Trump 2.0: Changes in the International Order and South Korea's Strategic Response

Sang Hyun Lee

Principal Fellow, Sejong Institute

1. Trump 2.0: Foreign Policy Orientation

April 29 marks the 100th day of the second Trump administration, and so far, negative evaluations of its policies outweigh the positive ones. Positive assessments are dominant only in regard to Trump’s immigration policy, while negative evaluations prevail concerning his key agendas such as tariffs, alliance policy, relations with Europe, and negotiations to end the war in Ukraine.

Contrary to the widespread perception that Trump’s foreign policy is unpredictable, some analyses argue that it is actually highly consistent and formed around three main pillars. First, Trump is an America first advocate. While Biden framed the world as a contest between democracy and authoritarianism, Trump divides the world into America versus all other countries. For Trump, America is conceptually distinct from the rest of the world and occupies the central place in his worldview. Second, the United States is firmly convinced that it has long been "ripped off" by both allies and adversaries. While the U.S. has borne disproportionate costs under the banner of global leadership, its allies and enemies have exploited America's wealth, power, and goodwill—resulting in trade deficits, free-riding by allies, and porous borders open to drugs and criminals. Third, the method for correcting this imbalance is a negotiation tactic that involves intentionally escalating tensions at the outset in order to shake the counterpart and compel them to come to the negotiation table on their own terms.

The United States is currently undergoing a fundamental transformation in its identity and role concept. Since the 20th century, through turning points such as Woodrow Wilson, Franklin Roosevelt, and Bill Clinton, the U.S. developed the identity of a benevolent hegemon pursuing the doctrine of “liberal internationalism,” which has become familiar to us today. However, in the current post-unipolar era, America is now at a crossroads, transitioning toward an identity as an illiberal or coercive hegemon—or even a “normal” great power. Leading this transition is Trump and the Make America Great Again (MAGA) movement that supports him. What stands out most in the early days of Trump’s second term is the manifestation of a 19th-century-style imperial or great power identity. Trump's remarks regarding the annexation of Canada as the 51st state, the purchase of Greenland, and the reclamation of control over the Panama Canal specifically signal the return of 19th-century Machtpolitik or sphere-of-influence politics. Contrary to initial expectations of an isolationist foreign policy, Trump’s vision of restoring a “great America” under the MAGA banner and returning to America's “golden age” overlaps with Jacksonianism and the Monroe Doctrine.

The return of Trump is regarded as having opened a ‘New Age of Nationalism’ on a global scale. Since the 2008 global financial crisis, the rise of protectionism, stricter border controls, and prolonged economic stagnation have accelerated the resurgence of nationalism—particularly economic nationalism and ethnonationalism—around the world. Rather than preventing this trend, ‘America First’ has actively fueled it. As concerns about supply chain resilience began to outweigh the logic of economic interdependence, and as the benefits of globalization became unevenly distributed from the 1990s onward, populist figures began blaming undocumented immigrants and corrupt political elites. As a result, major powers have increasingly tilted toward a form of nationalism that prioritizes their own national interests. Anti-immigrant rhetoric has spread widely across the globe, and governments have shifted toward industrial policies and state-led capitalism as a way to protect their domestic economies from the adverse effects of globalization.

Under Trump’s second term, the erosion of democracy and domestic political institutions has also become severe. His coercive immigration policies, the arbitrary revocation of visas for international students, and pressure on progressive universities like Harvard under the pretext of dismantling DEI (Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion) initiatives have raised concerns about the future of American democracy. This institutional degradation is driven less by policy content and more by retributive intent toward domestic groups that opposed Trump’s policies and agenda during his first term. The primary targets include law firms, universities, the media, the judiciary, the bureaucracy, and allied countries abroad. Since the launch of Trump’s second administration, the U.S. score on Freedom House’s democracy index has dropped from 92 (on par with France) to 83 (on par with Panama and Romania, and lower than Argentina). There is growing concern that the United States may no longer meet the fundamental criteria of liberal democracy—such as universal suffrage, free and fair elections, and broad protections for civil rights.

2. Changes in the International Order: From Rules-Based International Order to Multipolar Order

The changes in the international order can be summarized in several ways. First is the dismantling of the rules-based international order, or the regression of the liberal international order. The rules-based order, which had been constructed and maintained under U.S. leadership since the end of World War II, is now in retreat. In its place, a new international order has emerged—one dominated not by international norms, institutions, or rules, but by money and power. Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin are figures gripped by the belief that "might makes right," a mindset that has led to the decline of value-based diplomacy, once a cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy. A symbolic illustration of this decline is the United States joining Russia, Hungary, North Korea, Iran, and Nicaragua in voting against a UN General Assembly resolution condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

In fact, even before Trump took office, and especially after the COVID-19 pandemic, the world has been experiencing systemic fragmentation, leading to an era of fractured international order in which all states pursue survival based solely on national interest. The disruption of global supply chains triggered by the pandemic, the return of geopolitics, the resurgence of great power competition, the dysfunction of international institutions and regimes, and the paralysis of global governance have all contributed to this environment. One of the main causes of this shift is the weakening of global leadership that had sustained the rules-based order. The United States is no longer willing to play the role of a benevolent hegemon, while China is not yet prepared to assume that role. From the perspective of global leadership, this period can be described as an interregnum. Meanwhile, at the domestic level, the rise of populism, authoritarianism, and political extremism across the world has led to widespread democratic backsliding, making further erosion of the liberal international order inevitable.

Second is the emergence of a multipolar order, or what some refer to as “Yalta 2.0” or the revival of great power sphere-of-influence politics. Secretary of State Marco Rubio noted that “with the end of the Cold War, the United States emerged as the world’s only superpower and found itself burdened with the role of solving all global problems. This order is abnormal... and going forward, we must return to a multipolar order in which multiple great powers dominate different regions.” He argued that the U.S. must now re-prioritize and ultimately move toward a world in which multiple great powers, not just one, exercise regional dominance.

As this statement suggests, the world envisioned by Trumpists is one in which three major powers—the United States, China, and Russia—each establish their own spheres of influence and construct a stable, 19th-century-style balance-of-power system through geopolitical bargaining and adjustment. This resembles the traditional pattern of great power politics, in which powers build, compete over, and negotiate their respective spheres of influence—similar to the post-Napoleonic War Concert of Europe, centered around five major powers. It is a vision of stable relations in which the primacy of the United States remains unchallenged by China or Russia, but in which mutual recognition of status among great powers enables simultaneous negotiation and transactional cooperation.

The current global geopolitical landscape resembles the situation immediately following World War II, when Franklin Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, and Joseph Stalin negotiated the division of spheres of influence in Europe. Most clearly, the Ukraine peace negotiations symbolize a return to 19th-century-style geopolitics in which great powers impose outcomes on weaker states. The concept of spheres of influence first emerged during the 19th century when European imperial powers divided Africa, and it has continued to evolve through the Monroe Doctrine, World War I, and World War II. With the end of the Cold War in 1991, and the rise of globalization, democratization, and market liberalization, the notion of spheres of influence lost much of its relevance as economic interdependence became the dominant norm. However, sphere-of-influence politics had already begun to reemerge even before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. For example, NATO’s 1999 intervention in Kosovo, led by the United States, and the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 can both be seen as preemptive military actions intended to protect a sphere of influence.

The 2025 Munich Security Conference Report points out that the future international order will move toward multipolarization in one form or another. Multipolarity is a controversial concept, but it is generally understood as a system in which multiple great powers compete to expand their spheres of influence. However, some still regard the United States as ‘all-powerful,’ world’s only ‘hyperpower.’ The United States accounts for 40% of the world’s defense spending, maintains 128 military bases in 50 foreign countries, and the U.S. dollar still holds its dominant position as the global reserve currency. Furthermore, there is no sign that the U.S. will voluntarily give up its position as the top-dog anytime soon. From another perspective, some point out that the world is gradually shifting into a bipolar system dominated by the U.S. and China. In sum, today’s international order shows characteristics of unipolarity, bipolarity, multipolarity, and even nonpolarity. Regardless of what form the international order takes, it signals the collapse of the Western-centered global order. As John Ikenberry has pointed out, it seems impossible for the Global West to recover its former dominant status.

Third, we can point to the fracture of the transatlantic alliance. The White House dispute between Trump and Zelensky has been evaluated as symbolically representing not just an issue between the U.S. and Ukraine, but more broadly a fracture in the transatlantic alliance. Europe, feeling a sense of crisis due to the U.S. pressure on Zelensky to step down, is becoming more united in its efforts to strengthen its own defense capabilities, with the growing perception that the U.S. may no longer be a reliable ally. The United States is no longer the sole leader of the free world, and the changes in the U.S. are being interpreted as symbolizing the “end of an era.”

Currently, the prevailing view in Europe is that it must politically and emotionally support Ukraine and stand against Russia, whereas the U.S. is unilaterally pursuing a ceasefire plan without consulting its European allies. The Trump administration’s main concern is to reduce the U.S. burden of covering 68% of NATO’s $1.47 trillion annual budget. However, this cannot be seen purely as an economic calculation, but rather reflects a growing ideological and societal value gap between the U.S. and Europe. CDU leader Friedrich Merz, confirmed as Germany’s next chancellor, said in response to a question about security relations, “I will try to persuade Americans that maintaining strong transatlantic relations remains mutually beneficial,” while also pointing out that “we must be prepared for the worst-case scenario.” Merz also stated that Europe must discuss nuclear sharing with the nuclear-armed U.K. and France, expressing his intention to shift the continent’s security policy, which has long relied on the U.S., toward a more European-centered approach.

The speeches of high-level Trump administration officials reveal the U.S. perspective on the transatlantic alliance. Vice President J.D. Vance, in his first summit diplomacy appearance, publicly defended far-right political forces and criticized European countries’ regulations against them as “undemocratic acts,” sparking controversy. Comparing the second Trump administration to a “new sheriff in town,” he demanded that European allies increase their defense spending and implement strict illegal immigration policies like those of the U.S. Vance also warned that Europe is backsliding on core liberal democratic values—such as immigration, freedom of expression, and electoral systems—and declared that “U.S. will not extend its security guarantees to European allies who don’t align with Trump-era American values.”

European reactions to the U.S.’s coercive attitude vary. Some opinion leaders insist on persuading the U.S. through dialogue and negotiation to preserve the transatlantic alliance, while others argue this is an opportunity to establish an independent foundation for European security cooperation. Europe, having long free-rode on American military power, now faces the imperative of enhancing its own defense capabilities. But independent European defense without U.S. support could take up to 10 years and comes with numerous practical challenges. To meet NATO’s war planning goals, the required defense spending for each European country is 3% of GDP—yet many states have not even met that. NATO is reportedly reviewing a new target of 3.7%, and if the U.S. withdraws significantly, the requirement could well exceed 4%. Europe may possess many modern combat aircraft, but lacks sufficient ammunition to penetrate enemy air defenses and does not have enough trained pilots. Above all, the U.S. provides nearly all capabilities for airborne electronic warfare and ISTAR (intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance). NATO’s command, control, and coordination capabilities are also problematic. The Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), which sits at the top of NATO's military command structure, has always been led by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), a position traditionally held by a U.S. general. It remains uncertain whether Europe possesses the independent capability to conduct large-scale, high-intensity, and complex military operations. Lastly, another critical issue is the U.S.-provided nuclear umbrella. If the U.S. disengages from European security, Europe will lose both the strategic nuclear weapons capable of reaching deep into Russia and the “sub-strategic” nuclear weapons deployed for delivery by European air forces.

Fourth, we can point to the collapse of the free trade system and the retreat of globalization. Trump’s erratic, all-out tariff wars have thrown the global economy into turmoil. The economic prosperity and liberal trade environment that the world enjoyed under the liberal international order, which was based on free trade, has now reached a fundamental turning point. Stephen Miran, chairman of the White House Council of Economic Advisers and known to have provided the theoretical foundation for Trump’s tariff war, explains the complex rationale behind the trade war. Miran is leading the economic initiative known as the “Mar-a-Lago Accord.” According to him, President Trump essentially wants the dollar to retain its dominant global role while remaining weak to support U.S. exporters. He wants to expand the budget deficit through tax cuts, keep interest rates on U.S. Treasuries low, raise tariffs on other countries to reduce the U.S. trade deficit, and simultaneously strengthen the U.S.’s appeal as an attractive investment destination for foreign investors. His analysis suggests that the U.S. bears massive costs by supplying dollars and Treasuries as reserve assets supporting the global trade and financial systems. This has led to currency distortion, a structurally unsustainable trade deficit, and the hollowing out of domestic manufacturing. Miran, who holds the view that “national security and trade are closely connected,” believes—along with the Trump administration—that the U.S. security umbrella is something foreign countries must in some way pay for.

Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent supports President Trump’s view that America’s success depends on the revival of factories, asserting that the core of this vision is the strengthening of America’s manufacturing industrial base. According to him, the only opinion that really matters is that of President Trump, whose view is fundamentally very simple: he wants manufacturing jobs to return to the U.S., and to make that happen, high tariffs are necessary.

3. South Korea’s Strategic Response

To examine South Korea’s response to the second Trump administration and the changing international order, it is first necessary to briefly examine the Yoon Suk-yeol administration’s foreign policy. The Yoon administration has presented the vision of a “global pivotal state for freedom, peace, and prosperity” as its foreign and security policy goal. In particular, it has proposed strengthening solidarity with countries that share core values such as freedom, democracy, and human rights for world peace and prosperity, and has aimed to pursue fair international cooperation based on norms.

Accordingly, since its inauguration, the Yoon administration’s diplomatic moves have shown two main characteristics: first, it has clearly emphasized South Korea’s identity in value-based diplomacy; second, it has promoted strategic transparency over strategic ambiguity. Despite criticism of the Yoon administration’s value-based diplomacy, while it is true that national interest must be prioritized over moral considerations in diplomacy, principles and direction also matter. If every country were to solely pursue its own interest, the international order would become highly unstable. The importance of values in diplomacy lies in their role as the basis for moral legitimacy. National identity is inevitably reflected to some extent in values, and diplomacy is what reveals national identity. Therefore, while the Yoon administration’s pursuit of value-based diplomacy is commendable in itself, it can be assessed that its conflation of value-based diplomacy with ideology-driven diplomacy in its execution unnecessarily provoked China and fueled the extreme anti-China sentiment among far-right forces in South Korea.

South Korea’s strategy in response to the changing international order can be examined along three strategic pillars: self-reliance, solidarity, and inclusiveness. First, in a situation where geopolitical uncertainty and risk are growing, it is natural for every country to possess a minimum level of self-defense capability. Another reason for South Korea to strengthen its self-reliance is the largely negative perception of Korea held by President Trump and MAGA supporters. To them, South Korea has been seen as a representative security free-rider, and there have even been criticisms that in the event of a contingency on the Korean Peninsula, the South Korean government seeks to use U.S. Forces Korea as a “tripwire” to trigger automatic military involvement from the United States. Among the generation in their 40s, such as Vance and Hegseth, who served in the War on Terror (Iraq, Afghanistan), there is a strong consensus that young American soldiers should not shed blood in other countries’ wars. It is now a reality that South Korea needs to prepare for a European-style security dilemma.

The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) reported that the U.S. Department of Defense is considering relocating about 4,500 out of the approximately 28,500 U.S. troops currently stationed in South Korea to other locations in the Indo-Pacific, including Guam, a U.S. territory. Therefore, preparations are needed for possible reductions and role changes of U.S. Forces Korea. Additionally, in line with the Trump administration’s trend of reducing the defense budget, South Korea must prepare for the possibility of weakened support and readiness for allies. It is known that Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth, at the start of his term, instructed senior Department of Defense officials to draft budget plans with an annual 8% cut over the next five years. However, recently, President Trump stated that he would approve the largest defense budget in history, and Secretary Hegseth posted a message saying that the realization of the first-ever $1 trillion defense budget would happen soon. This indicates that the confusion within the Trump administration regarding the defense budget is likely to continue for the time being, and South Korea must prepare for various uncertainties.

Second, the importance of solidarity. Despite the Trump administration’s isolationist tendencies, the United States remains the world’s only superpower, and nearly all indicators of national power still show America’s overwhelming dominance. Thus, the first country South Korea should seek solidarity with is still the United States. However, South Korea cannot depend solely on its alliance or rely only on the alliance. A situation has emerged where the alliance itself is a risk and the cost of alliance is rising. A ‘world without the United States’ would be full of disorder and violence, but neither the EU, China, Russia, India, nor Japan has the capacity or willingness to replace America’s role. The only alternative is for all members of the free world—so-called like-minded countries such as the EU, South Korea, and Japan—to form a “coalition of the willing” and share America’s burden. South Korea has achieved peace, prosperity, globalization, and democratization within the rules-based international order alongside the ROK-U.S. alliance. It must continue cooperating closely with countries that prioritize international rules—such as the G7, EU, UK, Japan, Australia, Singapore, and Canada—to restore the collapsing rules-based order.

Third, inclusiveness or balance. South Korea must seek to expand the scope of its diplomacy toward “less like-minded” countries. This includes pursuing mutually beneficial relations with Global South countries, including China and Russia. With the continued U.S.-China strategic competition and the realignment of global geopolitical coalitions, the partial decoupling of the Global West and Global East has become a reality. In a world where about two-thirds of the population live in non-democratic countries and lack security and development, it is increasingly difficult for a country like South Korea—with a high degree of external economic dependence and a trade-based survival model—to ignore these countries and regions. The direction of South Korea’s diplomacy should be to reduce enemies as much as possible and make as many friends as possible.

4. Conclusion

South Korea is currently facing unprecedented uncertainty and complex risks both domestically and internationally. What drives the current international order is the worldview held by Trumpists—namely, a traditional great power politics in which major powers such as the U.S., Russia, and China each establish their own spheres of influence, repeating cycles of competition and compromise. In this process, it is important to keep in mind that countries “without negotiation cards” may at any time face humiliation. Internally, following the impeachment of President Yoon Suk-yeol, the government elected through an early presidential election must firmly restore democracy and swiftly reorganize the country’s external strategic posture.

South Korea must also be prepared for the possibility of important geopolitical bargaining taking place in East Asia. In this post-unipolar era, the security environment on the Korean Peninsula is gradually being redefined as part of the great power competition among the U.S., China, and Russia. Concepts such as liberal democratic value alliances, which we have grown accustomed to, are being reduced to secondary elements, and we must clearly recognize that Washington’s strategic calculus is increasingly focused on how to use South Korea and North Korea as cards in the grand “gambling table” of great power rivalry.

In a situation of great external uncertainty, above all, flexibility and a sense of balance in foreign policy posture are crucial. While the ROK-U.S. alliance remains important for South Korea and trilateral security cooperation among South Korea, the U.S., and Japan must continue to be strengthened, it is becoming increasingly difficult to rely solely on the U.S. for security. South Korea should stabilize its relations with Japan and maintain the ROK-U.S. alliance while also working to improve relations with China; at the same time, it must strengthen both ROK-U.S.-Japan and ROK-China-Japan cooperation.

South Korea’s prosperity depends heavily on a stable and rules-based world order and the free flow of trade, capital, people, and ideas. Accordingly, it must deepen and expand networks with many countries that, like South Korea, are open, stable, and committed to a rules-based global system, thereby preserving multilateral frameworks and laying the foundation for a more stable global order going forward. While maintaining its alliance with the U.S. and a friendly relationship with China, South Korea must further strengthen its solidarity with like-minded countries that desire a rules-based international order and democracy—and this should serve as the compass for South Korean diplomacy in times of chaos.

Even without America’s hegemonic leadership, multilateral cooperation is possible—but only if key members of the international system—Europe, Japan, South Korea, and other countries that prefer multilateral cooperation—proactively unite.