The Modernization of the U.S.-Japan Alliance and the Direction of Korea's Response: 

Focusing on the revision of Japan's three security documents 

MyonWoo Lee

(mwlee@sejong.org)

Vice President

The Sejong Institute

​■ Key features of Japan’s revised three security documents : Introduction of counterattack capability and modernization of the U.S.-Japan Alliance.

○ Japan’s revised three security documents of National Security Strategy (NSS), National Defense Strategy (NDS), and Defense Buildup Plan (DPS) had passed the Japanese cabinet meeting on December 16, 2022.

○ The key content of the revision is to fundamentally resturcture Japan's military capabilities, and strengthen and modernize the U.S.-Japan alliance and defense cooperation to for responding to the challenges from China, Russia, and North Korea's disrupting the existing international order. 

 - The revised 2022 "National Security Strategy" proposes to strengthen Japan's defense capabilities fundamentally to upgrade and modernize  defense cooperation with the United States and its allies for maintaining the existing international order against the forces of threatening the status quo. Accordingly the renamed and revised 2022 "National Defense Strategy" stresses the need of newly introduced counterattack capabilities and the importance of drones and information processing for strengthening the defense capabilities, while the renewed "Defense Buildup Plan" suggests the ways of resturucturing the three Japanese Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) according to the newly adopted NSS and NDS. 

○ These new versions show several characteristics as follows.

 - First, they point out the need to strengthen Japan's defense capability and system primarily; second, they also mention about the importance for "National Power" reflecting the recent trend of emphasizing economic security, and third, they suggest the introduction of "counterattack capabilities" that can may fundamentally change current Japan's policy of exclusively defense only.

 - Fourth, the importance of information and drones is emphasized for enhancing the integration and comprehensiveness in strengthening defense system. Fifth, the perception of threats from China is clearly stated and sixth, the target of Japan's defense capability and the U.S.-Japan alliance has been shifted from the previous North Korean threats or conflicts over the Senkaku Islands to an emergency situation in Taiwan.

 - Thus, these new versions, with the above features, would be summarized as "New Development" and "Modernization" of the U.S.-Japan alliance and "Change in the Japanese Defense System."

■ Background for revision: Historical changes in the international order

○ There are four reasons behind Japan's revision of its three security documents.

 - The first is the perception that Japan has been facing historical changes in the international situation due to China and North Korea's advancement in weapon development such as a nuclear weapons, or supersonic missiles, and diverse missile platforms along with the high possibility of war as seen in Russia's invasion of Ukraine.

 - The second is the perception that the U.S. cannot respond alone to the aforementioned challenges coming from China and Russia, which leads Japan to rethink about its role for strengthening the U.S.-Japan alliance. Japan’s increased role has been usually interpreted as the result of the U.S.‘ strong demand, but if reflecting on Japan’s steady focus on the Indo-Pacific strategy in the face of China’s aggressive rise, especially in the 2010’s, Japan seems to be very serious in strengthening the U.S.-Japan relationship. 

 - Third, about the introduction of "counterattack capability", represented by "stand-off defense capability", there have been many explanations, but it has been mainly related to the withdrawal of Japan’s efforts to introduce the ‘Aegis Ashore’. According to the officials such as Kono Taro, Defense Minister at that time, the sudden cancellation of introducing ‘Aegis Ashore’ has been is due to its too high introduction cost, and because the alternative "strike capability to the enemy base," could have produced more deterrence effects at a relatively low cost.

 - Lastly, public support can be mentioned as a promoting factor. For example, a poll conducted by "Nihon Keizai Shinbun" between December 23 to 25, 2022 showed 60% of respondents agreed with the decision to retain counterattack capabilities. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine seems to have made the public more conservative in viewing the international situations.   

■ Evaluation and Issues: Transition to an active deterrence strategy and its implications

○ As seen from the characteristics above, the revision of the three security documents in December 2022 can be evaluated as leading Japan to make a historical shift from a passive defense posture to a more active defense posture or "offensive deterrence strategy".  

○ With these changes, the revision raised two issues: whether Japan's defense policy shifted from the post-war "Exclusively Defense-Oriented Strategy" to an aggressive strategy, and second, to what extent these changes will be realized in practice. 

 - The National Security Strategy clearly states that it will adhere to "Exclusively Defense-Oriented Strategy". Howver, if we consider on the aggressive propensity in the  "counterattack capabilities" and many questions about when and how to counterattack remain uncertain, it is necessary to pay close attention to the U.S.-Japan relationship through the trilateral cooperation between ROK, the U.S., and Japan. 

 - For the second argument of feasibility, we need to consider the political and economic conditions of top leader, PM Kishida. Despite his low approval rating, PM Kishida has a rather positive political situations such as no national election waiting in any near future, and the aforementioned high public support for the revision. The main problems would be economy-related since the public has been very negative about the economic condition and tax increase. 

 - Prime Minister Kishida's strong will and U.S. support for the revision suggest the revision would be  promoted as scheduled.

■ The Modernization of the U.S.-Japan Alliance and the direction of Korea's ‘Tolerance’ policy toward Japan 

○ The adoption of an "Offensive Deterrence Strategy" in Japan's defense policy means that the "Normal State" promoted by Japan over the past 30 years is almost completed along with the "Right of Collective Self-Defense" introduced in 2015.

○ Japan’s adoption of the aggressive deterrence strategy and the following  modernization of the U.S.-Japan alliance is expected to affect Korea in the following four aspects.

 - First, the strengthening of the U.S.-Japan alliance, which is driven by due to the growing urgency or possibility of conflict in the Taiwan region by China, may also invite Korea to join somehow in security cooperation.  Second, the U.S. military's increasing attention towards the Taiwanese crisis may mean ROK’s role over handling the North Korea’s threats would become bigger. Third, Japan's adoption of counterattack capability with the long-range missile capabilities would mean that the targets could be not only the aggression from North Korea but also aggression from the third country against U.S. Forces in Korea, and forth, the increased importance of integrated strategies and intelligence warfare may lead to a more positive military cooperation between South Korea and Japan, which would, for example, demand for upgrading the present level of GSOMIA and others.  

○ To the aspects raised above should Korea pursue the following responses. 

 - First, the ways to optimize South Korea's involvement in the demands from the U.S. and Japan, and the changing international environments, needs to be found out, which would be composed of minimizing its involvement in the Taiwan crisis, as well as taking the lead in response to North Korea's threats in the Korean Peninsula. 

 - Second, the ways to create advanced Korea-Japan defense cooperation need to be searched out, since Japan’s established role would be changed and upgraded for strengthening the U.S.-Japan alliance, which required Korea to respond with more sophiscated defense cooperation between the U.S. and Japan, as mentioned in the cases of Japan’s possible responses to the third countries attacking the U.S. bases in South Korea and in the efforts of U.S.-Japan integrated air and missile defense (IAMD).

 - Above all, Korea's approaches should be equipped with a realistic, pragmatic perspective to make the most out of them in terms of Korea's national interests and security rather than unconditionally worrying and criticizing Japan's becoming a "Normal State", and in this respect, a ‘tolerance’ policy attitude toward Japan is required.​