Assessment of North Korea's Tactical Nuclear and Maritime Nuclear Forces Command, Control, and Communications System (NC3)

Peter WARD

pward89@sejong.org

Research Fellow​

Sejong Institute​

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1.Introduction

The development trend of North Korea's nuclear forces can be summarized as ensuring survivability through diversification. Since 2021, North Korea has developed solid-fuel ICBMs, new SRBMs, IRBMs, cruise missiles, and tactical nuclear warheads, and it has opened the possibility that some or all of these systems could be armed with nuclear payloads. It has also pursued naval modernization aimed at building survivable underwater tactical and strategic nuclear forces. Further, Kim Jong Un has shown interest in air force modernization, which could open a path toward a full land-sea-air nuclear triad.

Another core feature is the expansion of strategic options through diversification. These capabilities create potential redundancy that can make a disarming first strike harder. Underwater nuclear forces in particular would be harder to target, especially if North Korea acquires nuclear submarines. Because they weaken the use-it-or-lose-it dilemma, they could in one sense stabilize the situation by lowering Kim's incentive to use nuclear weapons first. Yet as these capabilities grow, they may also increase North Korea's ability to threaten nuclear use against South Korea. If the United States does not intervene or refuses to intervene, North Korea could try to separate Washington from Seoul through nuclear coercion.

Although broader options may look favorable from Pyongyang's perspective, they require a functioning system of command, control, and communications. An effective NC3 system must either deter attack in the first place or allow the leader's preferred form of response if deterrence fails. Kim Jong Un must determine the shape of that NC3 system, and the answer can vary by scenario. North Korea's growing force array is of little use if Kim alone can authorize use but cannot reliably transmit that order when needed.

Given the present limits of North Korea's nuclear capabilities, its command and communications systems, and the vulnerability of its platforms, North Korea likely still operates a nuclear NC3 system built around assertive control and the separation of warheads from delivery systems such as missiles. There remain questions about the operational deployment and reliability of tactical nuclear warheads, and current capabilities still appear to require repeated testing and further development. Additional rules, procedures, and norms related to delegated control would also be required.

North Korea's underwater nuclear forces still appear to be at the stage before full deployment, or in the case of Romeo-class submarines, at the stage of limited modernization. Even so, when North Korea's nuclear doctrine, legal texts, and the communication constraints tied to battlefield and underwater nuclear operations are considered together, there is a real possibility that its nuclear command and control system could shift in a contingency from exclusive leader-centered decision-making toward some degree of pre-delegation and conditional delegation.

The 2022 nuclear law states that the authority to use nuclear weapons belongs only to the President of the State Affairs Commission, but it also requires first-use under specific conditions, which leaves room for prior conditional delegation or automated launch procedures. If North Korea wants a submarine-based second-strike capability that can survive decapitation strikes, it will be hard to weaken the logic of ‘disable the leadership to block nuclear use’ unless some authority is delegated to the units that operate underwater nuclear forces. The same logic applies to battlefield nuclear forces such as multiple rocket launchers. Because their purpose is to make nuclear warfighting possible, their real deployment would require procedures and devices at least at the level of conditional delegation to account for communication disruption and interference on the battlefield.

The development of nuclear-armed nuclear-powered submarines should be understood as an effort to reinforce the strategic stability of North Korea's existing land-based strategic nuclear forces. In a crisis, however, operational and communication limits would make exclusive assertive control harder to maintain, which means that some movement toward conditional delegation at the institutional and procedural level cannot be ruled out.

This paper therefore examines nuclear command and control with a focus on North Korea's tactical nuclear and sea-based nuclear forces and offers policy recommendations. Unlike the land-based strategic nuclear forces that have been the main focus of earlier analysis, these forces have high mobility and can disperse, and so nuclear command and control would work differently. Nuclear forces deployed in distant waters or on the battlefield can also face severe communication problems in a contingency, which can make them hard to manage under a centralized model. South Korea, the United States, and allied or like-minded states should therefore seek renewed US-North Korea communication and a missile and nuclear information-sharing mechanism while also strengthening space-based investment in ISR to improve strategic and crisis stability and South Korea's own capacity. To strengthen ASW against nuclear submarines, South Korea should develop new operating concepts with Japan and incorporate systems such as unmanned underwater vehicles, while also improving counter-force capabilities against North Korean space-based reconnaissance and communications.

2. Principles and Characteristics of NC3

NC3 is a comprehensive system involved in the full process of deciding on, transmitting, and executing nuclear use. It includes surveillance and early-warning sensors such as satellites, radars, and drones; communication systems such as networks, transmitters, and receivers; delivery platforms and force structures such as missiles, rockets, gravity bombs, missile submarines, bombers, and artillery; and command structures, procedures, and authority arrangements that pass political guidance to the military and enable planning, control, and execution.

NC3 can be organized along two axes: authority structure and control mode. Following Peter D. Feaver, authority structure refers to who holds release authority. Control mode refers to the functional balance between ensuring that an authorized order is executed, positive control, and preventing unauthorized or accidental use, negative control. In practice, most NC3 systems are mixed forms and can shift from assertive control in peacetime to conditional delegation in crisis, either through pre-delegation or last-resort delegation.

Assertive control means the top leadership monopolizes release authority and lower levels cannot use nuclear weapons without a valid order. Even if subordinate units possess the physical capacity to launch or deliver weapons, they are structured so that no use is possible without authorization and authentication. This model tends to be tied to strong negative-control devices such as PALs, access controls, separation and dispersed storage of warheads and delivery systems in peacetime, authentication codes, and two-person rules. Its strengths are that it lowers the probability of unauthorized or accidental use and fits well with civilian-control logic. Its weaknesses are that decapitation, leadership paralysis, or communication loss can make authorization itself impossible and weaken assured retaliation, while time pressure can turn centralized approval into a bottleneck. The United States is widely described as an example, with presidential authority concentrated at the top and safeguards such as PALs preventing lower levels from using nuclear weapons without valid orders. China is often cited as another example in peacetime because of the practice of storing warheads separately from missiles.

Delegative control means that nuclear-use authority is conditionally delegated to specific subordinate commanders, such as field commanders, unit commanders, or submarine captains. As Peter D. Feaver and David Arceneaux note, this can take the form of pre-delegation, in which authority is granted in advance because communication breakdown or decapitation is expected, or last-resort delegation, which is meant to operate only in an extreme case such as state collapse or destruction of the command structure. Its strengths are that it can strengthen deterrence by preserving retaliatory capacity under communication disruption and by reducing an opponent's incentive to attempt decapitation. Its weaknesses are that it raises the risk of unauthorized or mistaken use and can intensify mistrust in crisis, increasing the risk of accidental escalation. In some settings it can lower the nuclear threshold in a fail-deadly direction. The United Kingdom is often described in these terms because launch authority belongs to the prime minister, but SSBN commanders are said to have access to a letter of last resort for catastrophic conditions. Past NATO tactical nuclear arrangements also involved limited delegation. The United States in the 1950s and 1960s also left documentary traces of pre-delegation discussions in the context of forward-deployed tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. Pakistan's tactical nuclear posture is another case in which weak battlefield communications and weak early warning have raised concerns about possible pre-delegation.

Semi-automatized delegation is a special form of delegative control in which predefined conditions activate or channel nuclear use through automatic or semi-automatic procedures. Its strengths are that it can help preserve retaliatory capacity even if the leadership is decapitated or communications collapse, and it can reduce delay caused by human decision-making. Its weaknesses are that sensor errors, false alarms, or system malfunctions can translate into immediate danger, and rigid preset conditions can reduce flexibility in crisis management and lower the nuclear threshold. The Soviet and Russian Perimeter system is the most common example, described in open literature as a partially automatic retaliatory system designed to enable launch if the leadership is destroyed.

Positive and negative control are not separate authority structures but separate functions. Whatever the authority structure, NC3 must both make authorized use possible and block unauthorized use. Positive control includes early warning, situational assessment, command and decision procedures, communications systems including emergency action messages, and the readiness of operating units. Negative control includes physical protection and access control, two-person rules, personnel reliability and training, PALs and other blocking devices, and peacetime separation of warheads from delivery systems.

3. Trends in North Korea's Nuclear Doctrine and NC3

A. Existing Design

At the Eighth Party Congress in 2021, North Korea presented a five-year plan that set package-style goals linking long-range strategic weapons, ground- and sea-based solid-fuel ICBMs, hypersonic glide vehicles, reconnaissance satellites and unmanned reconnaissance aircraft, nuclear-powered submarines, and submarine-launched strategic weapons. This suggests a doctrine that treats nuclear forces not as a narrow retaliatory tool but as a warfighting and coercive instrument that combines detection, assessment, and strike. Because ISR, space assets, and unmanned systems were presented alongside nuclear-force goals, the doctrine may be moving beyond last retaliation toward a larger set of battlefield and theater options, including selective strikes and escalation management.

North Korea is also accelerating the operationalization of tactical nuclear forces by expanding the number and type of delivery systems. Since the March 2023 unveiling of the Hwasan-31 tactical nuclear warhead module, Pyongyang has repeatedly signaled possible integration with SRBMs, SLBMs, cruise missiles, large-caliber rocket artillery, and unmanned systems, while repeating messages about testing, training, and deployment. The routine character of training for tactical nuclear units suggests that North Korea is moving beyond simple possession and into a stage in which operational doctrine, missions, targets, and procedures are being practiced and internalized. The expansion of tactical nuclear and dual-capable delivery systems can also increase identification uncertainty in a crisis and create false alarms and miscalculation. For that reason, North Korea's doctrine can also be read as moving toward early use to suppress escalation, in a logic similar to escalate to de-escalate.

North Korea also seeks a survivable submarine-based second-strike capability. Reports on the launch of a tactical nuclear attack submarine and Kim Jong Un's on-site guidance at the construction of a nuclear-powered strategic guided missile submarine indicate that a survivable second-strike sea-based capability is envisioned as the next stage in the development of its nuclear forces. A platform with SSBN-like characteristics assumes communication disruption and decapitation threats. That creates incentives to strengthen the certainty or automaticity of retaliation and, in NC3 terms, increases pressure for some form of conditional pre-delegation or last-resort delegation.

North Korea's nuclear law also codifies assertive control to a meaningful degree. The September 8, 2022 Law on the DPRK's Policy on Nuclear Forces states that the nuclear forces of the DPRK obey the sole command of the President of the State Affairs of the DPRK and that the President has all decision-making authority related to nuclear weapons. It also states that a national nuclear forces command organ composed of members appointed by the President of the State Affairs Commission assists him through the entire process from decision to execution. This has the same assertive logic found in the 2013 law on consolidating the status of the DPRK as a “self-defensive nuclear state”, which stated that nuclear weapons could be used only by the final order of the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army when hostile nuclear states invaded or attacked the DPRK. Yet the 2013 law centered on retaliation, whereas the 2022 law lowers the threshold by presenting conditions for preemptive strike. In doing so, it also implies movement beyond pure assertive control.

The 2022 law goes further by providing for automatic nuclear strike through the following clause: if the command and control system over the state nuclear force is placed in danger by an attack from hostile forces, a nuclear strike shall be launched automatically and immediately according to pre-decided operational plans in order to destroy hostile forces, including the source of the provocation and the command center. The law also includes attacks, or imminent attacks, on the state leadership and the state nuclear forces command organ among the conditions for nuclear use. This suggests the possibility of conditional or delegated control in which nuclear use can become possible without a direct order from the leader. It also implies the existence of a party-centered command structure that does not appear directly in the law and that could operate if the supreme leader is absent or is decapitated.

North Korea is a highly personalist system in which the supreme leader is institutionally positioned to make final decisions on all major state affairs. As a result, nuclear command and control is likely to be designed and operated with regime survival and power security placed above pure military efficiency. The Workers' Party of Korea exercises final control over all state institutions, including the military, and the Party Central Military Commission functions as a core body for setting and deciding military policy in both peacetime and wartime. In the strategic forces, there is reportedly a three-in-one chain of command consisting of the military officer, the political commissar, and the security officer. This logic also applies to the navy and artillery, including tactical nuclear operating units. The 2021 Party Rules also provide for a proxy for the General Secretary by stating that the First Secretary of the Party Central Committee is the representative of the General Secretary of the Workers' Party of Korea, and the Politburo Standing Committee can also discuss and decide major issues under delegated authority from the General Secretary.

The Party Central Military Commission is also assessed as the body that controls nuclear warheads, and US intelligence has reportedly assessed that warheads are stored separately from missiles rather than kept mated. Given Kim Jong Un's governing style and personal inclinations, however, it is possible that he may not insist on absolute assertive control in nuclear command and control. In the economic, diplomatic, and military spheres, he has often granted limited authority to responsible officials while demanding results, and South Korea's National Intelligence Service has described this pattern as delegated governance. Forward artillery units are also expected to execute pre-assigned operational plans even if communications are cut in a contingency, which can be understood as one form of conditional delegation designed for communication loss. It is therefore hard to rule out the possibility that North Korea may eventually assign commanders of nuclear operating units the role of implementing nuclear doctrine and contingency operations, and that it may grant trusted core cadres both the position and the authority to design conditional delegation and automatic control mechanisms.

In North Korea's older land-based strategic nuclear forces, the real structure of NC3 is hard to trace because the relationship between the Korean People's Army Strategic Force and the Missile Administration, which appears to report directly to the State Affairs Commission, remains unclear. The Strategic Force was long understood as the organization that managed land-based nuclear-capable missile forces, but after 2017 it almost vanished from state media except for ceremonial references, and since 2018 there has been almost no reporting on its concrete activities. The Missile because , which appears to have replaced it or to perform a similar function, was first revealed in February 2023. In reports on the April and July 2023 Hwasong-18 test launch and training, participating units were identified as formations such as the 2nd Red Flag Company of the Missile Administration rather than under the general label of the Korean People's Army. The Missile General Bureau appears to oversee subordinate units such as the 1st Red Flag Company for liquid-fuel ICBMs and the 2nd Red Flag Company for solid-fuel ICBMs, and it seems to manage the testing and operation of land-based strategic nuclear forces. It may also operate outside the ordinary service structure as an organ directly under the State Affairs Commission, or in a comparable arrangement.

B. Development Trends

Some features of North Korea's NC3 have been revealed through reports on nuclear counterattack drills and the Nuclear Trigger system. In the March 19, 2023 comprehensive simulated tactical drill by tactical nuclear operating units, state media said the exercise repeatedly trained units to inspect the reliability of the command, management, control, and operation system for tactical nuclear forces; verify the accuracy of nuclear attack order transmission and receipt procedures; inspect nuclear weapon handling discipline and activation procedures under different nuclear attack plans; and master the actions and combat methods required to move quickly to nuclear attack under multiple hypothetical emergency conditions. Because the drill was conducted under Kim Jong Un's guidance, it shows that command and control is treated as a core issue. The language on the transmission of nuclear attack orders also suggests that the system may not be intended to function independently of Kim's order and direction in normal conditions.

A March 23, 2024 exercise involving 600 mm multiple rocket launcher operating within the state nuclear weapons integrated management system called Nuclear Trigger gave a similar picture. KCNA said the drill included practical training to familiarize units with the procedures and processes for moving into a nuclear counterattack posture when the highest nuclear crisis warning level, the Hwasan Alert system, is issued; practice in operating the nuclear counterattack command system; training to familiarize units assigned nuclear counterattack missions with mission execution procedures and order; and live firing of super-large rocket rounds fitted with mock nuclear warheads. The reference to a warning system shows that alert mechanisms now play a role in nuclear-use procedures, while the emphasis on procedures and processes highlights negative control, in the sense that the system is being trained so nuclear weapons can be used only through authorized procedures.

The same pattern appeared in the May 9, 2025 drill involving the 600 mm multiple launch rocket system and the Hwasongpho-11-Ka tactical ballistic missile. State media said the purpose was to train units in the procedures for operating those strike systems under the state nuclear weapons integrated management system, to check the reliability of the Nuclear Trigger system layer by layer, to train units in the detailed procedures for a rapid shift into a nuclear counterattack posture, and to provide separate special instruction for commanders in operating the counterattack system. The term integrated management system implies central management and a vertically integrated character, while phrases such as rapid shift into a nuclear counterattack posture also emphasize positive control.

At the same time, it remains unclear how systems such as Nuclear Trigger would apply to underwater nuclear weapons. North Korea has not yet conducted tactical nuclear drills based on submarines. Although a submarine has been launched, CSIS Beyond Parallel assessed in May 2024 that North Korea's first ballistic missile submarine was still not operational, which suggests that North Korea does not yet possess an operational tactical or strategic nuclear force at sea. North Korea's satellite and drone systems, which could be used both for early warning and as relay or order-transmission nodes for nuclear-capable missiles, also appear to be under development rather than fully fielded. Malligyong-1, launched on November 23, 2023, reportedly entered sun-synchronous low Earth orbit, but the additional launch attempt of May 27, 2024 failed. As a result, it is still hard to conclude that North Korea possesses practical space-based ISR or communications assets. The Saetbyol-4 strategic reconnaissance drone, revealed in July 2023, appears likely to function as part of a warning system, and later reporting on possible Chinese drone assembly lines suggests that drone-based reconnaissance and communications relay systems could advance in stages.

North Korea also revealed in March 2025 an IL-76 series transport aircraft, likely an IL-76MD, configured as a platform for airborne early warning and control. In NC3 terms, this means North Korea may have added another early-warning and situational-awareness tool that can compensate in part for the terrain and horizon limits of ground-based surveillance. If such an airborne platform is used as a command post or communications relay node, it could also improve continuity of command and mobility for the leadership in a crisis.

4. Technical and Institutional Directions

A. Potential Technical Development Paths

Even though the operating characteristics of tactical nuclear forces and underwater nuclear forces create pressure toward delegated control, North Korea will likely try to reinforce leader-centered assertive control at the same time by strengthening transmission infrastructure, including satellites, and by improving early warning. It may seek to develop and expand a wider range of transmission systems, including underground communications facilities. This would raise the reliability of nuclear command and control in peacetime and crisis and strengthen positive control, meaning the ability to transmit and execute orders when necessary.

For ground forces, underground wired networks can solve part of the communication problem, but submarines and highly mobile tactical nuclear forces require survivable networks of buried transmitters and relay nodes if command links are to survive attack. North Korea therefore has reason to build underground or buried transmitters and relay networks. Long-range submerged communication infrastructure using very low frequency or extremely low frequency signals has not been publicly confirmed, but it could be pursued in the future. Such facilities, however, are hard to conceal.

Cold War examples suggest another possibility. France, the United States, and Russia used or developed emergency communication concepts involving balloons or rockets as last-resort transmitters, such as the French systeme de dernier recours, the US AN/DRC-8 emergency rocket communications system, and the Russian Perimeter system. There is no public evidence that North Korea has developed such systems, but if it does, its NC3 would become more resilient. These technologies would also be more likely to serve air or land nuclear forces than submarines.

North Korea's future stock of AEW&C platforms and the diversity of its air-based platforms could also matter for the survivability of NC3. Drone-based transmission and relay systems have not yet been revealed, but North Korea may develop and operate unmanned communications and relay platforms. Even so, airborne surveillance and relay assets can support NC3 survivability only to a degree. Sustained operations require multiple air-based platforms and an operating system, so their effect in the near term may be limited. North Korea also lacks satellite assets that can currently function as transmission or relay nodes, which means some nuclear forces that need to remain linked to submarine-based or other command posts may be unable to receive direct instructions from wired networks or ground-based radio transmitters.

North Korea may therefore consider communications and relay systems that use alternative platforms such as balloons and drones, and in the medium to long term it may also pursue communications satellites. Yet if submarines move beyond the line-of-sight range of coastal or ground relay systems, long-range two-way communications would remain sharply limited without SATCOM or long-range airborne relay platforms of the TACAMO type. For that reason, North Korea is also likely to continue developing space technology in order to compensate for current limits in early warning. Stronger space-based ISR and warning could reduce the plausibility of a disarming first strike by an opponent and could also reduce the time pressure that accompanies positive control in nuclear decision-making.

At present, however, North Korea's only military reconnaissance satellite cannot provide continuous real-time surveillance of a specific target because low-earth-orbit satellites move quickly and have limited revisit rates. Orbital maneuvers may suggest some progress in satellite operation and control, but they do not by themselves prove reconnaissance performance in resolution, datalink capacity, or image processing. If Russia were to provide support in the satellite field, some bottlenecks in launch reliability and satellite technology could ease. Even so, since Kim Jong Un highlighted this issue at the October 2023 Russia-North Korea summit, clear evidence of such support has not yet emerged.

Ground-based radar alone also has major limits in detecting and tracking cruise missiles and hypersonic weapons. If North Korea wants a practical early-warning capability against South Korea's advanced strike systems, it will need space-based assets such as reconnaissance and early-warning satellites. North Korea will likely seek to acquire these capabilities through cooperation with Russia, but the scope and depth of cooperation are likely to remain limited. Russia may be reluctant to provide advanced support because it must manage its relationship with the United States, faces production and delivery limits due to existing defense orders, and wants to protect core national advantages in technology and markets. Space-based ISR and satellite communications are also hard industrial and technical problems, which makes rapid progress by North Korea unlikely. Similar limits apply to possible cooperation in the air domain, including AEW&C support or help for nuclear and non-nuclear air operations. Such possibilities have been discussed since 2022, but no clear progress has appeared, and Russia's order backlog, production constraints, and external-policy costs may continue to slow any meaningful cooperation.

B. Strategic and Institutional Problems

Even if North Korea relies on delegated control in part, it will still need ways to preserve positive control. It is therefore likely to assume a strategy in which submarine-based tactical nuclear forces and other tactical nuclear systems are dispersed and operated in a contingency, and it will have to review related contingency plans in advance, including operating procedures, communication alternatives, and the criteria for conditional delegation. Tactical nuclear forces such as super-large multiple rocket launchers are likely to be stored in concealed locations not far from the front in peacetime. In a contingency, however, they could exploit mobility and move toward the battlefield, where they may no longer remain linked to command posts through existing communications systems such as buried wired networks.

From Pyongyang's perspective, assertive control based on underground communications may work for fixed tactical nuclear units, but if mobility is not guaranteed those units remain exposed to preemptive strike. For that reason, North Korea may be more likely to rely on pre-delegation under specific conditions than on any simple model of automatic launch. North Korea also needs to review the basing concept for submarine nuclear forces if those forces are to play a meaningful role in a crisis.

In the case of the Hero Kim Kun Ok, the SSB-type platform described as a tactical nuclear attack submarine, the limits of diesel-electric propulsion mean submerged endurance is short, periodic snorkeling or surfacing is unavoidable for battery charging, and refueling is required. That makes it more likely to operate near the East Sea littoral and in concepts of operation with easy access to base support rather than on long open-ocean patrols. If a future SSBN operates in a Soviet-style bastion close to the coast and in friendly waters, its patrol area would be restricted and it would be easier to track and contain. At the same time, ties to land-based and coastal communications and command networks would be easier. By contrast, open-ocean patrols would expand the search space in places such as the western Pacific, raising the burden on an adversary's detection, tracking, and blockade efforts and improving survivability and operational flexibility. But such patrols would often take the submarine beyond the range of coastal line-of-sight communications and increase dependence on satellites or long-range manned or unmanned relay aircraft, which would add to the burden of command and communication.

Because the transmission and two-way communication problems needed for submarine nuclear operations in distant waters are unlikely to be solved in the near term, and because decapitation threats remain real, strategic stability could deteriorate sharply in a crisis. If North Korea adopts and expands a pre-delegation structure for submarine nuclear forces similar to the one that may be used for land and air tactical nuclear forces, it could move toward a fail-deadly operational bias that places priority on ensuring possible use even when real-time central command and control is weakened.

This creates a structural tension with the strict application of strong warhead control devices such as PALs. Pressure could emerge to relax the strength of control in order to preserve responsiveness and survivability, which in turn could narrow the scope of PAL application or create more room for operational bypasses or loosened procedures. The three-in-one structure seen in North Korea's military organization, meaning the commander, the political commissar, and the security officer from the Security Command, could also be applied to tactical nuclear forces and sea-based nuclear forces. By dispersing authority and imposing mutual monitoring, this structure could function as a negative-control device that lowers the risk of accidental or unauthorized use and in that sense contribute to strategic stability to some degree.

In the Soviet case, discussion often centers on a two-person approval rule involving the captain and the political officer. In North Korea, by contrast, the involvement of the security officer could create a de facto three-person authorization requirement under certain conditions. Personnel from the Security Command may also play a central role in warhead custody and security. If necessary, they could be organized into a dedicated control or management unit with oversight functions separate from the ordinary military chain of command. Even under delegated control, such negative-control arrangements could place some limit on unauthorized use. Just as the KGB performed an analogous role in the Soviet Union, the Security Command may do so in North Korea. North Korea could also establish separate nuclear-weapons management units inside the Ministry of Defense, as Russia has done, though in Russia such units are in practice woven into the chains of command of the navy, strategic forces, and related services.