Access to Information in North Korea

Peter Ward

Research Fellow​

1. Introduction 

Access to information is considered a fundamental human right and also crucial in fostering change in North Korea. Access to information for the North Korean people is an end in itself, insofar as it contributes toward human flourishing. It is also considered crucial in helping North Koreans understand alternatives to their sociopolitical and economic order.

Efforts to expand information access in North Korea have been ongoing since the Cold War, and a wide range of organizations utilizing a range of methods. Radio broadcasts into North Korea are funded or provided by the South Korean, US and Japanese governments, as well as private organizations. Dissemination of content into North Korea via balloons and other aerial means (drones), usually leaflets, bibles and electronic storage media. Distribution of content and devices into North Korea via the land border or via sea, including USB drives, SD memory cards, mobile phones, computers and other devices.

The North Korean authorities have gone to great lengths to preventing outside information spreading within their society. These include extensive jamming for radio, and also seek to regulate and control access to freely tunable radio sets, extensive systems of neighborhood-level surveillance that involves regular household inspections, including of digital devices and storage media, a range of domestically produced smartphones with integrated surveillance software and systems of digital fingerprinting for files, more aggressive enforcement of laws against the use of Chinese mobiles and other unlicensed digital devices that enable access to information, and stricter laws and punishments for the consumption and dissemination of foreign media, including the use of the death penalty for mass dissemination

There is a pressing need to improve access to information and to counter the tactics being employed by the North Korean side. Three issues need to be addressed. First, problem of content distribution into and across North Korean society even as repression and control become harsher. Second, the need to build international solidarity and understanding surrounding the issue to ensure efforts continue and are strengthened. The issue of domestic polarization around the problem of relations with North Korea and how information dissemination fits into such concerns. The question of whether information dissemination is primarily a tactic, a strategic concern, or an end in itself.

This brief ends with a discussion of the options that the government should consider. Exploring to improve access to information inside North Korea through improved logistics, funding, and technologies. Building consensus both at home and abroad to make efforts sustainable. 

2. Current Situation

ａ) Need and purpose

ⅰ) Need

North Korea is one of the most oppressive and closed societies on earth. It has a closed information system in which the entire media-scape is owned, operated and controlled by the party-state. It is a mono-organizational society in which all legal economic and social activities beyond the household and small-scale friendship networks are controlled by the party-state. It maintains a highly repressive system of laws and prisons designed to punish any form of dissent including the consumption of unauthorized information with the passage of new laws like the Reactionary Ideology and Culture Exclusion Act.

The world is divided in how to deal with the problem. Different actors in government and outside with different priorities and aims, meaning that information dissemination is pursued for very different reasons in different ways. Actors in different countries with differing perspectives on the North Korean problem and how it should be dealt with. 

ⅱ ) Differing aims

The human rights case for information access (an end in itself). Under international human rights law, information access is a crucial part of as part of freedom of expression. North Korea is a signatory to International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and has a responsibility to guarantee such rights under international law. Article 19.2 of the ICCPR stipulates: "Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice."

The strategic unification case for information access (a means toward unification) has been put forward by South Korea’s current government. Under the 8.15 Doctrine, the current government seeks to expand access to information in order to foment social change in North Korea that also changes the character of North Korean government policy. It may also be seeking to bridge the cultural gap between North Koreans and the South on order to create citizens for a unified Korean future.

Information is also used as a military tactic of coercion (managing North Korea as a threat). Information operations are pursued as part of psychological warfare aimed to weaken the enemy’s morale. Materials are distributed that are designed to exert pressure on the leadership in order to force them to change policies. 

ｂ) Current state of access and state response

ⅰ) Current state of access

Information access in North Korea cannot be directly measured, but surveys of North Korean refugees and in-country mean we have some understanding of the information environment. Ministry of Unification survey data from this year indicates that of refugees who left the country post-2012, 36.4% owned mobile phones, 85.6% televisions, 73.6% CD/DVD players, 16.5% radios, 19.6% computers, 30.8% computers. The same survey also found that around 5% of North Korean refugees could watch South Korean TV broadcasts, while 82.4% of refugees who left the country after 2012 had watched foreign video content. Chinese films (73.9%) and South Korean films (26.9%) made up the vast majority of content consumed by North Korean refugees before they defected post-2012. HanVoice-Woorion survey work indicates that most North Korean refugees believe contact with relatives outside the country is the most effective method of information dissemination (65%), followed by radio (55.6%), sending USBs, CDs etc. (54.6%), and far fewer leaflets and balloons (34%). Seoul National University’s Institute for Peace and Unification Studies (IPUS) data collected between 2010 and 2022 indicates that around 50% of refugee who left when aged between 10 and 39 had frequently consumed South Korean culture, while the number decreased substantially thereafter. Unification Media Group’s (UMG) recent survey of 100 North Koreans inside the country indicates that over 10% possessed tunable radio sets, and that 5% had previously listened to UMG programming more than once a month. Inferential studies of North Korean refugee survey data point to the potential transformative impact of South Korean culture, but also problems with distribution. North Korean consumers of South Korean media appear to be considerably more likely to be college educated, engage in market activities and be reliant on markets for their income. Peter Ward and Wonjun Song, “Who violates Authoritarian Censorship Laws? Evidence from North Korea,” Unpublished whitepaper. Other surveys show that most North Korean refugees were interested in South Korean culture, but due to a lack of social trust and the threats posed by the regime, generally seek to use personal networks to acquire content via friends and family not in public spaces.

ⅱ) The state’s response

The North Korean government has invested considerably in seeking to prevent the spread of unauthorized foreign content. These efforts include seeking to improve the production values and appeal of regime-produced culture. The results have included bands like the Moranbong Electronic Ensemble and the rather violent new film ‘A Day and a Night’. The regime has sought to crackdown on the use of Chinese mobiles to make direct contact with the outside world. It has also created a range of harsh new laws that punish consumers and distributors of South Korean and other ‘adversary country’ content, such as the Reactionary Culture and Ideology Exclusion Act (2020), the Pyongyang Language Protection Act (2023), and the Youth Education Guarantee Act (2021). The Reactionary Culture and Ideology Exclusion Act includes the threat of the death penalty for mass dissemination of “reactionary culture”. The Pyongyang Language Protection Act (2023) includes the threat of the death penalty for excessive use of South Korean dialect.

Actual enforcement of such measures is not directly measurable, but reports point to draconian crackdowns. These include far more regular inspections of household devices and dwellings more generally, as well as far harsher prison sentences and even public executions of those caught disseminating some content. Such punishments are also accompanied by regime propaganda designed to ensure that people are made aware of potential punishments.

ｃ) Current methods

Depending on the purpose of efforts to expand access to information methods can vary significantly. Illicit distribution has to rely on either radio or television, or else covert transnational distribution networks for digital content. Since the Covid-19 pandemic, North Korea has become more closed. The regime has erected a large wall on its northern border with China, making both escape and smuggling far more difficult. 

Direct transmission into North Korea of radio and TV is not new and has been happening since the Cold War. There are over a dozen radio stations that broadcast into North Korea on a regular basis (see table1). South Korean television is also seemingly still broadcasting in analogue for a North Korean audience, though the exact number of stations is not public. Interview with specialist (2024.11.7) There are also sporadic loud speaker broadcasts from the DMZ by the South Korean military – these had been removed in 2018 as a consequence of inter-Korean agreements. A wide array of governments and NGOs broadcast content of varying amounts daily into North Korea. The content produced varies by provider, with some tightly focused on issues like the abduction issue or the provision of Christian ministry and others more general programming related to life in the two Koreas.

Table 1: Radio Broadcasters 

Source: Martyn Williams (Stimson Center)

Leaflets and other airborne delivery is largely conducted via balloons due to the costs and legal concerns surrounding drones, with some balloon drops guided by GPS as well. A wide range of organizations send leaflets and other media via balloons into North Korea, with a range of different aims, including criticizing the North Korean regime, carrying out missionary work or delivering Christian materials to underground churches inside the country, spreading South Korean cultural content, and/or rescuing kidnapped individuals.

Table 2: Leaflet distributing organizations

Source: 장도경 · 김영석 · 황정남 · 주은우, 민간 대북전단의 목적과 효과 연구, 통일정책연구 30권 2호 (2021), 41쪽.

Digital distribution via human smugglers is largely conducted. A range of South Korea-based and foreign organizations are involved in digital distribution of USBs, micro-SD and other digital media like DVDs. ganizations involved in such distribution include Unification Media Group (Daily NK), No Chain for North Korea, the North Korea Strategy Center and others. 

3. Current Issues

The issues faced with improving access to information are varied and complex. Politically and strategically, differing goals associated with different funding sources and organizations involved presents challenges for a more coordinated approach. There are complex and difficult technical and logistical issues associated with all forms of activities that seek to expand information access into North Korea. There is a lack of sufficient consistent and coordinated policy support for many legal methods that aim to expand information access, which are often seen as rewarding North Korea for bad behavior, but also a lack of support for illicit methods. In seeking to expand interest in and support for North Korean human rights, especially information access, international solidarity is both essential and much work is to be done, with comparatively little interest compared to other global human rights emergencies. 

ⅰ) Conflict over aims

¡ There are fundamental differences in the purpose and aims of programs designed to provide information to the North Korean people, these aims create competing or even conflicting programs. The current South Korean government’s approaches emphasize two different aims that appear somewhat compete with one another. Tactical and strategic concerns do not necessarily conflict with one another, but they do compete, with tactical concerns potentially leading to particular operations being scaled back or stopped.

The NGO community and many foreign governments, led by the U.S. government, have pursued information operations as a fundamental human right, this vision is distinct from and is not complementary to unification-related or tactical ‘battlefield’ use of information operations. Fundamental rights-based approaches seek primarily to expand information access as an end in itself or else to otherwise improve the North Korean human rights situation more generally. There is some debate and discussion about how to do so including whether more information is necessarily better, and what are the potential spillover effects of enhancing information access. 

ⅱ) Technical and logistical issues

Technical and logistical challenges are manifold and daunting, related to the North Korean government’s policies and systems of political control. The North Korean government has created its own walled garden of information ecosystems and electronic devices. These include various closed and balkized information networks (intranets), like the country’s phone networks and its various networks in different industries, which are not connected to the internet. A range of electronic devices including mobile phones and tablets often produced using Chinese-sourced components and sometimes assembled in China. The software on these devices is generally produced locally, is designed to surveil through the use of tracking software, and prevent the use of unauthorized files from outside.

Many digital-related operations related to expanding information access seek to bypass this ecosystem. Such operations involve the provision of foreign media that can be consumed on foreign-sourced devices. The continued viability of such an approach is uncertain, however, given the government’s continued introduction of new devices and the potential threat that it may seek to confiscate older non-North Korean devices. 

Other digital-related operations seek to break through the walls of the walled-garden through a range of methods, though this is fraught with logistical and technological complexity and risk of detection. North Korea generally forbids the export of devices, hence they must be smuggled out of the country. Thereafter, the software used on the devices to surveil users and to prevent the use of unauthorized files must be deconstructed and analyzed; the same also applies to hardware-based controls. Analysis of software and hardware-based systems of control then must be utilized to develop ways to circumvent them. Circumvention methods must then be re-exported back to North Korea with the hope that the North Korean regime cannot easily detect and patch any methods provided.

Older illicit methods such as radio and analogue TV are less politically exciting, and there is some concern that access and interest are waning. That said, they remain the only ways for North Koreans to access information in real time about the outside world. The South Korean government has, across different administrations, restricted access to NGOs looking to broadcast radio and/or TV from South Korea. The only non-South Korean government entities that have been permitted to broadcast direct from South Korea are U.S. government entities like the VOA and the RFA. Currently, NGOs are not allowed to broadcast from Seoul, and the barriers to getting permission from the Korea Communications Commission (KCC) are both significant and daunting. Some of these barriers are political (the KCC operates on political consensus), but others are financial and logistical with access only granted to organizations that have specific facilities.

Content creation is not well-funded, and many NGOs largely have to send in South Korean content with little localization, or else produce highly political content. NGOs lack professional expertise, resources, and an understanding of what North Koreans actually want to consume. Existing content may be appealing (South Korean dramas) or it may be educational, but it is rarely both. Content about rights and democracy is also quite abstract and divorced from North Korean circumstances. Other logistical challenges have mounted as North Korea has reinforced its border defenses and cracked down on a broad range of black markets. Cross-border financial networks, i.e., brokerage, have been badly damaged by border closures and tighter restrictions on cross-border flows of people since Covid-19 in North Korea.

ⅲ) Governance issues

Information access activities, especially those involving digital methods have significant overlap with cyber security issues but this has been underexplored and the links between ecosystems weak or non-existent. The NGOs conducting information access operations in North Korea are threatened by cyber-attacks from the North. Cyber security experts that help to support South Korean commercial cyber security are largely disconnected from the North Korean information access space.

The South Korean and other foreign governments have been far from persistent or consistent in their support for either illicit or legal forms of approaches to information access. Political divisions in South Korean society pose significant issues with continuity in South Korea’s current strategic orientation. The budgets for North Korean human rights have historically been small, with the current government providing 1.8 billion won in 2023 for North Korean human rights work outside of human rights record-keeping efforts.

 A lack of political consensus in South Korea may also explain the lack of support for radio and TV broadcasts using South Korea-based systems. 

ⅳ) Awareness

North Korean human rights issues are relatively underexplored and understood in the international media and relatively unknown by much of the world. International solidary and general interest in the issue contrasts markedly with the Palestinian issue, for instance, which has become a major popular cultural phenomenon. Visibility and long-term, sustained campaigns have barely penetrated popular culture even inside South Korea, let alone beyond.

Lack of actual visibility of rights abuses, given the closed nature of the North Korean regime partially explains this issue. Some outlets like DailyNK, Asia Press and PSCORE have been successful in smuggling out images of North Korean life and of human rights abuses, including North Korean government films depicting such abuses. 

International awareness has lagged significantly compared to the scale of the problem, though North Korea is well-known to be a highly authoritarian and threatening regime, part of the blame rests with South Korea. South Korea has become exceptionally good at building its own national brand, with the spread of Korean wave across the world in the last two decades. It has been far less adept at boosting awareness for North Korea’s human rights record and more generally about life inside North Korea.

This makes fundraising for NGOs difficult, but it also means that the North Korean government faces comparatively little pressure for its human rights abuses. Compared to the Palestinian issue, where NGOs receive significant private funding for humanitarian assistance. Compared to China, which faces considerable pressure due to the Xinjiang issue, which the government has felt forced to respond to.​