The Need for and Challenges of Formulating a National Space Security Strategy: Key Issues and Strategic Direction
Joonkoo YOO
jkyoo88@sejong.org
Senior Research Fellow
Sejong Institute
1. Introduction
Rapid advances in space technology are transforming outer space into an arena not only of expanding commercial activity but also of security competition among major space powers. More than 90 countries worldwide are already engaged in commercial space activities, the number of satellites currently being tracked stands at roughly 31,000 (as of September 30, 2026), and the number of satellites registered for launch in 2028 exceeds one million. Innovations in space science and technology, including lower launch costs and satellite miniaturization, are driving rapid growth of the private space industry and an expanding market. Against this backdrop, competition among major space powers to secure a dominant position in space has fully taken hold, and space is now regarded as a highly valuable strategic “operational domain.” Accordingly, with the dawn of the New Space era and the intensifying technological rivalry now extending into space, the need for a national-level space security strategy to strengthen space security is becoming apparent.
A national space security strategy transcends the boundaries of any single field and calls for a comprehensive approach spanning the military, economic, and diplomatic dimensions. To date, Korea’s space activities have exposed a limitation: rather than following a systematic strategy for national security, they have been pursued in a fragmented manner across individual ministries, centered on space technology development and industrial promotion. National space security must encompass not only the development and promotion of space technology but also military, diplomatic, and economic security, and it is essential to foster an overall space ecosystem and build supporting infrastructure through the accumulation of private-sector capabilities. In the New Space era in particular, integrated governance capable of carrying out a comprehensive national strategy, including by linking policy with industry, is needed. Premised on an appropriate strategic direction, a national space security strategy should be built on three pillars: responding to space threats, revitalizing the space economy, and integrated space diplomacy
The space security strategies of major space powers such as the United States, China, Russia, and the EU have each been formulated and have evolved in line with the country’s strategic position and changes in the space environment. All of them, grounded in a comprehensive space security strategy, have identified and are pursuing common priorities: responding to space threats and enhancing counter space capabilities, building space infrastructure, and strengthening space diplomacy and international cooperation. One implication of these strategies is that, because space technology development and infrastructure building require enormous resources and time, these countries establish efficient domestic governance and implementation structures and then set priorities for execution. While policy research on space security has gradually accumulated, discussion of space security strategy has remained limited to the level of space development promotion plans, and it needs to be deepened and broadened from a national strategy perspective.
2. Background and Need for Establishing a National Space Security Strategy
The background to the intensifying space race lies in the expansion of commercial use driven by advances in space technology, together with the growth of private-sector space development and markets. Innovations in space science and technology, such as lower launch costs and satellite miniaturization, are accelerating market expansion as the space industry grows rapidly. For example, the cost of launching a satellite, which once exceeded $50,000 per kilogram, has plunged to under $2,700 per kilogram for the Falcon 9, about one-twentieth of the earlier level, now that first-stage booster recovery and refurbishment technology has matured (Market Research Future). According to a UN General Assembly report, the global space market grew 8% to $424 billion in 2022 and is projected to exceed $737 billion by 2030. In particular, state-led space programs are being delegated and extended to the private sector, as when SpaceX carried out crew and cargo transport missions to the International Space Station in 2021.
Major space powers have recently been focusing on strengthening their space situational awareness (SSA) capabilities in response to a changing security environment in space. As competition in space intensifies as a strategic domain, the range of threats to the safe and sustainable operation of space assets is growing. UN General Assembly Resolution 75/36, “Reducing Space Threats Through Norms, Rules and Principles of Responsible Behaviours” (A/RES/75/36), stresses that threats already exist in space and on Earth, and that recognizing and managing them is therefore important. Because space assets are dual-use, serving both civilian and military purposes, recognizing and responding to space threats has become an important task for individual states and the international community alike, and verification, a basic element of arms control, plays a key role in this regard. To respond to a variety of space hazards and threats, leading space powers are concentrating on building up SSA capabilities for the safe operation of their own space assets, and the trend is to expand SSA into space domain awareness (SDA) and space traffic management (STM). Owing to the shape of the Earth, the orbital motion of space objects, and the geographic location of each country, it is practically impossible for any single state to achieve complete SSA capability, which makes international cooperation essential. The United States and the EU regard SSA as the most feasible and impactful area of cooperation among technology fields.
Not only the United States and other leading space powers but also regional political and security organizations such as the EU and NATO are expanding bilateral, minilateral, and multilateral space cooperation centered on security, defense, and intelligence. US international space cooperation is built on bilateral partnerships, pursued in a comprehensive yet differentiated manner; in bilateral cooperation in particular, the agenda, level, and emphasis are tailored to each partner’s space capabilities. Because the United States pursues space security cooperation within a broad national security framework, it is difficult for partner countries to prioritize and drive specific agenda items of their own, and Washington places weight on the capabilities a partner can offer that provide tangible benefits to the United States.
Various normative efforts are under way to govern the safety and security of space activities and military space activities. After more than a decade of discussion, the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UN COPUOS) adopted the Guidelinesfor the Long-term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities in June 2019, setting out normative and technical guidance, including on international cooperation, for states’ space activities. To enable substantive and focused UN-level discussion of space security, the United Nations established the Group of Governmental Experts on Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures in Outer Space Activities (TCBM GGE, 2012-2013), the Group of Governmental Experts on Further Practical Measures for the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS GGE, 2018-2019), and the Open-Ended Working Group on Reducing Space Threats (OEWG, 2022-2023). These UN bodies failed to adopt agreed outcomes on key issues amid confrontation between states and blocs, with sharp disagreement over whether and to what extent militarization and weaponization should be discussed, and whether to create new international law. The two opposing bodies (the PAROS GGE and the OEWG) were then merged into the PAROS OEWG (2024-2025), which agreed to take up two mandates: voluntary norms and principles of responsible behavior, and the creation of international law banning weaponization. Future discussions on space security governance and norms therefore warrant close attention.
3. Current Issues and Challenges in Formulating a Space Security Strategy
Given the rapid changes in the space environment and the interlinked, converging nature of security, the economy, and science and technology, Korea needs to formulate a comprehensive national space security strategy that goes beyond conventional space development. As science and technology-driven space development has been linked and extended to the security and defense sectors, space strategy has evolved into a core national security issue. In November 2022, the government set out detailed tasks for “realizing space security,” one of six policy directions, in its Future Space Economy Roadmap. The roadmap calls for establishing a space security strategy framework, building a civil-military collaboration system, advancing the ROK-US space alliance, developing space security technologies tailored to space operations, and expanding space security cooperation with the international community. In December 2022, the 4th Master Plan for Promotion of Space Development then designated “establishing space security” as one of five long-term space development missions, calling for a system to protect space assets, the acquisition of related technologies, and the procurement and expansion of space systems for national security. Even so, space strategy is still largely formulated and pursued within the confines of space technology development and industrial promotion rather than from a comprehensive national strategy perspective. Although the revised basic plan emphasizes “space as a core domain of national security,” it continues to approach space security as a matter of space development. A national space security strategy should therefore be formulated with its intended policy objectives in mind, including ensuring sustained space activities, deriving military and economic benefits from space, creating national wealth by fostering the space industry, responding to geopolitical competition, and securing future space technologies.
Alongside the expansion of space security assets, strengthening space situational awareness (SSA) capabilities is essential to improving the survivability and resilience of those assets. Strengthening the SSA system requires disaster prediction and warning systems that draw on space information, as well as the implementation of effective space traffic management policies. Korea’s space surveillance is currently understood to focus on space hazards from a disaster-response perspective rather than on space threats, and a shift toward responding to the growing number of deliberate space threats is called for. Achieving this requires an urgent expansion of space surveillance radar equipment, which is dual-use technology and therefore subject to US export control law.
Korea lacks comprehensive legislation and national policy that address space surveillance and situational awareness in an integrated manner. Existing frameworks, such as the Space Development Promotion Act and the basic plan for responding to space hazards, treat space hazards merely as one element of space surveillance. This approach has limits in responding to the various forms of space threats as security competition in space intensifies, and an SSA and surveillance policy grounded in national security is urgently needed. On this basis, Korea must build an integrated public-private-military SSA system, since the commercial, military, and intelligence domains risk operating in a fragmented and compartmentalized manner.
Strengthening space security capabilities in the New Space era requires creating synergies with the space economy. Korea’s space security capabilities, in both security and industrial terms, still lag behind those of leading space powers, making it urgent to close the technology gap through public-private cooperation. To secure space assets and foster a space economy ecosystem, priorities for space technology development must be set and pursued. Core space infrastructure is needed, including satellites, space launch vehicles, satellite navigation systems (PNT), space exploration, SSA, and crewed spacecraft, but given the enormous resources and time required, selection and concentration through prioritization are necessary. It must be clearly recognized that, by the nature of space infrastructure building, developing one capability inevitably delays development in others. For this reason, Korea should first actively pursue the development of space launch vehicles, a precondition for both SSA and the expansion of space assets.
In the security context, as the ROK-US alliance extends into a space alliance, space calls for a diplomatic and security approach that goes beyond simple international cooperation. Most of the space capability-building agenda Korea is pursuing (launch vehicles, satellite navigation systems, and SSA) requires cooperation with the United States. As North Korea-Russia cooperation in space, centered on technology transfer, deepens, Korea must also strengthen the ROK-US space alliance on concrete issues such as SSA, launch vehicles, satellite development, satellite navigation systems, and space exploration in order to respond to changes in the space security environment on the Korean Peninsula. At present, however, ROK-US space cooperation is being pursued in a fragmented and compartmentalized manner by individual ministries, through channels such as the Space Policy Dialogue, the Space Cooperation Working Group, and the Space Science and Technology Cooperation Meeting, without an underlying basic strategy. Closer coordination among them is needed.
4. Implications of the Space Security Strategies of Major Space Powers
The United States is strengthening its space security strategy and policy within its broader national security strategy, on the premise that space underpins its military power and is essential to national security and prosperity. In implementing its space strategy, Washington pursues its strategic objectives by prioritizing resources and managing risk in ways that advance US national interests. US space strategy has been pursued on a relatively bipartisan basis, and the United States regards China’s and Russia’s development, testing, and deployment of counter space capabilities, along with conflict extending into space, as the most pressing threats.
China likewise regards its space development projects as a core element of its national security and national development strategies, and is working to narrow the gap with the United States in space security capabilities. Grounded in its “military-civil fusion” strategy, China is enhancing its counterspace capabilities to counterbalance the United States and pursuing a regionally led space security strategy. To advance economic security and improve the space operations capabilities of the People’s Liberation Army, China approaches space as a matter of critical infrastructure development. To this end, it is integrating military and civilian space assets, giving priority to national security across all space sectors, enhancing space capabilities, and providing government support to innovative start-ups.
For Russia, a traditional space power, the core of its space security strategy is “asymmetric denial,” aimed at overcoming its economic disadvantage and countering the space superiority of the United States and NATO. As the central strategic principle, Russia focuses on neutralizing its adversaries’ space assets rather than competing with the United States in building large satellite constellations. Russia also links the space domain to its nuclear deterrent, using it as an essential tool of national defense.
The EU regards space as a strategic domain and is strengthening the resilience and protection of space systems and services within the Union. To this end, it emphasizes an EU-level security framework for protecting space systems and for sharing information and cooperating on space security threats. In particular, the EU stresses its own technological sovereignty to ensure the security of space infrastructure and supply chains. The EU also emphasizes bilateral space cooperation with the United States and other like-minded countries for the sake of space security, and has recently been strengthening space cooperation with Korea, Japan, and Australia.
5. Conclusion
As security issues evolve, a national security strategy must be comprehensive in nature while still providing basic guidelines for specific security threats. Accordingly, alongside strengthening military power based on space and other science and technology, a new security strategy is also called for to respond to emerging threats such as those arising from AI and space. In the case of space security, no single ministry can formulate and implement policy on its own, and formulating a strategy would also help improve the integration of space security strategies and policies that are currently pursued in a fragmented and compartmentalized manner.
Major space powers, recognizing space as a core domain of national interest, are pursuing domestic legal reforms and capacity-building to implement their space security strategies. Korea’s current laws and institutions urgently need a comprehensive overhaul, given the absence or fragmentation of a space security strategy, the need to reorganize domestic implementation structures and governance, the lack of implementing legislation, and duplication in policy implementation. In this regard, formulating a space security strategy requires domestic capacity-building policies that respond to intensifying space competition, including a standing consultative body built on a network of experts and research institutions. With the National Space Committee now elevated to operate directly under the President, a consultative body capable of carrying out the strategy in a substantive and sustained manner is needed, and it would also contribute to building a civil-government-military cooperation framework for implementing the space security strategy.
Discussions on norm-setting in the UN and other multilateral forums on space security have recently shifted to a single-track process, and an urgent response is required. Confrontation between states and blocs has delayed both the recognition of space threats and discussions on related norms, and the dual-track structure of the forums yielded limited results. Since 2024, however, the participants have agreed to discuss legally binding international law and norms of behavior simultaneously within a single-track Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG). Korea must therefore articulate and announce its basic national position on space security, engage actively, and reflect its national interests. Because states’ interests diverge sharply on each issue in international norm-setting, Korea’s national space security strategy should be reflected in the OEWG’s specific mandates. Moreover, international space security norms are also taking shape through the spread of individual domestic laws of major space powers such as the United States, a trend that has considerable bearing on Korea’s own space security strategy.
The United States, China, and EU member states are emphasizing space diplomacy in their space security strategies and actively pursuing international cooperation to deepen cooperation. Korea should take note of the recent trend of the EU strengthening space diplomacy-based cooperation with key middle powers such as Korea, Japan, India, Australia, and Canada in order to compete with space powers such as the United States, China, and Russia. As Korea needs to strengthen and develop bilateral cooperation with existing space powers, it should formulate and pursue a space diplomacy strategy based on a reassessment of key agenda items such as space threat perception, revitalization of the space economy, and space technology innovation. Because space features in most of Korea’s bilateral cooperation agendas with leading technology powers, it is urgent to identify concrete cooperation projects on core issues such as responding to space threats, the supply chain security of space technology, and the formation of space security norms. In addition, North Korea-Russia and North Korea-China-Russia cooperation in space is expected to deepen despite certain limitations, so Korea should pursue bilateral cooperation with the United States and other major like-minded countries from the standpoint of both space security and space diplomacy.
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