China’s recognition and response to the U.S.-China strategic competition
Chung Jae-hung, Han Xiandong
(jameschung@sejong.org, hanp668@163.com)
Research Fellow, Sejong-KT&G China Fellow,
The Sejong Institute
Executive Summary
■ The inauguration of the Biden administration and the intensifying U.S.-China strategic competition
○ The Biden administration described
that its China policy will be “competitive when it should be, collaborative
when it can be, and adversarial when it must be”.
○ The Biden administration’s China
policy is based on the QUAD of the Indo-Pacific Strategy. Biden indicated that
it will strengthen the Japan-U.S. alliance, the QUAD, security cooperation
between South Korea-U.S.-Japan, NATO relations with Europe, and the D-10
democratic alliance.
○ The Biden administration’s China
policy has partly inherited that of the Obama administration. It aims to
restore U.S. leadership by improving U.S. relations with its allies through
adhering to the Obama administration's Rebalancing strategy and democratic
values.
○ The Biden administration indicated
that it will inherit the Trump administration's Indo-Pacific strategy and the
QUAD, unlike domestic policy, and that it will further expand its encircling of
China by allying with countries that share democratic values
○ The U.S. and China held their
first high-level strategic dialogue in Alaska in March 2021. Although there was
a clear difference between their positions on core interests, there was an
agreement that they need to communicate
■ How Xi Jinping recognizes the
U.S.-China strategic competition
○ President Xi Jinping announced
that China will become a Xiaokang society by 2049 and celebrate the 100th
anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China as one, rich,
socialist, happy China under the Two Centenaries (兩個一百年) strategy.
○President Xi emphasized dispelling
corruption through the Four Comprehensives and promoting China’s own socialist
development model through its unique system, values, and norms to achieve the
Chinese Dream and become a powerful socialist country by 2049.
○ President Xi understands that the
U.S.-China relations cannot be restored after the arrest of Meng Wanzhou of
Huaweii in December 2018, the U.S. involvement in the 2019 Hong Kong protests
in June, and the U.S. ideological attack of the Chinese Communist Party in July
2020 during the U.S.-China strategic competition
○ President Xi announced that China
will not compromise its sovereignty and/or yield Taiwan, Hong Kong, Xinjiang,
or Xizang at any cost but will deal with the U.S. through an “eye for eye,
tooth for tooth” strategy.
○ President Xi understands a mid-to
long term U.S.-China strategic competition is inevitable. Therefore, he
introduced a new path to achieve China’s socialist modernization and
economically outrun the U.S. by 2035 as one, Xi Jinping-centered Chinese Communist
Party.
■ China’s response to the U.S.-China
strategic competition
○ Upon taking power, President Xi
announced to transform China from a developing country to big power, expand its
influence by being able to compete with the U.S., achieve socialist
modernization by 2035, and become a powerful socialist country by 2049.
○ At a press conference held in
March 2021 on the theme of China's Foreign Policy and Foreign Relations, it was
stressed that China will protect and not accept the U.S. intervention or
interference in China’s domestic core interests, such as issues regarding the
Xinjiang/Xizang minorities, the South China Sea, Hong Kong, and Taiwan as the
U.S. and China should adhere to the basic principle of not interfering with
each other’s internal affairs.
○ As the U.S.-China trade conflict
intensified in July 2019, the Chinese Communist Party held its Central Economic
Work Conference and outlined its six-stability policy of job stability,
financial stability, external trade stability, foreign investment stability,
investment stability, and expectation stability.
○ After President Xi took power and
the U.S.-China strategic competition intensified, the Belt and Road Initiative
was promoted to enter a new global market and connect with Europe, Russia,
Central Asia, Southwest Asia, Middle East, Africa, and East Asia in order to
extend China’s international influence.
○ At the 19th plenary
session of the 5th Central Committee that ended on October 29, 2020,
China proposed to pursue a “double-cycle” strategy centered on transforming
China’s national development strategy based on traditional export-oriented
growth to one based on developing its domestic economy so that China can strengthen
its durability and respond to the U.S.-China strategic competition.
○ Through the 19th
plenary session of the 5th Central Committee, President Xi expressed
his intent to modernize the Chinese military by 2027, the 100th anniversary
of the founding of the army. The politburo of the Party said in a press release
that “the military should abide by the fundamental principle of absolute Party
leadership over the armed forces” and will modernize defense and military
forces by 2027. Unlike in the past, the military plan was finalized first and
then announced at home and abroad.
○ China has taken a firm stance
that it will achieve socialist modernization by 2035 and become a powerful
socialist country by 2049 and therefore has no intention of making concessions
or compromises on core interests, including Hong Kong and Taiwan.
○ Premier Li Keqiang issued about 1
trillion yuan worth of special government bonds to secure large-scale funds for
the revitalization of the economy in the midst of the recent intensification of
the U.S.-China strategic competition and the COVID-19 pandemic and foster the
growth of e-commerce, online mobile, smart manufacturing, 5G, IoT, AI, big
data, and other 4th industrial revolution-related agenda.
○ President Xi has repeatedly shown
a strong will to maintain the Communist Party-led system and protect its core
interests and has clearly defined the Communist Party-led socialist value line as
China's national identity. There seems no possibility of compromising with the
U.S. over important interests such as the Communist Party system.
○ The successful 100th anniversary
of the founding of the Communist Party of China highlighted the strong
leadership and efficiency of President Xi’s Communist Party of China. It is
expected that the party and the people will unite under the Communist Party of
China and Xi’s system to become a socialist power with Chinese characteristics
by 2049.
■ Key implications
○ In order to comprehend China’s
recognition and response to the U.S.-China strategic competition, it is
necessary to understand Chinese history. In 1978, China began to develop its through
a historic transformation of socialist modernization. Such will continue until
2049—until China becomes a powerful socialist country.
○ Despite the continuation of the
COVID-19 pandemic and the intensification of the U.S.-China strategic
competition, China has strengthened its Xi-centered system and showed
sustainable economic development with its goal of becoming a socialist power by
2049. Although China does not want to prolong its dispute with the U.S., it has
no intention of unilaterally surrendering or compromising with the U.S. Unlike
in the past, China may respond rather actively with its own initiatives.
○ If the U.S.-China relations
continue to deteriorate, there will be a direct impact on South Korea-China
relations. China is carefully monitoring whether South Korea supports the
Indo-Pacific Strategy and the QUAD of the U.S. Therefore, it is necessary to carefully
revitalize other multilateral security system (six-party talks and four-party
talks), keeping South Korea-China relations in mind.
○ South Korea must abandon choosing one side in the U.S.-China strategic competition. Instead, it needs to build a new regional order by both promoting the denuclearization peace process on the Korean Peninsula and establishing the Northeast Asia Peace Economic Community.
※ Translator’s note: This is a third party’s unofficial translation of the original paper that was written in Korean. All references should be made to the original paper.
※ This article is written based on the author’s personal opinions and does not reflect the views of the Sejong Institute.
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