Evaluation of the Transfer Process of Wartime Operational Control and Future Policy Directions

Beomchul Shin

bcshin@sejong.org​

Principal Research Fellow

Sejong Institute

1. Introduction

Operational control (OPCON) refers to the authority to command units in a limited time and space to conduct a specific operation. Wartime operational control refers to the authority to control the operations of military units assigned to conduct operations in wartime. Thus,, wartime operational control is a limited authority to command designated units through the ROK-US Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) of the defense ministers between the two countries and the ROK-US Military Committee Meeting (MCM) of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff upon receiving instructions from the presidents of the two countries. In this regard, the transfer of wartime OPCON means that it is just a part of the combined defense system which is operated under the leadership of alliance partner.

On the other hand, wartime OPCON is not a concept of commanding all military forces. It exercises operational control over units assigned to the Joint Command. In practice, it means transferring the wartime operational control currently exercised by the commander of the US Forces Korea to a Korean general.

The transfer of wartime OPCON has been continuously pursued since the agreement on the basic principles at the ROK-US summit in September 2006. The transfer date was initially agreed upon based on the original date of April 2012, and then adjusted to December 2015. However, agreement was reached on the transfer of OPCON based on conditions in 2014.

In history, the OPCON of Korean military was transferred to the Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Command during the Korean War in 1950, then to the Commander-in-Chief of the ROK-US Combined Forces in 1978, and again in 1994, the OPCON in wartime and peacetime was separated, and the OPCON in peacetime was transferred to the ROK military, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff exercises it. Currently, the commander-in-chief of the Combined Forces Command (CFC) exercises the wartime operational control.

2. Condition based OPCON Transition

In October 2014, the ROK-US ministers of defense changed the existing ‘transition method based on timing’ to a ‘transition method based on conditions’ to ensure stable progress of the transfer of wartime operational control. Currently, the transfer of wartime operational control is being prepared according to the ‘Condition-based OPCON Transition Plan’ agreed upon in 2015 by the defense ministers.

The core contents of the conditions-based transfer of wartime operational control are three: first, the ROK military capabilities’ necessary to lead the combined forces; second, the ROK military’s comprehensive ability to respond to North Korean nuclear and missile threats; and third, the security environment on the Korean Peninsula and in the region that is compatible with a stable transfer of wartime operational control. Currently, during the transfer process of wartime OPCON, each condition is periodically evaluated based on the criteria of the ‘Combined Mission Essential Task List (CMETL)’ to confirm whether the ROK military has the necessary capabilities. In this process, the following three Assessments (IOC, FOC, FMC) have important meaning.

● Initial Operational Capability (IOC) Assessment: This is an assessment of the minimum military capabilities required to carry out the major tasks of the future combined forces, and was conducted in August 2019.

● Full Operational Capability (FOC) Assessment: This is an assessment of whether the future combined forces have sufficient capabilities to carry out their major tasks. The assessment will be conducted in August 2022. Efforts are currently underway to address any shortcomings based on the current FOC.

● Full Mission Capability (FMC) Assessment: This is an assessment of whether the future combined forces have sufficient military capabilities to carry out all major tasks. The specific schedule has not yet been set.

3. Changes in political environment relating to OPCON Transfer

The possibility of a change in the position of new administration of the ROK and US regarding the transfer of wartime OPCON is increasing. Up until now, the progressive government in Korea has been pushing for a speedy transfer of wartime OPCON, while the conservative government has been emphasizing for a stable transfer of wartime OPCON. On the other hand, the US has been cooperating in a way that respects the intention of the ROK government.

However, the Trump administration is seemed to be more proactive in the transfer of wartime operational control than the Biden administration. In the case of President Lee Jae-myung, he also proposed ‘recovery of wartime OPCON’ as a pledge for the presidential election. Thus, it is expected that the ROK-US authorities will have a consensus on the early transfer of wartime OPCON, and related discussions are expected in the near future.

In the case of Lee administration, president Lee is continuing the Democratic Party's previous stance of being proactive in transferring wartime OPCON. Although president Lee Jae-myung did not make any detailed comments regarding the transfer of wartime OPCON during the 21st presidential election, but during the 20th presidential election, he expressed a positive stance on the transfer of wartime operational control, saying, “It is important to quickly complete verification through the already agreed upon procedures (between Korea and the US).” As a result, it is expected that the positions of the Korean and US authorities on the early transfer of wartime OPCON will be aligned, and discussions for the early transfer of wartime OPCON are expected to unfold.

Further, the butterfly effect of accelerating the transfer of wartime OPCON due to the issue of strategic flexibility of the USFK can be expected. The Trump administration is developing policies with the containment of China as its top priority, and the USFK is no exception. As a result, the issue of strategic flexibility that allows the USFK to be involved in the Taiwan crisis will be raised, and it is expected that it will affect all current issues of the ROK-US alliance, including the reduction of the USFK, depending on discussions between the ROK and US military authorities. The US concept of strategic flexibility includes the concept of the ROK-led defense of the Korean Peninsula. As a result, the US is likely to secure strategic flexibility and push for an early transfer of wartime OPCON.

This is not a new concept, but an issue that the US has been continuously concerned about since the end of the Cold War. If the strategic flexibility consultations between the ROK and the US authorities go well, the transfer of wartime OPCON is expected to proceed smoothly according to the agreement between the two countries. However, if not, it probably cause some disputes between the two countries, and the speed of the transfer of wartime OPCON may be accelerated. In this case, the possibility of affecting the command structure after the transfer of wartime OPCON cannot be ruled out. For this reason, harmonious discussions on all pending issues related to the ROK-US alliance are necessary, and the issue of wartime OPCON should be addressed within those discussions.

4. Policy Recommendation

Maintain the conditions based OPCON transfer

The ROK must maintain the wartime OPCON transfer based on the conditions under CMETL, and promote the wartime OPCON transfer while maintaining the integrated command structure. Faithfully implementing the transfer plan developed so far is the way to build a strong combined defense system through a stable wartime OPCON transfer. Satisfying the CMETL will be the basis for strengthening our military's capabilities.

After the transfer of wartime OPCON, the ROK also continue to cooperate appropriately with the United Nations Command and focus on receiving power from the international community in times of crisis. To do so, the ROK must strive to maintain unified command structure, such as the current CFC.

Secure the core military capabilities

To make stable wartime OPCON transfer, the overall capability to perform theater operations must be reinforced. Currently, command and control, surveillance and reconnaissance assets, firepower assets, and war sustainability capabilities are included in CMETL as detailed tasks, and evaluation and supplementation are being carried out each year by the military authorities. However, the capability to such as drone capabilities, AI capabilities are essential and the application of advanced science and technology suitable for modern warfare must be established.

The transfer of wartime operational control is both an opportunity and a challenge for our military. Strengthening capabilities is an opportunity, but there is also a challenge in the form of the possibility of weakening deterrence against the North. Therefore, by showing that the core military capabilities are being strengthened, the ROK must send a signal to the North that a strong deterrence is in effect even after the transfer of wartime OPCON.

Narrow the gap in assessing the security environment between the ROK and the US

In assessing the security environment of the Korean Peninsula and the Northeast Asian Region, the differences in threat perception between Korea and the US should be narrowed. Efforts to ‘build consensus’ between Korea and the US should continue with regard to the issue of third-country threats on the Korean Peninsula and the impact of third-country threats outside the Korean Peninsula on the Korean Peninsula.

The actual capacity to wage war may not weaken after the transfer of wartime operational control, but may be further strengthened. However, the weakening of the US military's involvement may give the impression that the deterrence against the North has weakened. Therefore, the ROK must instill in the domestic and international community the perception that the ROK-US alliance will remain strong even after the transfer of wartime OPCON. To achieve this goal, The ROK need to narrow the gap in threat perception between the alliance partners. Additional efforts are needed for this.

Continue to build a comprehensive strategic alliance

A government-wide effort is needed to continuously develop a comprehensive strategic alliance. Through the Korea-US summit, a new vision document that goes beyond the Washington Declaration in 2023 and the Camp David Declaration (Korea-US-Japan) in 2024 should be discussed and agreed by the leaders of both countries. Through this process, the strength of the Korea-US alliance can be demonstrated to the world.

The ROK and the US must smoothly resolve various pending issues, including tariffs and economic security issues, diplomatic cooperation, not to mention of defense cooperation. Inter-governmental cooperation among the military, diplomatic, and economic levels must be deepened. The alliance partners must continue to develop the Extended Deterrence Consultative Group, e.g. EDSCG, NCG to strengthen the nuclear deterrence, and expand the horizon of cooperation to other partners such as Japan, Australia, and other countries in the Indo-Pacific region to promote the peace and security of the region. All of this cooperation will serve as the foundation for a stable alliance system including transfer of wartime OPCON.