Sejong Policy Briefs

(Brief 2023-07) European Experts' Perspectives on the Nuclear Armament of Korea: A Survey Analysis of European Experts' Perspectives on the Nuclear Armament of South Korea

Date 2023-05-24 View 818 Writer LEE Sungwon

European Experts' Perspectives on the Nuclear Armament of Korea: A Survey Analysis of European Experts' Perspectives on the Nuclear Armament of South Korea

 

Sungwon Lee

sw.lee@sejong.org

Research Fellow

The Sejong Institute

 

 

 

■ The necessity of discussion about South Korea's independent nuclear armament and analyzing Europe's perspective


❍ The International community's perception and evaluation of the security situation on the Korean peninsula and the legitimacy of Korea's nuclear development decisions, systematic collection of information, and analysis of expected response were relatively weak.

❍ At a time when the cooperation between Korea and Europe is gradually expanding and deepening, South Korea's nuclear armament can directly or indirectly affect not only Northeast Asia but also Europe's security interests. Therefore, looking at Europe's perspective on the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula is meaningful work in expanding and organizing the scope of discussions on responding to North Korea's nuclear weapons development.


■ Opinions on the seriousness of the North Korean nuclear threat and the legitimacy of South Korea's independent nuclear armament

❍ Currently, Europe's non-nuclear states in Europe are facing conventional war in geographically close areas and are exposed directly and indirectly to nuclear threats, but Korea's nuclear development is unlikely to be recognized as countermeasures against North Korea's nuclear weapons. This suggests that South Korea's decision to nuclear armament based on the increasing level of North Korean nuclear threat at the moment is an unacceptable rhetoric for the international community.

❍ When a non-nuclear state in a similar status and position to South Korea in terms of vulnerability to nuclear strikes decides to develop a nuclear weapon, it leads to a question of whether South Korea can accept such a decision despite direct and indirect security risks.


■ Evaluation of the Effectiveness of Extended Deterrence in the United States 

❍ In general, European researchers tend to put a high value on the effectiveness and reliability of the U.S. Extended Deterrence in response to North Korea's nuclear weapons program. European perspectives and standards approaching the reliability of Extended Deterrence differ from domestic discussion issues.

❍ The reliability of the U.S. Extended Deterrence from Europeans tends to be mainly based on the U.S. presence in the region. While the presence in the region reflects the strong will for Extended Deterrence, discussions on Extended Deterrence in Korea tend to be approached from the perspective of missile defense capabilities and systems against North Korea's continuous development of high-altitude nuclear attack capabilities.


■ Crisis Management on the Korean Peninsula and the Role of Europe

❍ There is a dominant evaluation about Europe's actual diplomatic influence and activities are limited toward crisis management in the Korean Peninsula situation. However, it should be noted that Europe has a high willingness to participate in reducing crises and resolving conflicts on the Korean Peninsula based on their abilities. With relations between South-North Korea, and the North-U.S dialogue channel narrowing, it suggests that more active discussions on Europe's role in mediating conflicts on the Korean Peninsula and cooperation between South Korea and Europe are needed.


■ South Korea's response to North Korea's nuclear development and provocations [alternatives]

❍ Given the current tendency to focus on crisis response measures suitable for the level of deterrence and development of defensive measures, there is a need to listen to and cooperate with European resolution mechanisms that will prioritize diplomatic measures for the ultimate stability of the Korean Peninsula


■ Potential U.S. and European Views on Nuclear Armament on the Korean Peninsula

❍ Basically, Europe and the U.S. shares strong opposition toward South Korea's nuclear possession. There is a common understanding between the two parties that Korea's nuclear armament decision poses a risk of nuclear proliferation in strategically important regions.

❍ As a normative power, Europe tends to recognize nuclear non-proliferation norms as a pillar for global stability. It is recognized by the U.S. that it tends to approach nuclear armament issues on the Korean Peninsula

File Brief 2023-07 Writer Sungwon Lee