabinet, which displays a more positive stance on addressing historical issues, offers Korea a valuable opportunity—one that should be actively pursued—to break the deadlock on historical issues between the two countries.

Above all else, Ishiba’s track record suggests that he is capable of offering an apology. This increased likelihood of a Japanese prime minister issuing an apology could help ease mutual distrust and reduce the domestic politicization of historical issues—arguably the greatest obstacle in South Korea-Japan relations.

In particular, as 2025 marks the 60th anniversary of the normalization of diplomatic relations between Korea and Japan, if a new Kim Dae-jung-Obuchi Declaration (i.e., Kim Dae-jung-Obuchi Declaration 2.0), could be made, building on the spirit of the previous Kono, Murayama, and Kan statements, through a visit to Japan by President Yoon or a visit to South Korea by Prime Minister Ishiba, unlike the statement issued by former Prime Minister Abe to commemorate the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II, this could serve as a stepping stone for shifting South Korea-Japan relations from the past to the future.